The performance of worker co-operatives in a capitalist economy: British co-operatives in printing, clothing and wholefoods, 1975-1985 by Jefferis, Keith
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
The performance of worker co-operatives in a capitalist
economy: British co-operatives in printing, clothing
and wholefoods, 1975-1985
Thesis
How to cite:
Jefferis, Keith (1989). The performance of worker co-operatives in a capitalist economy: British co-operatives
in printing, clothing and wholefoods, 1975-1985. PhD thesis The Open University.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 1989 The Author
Version: Version of Record
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
31 0002985 9 
IIII III J)X 8734-b 
The Perfonnance of Worker Co-operatives in a 
Capitalist Economy: British Co-operatives in Printing, 
Clothing and Wholefoods, 1975-1985. 
A study in political economy 
Keith Jefferis B.Sc, M.Sc. 
Submitted for Examination for Ph.D. 
Open University 
September 1988 
:D cU.t.. c:rJ-~ r(H~~O"': 30 Seft:e"..-,het- ft:l ~~ 
J)cW.., 1- cu../a.h::l : 2.0 J~ 19 ~9 
Abstract 
This thesis aims to contribute to the debate on the role and potential of worker co-<>peratives 
in a capitalist economy, and analyses the development of the eo-<>perative sector in Britain 
since the mid-1970s in the context of an economy undergoing a major crisis and 
restructuring. 
Part One examines competing theoretical perspectives in economics towards eo-<>peratives. 
This reviews and criticises the orthodox neoclassical and behavioural approaches, before 
turning to a marxist analysis and developing it in the context of co-operatives' role as small 
enterprises in an economy dominated by large firms. The analysis concentrates upon 
co-operatives' market relationships and competitive position as the mechanism through 
which they interact with the rest of the economy. 
Part Two moves from theory to the concrete, and examines the performance of workers 
co-operatives as commercial enterprises, in three industries (printing, clothing manufacture, 
and wholefood distribution) which demonstrate contrasting relationships between large 
and small firms. It includes an overview of the development and characteristics of the 
C()-()perative sector, before investigating the financing of C(H)peratives and their commercial 
performance. This is then explained in the context of the political and economic 
development of the co-operative sector, of the British economy, and developments in the 
industries in question. It finds that whilst the performance of eo-<>peratives has improved 
over time, it remains worse than that of competing capitalist finns in terms of wage levels 
and capacity to generate a reinvesb'ble surplus. 
Part Three builds upon this work to identify the important conditions and processes which 
have contributed to the rapid growth and development of the co-operative sector in Britain, 
and seeks to develop a broad understanding of the means by which the degeneration of 
C()-()peratives can be avoided. It concludes that the resurgence and growth of C()-()peratives 
must be located in the particular form of economic restructuring taking place in the early 
1980s. The establishment and survival of co-operatives has been dependent upon support 
for workers' initiatives by the state, and on the nature of market processes in particuJar 
areas of the economy. However, these conditions are transient and the future development 
of the co-operative sector is crucially dependent upon the long tenn support of the state and 
the labour movemenL 
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Preface 
For much of the post-war period there was a broad consensus across political perspectives 
that most of Britain's economic problems could be solved by Keynesian demand 
management techniques designed to increase economic growth. 'F'me tuning' of the 
economy, balancing low levels of unemployment and inflation, was seen as the way to 
avoid any repeat of the social and economic disaster of the 19305 and previous depressions 
in the nineteenth century. Continuous economic growth managed by the state would 
provide an increasing material standard of living and provide the resources to aUeviate any 
remaining pockets of poverty. 
Eventually, however, the long boom coUapsed under the weight of its own domestic and 
international contradictions, and so too did the social democratic consensus as its material 
economic base disappeared. The past fifteen years, in contrast, have been a period of intense 
political and economic change in Britain, as temporarily submerged class divisions and 
interests are once again reasserted. The Labour government's last-gasp attempts to find a 
consensus solution to the crisis failed during the 19705, and since 1919 the 'new Right' has 
held a dominant political and economic position. This has been used to bring about a 
restructuring of society and the economy in interests of major companies and finance 
capital, whilst the social provision developed in the post war era has been progressively 
dismantled, and the trade union movement undermined and attacked. 
It is within this context that there has been a resurgence of political and economic interest in 
workers co-operatives. Although they have historically played a minor role in Britain, and 
had virtually disappeared by the early 19705, since then many new co-operatives have been 
formed. Perhaps unusuaUy in the present climate, they have attracted interest and support 
from throughout the political and economic spectrum; this naturally suggests that co-ops 
can be viewed - and used - in a variety of different ways. this broad range of support 
reflects their inherently contradictory role within capitalism; as enterprises owned and 
controUed by workers they do not fit neatly with capitalist patterns of ownership, while as 
socialist forms of enterprise they are continually subject to the constraining forces of a 
capitalist market economy. 
Much support for co-ops has been based upon their role as an alternative to capitalist 
economic activity, as enterprises where production takes place under workers control and 
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in their interests. Furthermore, they are seen as representing a democratic, community level 
response to the inhumanity of mass unemployment and increased inequality. As a potential 
decentralised socialist alternative, co-ops caught the enthusiasm of many, disiUusioned with 
the bureaucratic and insensitive tradition of both multinational companies and nationalised 
industries. At a time when the labour movement was reeling under the twin impact of 
record levels of unemployment and legal restrictions on its activities, co-ops formed part of 
a wider grassroots resistance to capital, and were closely linked to the new power base of 
the left in the 'municipal sodaIisf local authorities. Furthermore, they could operate as a 
form of socia1(ist) ownership which paid attention not just to numbers of jobs and the 
appropriation of the product, but also to the nature of work,. to democratic management and 
control, challenging the established capitalist-inspired hierarchical structure; perhaps they 
are visions of a socialist future. 
Other supporters of co-ops saw them very differently of course. They could fit neatly into 
social democratic aspirations for a 'social market economy', as enterprises where the 
conflictual relationships between capital and labour no longer applied. On the right they 
could be incorporated into a reinvigorated 'worker capitalism' where trade unions were 
unnecessary and individual effort rewarded. The previous heyday of co-operatives was 
during the 19th century, and it is interesting that recent growth comes as 'Victorian values' 
are once again being reasserted. Whilst CXH>peratives in some ways reflect a collectivist 
response to social and economic problems, they operate against a background of intolerant 
individualism. 
The upsurge of CXH>perative activity at a time of great sodaI and economic dislocation 
suggests that the drcumstances surrounding the growth and experience of co-ops need to 
be carefully analysed. Although enthusiasm for C(K)PS has its uses, many supporters appear 
to have jumped uncritically on the bandwagon, especially during the early 19805 when 
co-ops were 'flavour of the month' for several years. Many wild claims have been made 
about their potential role in transforming the British economy, in the absence of any 
considered analysis of their position. This is particularly necessary given the historical 
experience of CXH>ps in Britain, which has been uniformly cyclical and made no lasting 
impact. Therefore, especially for supporters of C(K)PS, it is necessary to undertake a 
historically-rooted analysis of the role that co-ops are currently playing in the economy, of 
the reasons for their re-emergence, and the conditions under which they might become 
successfully generalised. 
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The original objective of this research was to concentrate solely on the. financing and 
commercial performance of the new British co-ops. Similar work had previously been 
carried out for the much larger CXH>p sectors in France and Italy, and also for the Victorian 
British CXH>ps which survived into this century. This narrow focus had to be quickly 
abandoned for two reasons. FU'Stly, these issues could not be solely analysed within a 
quantitative perspective. Indeed, much of the earlier quantitative work was of very limited 
usefulness for this very reason; it followed the conventional division of 'positive' economics 
from social and political issues, but as a result divorced any analysis from its social context. 
Although there is a role for quantitative analysis, it can only come within an appropriate 
political and economic framework which does not make this artificial distinction. 
This led to the second problem, which was that despite the huge attention which CXH>ps had 
received, nowhere was there a politically-informed analysis of their role in the context of the 
extensive economic changes and restructuring which had taken place during the 19705 and 
1980s. Co-ops are dominated by their contradictory position in a capitalist economy, as 
enterprises where workers own the means of production but operating as competitive 
commercial enterprises on terms largely dictated by capitalist firms; small enterprises in an 
economy dominated by large companies. Co-ops' existence is about the working out of 
these contradictions, and an analysis of them is the starting point of any considered 
assessment of their experience to date and future prospects. The quantitative aspects of 
CXH>ps' commercial performance are nevertheless important; ultimately CXH>ps either 
survive or die according to the judgement of competition in the market. However, markets 
and competition do not exist in isolation, nor do co-ops' relationships with them, and 
therefore much of the thesis is devoted to the political economy of worker co-ops and the 
industries in which they operate. 
I have attempted to evaluate both the past experience of co-ops and their future prospects, 
not just passively but in a way which identifies the conditions under which the successful 
and progressive aspects of their experience can be generalised. Combining quantitative and 
qualitative analysis is not an easy task as the two are generally carried out in isolation from 
each other, and therefore much of the combination is experimental. Just as co-ops are part of 
a process, so is research, and the main assessment must be whether this exercise has made a 
positive contribution. I hope that despite its undoubted flaws, this research contnbutes to a 
more realistic assessment of how co-ops have reached their present position, and of their 
future. 
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1. Economics of Co-operatives 
Orthodox Analysis 
INTRODUCTION 
In the first two chapters I examine different approaches in economics towards the question 
of co-operative performance. These three perspectives - orthodox neoclassical, behavioural, 
and marxist - all analyse co-operatives in different ways, reflecting their contrasting 
conceptions of the capitalist economy. An examination of these schools of thought is 
important as they relate to the various roles which co-operatives take in practice - varying 
from competitive and commercially-oriented enterprises appealing to the individualistic 
self-interest of the workforce, through harmonious and democratic organisations 
overcoming the antagonism between capital and labour, to a nclass-conscious vanguard of 
the labour movement"l. 
While there is a broad consensus of political support behind co-operatives, underlying this is 
a confusion as to what exactly a co-operative is, where it is going and what sort of economy 
and society would be associated with widespread co-operative activity. This confusion is 
both intensified by, and reflects, the contradictory and conflicting roles which co-operatives 
are urged to follow. The aim of these two chapters is to examine the economic perspectives 
beneath these possible roles for co-operatives, and hence to relate these roles to the particular 
conception of society on which each perspective is based. 
An overview of the economics of co-operatives is important, because ultimately all analysis 
social science and explanation rests upon an implicit or explicit economic foundation. This 
foundation encompasses a number of crucially important factors, of different ways of 
conceptuaIising the world: how relationships between people operate, the basis of power 
and wealth, the nature and origin of processes of change. Different perspecti~es encompass 
conflicting and contradictory explanations of economic processes, and so it is necessary to 
clarify the economic basis of analyses of C(H)peratives and their activities. 
The aim of these chapters is not simply to provide some kind of detached review of the 
economics of co-operatives. They aim to critically assess economic perspectives - and 
1 OtIrb,1984,,,. 98. 
4 Theory and methodology 
specifically to reveal the inconsistencies and inadequacies of conventional analysis - before 
developing my own approach. 
Most 'economics of co-operatives' - as with economics generally - is derived from a 
neoclassical perspective, resting upon an individualistic, ahistorical analysis, using elegant 
and formally correct mathematical models, but which offer little understanding of the real 
world. Some commentators have recognised the inappropriateness of using neoclassical 
theory to analyse co-operatives, essentially a collective activity, but amongst them there has 
been a strong tendency to to view co-operatives in organisational and behavioural terms. My 
own conclusion is that whilst this offers more insight than the neoclassical approach, it too 
fails to incorporate the fundamental structure and dynamic of a capitalist economy, again 
resting upon ahistorical analysis and omitting the major processes working on co-operatives 
and in the economy generally. In chapters 2 and 3 I turn to marxist economics in order to 
develop the approach used in this thesis. In contrast to neoclassical and behavioural 
approaches, marxist analysis of co-operatives is relatively underdeveloped, and has been_ 
marginalised within both bourgeois and radical social science. In part this is because it is 
seen as deterministic - co-ops will inevitably fail within a capitalist economy - but this in tum 
is due to misrepresentation of what many early marxist writers had to say. My aim is to 
demonstrate that such determinism is wrongly ascribed to marxist analysis of co-operatives, 
and secondly, that a marxist analysis is essential for a correct understanding of the process of 
co-operative development in a capitalist economy. Commensurate with the use of a marxist 
framework, my concern is with the potential of co-ops as anti-capitalist enterprises in the 
transformation of capitalism. 
For each economic school of thought these chapters outline (i) the conception of society 
integral to the analysis and its basic approach to economics; (ii) how co-operatives are dealt 
with, and the main debates; (iii) weaknesses in the analysis, both generally and on the 
specific topic of co-operatives; (iv) the 'material context' of the development of each school 
of thought in terms of the historical development of capitalism and of co-operatives within 
capitalism. A recurring theme will be the ideological basis of each school of thought; this will 
be taken further and related to possibilities for alternative roles and paths of co-operative 
development in Part m. 
Much of the debate around co-ops centres on the issue of 'degeneration'; can co-ops 
maintain their essential character whilst avoiding either degeneration into a capitalist firm, 
Economics 0/ co-operatives 1: Orthodox theories 5 
or commercial failure. However there is no agreement on the 'essential' character of co-ops. 
Because of the contrasting ideologies and values which the different analyses are based 
upon, there are very different ideas about where co-operatives should be going and the 
achievements they should be aiming for. 'Success' and 'failure' mean different things to 
different people, and 'performance' can only be judged against a specific set of value criteria. 
Therefore talk about the degeneration of co-operatives depends on what the perception of an 
'ideal' co-operative is - should degeneration be viewed in commercial, organisational or class 
tenns7 I hope that these first two chapters will at least clarify some of these issues. 
THE NEOCLASSICAL TRAomON 
In common with economics as a whole, _ the neoclassical2 approach dominates the economic 
analysis of worker co-operatives3. The main work has been carried out over the past thirty 
years, with Jaroslav Vanek developing the most coherent body of theory4. This itself 
extended the pioneering work of Ward and DomarS, and has been further developed by 
Meade among others6, _ and has stimulated a substantial amount of subsequent theoretical 
and empirical work7. 
The development of the neoclassical tradition had two main infIuences.- Firstly, material 
developments in the activities of worker co-operative or self-managed sectors in various 
economies, especially in western Europe8 and Yugoslavia. The second influence was 
developments in the study of economics itself. 
2 TIrerr De tIIIrious defiIIifitng af MlldasicllllCOrlOlllics.1 IDIIImf1D.14 it /IS /DI """ysis of marbts aM ,mea irt /DI «X»II1IrrY 
tXIrIstihltd of iPlliirlidlllll_ic 81mb (CDIIS1DIIDS /DIll producers) mtlowetlll1itla fiDtl flutes, IIIImts IIfttlWlflllltla, IIfttl 
.., adadIIW actiOlls III lIS to maim .. ,.,.w utility or -t-. 0tIwr a:untlfIIists (c.g.1UIm, 1982, ,. 354) IIIIIIWl Nlate 
it -1IImJIIIly to pafect amrpetition (1Il1'gmb De ,na 1IIkm), or IOldy to profit maximisirtg brIIariour fly finru _ 
utility -anisbtg fly ftulirlidllllls. 
3 Or 'self-gerMJll' /IS it is often rtfmU to ira the literatim. 
4 Vanek, 1970, 19n, 1977. 
5 Ward, 1958; Domar, 1966. 
6 MIIuIe, 19n. Major amtributiOlls 1rIw IIlso '-' matlc fly ,.g. fllP'lll7om (1976); """" Ii MecIdiJrg (1979). for. 
l1ibliogrwplry of PIIOCIasiad TDrilirags 011 tD-Of1mJtifla/sdf-",."."",.,.t ,. Bllrtktt Ii Uwlic, 1915. 
7 Mild! af it ClftfDU 011 Contelllbdumity, NIfD Yort, IIfttl irt Yuplaril. _ 
8 for ItistoriaJlllCCDllllt.", '1'Itomley,1981, 011 British aM other Eul'OJlMll ~".,.".".,,; CfIrb'. 4PM1!4 _ 
RnolutiOll? TIle Polities 0( ~. Co-ojmtiws 1BQO.l9BO (l983c, t:IuqMt 2); Pol1tri, 1.167;~, !!I78. 
6 Theory and methodology 
Self-"uuu'gement ad economics in history: the emergence of neoclassical economics 
The early co-operative experiments in both Britain and Europe emerged with capitalism 
itself from the industrial revolution, and at this time economics9 was dominated by the 
classical tradition: that of Adam Smith and RicardolO (and later Marx). The major questions 
which concerned Smith and Ricardo related to the nature of the processes which led to the 
creation of 'The Wealth of Nations', and to the reasons for the particular distribution of that 
wealth amongst society's various classes. Marx too was concerned with similar issues - the 
'laws of motion of capitalism' although his analysis was very different. Smith considered at 
length whether the sourCe of value of a commodity was the labour embodied in its 
production or the labour commanded through its exchange. He never satisfactorily resolved 
this contradiction, but the two theories were adopted by competing schools in economic 
thought. Ricardo drew upon Smith's labour-input approach and developed economic 
theory, which, in the turbulent times of the early and mid-nineteenth century, had a radical 
edge. Under the labour input theory of value, profits and rent are conceptualised as 
deductions from the value of the product of labour - in other words labourers do not receive 
the full product of their work. In the mid-nineteenth century this provided the basis for a 
Ricardian socialism. 
Economics had itself developed principally as a response to the rise of capitalism, and by the 
1870s a mass labour movement and a widespread socialist challenge in Europe stimulated 
the emergence of an economic theory supporting bourgeoiS values and justifying bourgeois 
interests. The work of Jevons, Menger and Walras, independently but nearly simultaneously 
published in the early 1870s, drew upon the other strand of Smith's work, the labour 
commanded theory of value. The aim of their work was to justify the bourgeois order 
against the socialist offensive by claiming that this order was essentially classless, and 
further that this claim could be scientifically substantiated. Tenned neo-classical, the theory 
rejected class in favour of the individual as the central analytical category of economics, and 
was expressed in mathematical tenns to give it both the credibility and mystique of a 
science. 
, AI fIrII ,.", 1CDfIDIIriI:I .. • n..I .. , ",.. diIciJIIN" sud! Dt lite JUIOClaIictII {uIIftm h' ,.,., of 41ft Dt~ 
".,.. of IOdny 11M tile tt:DIIIItrIy. 
• 20 s.. Smill!, 1974;~, 2152. 
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In neoclassical economics, both the nature of the questions asked and the method of analysis 
are very different to the classical tradition. Fundamental to neoclassical economics is its 
preoccupation with relations in exchange rather than in production, with commodities 
deriving their value because they are wanted, or provide 'utility' to the consumer. The 
driving force of the economy is thus actions by individuals to satisfy their desires through 
consumption, rather through than the need to produce. Through this focus on exchange, the 
economy and society is conceived as atomised into a collection of rational individuals rather 
than classes, each owning initial (but unexplained) factor endowments Oand, capital and 
labour}. These are inputs to production, which is seen as a technical transformation of inputs 
into outputs (depicted in the production function Q=f(K,L». Besides factors of production, 
individual agents are endowed with tastes or preferences, and have a motivation to 
maximise the utility, or satisfaction, which they derive through consumption. Similarly 
individual firms are motivated to maximise profits. All of this gives rise to supply and 
demand, which, when equalised in all markets by a set of prices simultaneously, give rise to 
a general equilibriumll. The task or question which neoclassical economics sets itself is to 
determine the conditions under which such an equilibrium will exist and what its nature 
will be. The emphasis on the steady state or equilibrium in neoclassical economics contrasts 
with the classical economists' concern with the laws of motion of capitalism. The emphasis 
on equilibrium and on individuals in exchange or consumption relations, rather than on 
class in production relations, is ideologically supportive of capitalism, and unsurprisingly 
the neoclassical approach has maintained a dominant position within economics ever since. 
However, the infancy of neoclassical economics meant that the extensive co-operative 
experiments of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were largely analysed from a 
classical perspective12• 
Soci4lism 118 P4reto-optim4lity 
Although by the tum of the century the western economies were firmly established as 
capitalist, there was a formidable socialist opposition in many countries in the early years of 
the twentieth century. The major political and economic event of this period was the 1917 
socialist revolution in Russia, following which capitalist regimes came under severe pressure 
11 SIriI:IIy .,..mg it •• w.lnr.situr gCIIGYIl apdlibrilUra. 
22 Mn'.lf1IIIlysis nr«iws more dcflliltll.tkrlticm in 1M IICrt duJ",.,.. 
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in Germany, Finland, Austria, Italy and Hungary, although socialist revolutions in the latter 
countries were all defeated in the 1919-23 period13. 
The 19208 in the Soviet Union saw extensive debate around socialist economic development, 
in particular over the transition from war communism to the New Economic Policy, and 
how to reconcile the anti-feudal revolution of the peasantry with the anti-bourgeoiS, anti-
capitalist revolution of the factory proletariat1'. Although the more market-oriented NEP 
was controversially adopted under Lenin, by the end of the decade it had been abandoned in 
favour of Stalin's alternative of strong central planning and the creation of large units in both 
industry and agriculture. 
In the 19305 neoclassical economists were constructing models of such a centrally-planned 
economylS. They attempted to use them - in what Bergson terms "the great theoretical 
debate on socialist rationality that was waged during the interwar period"16 - to determine 
the conditions, if any, under which a planned socialist economy could match the (theoretical) 
efficiency of the capitalist economy. Efficiency, of course, is reaching an equilibriu~ which is 
Pareto-optimal17• In one fell swoop the neoclassicals had transformed the question of 
'capitalism or socialism?' from class struggle to allocational efficiency, utility functions and 
consumer preferences. The irony"of this exercise, carried out at a time (the 19205 and 19305) 
when capitalism was being anything but efficient, seems to have been lost on the 
participants and their successors. 
Following world war 2, western interest in the experiences of the socialist states was 
suppressed by the cold war, and economists were more concerned with their new-found role 
as the Keynesian saviours of affluent capitalism. But in Yugoslavia, on the fringes of both 
socialist eastern europe and the capitalist west, the policy of soviet-style central economic 
planning was rejected in 1948 in "favour of'self-managed socialism' - although "given the 
significance of this contribution," it is remarkable that the Yugoslav leaders thought it up in a 
hasty act of improvisation-18• 
13 AofIIUd, 1917". 'I1. 
I. Om, 2152,.,." I •. 
1.5 $II ..,.I.Ift&t, 19l1; Z-, 2''''; DIctiIaI, 1"'; Lippincutt, 1931; DIDfIirI, 1936. 
2' ..... ,2167. 
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Under Yugoslav self-management, enterprises were to be run by workers' councils and 
allowed a degree of decentralised decision-making within a framework of some state 
planning and control19. Ward's 1958 article - entitled The Finn in nlyrilz - was inspired by the 
Yugoslav experience20• It referred to a somewhat idealised version of the Yugoslav economy, 
with much more extensive market relations than applied at that time. A similar stance was 
taken by Domar who, in The Soviet Collective Farm as a Producer Co-operative, placed the soviet 
kolkhoz in a market economy. It seems safe to assume that these articles contained a 
propagandist element in favour of a market rather than a planned economy. Since 1965 the 
degree of state involvement in Yugoslavia has been progressively reduced and market 
relationships extended, and the economy integrated into world capitalism by the removal of 
tariffs and import controls21. As a result Yugoslavia's economic problems in the late 1970s 
and 1980s resemble those of the capitalist west rather than those of the Soviet bloc. 
The WIITII-Vtmek-Meade model 
The framework originated by Ward, and developed most extensively in Jaroslav Va~ek's 
seminal work The General Theory of Labour-Managtd Market Economies, relates to a perfectly-
competitive market economy, within which enterprises are owned and managed by worker-
members. The Ward-Vanek-Meade (WVM) model applies the method of neoclassical theory 
of the firm to this labour-managed economy. All assumptions underlying the former are 
maintained, with the exception that the labour-managed firm maximises income per worker 
illum;",m,.g _, ofluno 1M """ of fIIOI'Am' Ielf~' J"IN1ItIIl illel, IU '1M ..., to 'Ids crisis. Ira Ill! 
Uraptrfrct Soddy III TDriIa: 
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"fter till outllrakwitlt thcl(lUl1nl witlt SWill, ill 1949, /IS far /IS I mrumI.Ier, Ibq8ra to mad MIIrx's ~ 
to .. if I c:md4 {bid ""..., to "" ri4dk of fIIIty, to JIUl iI ill .i1rqIIistic tmru, Stalinism .. ball II11II 
Yllpltntia .. good. _._. 'nil COIIIItry .. ira 1M .tnmgldJol4 of "" burazuawcy, II11II 1M JIflrlY lauUrs rum 
ill the grip of ,.. -' 1rDm1r - tile iraClllr'rigliWy III'fIitmoy IMIIIN of 1M JIII"Y lIIIIdtiM they W ., up ,,"II 
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rather than profits. The methodology is finnly in the neoclassical tradition, in that its 
assumptions are essentially a set of premises necessary to generate a long-run Pareto-
optim.at allocation of resources22. Co~ps are assumed to operate in a market economy, and 
it is held that unregulated competitive markets lead to economically optimal outcomes. 
Neoclassical economics emphasises property rights and the structure of penalties and 
rewards in motivating human beings towards the achievement of efficient solutions. Whilst 
standard theory relates to the appearances of capitalist society and is framed in terms of 
entrepreneurs owning capital and hiring labour, it is entirely compatible with labour 
management and ownership. In the neoclassical view of production as a technical process, 
where inputs of labour and capital are combined in a 'black box' to produce output, there is 
nothing which dictates that 'capital' (a technical rather than a social category) should not be 
owned by labour. Chiplin &: Coyne argue that w~e 
..... the payment of residual rewards is vital to ensure the efficient operation of 
an enterprise, [there] is no theoretical necessity for this residual to rest with 
traditional shareholders or capitalists. There is t:'o objection, in principle, to the 
employees in the enterprise becoming the 'capitalists', which is the essence of 
the worker-managed co-operative in market socialism, or market syndicalism23• 
In the same vein, Samuelson asserted that "in the competitive model it makes no difference 
whether capital hires labour or the other way round"24. 
Following the earlier work of Lange and his contemporaries, the W-V-M analysis compares 
the labour-managed model with the theoretical Pareto-optimality of the capitalist model. 
From this are derived the necessary conditions for the Pareto-optimality of the labour-
managed equilibrium. 
TIw!re has been a substantial amount of subsequent theoretical literature on the subject2S. 
This has mostly been carried out within a partial equilibrium framework (following Vanek). 
More recently, and in tine with the eclipse of partial equihbrium analysis within neoclassical 
theory, Dreze26 has attempted to develop this work in a general equilibrium setting. The 
various neoduaical models are highly sensitive to the assumptions made, especially with 
22 SIqIMII, UN, ,. 5. 
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respect to particular institutional conditions, and most theoretical 'advance' has consisted of 
analysing the impact of varying these assumptions. 
The neoclassical literature on cooOperatives offers a mixed view on their prospects. Many 
theorists conclude that under certain circumstances cooOperatives can be at least as efficient 
as capitalist firms, and in addition, that ParetooOptimal solutions will be associated with a 
more egalitarian distribution of income27. However, the conditions needed to ensure this are 
more rigid than those for capitalist firms. In a neoclassical version of the degeneration thesis, 
Vanek identifies several'self-extinction' forces acting on co-ops, deriving from the structure 
of ownership and capital formation, but concludes that these problems can be avoided if the 
correct institutional conditions are in place. In addition, Vanek considers that extra labour 
productivity will result from the incentive effect of participation. Meade also concludes that 
a Pareto-optimum is attainable, but notes that conditions to ensure the free entry and exit of 
new enterprises - i.e. an absence of the 'barriers to entry' common in advanced capitalist 
economies - are especially important in a labour-~ged economy. Miyazaki and Ben-ner28 
consider that co-ops will ultimately be transformed into capitalist firms through the 
incentive to hire wage labour, although again this can be restricted through correct 
institutional and legal conditions. 
Possibly more serious objections are raised by Alchian and Demsetz29. They move beyond 
the neoclassical concept of a 'black box' and look inside the enterprise. They introduce the 
concept of production as a team effort, where the essence of the problem is the difficulty 
involved in assessing the performance of anyone member. The output of a team results from 
joint effort and is greater than the sum of individual efforts, and to make the best use of 
inputs it is necessary to introduce a reward structure somehow related to effort. Alehian &: 
Demsetz consider that the two key deman4s placed on an economic organisation are to 
monitor both the productivity of, and the rewards to, inputs. Because in a team anyone 
individual does not bear the full cost of her lhis actions, the incentive is created for 'shirking' 
behaviour (the 'free-rider' problem); if such shirking is to be controlled, a 'monitor' must 
exist who has sufficient incentive not to shirk her lhimself. This incentive could be the right, 
to 'residual rewards' or profit. A1chian &: Demsetz consider that ownership of a capitalist 
27 'l'rofi'" 1IIOUl4 III 4iItrlbu16l1lrlOfl8.t II rdatiwly IMp-murrlMr of ~ tItIIJI crmtnmr.lly 10 t:apitIIIist ~. 
HCIfDffJIf', II CtHIpmltiw tt:tmtmry of fill W-V·M IyJI' migltt ltd 10 IllfUite"".., ;iJtrilndiorl of iIrt:tJrM "'""'1" '..,.'. 
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finn meets these demands effectively. They add that for this reason capitalism is a superior 
form of economic organisation, as long as the 'property rights' of ownership are unfettered. 
For them, the hierarchy of a conventional finn is simply a set of mutually beneficial 
contractual relationships between capitalists and workers, and in many ways represents an 
extension of freely contracted exchange relationships in the market. Co-operative 
organisation is likely to be inefficient because of the lack of hierarchical supervision means 
that there is no effective monitor. 
Some of the more optimistic predictions from self-management theory have also been 
countered by the Furubotn-Pejovich effect30• This is that workers will tend to under-invest 
from retained earnings if they do not retain an individual and marketable (rather than 
collective) share in productive assets. If workers cannot sell shares in their co-operative 
when they leave, they will tend to have a foreshortened time horizon as they will not benefit 
from the proceeds of investment after their departure; therefore they will tend to choose less 
than optimally efficient programme of investment, and co-operatives will be less efficient 
than capitalist firms. It is suggested then that co-ops will ultimately liquidate because of 
flaws such as workers being too short-sighted and failing to innovate; by distributing 
surpluses as current income, or simply that workers are basically lazy and will not work 
hard if ~e co-op is lacking discipline. 
Other writers are concerned with the question of how the respective systems respond to risk, 
which is not dealt with in the W-V-M model. While the theory proves inconclusive on the 
respective abilities of the co-operative and capitalist systems to respond to risk, it is argued31 
that it is an unfair double burden on workers to bear the risks as well as do the work, and 
furthermore that their risks are not spread, like those of most shareholders. If their firm goes 
bankrupt, their jo~ as well as their savings vanish at the same moment. Meade argues 
further that the capitalist system has as its essence the acceptance of risk to an asset in the 
expectation of a profitable return reward lor taking the risk. He notes that 
while property ownen can spread their risks by putting small bits of their 
property into • large number of concerns, a worker cannot easily put small bits 
. of his effort into a large number of different jobs. This is presumably why we 
find risk-bearing capital hiring labour rather than risk-bearing labour hiring 
capltaJ32 
.so TId. """ AI iIIlrcJIIuteIf fly McCat, 1f7!; .. FImtlIom lit Pfjttri:II ("".) If74. 
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Meade adds that as labour cannot spread its risks, C<H>peratives are most likely to be found 
in activities where risk is not too great. 
Uses and problems of the neoclassical theory of self-mllnllgement 
The various neoclassical models have been used extensively as the basis for empirical work. 
Much of this relates to the experiences of Yugoslavial.1, and more recently on the experiences 
of workers co-operatives in Britain and Europe34. These models are a very dubious guide to 
co-operatives in real market situations, as others have noted35. 
One of the main questions addressed by Vanek, and by others since, concerned the financing 
of capital invesbnent by co-operatives36. This has always been a prominent issue around 
co-operatives and self-management, and received attention in Vanek's paper The Basic Theory 
of Financing of Participatory Firms37. In this he compares the case of a co-op which raises its· 
capital entirely through collective saving - either initial contributions or retained surplus 
which remain irrecuperable - with an 'ideal' capitalist company which is financed entirely by 
external interest-bearing debt. He concludes that under these circumstances a Pareto 
optimum will not be reached, and such co-ops will be inefficient; that is, they will under-
invest, under-produce and under-employ compared to capitalist firms. Vanek considers that 
his arguments are 
so powerful in explaining the shortcomings of ... conventional forms of 
producer co-operatives ... that they offer an ample explanation of the 
comparative failure of these forms.38 
Vanek's argument has carried much weight in the formulation of views concerning the 
nature of appropriate support structures for co-operatives. Vanek concludes that co-ops can 
avoid this inefficiency by resorting to external finance, i.e. by paying a price for capital which 
'reflects its scarcity'. But because the conventional banking system is unlikely to 
satisfactorily fulfil the role of providing finance to oo-ops, a secondary support structure is 
33 For. mrinP.,." ~« list Me 'StqIwn, 1976; 81110 £.tri7t, 1982; £Stri7t & lhrrllett, 1982. 
34 e.g. 1-& Bdw, 1m; /Orta, 1974; Jorta & Swjrua- (lb.), 1982; '17IOma & l.Dga (1.982)".. __ iarl u-y, lit 
,.", hi tMir .wys;. of MontlFlpl ill SJIIIbI. 
35 e.g. I'*'"' & lAwI, 1982; SIqIIa, 1982; Ociplill & CDyN,1977. 
36 S. VIIId, un or 1977; Df(rNmy' .1982 '"fWY 1Irliclc; or stqMn, 19U. 
37 Vark, 2171, 1975. 
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necessary to supervise (but not control) the capital market, amongst other functions39• If 
such financing is used, co-ops will be just as efficient as capitalist companies. 
It is important to note that in Vanek's analysis, the effects of a hostile (capitalist) 
environment are dismissed as being able to explain "only a part, and perhaps only a small 
part of the difficulties of CCKlperatives"40. 
More recently, Stephen has demonstrated inconsistencies in Vanek's argument which, he 
claims, render it useless, and unable to explain the poor performance of co-operatives in the 
UK and western Europe41. Unlike Vanek, he claims that 
the source of the problem [for co-operativesJ is more likely to have been a 
shortage of funds (for whatever reason) to finance expansion42• 
The~ are many problems encountered in applying neoclassical analysis to co-operatives in 
this way. Firstly it is an equilibrium analysis, which demonstrates a fundamental 
inconsistency. By definition, in equilibrium all markets must clear, but at the same time it is 
acknowledged that the capital market will not clear - financial institutions will be biased 
against lending to co-operatives even thought the latter are willing to pay market rates of 
interest. If markets cleared there would be no need for Vanek's support organisation (to 
supervise capital markets); it is important to note that Vanek does not envisage the support 
organisation providing loanS to co-ops at concessionary prices - he merely sees it as aiding 
the provision of loans to co-ops at market rates, which will ensure the efficient allocation of 
capital resources - a clear admission that the capital market is not in equilibrium. 
The second major difficulty is that neoclassical analysis comes to a halt in attempting to 
explain the problems of a hostile and prejudiced environment. It is therefore no surprise that 
Vanek dismisses it as unimportant. In his view poor performance is a result of incorrect 
decisions talcen inttl'nally within the co-operative, and while Stephen rejects this, he is still 
unable to use neoclassical analysis to explain why co-operatives suffer a shortage of capital. 
In a crucial respect it fails as an explanatory theory. As with all neoclassical economics, once 
the initial assumptions are made, the outcome or solution is determined - all the analysis can 
do is work out what that solution is, say, concerning levels of prices, output quantities and 
3' JIIiL,. 35. 
4O.Ill.f!;b,.453. 
42 s,.",."., 2JU. 
42 JI5L,. H. 
Economics of co-operatives 1: Ortlwdox tluories 15 
factor incomes, and whether or not it meets one particular definition of 'effidency'. The 
important aspects of the situation fadng co-operatives are left unexplained because they are 
outside of the theory. Furthermore, neoclassical theory is inherently incapable of addressing 
these important issues; an analysis posited in terms of relationships between individuals 
necessarily fails to take into account the importance of wider social relationships and the 
specifically capitalist environment within which co-operatives operate. 
In practice the vast bulk of literature on c<HIperatives from a neoclassical perspective relates 
to a continuous refining of different models, debating their properties rather than explaining 
economic reaIity.43 
Despite the ideological role of neoclassical theory in underpinning bourgeois interests and 
values, its use is not restricted to those on the right. Indeed, Vanek and other market 
socialists often have the most laudable of intentions, but fail to challenge economic 
orthodoxy. For example Stewart uses a neoclassical model to analyse Worker Co-operatives 
and the Alternative Economic Strategy, treating the question largely as one of the relative 
technical effidency of capitalist and co-operative firms44. A similar approach is taken by 
many economists in the USA, and in Yugoslavia, who consider themselves to be politically 
radical. It really is rather curious that proponents of self-management rely extenSively on 
J\eoclassical theory, since above all C<HIPS' origins lie in attempts to improve the position of 
workers as producers, not as consumers. 
Although it is widely used, the neoclassical framework has been rejected for this thesis. The 
reasons for this are located in a general criticism of neoclassical economic theory rather than 
the specific way in which it is applied to the analysis of co-operatives. Although I do have 
particular critidsms of the neoclassical analysis of co-operatives, these are derived from the 
general critidsms, and as such are not resolvable within a neoclassical framework. 
Critique, of neoclllssicill economic. 
Neoclassical economics has been subjected to many extensive critiques'S, but still retains a 
strong hold, particularly amongst academic economists. Despite extensive mathematical 
reformulations it differs little in its fundamentals from what Marx contemptuously described 
4J .. e.g. Pryor, 1983; SIqIIm,1984; J<ma 111 Swfrun', 1982. 
44 StnIIrrl, 1983. 
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as 'vulgar economy'. Hodgson considers that "the neoclassical model of the market system is 
sophisticated, elegant, seductive and fonnally precise. But is wrong"46. I would argue that it 
is not so much wrong as misleading, represents bourgeois interests, and is inadequate for 
any real understanding of the economy. 
In a classic article, Bob Rowthom criticises vulgar economy on three main grounds: its 
subjective individualism; naturalism; and the primacy afforded to exchange47. The first 
characteristic is that 
society is seen as a collection of individuals whose nature is, for analytical 
purposes, assumed to be given or predetermined, quite independently of the 
social phenomena under consideration ....... society is explained in terms of the 
individual instead of the individual in terms of society'S 
Secondly, naturalism refers to the treabnent of production, like the individual, as asocial. 
Instead of seeing production as a social process in which human beings 
combine together within a specific framework of social relations, vulgar 
economy sees production as an asocial or natural process in which inputs of 
land, labour and means of production ........ are mysteriously transformed into 
outputs of material and non-material goods49• 
Thirdly, the primacy given to exchange and market phenomena us hardly surprising given 
that society is seen as an agglomeration of individuals whose nature is fixed, do not combine 
- together in a social production process and whose only link with each other is through the 
buying and selling of commodities. 
'Vulgar economy', then, is a timeless and ahistorica1 analysis, and pays no attention to the 
social relations which characterise a particular economy at a particular time. As a result one 
of the standard claims of neoclassical theorists is that their analysis can be applied to any 
economic system and is not restricted to capitalism; hence its application, by Lange and 
others cited earlier, to· socialist economies, and by Vanek to the labour-managed market 
economy. 
This can only be achieved on the basis of the characteristics identified by Rowthom, by 
isolating the analysis of economic phenomena from the society in which they are embedded. 
If the basis of the analysis is individual, rational choice, then it appears to have a universality 
" 1WpIft, 2915, ,. 4. 
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which can be applied to any society made up of rational individuals. This contrasts with the 
approach of the classical economists, who were concerned with the study of the economy 
within society. Neoclassical economics achieves this by looIcing only at the appearances of an 
economy; all societies appear to be constituted of individuals, even if the fundamental 
categories are classes. This corresponds with the apparent organisation of capitalism itself, as 
if the economy could be understood in isolation from the political, legal and other necessary 
conditions for its existence. 
My concern here is with explaining appearances, not by analysing the appearances 
themselves but the underlying structural factors, and most importantly the social relations 
which characterise the development of an economy. Neoclassical economics is limited to a 
consideration of the appearances which are merely symptoms of those underlying causes. 
While neoclassical economists see this generality a!! a strength of their analysis, it is also a 
fundamental weakness because it lacks any concept of a mode of production, which 
provides the basis of distinguishing one society from another. 
It is the mode of production and associated sodal relations which fundamentally determine 
the characteristics of any economy, and these social relations are distinctly different in 
capitalism, as opposed to feudalism, slavery, or socialism. Because of its starting point, 
neoclassical theory fails to offer any explanation of the operation of the capitalist economy 
beyond a trivial level. It similarly and necessarily fails to explain other economic systems as 
well. Rowthom notes that 
the conceptual framework and starting point of neoclassical economics renders 
virtually impossible a scientific analysis of the capitalist or any other mode of 
productionSO (emphasis added). 
As an example, neoclassical economics gives primacy to consumption by individuals 
endowed with initial wealth and tastes, but pays no attention at all to the process by which 
wealth and tastes are created, other than explaining the former as the result of past 
consumption and investment decisions. Given that these are assumed to direct the operation 
of the mar1cet (and hence the economy), and that wealth is the source of economic power, 
this seems remarkable. Enoch Powell once observed that consumers' spending activities are 
"votes in the economic ballot box", but clearly some consumers have more votes than others. 
An analysis of how this comes about would seem to be a minimal requirement for 
5O~,.16. 
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understanding the economy. Ironically, not only does neoclassical economics fail in its 
objective of explaining of any economic system, it becomes an ideological apology for 
capitalism ("a moral justification of the existing order"SI). Ironically, maintenance 'of an 
individualist standpoint - which cannot penetrate appearances to the reality of exploitation -
is in itself a class standpoint, of the bourgeois or capitalist class. 
This is not to say that neoclassical economics is always totally useless or wrong. The 
economic categories of demand and supply, prices, wages, profit, interest etc., do exist, and 
are the visible relations of society; they may have a certain usefulness in analysing 
individual decisions. For certain purposes it may be sufficient to have an idea of how 
variables appear to move, and demand and supply may be sufficient for this. However, 
these categories do not scientific, in that they do not theorise the essential logic of capitalism, 
and cannot deal with its underlying dynamic. Thus when the workings of the capitalist 
economy produce crises, neoclassical theory has to attribute them to exogenous shocks of 
one kind or another52. 
In the light of the above, we can reconsider neoclassical analyses of co-operatives and 
arguments in their favour, and immediately and inconsistency is revealed. All neoclassical 
theorising regarding co-operatives is concerned with establishing the conditions under 
which the co-operative market economy will be as efficient as the perfectly functioning 
capitalist economy. But this begs the question of why should such a co-operative economy 
be considered in the first place. As Stephen points out, Vanek 
merely prescribes the behaviour and institutions necessary to achieve an 
efficient allocation of resources gillen a collectivised form of industrial 
ownership53 (emphasis added). 
Vanek's analysis lacks any idea of the economy as an unfolding process, and does not give 
any 'economic' arguments as to htn.o or why such collective ownership may come about. If it 
is only capable of ,.,lIdin, the efficiency of the capitalist economy (the ideal), and then only 
under certain conditiON, why ia it better? To answer this, neoclassical theorists must move 
outside the realm of their economics and 'objectivity' and resort to value judgements; Vanek, 
51~,.2'. 
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for example, claims that co-operatives are "appealing and desirable on moral and 
philosophical grounds .... [with] .... an absence of alienation, and a no-conflict atmosphere at 
work"54. Although these advantages are cited, no further explanations, analysis or 
justification is given55• 
One reason is that the theory has no means of incorporating relationships within the 
enterprise into the analysis. Neoclassical theory of the firm is about costs and markets, and 
not about the firm at allS6; the firm is merely a locus of technical combinations of factors of 
production to produce output, selected by a process of cost-minimisation, not a social 
process involving people. 
Not only are problems encountered in explaining why a co-operative economy is preferable, 
but there are corresponding difficulties with explaining why there are very few co-ops in a 
capitalist economy. Although Vanek relies upon arguments concerning the impact of 
financing arrangements, these are ultimately chosen by the workers involved. Whether or 
not co-ops exist therefore results from workers preference schedules, which are of course 
unexplained by the theory. Then we are presented with another paradox. Co-ops are 
superior, as Vanek has explained above, but the reason for the lack of co-ops under 
capitalism is because workers prefer working in capitalist firms! 
If capitalist forms are overwhelmingly favoured, as the historical evidence 
shows, this reveals something about the preference structure of the population 
as a whole. Either· the bulk of the population actively wish to avoid the risks 
and anxieties of capital ownership, and so willingly transfer these 
responsibilities to the few willing to bear them; or the efficiency of the capitalist 
firm is such that it can pay wages high enough to compensate the work force 
for the loss of autonomy in comparison with the co-operative alternativeS?'. 
At the end of his extensive survey of neoclassical writing on co-operatives, Pryor also 
laments the lack of economic analysis of the process of co-operative formation, noting that 
the vast modeling literature appean sUent as to the general reasons why 
co-operatives are founded; and I have been unable to find in any literature any 
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serious and extended attempts to find and test propositions on the social, 
political and economic forces underlying the fonnation of such co-operatives.58 
This is perhaps less true now; the upsurge in co-op activity has promoted analysis of the 
'entrepreneurship problem' for co-operatives, and the work of Alchian & Demsetz is highly 
relevant. However, it is hampered by fta more general problem, in that orthodox economic 
theory lacks any general explanation of the structure of finns59". Much of the analysis has 
been from outside the orthodox neoclassical perspective, moving towards an eclectic or 
behavioural approaeh60• 
Further inconsistencies are apparent. For instance, there is no explanation of the existence of 
alienation or conflict in capitalist finns, although this wouid appear to be a central part of the 
pro- co-operative position. Labour should be content with its reward; all agents are fully 
compensated for their marginal contribution to production, as at equilibrium the wage 
equals the value of the workers' marginal product. The distinction between workers and 
capitalists becomes one of different skills and choices, and if capi,talists are better off than 
their employees it is because "those with managerial skills are assigned through the market 
to their appropriate place and are rewarded for their scarce resources accordingly"61. The 
possession of skills is considered to be the result of decisions taken regarding education and 
training in accordance with an individual's own preferences. In this case, why should there 
be any conflict between workers and bosses if all are suitably rewarded for their contribution 
to production, which is itself the result of consdous individual decisions. 
Alienation can only be justified in terms of Alehian and Demsetz's62 assertion of a tendency 
to 'shirk', itself a result of supposedly fixed human nature. But if this tendency to shirk is 
located within specifically capitalist relations of production - where workers are exploited in 
the extraction of surplus value by capitalists - then this, characteristic of human nature 
becomes a characteristic specific to capitalism rather than a timeless one, i.e. it is the nature 
of capitaUst production which causes alienation, not human nature. 
The neodassical analysis of co-operatives and self-management essentially. follows the 
methodology of orthodox neoclassical economics, and suffers from all of its problems. 
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Orthodox theory fails to offer a meaningful analysis of capitalism because it is ahistorical 
and ignores the social relations and features which are specific to that system, and which 
characterise it. Nevertheless this feature is seen by its proporients as a strength, and has 
enabled the development of a neoclassical theory of self-management. It tries to explain 
co-ops without reference to the specific character of capitalism and yet justifies them in 
terms of its (unexplained) failures. The inconsistency of neoclassical analysis is that it can 
only justify co-operatives on the basis of features specific to capitalism, but claims to be able 
to analyse them without reference to these specific features. 
This has led to a muddled confusion between the analysis of a co-operative economy 
(market socialism) and co-operatives within capitalism; the two are treated as conceptually 
equal and the essential features of each are lost. Ultimately neoclassical theory can't explain 
anything about co-operatives - questioning the important causal influences is outside of the 
theory. 
This thesis is not concerned with the character of a co-operative or market socialist economy 
(such as Yugoslavia), but with co-operatives in a capitalist system. In neoclassical theory the 
role of co-ops is seen purely in competitive or commercial tenns, the objective being to 
compete in the market for maximum effidency in production, whilst the benefits (to be 
maximised) are material rewards. The role of co-ops as self-contained competitive 
enterprises in a capitalist market economy - as in the neoclassical vision - will be taken up 
again in the conclusion, but the pressure on co-ops to behave in this way is related there to 
the specific features of capitalism, not an ideaUsed neutral environment. 
BEllA VIOURAL THEORY AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
I now turn to what may be termed a 'social demoaatic' approaclt to political economy63, and 
more specifically the associated behavioural analysis of the theory of the firm. Prom this an 
approach to co-operatives is derived which concentrates on the internal organisational 
influences on performance and a distributional reform of capitalism; an approach which is 
epitomised in Robert Oalceshott's book Tht Case for Workers CtH1pS. Despite changes in 
ownership relations within the enterprise there is no fundamental challenge to capitalist 
class relations in the economy as a whole. 
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Socilll UmOC1l1tic economics - Srlll/ll 
Following 1945 there were major changes taking place within the advanced capitalist 
economies and within economics itself. As capitalism developed, the industrial scene 
became increasingly dominated by large corporations and multinational companies rather 
small scale and highly competitive firms64. Traditional neoclassical models of the theory of 
the finn had dealt with the appearances of capitalism in the late 19th century; they assumed 
perfect competition, where individual firms could not influence market prices. As firms 
grew larger, the pretence that these models could give some guide to the real world became 
harder and harder to sustain. 
Orthodox economic theory had also taken a battering during the pre-war period. High and 
persistent levels of unemployment gave lie to one of main tenets of neoclassical theory - that 
the market system could, unaided, ensure an efficient, equitable and relatively stable 
equilibrium in the economy. Keynes' attack on this approach in The General Theory, 
published in 1936, claimed that aggregate levels of economic activity would not respond in 
the way that orthodox miao-Ievel analysis suggested. His analysis justified a whole new 
role for government intervention in the economy, particularly in the manipulation of 
aggregate demand to achieve full employment, and fonned the basis for macro-economic 
policy in the period following 1945. This conflicted with the orthodox lIlissez-faire approach -
towards government activity. Furthermore, the neoclassical counter-attack on Keynes 
stimulated the Cambridge Capital Controversy6S, which seriously undermined the 
theoretical coherence and validity of neoclassical partial equilibrium models, including 
conventional theories of the firm. The integrity of the theory could only be maintained by 
resorting to the general equilibrium model, which wu theoretically sound (in neoclassical 
terms at least) but demanded even stricter and more unrealistic assumptions for a stable 
solution. 
Cambridge (UK) mntinued to provide a critique of orthodox neoclassical theory, centered on 
the work of Snffa66• SraHa'. work has been controversial and interpreted in a variety of 
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different ways67, but one important element was a renewed emphasis on the sphere of 
production rather than exchange, in particular as the location of important economic 
decisions. Sraffa also showed the'conditions under which distribution (between profits and 
wages) follows no particular natural laws. Orthodox theory, in contrast, held the rate of 
profit to be determined by the marginal productivity of capital, and wages by the marginal 
productivity of labour. Crucial to Sraffa's analysis is the proposition that equilibrium prices 
of production, to which the economy would tend, could always be found when physical 
input-output coefficients (i.e. available technology) and distribution (between wages and 
profits) are known. The state of technology is therefore crucial for economic equilibrium, and 
it is technological change which permits economic growth. On a general level, Sraffa took 
the view that the national pattern of distribution had very little to do with the requirements 
of production; thus the question of distribution was allocated to the moral and political 
spheres and away from the economic. This does permit a role for class struggle - the working 
class can attempt to shift the wage-profit distribution in their favour. More generally the 
Sraffian schema provides an economic basis for competition between various groups over 
the distribution of economic surplus. While in theory the outcome of this distributional 
struggle is independent of production itself, the competitive process can potentially disrupt 
production. These crudal elements of Sraffa's work underlie (usually unconsciously) much 
recent work on the theory of the firm. In the next sections I move on to look at a behavioural 
model of decision-making in the production units of advanced industrial society, a model 
which is highly consistent with Sraffa's analysis at the aggregate level of the whole 
economy68. 
BehlWioural conceptions of the enterpriu 
The neoclassical concept of the firm is a 'black box' which exists to allocate resources, and as 
a result theory has little to say about the production process and social relationships within 
the firm; the primary focus is upon external (exchange) relationships between firms, and not 
intema1 relationships within the firm itself. This concept relates to perfect competition, with 
large numbers of small identical firms. In the era of the giant corporation and monopoly 
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capitalism the neoclassical neglect of the internal structure of the firm became increasingly 
untenable. Cyert and Hendrick observed that 
none of the problems of real firms can find a home within this special construct. 
'There are no organisational problems, nor is there any room for analyses of the 
internal decision-making process69• 
The large corporations which concern Cyert &: Hendrick are characterised by a division of 
ownership and control between shareholders and management. The former have formal 
ownership but take little active role in the running of the corporation due to their dispersed 
numbers and lack information. Management is usually organised into a strict hierarchy, 
carrying out specialist functions, whilst the workforce is typically organised into one or more 
trade unions. 
Co-operative theorists have shared similar concerns about the behavioural foundations of 
neoclassical theory70. The emphasis on individual maximising behaviour and the need for 
hierarchy and supervision, as argued by Alchian &: Demsetz71, contrasts with the 
import8nce of trust and commitment in any functioning economic organisation72• It is 
argued that self-managed enterprises may well gain from the latter in terms of economic 
performance. Secondly, the benefits of working co-operatively (e.g. 'job satisfaction') are real 
,but cannot be adequately summed up by commercial criteria, and hence tend to be neglected 
if they cannot be quantified. Thirdly, the dynamics of co-operafives cannot be explained 
solely by individual actions, but need to take account of collective activity73. Jan Vanek (not 
to be confused with Jaroslav Vanek) has argued that workers' co-operatives, in Yugoslavia at 
least, have a variety of goals and the mix cannot be easily specified in advance74• Therefore, 
any modelling of co-op behaviour through the use of an objective function representing 
whatever is to be maximised is oversimplistic and useless. 
'Por behavioura1ists the question of who runs the corporation (or co-operative), and with 
, what ends in view is very complicated, because of these various power groups. It has been 
explored by Galbraith75 and by Baran and Sweezy76, who in Monopoly Capital start with a 
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model of the economy which has strong analytical connections with Sraffa's. In general such 
studieS are an analysis of power within the firm, which is perceived are a coalition of groups 
with conflicting interests (reflecting the structure of society as a whole), bargaining over the 
distribution of the finns' surplus - i.e. the surplus of revenue over the prime cost of 
production. At the level of the enterprise, poor performance may be due to managers' role in 
frittering away the surplus on items of personal aggrandisement. Alternatively, it may be 
due to distnbutional conflict between groups in the corporation - resulting in strikes, lock-
outs and other disruptions to production which reduce output below its potential level. 
Trade unions are often seen as the villains of the piece; they have developed as defensive 
organisations for the employed and have an interest in resisting technical change, both 
because jobs are at risk directly, and as an indirect means to secure a stronger position in the 
distributional power struggle. But technical change determines the potential for economic 
growth, and hence resistance is against society's long term interests. Also, the general 
struggle over the level of wages is conducted by trade unions on the basis of potentially or 
actually disrupting production, and as a result, trade union activity is predominantly 
damaging and not in anybodys long term interests. Unions are often characterised as 
narrow and short-sighted, and in the longer term working against the interests of both their 
members and society in general. In fighting over the division of the production 'cake', all 
that is achieved by such disruptive activity is a reduction in the size of that cake, both in the 
short and long term. The resulting combination of low productivity and poor industrial 
relations is often termed the 'British Disease'11. 
From a social democratic perspective poor industrial relations are primarily the result of 
ignorance and prejudice, and a failure to appreciate where long term common interests lie. 
The problem is perceived to be particularly severe in Britain because of a long-standing 
class-consdousness and class divisions - although class is seen as rooted in culture and 
consciousness rather than in material drc:umstances. David Owen claims that "adversary 
politics continue to fan the embers of class divisions"78 (rather than the other way round!). 
This leads to irrational disbibutional struggles between groups within industry _ 
management and unions, or between different trade unions for increased power and 
influence. Overcoming such problems is essential for economic growth and recovery, but in 
77 OrI1raIIoIt, 1978, ,.12. 
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achieving this one cannot ignore the existence of these disparate interest groups. The 
solution proposed by social democrats has two elements. The filit parallels (their) desired 
reforms in the political sphere; thus demands for proportional representation in elections are 
matched by a need to ensure effective representation of interest groups in decision-making 
in industry. In conventional companies, decision-making is in the hands of a limited group 
of managers or owners, and the exclusion of the majority of the workforce from decision-
ma1cing is viewed as forcing the workers into support for trade unions, with negative long 
term consequences. Proper representation of workforce interests - access to decision-ma1cing 
through a participatory industrial and organisational structure - will enable these to be 
articulated and taken account of and avoid much unnecessary conflict. The second aspect is 
an attempt to 'blur' the competing distributional categories - for instance by giving workers 
the opportunity to share in the ownership or profits of the firm. 
The benefits of effective participation by workers in management are generally seen in terms 
of increased efficiency as a result of reduced conflict. The follOwing quote from Martin . 
Lockett illustrates this well. Although he refers specifically to workers' co-<>peratives, the 
argument applies equally to any form of demOcratic industrial participation and/or profit-
sharing: 
the exclusion of the majority of the workforce from ownership and control is 
seen by most advocates of co-operation to be a structural factor which leads to: 
(i) lack of motivation on the part of the workforce (ii) lower efficiency and 
productivity (iii) conflict between employer and workers due to their different 
interests and (iv) a consciousness of the inequality of such a situation amongst 
the wor1cforce and consequent loss of legitimacy by management. Thus it is 
widely argued that the structure of capitalist forms of ownership and control 
tends to restrict production to a level below that which is theoretically possible 
and to lead to potentially avoidable social conflicts .•..•....• the problem is how to 
remedy the shortcomings of capitalist organisations which do not perform as 
efficiently as they could due to lack of commitment of the workforce to an 
enterprise. This is reflected in a loss of manageria1legitimacy and support for 
trade union organisation and action79• 
The argument that increased worker participation will increase efficiency and counter 
economic decUne was well put in the Bullock report. The way 
to provide greater satisfaction in the workplace and to assist in raising the level 
of productivity and efficiency - and with it the living standards of the nation - is 
not by recrimination or exhortation but by putting the relationship between 
capital and labour on to a new basis which will involve not just management 
79l.odtnl,lIft. 
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but the whole workforce in sharing responsibility for the success and 
profitability of the enterpJise80 
For social democrats, therefore, the antagonism between capital and labour can be 
ameliorated or overcome by a combination of incentive and organisational changes. 
This approach contrasts completely with that of the 'property rights' theorists mentioned 
earlier. For them, the right to participation in control derives directly from ownership, 
whereas a typical social democratic perspective is as follows: 
workers' participation is based on fundamental concepts of justice ..... the 
ordinary worker invests his labour and ties his fate to his place of work. For this 
reason he has a legitimate claim to have a share in influencing various aspects 
of economic policy.8) 
Chiplin &: Coyne82 dismiss the findings of the Bullock Report because it gives workers a say 
in crucial decisions without hamg to take responsibility - in terms of the resulting profit or 
loss - for the outcomes of those decisions. For them, a major cause of the 'British Disease' is 
. that the attenuation of property rights has already gone too far, and Bullock-type 
suggestions would worsen, rather than bnprove, the perfonnance of British industry. 
Co-operatives tI1Ul tM 'Third ~ctor' 
While this argument can be applied to any enterprise under capitalism (or socialism for that 
matter - as Oakeshott's book repeatedly attempts to do), it is particularly applicable to 
support for workers co-operatives, where democratic partidpation is integral to the structure 
of the enterprise, on a formal level at least. It is used to justify the development of a 'third 
sector' of the British economy; a self-managed / co-operative sector to complement the state-
run (nationalised) and private sectors. In this, workers co-operatives can potentially play an 
important role. The status of workers as owners and the entitlement of workers to a share in 
the profits should engender further commonality of interest. Theii- democratic fonn offers 
the possibility of dialogue and representation of all interests within the enterprise, but _ 
despite an easing of the conventional capitalist-worker division - there may be new and 
different conflicts and problems in co-ops. Much attention is therefore paid to developing 
suitable organisational and partidpatory structures to deal with these new conflicts and 
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demands, particularly in larger co-operatives where direct participation becomes 
unworkable. 
Co-ops are seen as potentially more efficient than capitalist firms. It is usually argued along 
the lines that: firstly, workers have a greater motivation to work harder, as they are working 
for themselves rather than an employer and can reap the rewards of their own efforts; 
secondly, less effort should be wasted in unnecessary conflict and more devoted to 
productivity as the co-op members are the final arbiters of management decisions; thirdly, 
workers should be less alienated and therefore able to work harder. On the negative side, 
productivity may be lost because of the effort involved in developing the new participatory 
structures, and simply because of the time taken to operate them83. 
Co-operatives are often also seen as morally sUperior to capitalist enterprise, besides being 
more efficient. There is a strong Christian socialist tradition amongst supporters of 
co-operatives, including advocates such as E.V.Neale in the 19th century and Ernest Bader, 
founder of the Scott Bader co-operative, more recently, and has been a strong influence in 
the main collective organisation amongst British co-operatives, the Industrial Common 
Ownership Movement (ICOM). They believed that the division between capitalist and 
worker is both immoral and counter-productive; co-operatives are seen as superior because 
they do not have this division and its attendant conflicts. In recent times the Christian 
socialist element in the co-op movement has been taken over by "the essentially middle-class 
tradition of progressive if paternalistic business management, fertilised to a greater or lesser 
extent by Quaker business radicalism"M. An earlier example was the establishment of the 
John Lewis Partnership in the 1920s85. 
The combination of making workers into owners and reducing conflict, with the 
introduction of appropriate organisational structures to resolve whatever divergent interests 
remain, is thus perceived as beneficial for both workers and society as a whole. There are 
two other essential elements of the sodal democratic analysis. Firstly, disdpHne and 
efficiency is maintained by management, through the adoption of a conventional 
management etnadure. Secondly, the market provides an external reference point for all 
enterprises and represents an efficient way of co-ordinating the economy • 
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Therefore, despite a concern with the internal structure of the enterprise, many aspects of 
work would remain unchanged even though there is a formal transfer of power within 
co-operatives. This stems from a belief in the necessity of conventional hierarchical 
structures. Oakeshott "most strongly" argues that "the functional distinction between 
management and the shopfloor will ... have to be maintained"86 and that "if anything ... the 
management required in an enterprise ultimately controlled by its workers must be 
particularly strong ... and certainly ... it must be more like than unlike management in a 
conventional firm"S7, although it may need to adapt its style. An ahistorical view of the role 
of management is typical of social democratic thinking - it is viewed as a technical function 
rather than an embodiment of social relations, or representing class interests - but at least 
Bradley justifies management hierarchy in terms of the relationship of co-operatives to a 
market economy88. Bradley essentially argues that "a firm's profitability is crucially bound 
up with the question of information", that competitive market forces require that certain 
information remains confidential to management (or else competitors will benefit). The 
market therefore influences information control structures within the firm and requires a 
necessary separation between management and workers. This does not mean that 
management cannot be ultimately responsible to workers, but that a hierarchical 
management structure is determined by the requirements of the market and is thus imposed 
on co-operatives al! much as capitalist firms. Bradley concludes that worker control as a 
radical strategy, focusing "on employee access to company information and the eradication 
of distinct 'closed' managerial groups [is) not feasible"89. Bradley's argument is highly 
relevant to the discussion of co-operative 'degeneration' into capitalist forms of enterprise 
under the pressures of market competition. 
A Reconstruction of 716oclllSsicUm? 
Sraffa's work was welcomed by many as a radical alternative to orthodox neoclassical 
theory90, and indeed this was Sraffa's own interpretation91. On certain crucial aspects 
however there are strong similarities between the two. In particular both Sraffian and 
neoclassical theory are &historical; there is no acceptance of the concept of a 'mode of 
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production', the set of social relationships within which economic activity (first of all 
production) takes place. Consequently there is no role for capitalism as a distinct mode of 
production. 
This is linked to the typical bourgeois conception of the economy as an object or thing rather 
than a process. 'The impact of ahistoricism is that there is no concept of historical process and 
its relationship to the present This imposes limits on the theory's ability to conceptualise 
some of the central categories of economic analysis and the theory of the finn and of 
co-operatives: class, the labour process, technology, management and ownership. Although 
Sraffian theory sees these in a different perspective to that of neoclassical economics, it is still 
unrelated to the capitalist mode of production. For example, Sraffian economics is often 
couched in tenns of a distributional class conflict between capital and labour, the existence 
of this conflict is exogenous to the analysis~ not explained within it. The same criticism 
applies equally to other conflicts; divisions within the enterprise remain unexplained. 
Therefore class conflict is not integral to Sraffian economics, it could just as well be religious 
or geographical conflict Where class is explicitly included it is a different conception of class 
to that of Marx - Sraffa's classes are merely descriptive rather than analytical categories. 
Sraffa drew upon the earlier work of Ricardo92 but the two analyses differ in important 
ways. Ricardo was concerned with reconciling the coexistence of capital and labour with the 
latter as the sole source of value. In contrast the Sraffian system "rejects value theory 
altogether, arguing that the characterisation of capitalism and its economic laws of motion is 
possible and indeed more satisfactorily accomplished without the encumbrance of a value 
theory based on labour time"93. 
Although there is more consideration of production than in the neoclassical 'black box' 
approach, both share the view of production as a technical rather than a social process, and 
Rowthom's earUer criticisms apply equally. Technology and technical change are exogenous 
- analogous to the exogenous production function in neoclassical theory. This is a 
particularly serious problem because it is technical change which is considered to provide 
the way forward for society, providing increased surplus, and yet the availability and choice 
of technology in production is unexplained. The division of labour is technically rather than 
12 0Iw of"" ....... tIIIIy Pmftdm ofCc!rmtlpilffg look so bt, 10 JIIDIIu« is ",., S,.". __ 1IIllhtg RJamlo' • 
..,.." .. . 
• " FIIfI, 2110, ,. !.S'. 
Economics of co-operatives I: Orthodox theories 31 
socially detennined, and in most behaviouralist work little attention is paid to the labour 
process. It is unsurprising therefore that Oakeshott (amongst others) treats hierarchical 
organisation in aH>peratives as technically determined, and therefore somehow'objective' 
or necessary, rather than socially detennined and therefore changeable. This reflects an 
uncritical acceptance of the existence and role of the market. 
Indeed there is great similarity in the role of the market in behavioural and neoclassical 
theories. In both the existence of the market is unexplained, whether in a capitalist or market 
sociaIist economy - in contrast to marxist theory. Frequently a market economy is perceived 
as superior to a planned economy for technical reasons (it is better able to co-ordinate 
infonnation and decisions) and moral/sociaI reasons (a market is more democratic) . The 
role of the market will receive more attention later, but there is a widespread tendency to 
view the market as a neutral distributive and allocative mechanism. However, the market 
needs to be seen in its historical context; it emerged with capitalism as the dominant form of 
exchange and plays a central role in the accumulation process. Following this widespread 
and uncritical acceptance of the market, many arguing that planning is too restrictive, and 
incompatible with co-operatives' autonomy, but in reality the market imposes pressures 
which are just as constraining for aH>p8, if not more so. This preoccupation with the 
appearances of capi.taiism, with apparently '~ exchange in the market (a 'religious 
doctrine' ), is a characteristic of bourgeois economic theories. 
This uncritical acceptance of the existence of the market leads to a failure to examine the 
impact of market relations on the various possible objectives of finns or co-operatives, and 
the constraints which this imposes, or certainly any negative constraints. There does not 
appear to be a recognition that there may be conflicts between operating in the market and 
co-operative objectives; indeed, the market is often seen as a welcome and positive 
constraint. Oakeshott hopes that "making the workforce the owners of profits as well as 
wages, and by assigning to it ultimate responsibility and control, we will induce positive 
feelings about at least a partial and modified market system amongst larger numbers of 
working people"97 
94 OMaIrott, 1978, p.". 
95 V~, 1975; HodgfOft, 1984. 
96 FiM, 1984, ,. 25. 
97 0MaIr0tt, 1978, ,. 7. 
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The counterpart to the lack of critical attention paid to market relations is that studies of 
co-operatives tend to focus on internal co-operative problems rather than the conditions that 
they face outside. Actions are seen as determined in a 'voluntaristic" manner, that is, social 
processes are reducible to the apparently unconstrained will of individuals. Although 
internal processes are important, they cannot be analysed in the absence of external 
conditions; they need to be viewed in the context of class relations. This leads to particular 
problems in analysing why co-ops have performed in the way that they have, as a crucial 
aspect of explanation is missing. A consequence has been the frequent assumption that the 
experience of co-operatives elsewhere might easily be transferred to Britain. The problem is 
illustrated in Oakeshott's enthusiasm for the Mondragon group of co-operatives in the 
Basque country of Spain98. In his view the Mondragon experience can potentially be 
replicated <e.g. it) Wales99) as long as the correct internal characteristics are carried over -
such as individual (rather than collective) capital contributions, and "fully professional 
management", are stipulated. This position has been thoroughly criticised by Fairclough 
who shows the overwhelming importance of external conditions in· the success of 
MOndragon and hence in the potential extent of reproduction of this phenomenon1OO• 
As a framework for carrying out research into co-operatives, behavioural theory offers great 
scope for description but little scope for analysis· and explanation101• Objectives can be 
framed with little regard for external social relations, and thus the main item of interest 
about the co-operative is the internal processes by which decisions are reached and overall 
behaviour derived. tittle or no attention is paid to the origins of the particular decisions 
which have to be made, which invariably represent a conflict between some co-operative 
ideals and what the market will permit. Of course a preoccupation with internal problems 
and processes can be justified by the argument that this is what, in practice, co-op workers 
are dealing with day after day. For them, internal conflicts are i'eal and important. 
Examination of such processes can throw useful Ught on organisational constraints, because 
co-operatives do need to develop a set of internal processes which are distinctly different to 
thoee of capitalist firms. Being aware of such factors is one thing, however; making the leap 
that the solution to internal problems lies in refonning only, or even mainly, internal 
9B OdaIIotI,2978,197Bb. 
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processes is another. It falls into the trap of preoccupation with the appearances of 
capitalism rather than concern with its underlying processes. Problems are manifested 
internally for co-operatives, but these may be articulations of external processes. 
As far as providing an analysis of the position of co-operatives in a capitalist economy, 
behavioural theory is little better than neoclassical theory, with which it shares many 
characteristics. Research from this perspective can be usefully informative - although with 
an excessive concentration on internal problems to the exclusion of external relationships -
but is ultimately only descriptive. If explanation is sought, neither of these ahistorical 
frameworks is sufficient, and it is necessary to start by characterising the economy as 
capitalist. 

2. Economics of Co-operatives II 
Marxist Analysis 
INTRODUCTION 
Marxist political economy does not have a specific body of theory relating co-ops in the 
same way as bourgeois theories. Its approach is completely different, analysing economic 
phenomena in terms of their relationship to the whole economic and social structure, 
examining interrelationships, rather than dividing up into separate and unconnected 
'boxes'. What marxism does offer is a scientific method'of analysing economic' phenomena, 
theorising the essential nature of capitalism and revealing its underlying structure and 
processes. Its aim is different !o that of orthodox economics, asking different questions: 
Marx found other economists not so much wrong as inadequate. He was 
interested in probing beneath the appearance of society to the reality below. 
This meant taking nothing for granted; leaving no important phenomenon of 
society unexplained. What economists tend to assume as timeless features of 
humans and societies, Marx was determined to root out and understandl. 
In contrast to orthodox models, the central aspect of marxist theory is the fundamental 
importance of class as an economic concept. 
Concern with workers co-ops has never been prominent in marxist political economy, 
certainly in Britain, perhaps reflecting their peripheral role in the economy throughout most 
of the capitalist era. However, they have been discussed at various times by many 
prominent thinkers, from Marx himself to Lenin, Luxemburg and Mandel. More recently, 
the lengthy and widespread crisis and restructuring of capitalist economies stimulated a 
resurgence of interest in marxist economics generaUy2, as well as analysis of the 
co-operative growth which flowed from that crisis. Co-ops have also been of interest to 
several sympathetic sodalist but non-marxist writers, perhaps most notably the Webbs. 
Ouring the 198(B, in the context of widespread discussion - by both marxists and social 
democrats - of the nature and role of social ownership of ~e means of production, and of 
the way forward for socialist economic pollcy in Britain, co-operatives have moved closer to 
the centre of the debate. 
1 FIM, 1914, p. 18. 
2 H-t-, 2979. 
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The remainder of this chapter has several aims. Firstly, it covers the essential elements of a 
marxist analysis of co-operatives, at an abstract level. Secondly, it reviews the work of some 
of the writers referred to above. Finally, it attempts to further develop a marxist view of 
workers' co-operatives before the approach used in this thesis is developed in the next 
chapter. 
MAllXIST POLmCAL ECONOMY 
This ts not the flace for a full exposUion of marxist economic theory3, but some general 
poil\ts of contrast with bourgeois theories do need emphasising. Firstly, Marx did not start 
from the indivi~ual (as in neoclassical theory) nor from the technical relations of production 
(as in Sraffian economics). Instead he considered that in every society production is the key 
to the transformation of the material environment into items which people need to use, and 
that relations within production characterise any particular society. While the type of 
technology used detennines the technical division of labour in production, it is based upon 
a relationship of power over the use of economic surplus, where the source of that power is 
control of the means of production by a particular class. The whole structure and pattern of 
production, distribution, exchange and consumption reflects those social or class relations 
of production, and therefore economic theory has to be historically specific to these 
particular conditions. Therefore, a crucial element is the historical specificity of the analysis. 
Hence the criticism of both neoclassical and Sraffian theory for being ahistorical and omitting 
the crucial characteristics of the society or phenomenon requiring explanation. Secondly, 
marxist theory is concerned with ,elations rather than things; the economy is conceived as a 
social process rather than as an object. Thirdly, within any society there are contradictions 
between the technical relations of production and the social relations of production which 
provide the potential for social conflict, leading to social change. Marxist theory is thus 
dynamic: rather than static, and is not only a theory of power within capitalism but also of 
social change within and about capitalism. 
The crucial element of Marx's thought which underlies these points is the concept of a 
'mode of production', a set of social relations within which men and women produce. In his 
famous Prt{rlce to /I Contribution Marx says: 
.3 far '" irItrocI",''''' .. Fine,I9B4, or Cole c.mmm lit E4wImIs,1983. 
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In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are 
indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which 
correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive 
forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic 
structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political 
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. 
The mode of production of material life cOnditions the social, political and 
intellectual life process in general4 
The capitalist mode of production (CMP) is defined by (class) relations of production and 
the (technical) forces of production, and the articulation between the two. Whilst in any 
society production takes place by the application of la~ur to the means of production, the 
CMP is characterised by relations of pioduction wher: a class of non-workers own the 
means of production and the product of la~ur, while workers own only the commodity 
labour power. Capitalism therefore is a mode of production with specific features 
differentiating it from other modes ~f production. Marx therefore rejects the 'universalistic 
precepts' of much neoclassical economics; 
Whenever we speak of production ..•. what is meant is always production at a 
definite stage of social development - production by social individualsS. 
Not only is consideration of the ownership of the means of production important for 
understanding the dynamic of the economy as a whole, but it is essential to a a coherent 
analysis of the production process within enterprises. 
Any mode of production has two distinct levels: the mode of appropriation of nature (how 
is production organised), and the mode of appropriation of the product (who controls and 
benefits from what is produced). Both of these levels must be considered in an analysis of 
co-operatives under capitalism, and indeed this distinguishes marxist analysis from the 
bourgeois theories considered previously. The appropriation of nature in the production 
process is a social process, with specific characteristics such as prOduction techniques, 
organisation of the labour process, division of labour, authority and control. Appropriation 
of the product is characterised by a set of property relations; under capitalism this is carried 
out on the basis . of apparent freedom, according to the economic laws of commodity 
exchange, contrasting with extra«anomlc coerdon in ~dal or slave society. 
4 Mr.r 1970, J111. 21).21. 
5 Mr.r,1973. 
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Marx's method 
A second distinctive aspect of Marx's analysis is his scientific method. This relates to the 
need to uncover the underlying phenomena which characterise a capitalist economy, its 
'essen~ logic', whilst dealing with the forms in which these phenomena manifest 
themselves in the real world. "All science would be superfluous if the outward appearance 
and essence of things directly coincided"6, and Marx 'described science as a process of 
producing knowl~ge by going behind the superficial appearance of things'7. In order to 
understand these underlying phenomena, Marx's method starts with existing notions (such 
as (.'Oncepts of people and nature) and develops highly abstract but simple concepts. These 
abstract concepts do not in themselves appear directly in the real world, but by a process of 
. reasoning their interrelationships and intemal contradictions can be worked out to provide 
more complex but less abstract concepts. Gradually, observed features of the actual world 
are incorporated into abstract concepts until the concrete is reprodUCed; "for Marx, 
therefore, science implies a hierarchical relationship between concepts and, what is more, 
this pyramid is related to the hierarchical relationships of determination which link 
phenomena in reality"8. 
This method is a crucial element of marx's economics, and in this chapter I will attempt to 
use it to investigate further the position of co-ops in a capitalist economy, and particularly 
such contentious issues as co-operative 'degeneration'. To start with, I analyse co-ops at an 
abstract level. That is, the position and role of co-ops is abstracted from any concrete 
situation so as the basic concepts can be brought out. I will then consider co-ops in a less 
abstract context in the rest of this chapter, whilst the lowest level of abstraction - dealing 
with the actual state of co-ops in Britain - will be left for the bulk of the thesis. 
CO-OP' and capittdhm 
The central aspect of a marxist analysis of co-ops to to locate them in the wider processes 
taking place in a capitalist economy. Starting at an abstract level, it is PQ8Sible to identify the 
most fundamental processes acting on on co-ops, which derive from their very nature. 
61M"", 2959, ~ter 48. 
7 FiM iii HMrlt,2979, ,. 6. 
8 HIDTiI, 1978". 214. 
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The CMP is dominated by the process of production, appropriation and aCC!lmulation of 
surplus value, and by the class struggle which is inherent in it. Within this, C<H>PS are in a 
contradictory position. The central feature of a workers' co-op is that workers own the 
means of production, giving rise to a specific set of social relations within the enterprise. 
These are in direct conflict with the social relations of the eMF as a whole, based on 
capitalist ownership of the means of production. Orthodox theories consider that whilst 
co-ops are different to capitalist enterprises, the two meet as equals in the market, in the 
process of 'equal exchange'. By contrast, marxist analysis considers that relationships in 
production, not exchange, are paramount, and that the nature of the forces and relations of 
production determine the dynamic of the economy as aO whole, even outside of production 
itself. Therefore, whilst the contradiction between labour and capital is 'abolished' at the 
level of the unit of production, it is maintained on a social scale9; the existence of 
co-operatives does not transform the sociaI division of labour or the political economy of 
class struggle embedded within the CMP. 
Co-ops are tied in to the process of accumulation by virtue of their relationship as producers 
to other producers (capitalists) through competition in the market. Their position is subject 
to two contradictory forces (1) the competitive relationship with other producers, and (2) 
opposition to the capitalist mode of production. Capitalist accumulation necessitates 
attempts to increase the exploitation of workers by capital through increases in absolute or 
relative surplus value, in order to counteract the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. The 
very structure of co-ops represents workers' attempts to both challenge that exploitation in 
the immediate context of individual enterprises, and in the ownership and power structure 
of the CMP as a whole. This does not mean that co-ops will succeed in reducing 
exploitation, only that there will be a conflict. This will be articulated in different ways in 
variOus concrete situations - at some times there may not even appear to be a conflict at all-
but the underlying conditions of existence cannot be avoided. 
Acamud"te or die: CO-opet4tiflf!', competition ",.d IlCCIImul"tion 
Before moving on to examine the actual operation of market forces on co-ops, it is necessary 
to consider the process of accumulation and competition at an abstract level. In a system of 
commodity production each individual producer faces the market in competition with other 
producers. Competition takes the fonn of a process, whereby there is a constant pressure to 
9 Bettltltdm, 1977, p. 529. 
40 Theory and methodology 
cheapen commodities by reducing their value or the labour time necessary for their 
production, for this is the only way that owners of commodities can be sure of selling them. 
This is primarily achieved by developing more productive technology to enable lower unit 
costs of production, by renewal of production methods, and by producing in larger units 
('economies of scale'). All of these require the accumulation of capital. 
Accumulation and competition represent two sides of the same social process, resulting 
from the nature of. capital as self-expanding value. The social as~t is that whatever 
decisions individual ~pitalists take, the process cannot be avoided - it follows from the very 
nature of being a capitalist. The form may vary; for individual capitalists competition and 
accumulation can take be either aggressive or defensive; the first involves attempting to 
gain an advantage by reducing production costs below those incurred by other capitalists, 
the second a strategy to respond to aggressive competition from other capitalists. But 
although the form of competition can vary, it cannot be avoided; "the need to accumulate is 
felt by each individual capitalist as an external coercive force. Accumulate or die; there are 
fewexceptions"lO. 
The constitution of co-operatives as non-capitalist enterprises does not alter this situation; 
they too must 'accumulate or die'. The behaviour of individual enterprises - whether 
capitalist or co-op - does not depend on "the good or will of the individual" because "free 
competition brings out the-inherent laws of capitalist production, in the shape of external 
coercive laws having power over every individual capitalist"l1. As capitalism became 
established, independent artisans and other modes of production were destroyed by the 
combination of rapid increases in productivity which resulted from the capitalist 
organisation of industry and the evaluation of the productivity of different producers in the 
market. In principle, newly emerging co-operatives face the same pressure and the need to 
match increases in capitaUst productivity in order to survive. 
Given that the main means of reducing the labour time involved in production of 
commodities is investment in new or large scale technology, the ability of individual 
capitaUsts to compete is limited by the potential to accumulate. This can take two forms. 
Firstly, capital may grow through profits which are retained and re-invested; this process of 
concmtTtltion takes place gradually over time. Secondly, a capitalist may take over or merge 
10 PiN, 1984, p. 86. 
U Mmr, 1954,,,.270. 
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with another capitalist, so that the existing productive resources become gathered_ together 
in larger and larger units. This is the centralisation of capital, and through this process larger 
capitals can emerge much faster than through concentration. 
That accumulation and competition are two sides of the same coin is clearer in the case of 
concentration. A firm which is not competitive will be less profitable and less able to 
accumulate through reinvestment, leading to even less competitiveness, and a vicious circle. 
The only way for such a finn to survive is to increase the rate o( exploitation, but without 
accumulation there are physical limits to this. 
OH>peratives cannot avoid the competitive pressures of the market unless they are 
completely divorced from market relations, and therefore they must also accumulate, if they 
are to remain competitive over a period of time. Failure to accumulate will put pressure on 
co-ops to increase exploitation of workers in order to survive. The question of how co-ops 
relate to the two sources of accumulation will recur later, but at this point two observations 
are helpful. In principle, co-ops can accumulate through concentration, by reinvesting 
profits and increasing the productive resources at their disposal, although the rate at which 
they can do so depends (as for any firm) upon their profitability. Growth through 
centralisation is more difficult. Takeovers occur through the purchase of one company's 
share capital by another, usually involving borrowing through the credit system. A 'pure' 
co-op does not have tradeable share capital, and therefore cannot be taken over in this waYi 
however, in theory at least, a co-op could take over a capitalist firm, or two co-ops could 
merge if the members so decided. 
Co-ops' weaknesses in ac:cumulation 
At a less abstract level, we can examine how the actual fonn of co-ops impacts upon their 
competitive position. P'U'Stly, co-ops start off at a competitive disadvantage because of a 
frequent lack of initial finance to purchase productive resources. This will be exacerbated if 
co-ops attempt to pursue socialist objectives, as these will all tend to reduce profitability. In 
addition, co-ops frequently suffer from skill shortages, which will tend to restrict 
productivity further. This can stem from an inability to attract or retain people with certain 
skills, particularly where co-op wages - which tend to have much lower differentials than in 
capitalist firms - are significantly below market rates. Secondly, there is in any case a lack of 
workers with both managerial skills and a commitment to socialist pz:.indples. 
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In practice of course the strength of competitive pressure varies across the economy, and in 
certain seeton it is possible to make above average profits. There will be a tendency for 
co-op to seek out such areas - niche markets - where competition is less intense, and where 
it is possible to make above average profits. This also applies to capitalist firms, who will 
also seek out areas of higher profits, but the pressure on co-ops is greater because of their 
inherent disadvantages in a capitalist economy. There will be other factors which also affect 
the tendency for co-ops to operate in certain seeton - e.g. the nature of the labour process, 
degree qf capital intensity, general economic conditions in the industry: but in view of the 
central role of accumulation and competitive conditions we can initially abstract from these 
and concentrate on co-ops' market relations. 
MARX ON CO-OPERA1lVES 
The origins of workers co-operatives as attempts by worken to secure the full product of 
their labour, in reaction to the exploitative conditions imposed by capitalist production, 
made them objects of attention for nineteenth century socialists, who supported their 
potential contribution in the transformation from capitalism to socialism. Marx devoted 
some limited attention to thern in various works12, and much of what he said remains 
applicable to the worker co-operative movement today. He offered critical but enthusiastic 
support; essentially he saw them as representing the political economy of labour rather than 
the political economy of capital, and admired them as prefigurative forms of socialism. In 
1864, in his inaugural address to the International Working Men's Association he spoke 
highly of co-operatives: 
But there was [in 1848] in store a still greater victory of the political economy of 
labour Over the political economy of property. We speak of the co-operative 
movement, especially the co-operative factories raised by the unassisted efforts 
of a few bold 'hands'. The value of these great social experiments cannot be 
overrated. By deed, instead of by argument, they have shown that production 
on a large scale, and in 'acmrd with the behests of modem science, may be 
earned on without the existence of a class of masters employing hands; that to 
bear fruit, the means of labour need not be monopolised as a means of 
domination over, -and of exhortation against, the labouring man himself; and 
that, like slave labour, the serf labour, hired labour is but a transitory and 
inferior form, destined to disappear before associated labour plying its toil 
with a willing hand, a ready mind, and a joyous heart.13 
12 s.ltnIIit, 1962, for Mlrz's co&cfltl1llDrb .,." ClJlllmad. 011 ~. 
13 Mn, 1974, p. 79. , . 
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and elsewhere adds that: 
The co-operative factories of the labourers themselves represent within the old 
form the first sprouts of the new, although they naturally reproduce, and must 
reproduce everywhere in their actual organisation all the shortcomings of the 
prevaiImg system. But the antithesis between. capital and labour is overcome 
within them, if at first oIlly by way of makin.g the associated labourers into 
their OW1\ capitalist i.e. by en.abImg them to use the meaI\S of production for 
the employment of their OW1\ labour14 
Marx aclmowledges here that co-ops will face difficulties in .their confrontation with 
capitalism. Below he starts to identify the conditions which lead to this: 
At the same time, the experience of the period ·from 1848 to 1864 has proved 
that, however excellent in principle, and however useful in practice, 
co-operative labour, if kept within the narrow circle of the CQSUIll efforts of private 
workmen, will never be able to arrest the growth in geometrical progression of 
monopoly, to free the masses, nor even to perceptibly lighten the burden of 
their miseries. It is perhaps for this very reason that plausible noblemen, 
philanthropic middle-class spouters, and even keen political economists, have 
all at once turned nauseously complimentary to the very co-operative labour 
system they had vainly tried to nip in the bud by deriding it as the utopia of 
the dreamer, or stigmatising it as the sacrilege of the socialist. To save the 
industrious masses, co-operative labour ought to be developed to national 
dimensions, and, consequently, to be fostered by national means.IS (emphasis added) 
Despite their merits co-ops do not exist in isolation, and the pressures of a competitive 
capitalist economy would force them to replicate capitalist practices if they were to survive 
commercially. This was probably the first exposition of the 'degeneration thesis'. However 
Marx was clear that this degeneration was conditional, dependent on the relationship of 
co-ops to the rest of economy, and not solely on their OW1\ efforts. Earlier, Marx had 
supported the 'nationalisation of co-operation' to prevent such degeneration16. 
Marx clearly valued the experience gained and the examples provided by co-operative 
working, which went some way towards satisfyin.g the demands of collectivised 8J\d 
socialised activity and provided intellectually demanding work involving decision-making. 
Potentially, through co-operatives workers could add to themselves rather than sell 
themselves as a commodity. Yet Marx cmd Ernest Jones were pessimistic about the potential 
of co-ops, feeling that they could never challenge the concentration of capital achieved in 
dominant industrial firms by seeking to outcompete them. They considered that the 
24 MIn, 2959, p. 440. 
15 MM%, 2974, p. BO. 
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'socialism' of producer co-operatives in a market economy could never progress to 
communism without a political strategy linked to that of the labour movement. In practice, 
the 19th century producer co-operatives of Britain and Europe tended to be linked to liberal 
utilitarianism and philanthropy rather than with working class political parties and trade 
unions. As a result, Marx saw them as a bourgeois distraction for the growing labour 
movement. We will see later how this basic issue remains unchanged today. 
The general point needs making that Marx did not consider co-ops "in (lnd for themselves, 
but always in the general perspective of working class emancipation" 17. This point is 
absolutely central to a marxist analysiS of co-operatives. The crucial issue is not whether 
co-ops improve the position of workers in those co-ops, but what contribution do they make 
to transforming the position of workers as a class. This approach distinguishes marxist from 
bourgeois/ orthodox analysis - analysing co-ops on a class rather than an individualistic 
basis. 
CO-OPERATIVFS AND SOCIAUSTS SINCE MARx 
Many writers have seen Marx's position on co-operatives as contradictory, on the one hand 
supporting them as precursors of sodaIism, and on the other dismissing them as doomed to 
fail or degenerate. Such a view is based on a misunderstanding of Marx's political economy. 
The contradiction is not within MtlIx's analysis but is in the position of worker co-operatives in a 
CIlpitalist economy. Yeo points out that Marx did not attack the idetJ of co-operatives, only the 
deformation of the idea which appeared in practice; a further example where a distinction is 
needed between the abstract concept and its concrete form. In fact a misunderstanding of 
Marx with respect to co-operatives - and indeed on many other issues - is the rule rather 
than the exception. Amongst non-marxists it is widely considered that Marx and marxists 
are unsympathetic towards co-ops, bec:ause co-ops will inevitRbly degenerate, either failing 
commerdally, or becoming transfcHmed into capitalist enterprises, and that there is no 
po88ibWty of them succeeding tIS co-opmdiws in a capitalist economy. This orthodox 
interpretation has been 'put forward by Tomlinson in a comprehensive compilation and 
critique of marxist writings on co-operatives: 
1) Profit maximisation, central to the operations of a capitalist economy, provides 
a clear-cut criterion on firms as to their success and failure. This measure in 
17 y." 2913, p. 95. 
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turn regulates the flow _of investment from elsewhere in the economy and so 
governs the survival or otherwise of the firm. (The operation of the much 
vaunted 'law of value' often amounts to no more than this). 
2) Co-operatives (or indeed any other fonn of enterprise) if they are to survive in a 
profit-making economy will have to adopt the management practices of 
capitalist finns, imposed by profit-maximisation, or go out of business. 
3) Thus 1 and 2 imply that co-operatives as effective alternatives to capitalist 
enterprises cannot exist without an overthrow of the entire capitalist system18• 
Tomlinson's writings will be discussed later in more detail. For the moment I am concerned 
with exposing this interpretation as a nmunderstanding of many writers ori co-operatives 
coming from a marxist or socialist tradition. 
The Webb. and their influence 
Marx's work has been drawn upon by a number of writers and researchers (although not all 
marxists themselves), dealing with the potential of worker co-ops as part of a strategy of 
transfOrming capitalism. They reach a range of conclusions; some emphasise the internal 
dynamics of co-ops and tend towards the behaviouralist view that effective internal 
reorganisation (broadly defined) is the main obstacle to success for worker co-ops. But 
pessimism towards co-ops' potential contribution to wider social and economic forces for 
change has been more common on the left, in view of the constraints imposed on co-ops by 
market relations .. 
The earliest British writers to devote substantial attention to co-ops were the Fabians Beatrix 
Potter Oater Webb) and Sidney Webb, writing around the tum of the century19. Although 
not marxists, they were active socialists and were highly influential in development of 
political and economic strategy of the British labour movement and the emergent Labour 
Party. Many subsequent writers have drawn upon their work and it has formed the basis 
for many different strands of debate. 
The almost universal interpretation of the Webbs' work is the prediction that co-ops would 
inevitably either fail commerda1ly or as co-operatives. Their findings - on the basis of 
extensive empirical investigation in Britain and Europe - contributed to the distinct lack of 
11 Tomliluorr, 1912, ". JJ. 
19 Potter, 1891; WdfI: s. it 8.1914, 1920. 
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enthusiasm towards worker co-ops in the trade union movement20. The strongest recent 
attack on the Webb's work and conclusions has been carried out by D.C. Jones21, who was 
concerned with rehabilitating the idea of workers co-ops following the Webbs pessimism. 
Jones characterises the Webbs as detenninistic, prejudiced and empirically wrong. He 
concluded that they were mistaken in claiming the almost inevitable degeneration of 
. socialist co-operatives, and his work has been powerful in informing subsequent debate 
concerning the degeneration thesis and its relationship to socialist thought on co-operatives. 
Thus Coates refers directly to Jones' work when taking the view that "there is good reason 
to question some of the Webbs' more caustic judgements"22. . 
This work has been extensively criticised by Clarke23 - who notes that Jones presents a 
largely [neoclassical-KJ] economic and statistical analysis, rather than a political analysiS. 
Fairclough24 has alSQ carried out a detailed examination of the Webbs work on the 
degeneration of co-operatives, particularly in the light of Jones' criticisms. He undertakes a 
thorough and effective rebuttal of Jones' arguments, exposing the shakiness of his empirical 
analysis and the formal nature of his measures of participation and degeneration. The 
Webbs viewed degeneration in terms of changing class relationships within co-operatives; 
firstly on the likelihood of the growing influence and control exerted by outside capital 
(external shareholders>, and secondly on the emergence of a class of wage labour within the 
co-operative, excluded from the control and security enjoyed by members. Jones relied 
heavily on formal measures of participation, rather than the Webbs' politically informed 
classification. Within these measures the concentration is on the the worker membership of 
management committees of co-operatives rather than on the relationship between members 
and non-member employees, which was central to the Webbs' analysis. Fairclough also 
shows that Jones' sampling methods were unsound, and that when corrected the Webbs' 
arguments for degeneration are supported by Jones' evidence rather than undermined. 
20 AI""",," 1M W .... """".,." /Win,. .,., imparttmt in the {rmtuuitm of ,..,lItiw IIltiht4es IDwIJrtiI CICH1JI' in tire ,."" 
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of UII_ wIIIdt W '-' irnIolwII ill fill {vrm8titm of ctHIJIS, a{tDt to tIW substlllltiGl fi1umciII1 cost. TDfDID'tls tire erul of 
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23 QaW, 19B3c, ,.15. 
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It is important to point out that the Webbs were clearly sympathetic to the aims of those 
co-operatives which set out to be alternatives to the capitalist economy. Potter defined these 
as Oass I co-ops and described them as follows: 
Associations of workers fonned on the Christian Socialist model; selecting the 
committee of management from among their own numbers, and employing 
members only ... there are only eight societies in the first class, four of which ... 
deserve, however, an honourable mention, as the only associations true to their 
ideal of a "Brotherhood of Workers." From their own standpoint these 
associations defy criticism2S. 
However they broadly concluded that sociaIist-oriented co-operatives were almost certain 
to degenerate .into 'associations of small masters' and become indistinguishable from 
capitalist firms operating in the same market situations. 
Democracies of producers, as all experience shows ... have hitherto failed, with 
almost complete uniformity, whenever they have themselves sought to win 
and organise the instruments of production. In the relatively few instances in 
which such enterprises have not succumbed as business concerns, they have 
ceased to be democracies of producers managing their own work, and have 
become in effect associations of capitalists ... making profits for themselves by 
the employment at wages of workers outside the association26. 
It is important to realise that they were specifically interested in those co-operatives with 
avowedly anti-capitalist intentions; their analysis of degeneration was applied specifically 
those co-operatives with this orientation. They considered that the majority of co-Ops were 
already degenerate by their own definition and thus were not 'Democracies of Producers' at 
all. Their analysis was not applicable to the many co-operatives which were already acting 
in a capitalist fashion. 
The Webbs essentially saw degeneration occuning because co-operatives would be 
commercially weaker than their capitalist competitors. They gave three main reasons for 
this process. The first was failure to secure adequate workshop discipline - they felt that 
hierarchical organisation was essential for efficient production, and yet a manager who was 
both in charge of and responsible to the workforce would be in an impossible position. The 
second problem was that co-operatives which were predominantly set up by craft workers 
would lack the necessary marketing skills and sufficient knowledge of their market. Finally, 
there would be reluctance to adopt new technical processes if they involved making any 
25 Pot., 1m, ,. 139. 
~ WM S" B,1920, ;.155. 
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workers or skills redundant. These problems were presented as internal defects, rather than 
due to the location of co-operatives within a capitalist system: 
we infer that it is the very form of Associations of Producers that is ill-adapted 
to survive ... we think that it is these inherent drawbaclcs of the Self-Governing 
Worlcshop, rather than any accidental or remediable defects, that account for 
both the relative failure everywhere of this form of the organisation of 
industry27. 
Although their conclusions were strong and they were pesSimistic on the potential for 
co-operatives not to degenerate, their analysis did not have the determinism which has 
subsequently been ascribed to it. They were also concerned to determine the conditions 
under which degeneration could be avoided. Central to these conditions was an analysis of 
the impact of market forces, and they stressed that in the few cases where degeneration had 
been avoided it was beca~se market forces had somehow been softened. In particular they 
viewed the linlcs between producer and consumer co-operatives to be highly beneficial; the 
latter could provide a protected market, assist in planning product requirements, and 
provide managers if necessary, going some way towards overcoming problems of 
commercial weakness. 
On the negative side, the Webbs' primary concern was that co-operatives would accentuate 
divisions within the working class, because of the nature of the degeneration process which 
affected them. They identified two main processes arising from the commercial weakness of 
co-ops in the pressures of the competitive market. Firstly, divisions would arise internally; 
co-operative members, with secure employment and relatively good conditions, would be 
forced to protect their own positions by employing wage labour, with no rights to share in 
profits or decision making. Fairclough28 notes that this is in effect the emergence of a dual 
internal labour market within the co-op, consisting of 'central' and 'peripheral' workers29 or 
'primary' and 'secondary' segments30. The Webbs classed these co-operatives as 
'Association of Small Masters', that is, reproducing the wage-earner class. Secondly, 
co-operatives would be wlnerable to takeover by outside capitalists. Unlike most of todays 
co-ops, those in existence at the time of ~ Webbs' writings permitted outside shareholders. 
Frequently these were trade unions, other producer co-operatives, consumer co-ops, ex-
workers and other 'sympathetic' outsiders, but a tendency towards undercapitalisation 
27 *" S" 8, 1114,,,.21-22. 
28 Fchclougll, 11M. 
21 PrVtbrrIm, 1.977. 
30 RaIllery, I'..,. 
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inevitably made co-operatives vulnerable to control by finance capital. Indeed the 
degeneration of co-operatives into joint-stock enterprises was a frequent occurrence in the 
nineteenth century31. 
At the Webbs' writing, advocates of producer co-ops claimed that their generalisation could 
end the wage-eamer class system of capitalism. This position was encouraged by middle-
class social reformers such as E.V. Neale and Thomas Hughes, and drew upon the earlier 
ideas of Robert Owen and John Stuart Mill32, and received .some support from the 
economist Alfred Marsha1l33. They were suggesting that co-operatives had much greater 
potential than do most adv~cates today. The Webbs' poleJnical objective was to undermine 
this view, and was represented in the culmination of their work on producer co-operatives -
the supplement to the New Statesman on 'Co-operative Production and Profit-Sharing' in 
February 1914. This supplement addressed the question 'Can the Organisation of Industry 
be Based Exclusively on Associations of Producers?'; their analysis aimed to show the 
problems of a widespread co-operativism as a socialist political strategy, and as the basis for 
the economic organisation of a future socialist society 
We are agreed ... that land .. [and] .. industrial capital ... must be freed from 
individual or class ownership, and vested in the community for common 
benefit. But about the manner in which industry will be organised when this 
had been effected there is no identical vision. We seek to clear our minds on 
this point34• 
The Webbs were not anti-co-operative per se but were concerned with putting their 
potential into perspective and to specify the conditions under which co-ops could be 
successful as a part of such a socialist strategy. In the same issue of the New Statesman in 
which the Webbs' supplement appeared, an editorial argued that: 
while Associations of .Producers cannot of themselves provide the sole or chief 
basis for the organisation of industrial democracy, they may nevertheless in 
one form or another provide an essential element which, as time goes on, will 
secure increasing recognition from society as a whole35. 
Oearly, co-ops were not being completely dismissed as a result of the Webbs' work. 
However, they did have further concerns about the divisiveness of co-ops, beyond internal 
labour-labour relations. This was related to their particular view of the supremacy of the 
31 '1'IIom1q, 1981.; 1011f1, 1894; CDk, 1944. 
32 Mill, 1970. 
33 MDsNIIl, 1907. 
34 W"",., S.I!I B., 1914, p. I. . 
35 New 514"",..". FtInvIIry 14th, 1914". 584. 
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consumer interest (shades of neoclassical'consumer sovereignty'?) and tl:!e inherentlyanti-
consumer interests of producers. Market pressures would also force individual 
co-operatives to compete with each other in the market, in a manner which was essentially 
undemocratic: 
In the first place, it is a strangely distorted view of democracy to break a 
community into tiny self-governing circles of producers, which by the very 
nature of their activities must fight each other to the death or combine to 
impose price and quality on the public ..... For it is self-evident that all 
Associations of Producers ..... are directly opposed in their interests to the 
interests of the community36. 
Certainly there was frequently intense competition between producer co-operatives. The 
Webbs were concerned about 
the feature of their extreme mutual independence; and often their relentless 
competition with each other in the same trade. This rivalry is most marked 
among the ... boot manufacturing societies, and to a lesser extent among the ... 
printing societies, which compete furiously with each other, and with the 
Co-operative Wholesale Society, for the custom of the Co-operative Societies 
(Associations of Consumers). A similar rivalry marks ... the French 
Associations of Producers, and must ... . be deemed one of their 
characteristics.37 
They dte further the experience of French co-operatives: 
"We have made a mistake in France, and we must admit it," regretfully 
confessed recently an ardent co-operator. "We meant to establish co-operative 
production ••• what we have done is merely to create little shopkeeping 
establishments which compete with each other, and have just the state of mind 
that the coal dealer at one comer of the street had for the coal dealer at the 
other corner." (said in discussion in L'AssocUltion Ouvriere, November 25th, 
1912)38 
In contrast they extol the achievements of consumer co-operatives: 
••• the· great and growing Co-operative Movement of Associations of 
Consumers ... has succeeded as markedly as the Associations of Producers 
have failed39. 
On the basis of this work, the Webbs concluded that the labour movement should 
concentrate upon bUilding up consumer, rather than producer, co-operatives40• They 
36 Po,,.,, 1891, p. UI. 
37 Wcf1II, S. & B., 1914, p.20. 
31 iIzi4" p. I. 
39 iIzi4" p. 20. 
40 CmuumIr t:fHIPI g~ 1M WIbbs SIlJIIIDrl on 1M _is 0{ tMir flJ1PtW1l' ~, whidr IIltimal6ly ."., no' mamlilind. 
emcMM' ctH1'fII tlitl ",. cm.m achierN!mmtl to bm6fit 1M fDDI'kbtg clas; Yeo nota Uta, "by 1900 II fDa adW the most 
Economics of co-operati'Oes II: Marxist analysis 51 
argued that the consumer interest was a universal interest, whereas producer co-ops would 
benefit only those working in them rather than the wider community. This is of course in 
complete contrast to the work of Marx, who favoured producer co-operatives rather than 
consumer co-ops. 
We recommend to the working men to embark in co-operative production 
rather than in co-operative stores. The latter touch but the surface of the 
present economical system, the former attacks its groundwork41• 
The basis of any economy and society is the way in which production is organised, and the 
Webbs were wrong in looking to transform society by transforming the organisation of 
consumption; ultimately production must be the focus of attention42. It is instructive to note 
that in the latter half the 19805 history is repeating itself, as the Labour Party adopts a 
similar approach, focussing on exchange processes and consumers, rather than on 
production. 
Besides falsely elevating consumption to primacy over production, the Webbs' analysis was 
also weak because it was ahistorical. They failed to locate the commercial weakness of 
producer co-operatives within their relationship to the capitalist economy and the need to 
compete. Hence they could conclude that the difficulties experienced by co-operatives 
would always apply. They were concerned as to whether co-operatives could form the basis 
of the organisation of industry in some form of socialist economy, and used the results of 
their investigations and analysis to conclude that co-operatives were unsuitable as the major 
form of industrial organisation both within capitalism and the "State of To-morrow". 
The problems which the Webbs identified had put co-operatives at a disadvantage when 
competing with capitalist firms, but were not wholly negative. An improved quality of 
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work, and a reluctance to dismiss workers because of market-dictated changes in t~nical 
processes, are factors which should be valued in any socialist society43. To conclude that 
co-operatives can never be viable as a fonn of industrial organisation does not appear to be 
justified, although competitive pressures can make it difficult or impoSSible to pursue these 
objectives in a capitalist economy. 
The Webbs' position is based on their belief, common to Fabians of the time, in the merits of 
'elitist bureaucratic collectivism'. They had a conception of the inhE;l'ently hierarchical 
nature of industry and the impossibility of electoral structures there. This gave them a 
narrow view of degeneration which did not acknowledge any possibility of the 
advancement of worker control within co-operatives. Subsequent development of marxist 
theories of the labour process have opened up a wealth of debates of major relevance to 
co-operatives, which will be explored in a later section. 
The Webbs did not appear to consider that workers could conceivably be capable of 
running factories without managers or 'masters'; nor did they consider that low efficiency 
might be due to conflict between those managers attemptirig to implement capitalist 
methods of work organisation against the resistance of workers who resented this 
imposition. Oarke notes that: 
The Webbs frequent reference to the lack of management authority to impose 
work discipline in producers co-operatives, is reminiscent of a Spectator report 
("a Philistine English periodical") of 1866 upon which Marx commented with 
amusement, "The same paper finds that the main defect in the Rochdale 
co-operative experiments is this: 'They showed that associations of workmen 
could manage shops, mills, and almost all forms of industry with success, and 
they immediately improved the condition of the men, but then they did not 
leave a clear place for masters.' What a dreadful thingl"«. 
Nor did the Webbs favour democratic worker control within an enterprise even as an ideal; 
they felt that democratic control of an enterprise was inherently weak and that a 
management subJect to workers' c:ontrol would not be effective, and that a structure 
enabling'strong' management was essentiaL The Webbs' dismissal of worker control, even 
as an ideal, is perhaps less surprising when the nature of socialist thought in the 19205 is 
recalled. It was in the Soviet Union at that time that the debate about the nature of 'socialist 
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production' was taking place, both with regard to the nature of control in production and 
the nature of technology. This debate ended with the espousal of Taylorism and scientific 
management by Lenin, with its concomitant hierarchical structure in production and 
centralised control. The failure to develop worker control of production and wider 
democracy in the USSR contributed to much of its more recent economic and social 
difficulties45• 
Despite these criticisms the Webbs carried out valuable work on ~-operatives, the merits of 
which are largely ignored today. In particular they did offer some insight as to how 
degeneration could be avoided. They identified some co-operatives which had overcome 
the fact that "in active competition [they] could not stand in open market" by the fact that 
they had secured a high degree of market protection, through links with consumers 
co-operativesi "practically they have a 'tied market' - that is to say, the Associations of 
Consumers with whom they almost exclusively deal"46. For the Webbs the main potential 
for co-operatives lay either in sectors where market forces were less binding, or in the 
amelioration of market forces by one means or another: 
the self governing workshop, where the workers enjoy absolute autonomy, is 
proved by long and varied experience to be, in all but the most exceptional 
cases, neither stable nor, so long as it endures, economically efficient, and that 
where any commercial success ~ been attained it will be found that it has 
been gained with a close market, nearly always the partially tied market of the 
Associations of Consumers47• 
In particular they saw the potential of tying co-operatives into direct relations with 
consumer co-operatives. Such a relationship would avoid having to sell products on terms 
dictated by commercial capital, and would also assist in the provision of marketing and 
management expertise. 
Modern 1IUU'%ist.: MlllUlellUUl others 
More recent marxist analysis of workers' co-ops has tended to be pesSimistic towards their 
potential. There are two main lines of argument running through these views, one relating 
to co-ops as enterprises, the other to class formation. The' first is along the standard lines of 
the degeneration thesis, that the constraints imposed by competition will in practice force 
cc:H>ps towards capitalist methods of production, or cause them to fail commercially if 
45 MImMl, 1987. 
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adhering to socialist or co-operative principles. The point has been made in a well-known 
piece by Mandel: 
There have been many examples of workers' co-operatives that went wrong: 
there have been some that have "succeeded" - in capitalist terms that is! All that 
they have succeeded in, however, has been to transform themselves into 
profitable capitalist enterprises, operating in the same way as other capitalist 
firms48. 
He then goes on to emphasise the negative aspects of market competition: 
Not only is self-management limited to the level of the factory, work-shop or 
assembly line, an illusion from an economic point of view, in that the workers 
cannot implement decisions taken at this level against the operations of market 
laws, but, worse still, the decisions taken by the workers become more and 
more exclusively restricted to decisions about profits, as can be clearly seen in 
Yugoslavia. The fundamental principle underlying self-management, which is 
the liberation of labour, whereby workers dominate the process of production, 
decide for themselves the speed of the assembly line and the organisation of 
work in the factory, and which is part and parcel of the sort of socialist society 
we are trying to build, is unrealisable in an economy which allows the survival 
of competition. 
As the Yugoslav example shows only too clearly, the survival of competition 
imposes certain unavoidable imperatives on the units of production. They are 
faced with an unenviable decision. On the one hand, they can accept the logic 
of rationalisations: reducti.0n of the labour force, speed-up, ~d so on. On the 
other, they can reject this logic, thus condemning certain units of production to 
operate at a 105& and to pay wages far below average rates. The only solution to 
all these questions is to regulate industry at a socia1level, thus allowing for an 
effectively planned economy consciously run for the process of 
deproleteriaiusation to advance. 
Mandel clearly links the problems faced by co-operatives not just to capitalist ownership of 
the majority of enterprises, but to the domination of the economy by markets and 
competition. Nichols reinforces the point: 
Capitalist relations of production consist not only of intra-enterprlse relations 
(capitalists/managers: workers) but also inter-enterprlse relations (that is 
between private capitals which are unregulated and unplanned). Because of 
this it is difficult, for example, for workers co-operatives to break away from 
capitalist principles of organisation (hierarchy, wage. differentials, 
minimization of wage costs etc.). This is obvious enough perhaps in the case of 
the sole co-operative that seeks to stay afloat on the capitalist sea. But the same 
tendencies will assert themselves even if we consider the notional case of a 
society in which workers have appropriated all enterprises and seek to run 
them democratically, and on the basis of equality - unless, that is, they have 
4B~, 1975, ".lB. s.. MMs4d,1973. 
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had the foresight to abolish the commodity relations which formerly entangled 
these enterprises49• -
These views have been echoed reasonably widely on the leftSO. Scargill and Kahn assert that 
"in general, co-operatives .... have a record of either failing as enterprises or conforming to 
capitalist economics and modes of operation. They certainly have not contributed to the 
transformation of the economy as a whole"Sl. And at the time of the formation of the 'Benn' 
co-operatives in the mid-1970s, the SWP argued that turning these failed enterprises into 
co-operatives would change nothing, and that as "islands of socialism in a capitalist sea", 
they, were doomed to failS2. 
However, there is more to the problem than the impact on the workers immediately 
involved; the second strand of concern about co-ops are the implications for the wider 
working class. Referring to the problems faced by the Scottish Daily News co-operative: 
It would have to solve them by .... undermining the conditions that union 
action has achieved in the industryS3. 
Thus there is concern about the potentially class-divisive nature of co-operatives. The point 
was first made by the Webbs, and is reinforced by Mandel, who follows their arguments 
that market forces will lead to competition within the working class: 
The basis of the problem which I have attempted to elucidate is, thus, quite 
simple: for us, the notion of the class power of the proletariat exists in a very 
real sense precisely as class power and not the power of groups. To a large 
extent, these two conceptions are mutually exclusive. The more power is given 
to groups, the less is the power of the class as it is split into groups fighting 
amongst themselvesS4• 
The concern with the wider impact of co-ops on class is a distinctively marxist contribution 
to the co-ops debate, as other perspectives tend to confine themselves to enterprise-level 
issues. Cass issues have been absent from much of the debate, and have not been effectively 
countered. Similar objections have been raised more recently in a fl.te context of the GLC's 
industrial policy, with concern that the restructuring of individual capitalist enterprises 
through the promotion of 'flexible specialisation' by the local state, acts to undermine the 
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unity of the working class even if there are beneficial consequences for workers in the 
enterprises directly concerned55. 
The main counter-arguments .stem from those - such as the IWC - who emphasise the 
beneficial aspects of the struggle, even if there is eventual failure: 
the experience of the struggle, of taking over the management's position and 
powers, even for a limited period of time, can only have had a powerful effect 
in heightening the understanding and particularly the political awareness of all 
the workers involved ..... workers co-operatives have been and.can continue 
to be an example, a laboratory of working class experience . . . . that such 
experiments have limitations is obvious to the most casual observer, but that is 
no reason not t9leam from them56• 
This is perhaps a somewhat idealistic view of the experience of working in a co-operative; 
this issue will recur later, but there are many instances where workers have not been 
positively paliticised. The contribution of co-ops to such struggle will depend on the links 
established with the labour movement and progressive forces. Coates is more circumspect 
than his IWC colleague: 
the movement to establish co-operative factories cannot be evaluated outside 
the context of the labour movement which gives rise to it. If producer 
co-operatives are part of a wholesale onslaught upon the powers of capital, in a 
dynamic upsurge of trade union and labour action, then they have a quite 
different meaning, as stimuli and examples, from that which they may come to 
acquire in periods of recession in militant labour activityS1. 
This echoes earlier comments by Lenin, who considered that whether co-ops could be 
considered to be 'collective capitalist' institutions or genuine socialist organisations 
depended upon their particular context in the balance of class forces and their relation to the 
most progressive elements of the class struggle at the timeSS. 
Po.t-marxist. - Tomlinson: internal flexibility and external constraints 
Mandel's analysis of co-operatives, and much subsequent marxist work, tends to focus 
solely on economy-level 'forces, operating at the general level of the capitalist mode of 
production. Tomlinson59 argues that in order to understand the paths followed by 
individual co-operatives it is necessary to examine the impact of these forces at enterprise 
55 ColI,,,, 1986. 
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level. He draws upon the diversity of practice in capitalist enterprises t~ argue that while 
there are pressures from the market on all enterprises to 'profit-maximise', these are not 
particularly tight constraints. Secondly, there is no 'Royal Road to profit-maximising'60. 
lhat is, market pressures do not dictate the precise way in which an enterprise profit-
maximises, and that there are some choices over the mode of operation open to firms and 
co-operatives; the need to profit maximise does not determine the nature of the 
accumulation process within an individual finn. As a result, if a co-op wishes to adopt non-
capitalist forms of operation it does have some choice, and is potentially able to follow 
alternative, co-operative, objectives while achieving commercial survival; by implication, 
the ways in which co-ops operate do not have such a high cost in terms of commercial 
perfonnance that they will cause co-ops to fail. Ultimately Tomlinson urges the British left 
to support co-operatives because of their inherently democratic structure. In his view the 
combination of the variety of fonns open to an enterprise and the democratic nature of 
co-operatives means that they do offer a real alternative to the capitalist enterprise. 
Tomlinson rejects what he considers the detenninism of much marxist analysis of co-ops, 
whereby the need to maximise profits forces co-ops to adopt the management practices of 
capitalist finns. He attempts to steer a fine line between this and the behaviouralist 
approach of disregarding external constraints altogether, whereby the dynamic of 
organisations becomes one· of balancblg diverse goals to achieve a coherent enterprise 
strategy: 
The implication of the existence of these 'strategic possibilities' is that 
co-operatives which do have different fonns of organisation to the generality 
of capitalist enterprises can survive under capitalist conditions61• 
The analysis does acknowledge that co-ops' external relations have an impact on their mode 
, of operation, ~ut argues that the constraints operating on co-operatives need to be identified 
in particular cases rather than being given by the logical nature of capitalism. He suggests 
that co-ops should be investigated within the: 
particular constraints of operating within particular markets (product and 
labour) with particular means of production and within particular national 
economies62. 
60 Toml;""", 7984, p. 598. 
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However, this runs the risk of becoming purely descriptive of specific situations, unless the 
analysis remains rooted in the underlying dynamic of capitalist economies. Whilst I would 
not disagree with the need to examine these particular characteristics, they must be 
analysed as operating in the specific context of a capitalist economy, which can in tum be 
first dealt with at an abstract level. Otherwise the 'particular' constraints become purely 
descriptive; national economies cannot be located within the operation of underlying global 
econonuc forces, and the analysis loses touch with the underlying process of accumulation. 
Tomlinson's argument draws upon the theoretical work of Cutler, Hindess, Hirst and 
Hussain63. They consider that the concept of the mode of production must be abandoned in 
favour of a study of particular national economies and their 'conditions of existence'. This 
work "explicitly rejects Marx's [scientific] method and throws out the concepts of mode of 
production, laws of motion, value, exploitation, prices of pr~uction, and determination by 
the economy and replaces them with description of the interactions of particular 
institutions"64. Tomlinson'S position is based upon characterising all marxist thought on 
co-operatives as follOwing the deterministic 'logic of capitalism' argument that they must 
necessarily degenerate. But as Fairclough points out, this "is only one possible interpretation 
of the legacy of past writers in the socialist tradition"65. The alternative marxist approach is 
to analyse co-operatives starting from the most abstract concept of the capitalist mode of 
production and deriving the forces operating on them in the abstract form of tendencies. As 
anti-capitalist enterprises within a capitalist mode of production, the economic pressures 
towards degeneration on co-ops win be countered by their anti-capitalist origins. The 
analysis can progress this far without dealing with the particular form which any capitalist 
economy will adopt at any historical stage of its development. The next stage is to analyse 
the role of co-operatives as being determined by the contradictory operation of those forces, 
before finally mOving. to what the outcome of that contradiction will be, according to the 
balance of class forces in any sodal fonnation. 
Tomlinson himself fails to develop an examination of how these constraints on co-ops might 
operate in product markets, instead cOnfining his attention to general comments on co-ops' 
weakness in finance markets. He shares this approach with ThornIey, who asCribes great 
importance to difficulties in raising finance and considers that the sector's growth will be 
63 Cutt.r, HiIuUa, Hinlt IUId HvIMin, 1977, 1978. 
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limited ~ess "they are supplied with capital on favourable terms by sympathetic 
organisations"66. At the same time she condemns co-ops for paying insuffident attention to 
market forces and trying "to cut themselves off from the market and find protection in the 
labour and co-operative movement"67. Clearly there is an inconsistency in proposing that 
co-ops should be protected in finance markets ("capital on favourable terms") and yet 
dismiSSing the same approach in product markets. 
Tomlinson may be accurate in his characterisation of some of the more general marxist 
writing on co-ops, but in fact the study of the operation of constraints on co-ops is within 
the best traditions of marxist analysis; it is not all crude determinism. Co-ops can be dealt 
with without jettisoning fundamental categories of marxism, and in fact can only be 
adequately analysed in the context of a marxist framework. 
Rather than descending into an "eclectic institutionalism", it is possible to draw upon the 
work of previous sodalist and marxist writers which deal with co-ops in the context of 
. 
market constraints. The aim is to analyse how constraints operate on co-ops in particular 
concrete situations - particular social formations at particular times - but this does not 
require the abandonment of the basic categories of marxist analysis, of the mode of 
production, laws of motion, and the underlying class structure of society. 
MARxIsT ANALYSIS OF CO-OPS: A RECONSIDERATION 
The view that co-ops will inevitably degenerate within capitalism does not follow from 
Marx's analysis, although it has ascribed to many who call themselves marxists, and stems 
from a misunderstanding of the status of the 'laws of motion' of capitalism. These are not 
'deterministic iron laws' with definite and generalisable empirical outcomes, but have the 
status of tendencies. They refer to the underlying necessary relations and causal powers of 
objects, whereas the empirical outcome is the result of the interaction of causal powers and 
contingent conditions, which can occur in different forms; "the relationship between causal 
powers or memarusms and their effects is therefore not fixed, but contingent,-and indeed 
causal powers exist independently of their effects"68, An example relates to Tomlinson's 
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earlier claim that the variety of forms of operation of capitalist firms show that the need to 
profit-maximise is only a loose constraint; 
the effects of the law of value in forcing capitalist firms to reduce the labour 
time expended in producing each commodity will vary according to such 
contingent conditions as labour resistance, availability of new technologies, the 
nature of the product, management characteristics, etc. Firms may respond in a 
variety of ways, some speeding up work rates, some automating and others 
closing down69• 
There are clearly many ways to improve or maintain profits. Workers can be persuaded or 
coerced to work harder or for longer hours; work can be reorganised to improve technical 
efficiency, reducing wa~te; alternatively, new technology may be developed which enables 
machines to work faster, or with improved technical efficiency. Which method is chosen 
will depend upon a variety of factors, such as the history of class struggle in the industry 
and relative strength of capitalists and workers to impose or resist changes, technical 
characteristics, the strength of market demand, general economic conditions and the nature 
and extent of state intervention in the economy. Thus, for a long period capitalists in 
western economies chose to increase work intensity through the widespread imposition of 
Taylorist techniques of job analysiS and extreme division of labour. At the same time 
Japanese capitalists adopted a completely different strategy to achieve the same objective, 
building upon the values of team work instead of strict authoritarian control. But the. 
different strategy adopted in Japan does not remove the antagonism inherent in the 
capitaIist labour process, it merely deals with it in a different manner. And while the 
Japanese structure leads to relatively favourable working conditions for a privileged group 
of .ldlled workers, who enjoy employment security, high wages and some autonomy over 
the organisation of work, it is dependent upon the simultaneous existence of temporary and 
contract workers and those ~ployed by small sub-contractor and supplier firms who do 
not benefit from any of these rewards. 
Although alternative routes to profit maximisation do exist, the need to profit maximise in 
order to survive in the market remains. Nor does it follow that there exists an alternative 
which is suited to co-op organisation, Parttcwarly in view of the fact that most 
distinguishing aspects of co-op production have a cost in commercial terms. This is 
particularly relevant as recent restructuring has intensified competitive pressures on firms 
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as market forces ge!lerally in the economy have been strengthened, and the scope of 
economic activity subject to them has been widened. 
Variety in capitalist firms' operations tends to be at the level of fine detail. For instance, 
since 1979 there has been massive restructuring by firms (in which many went bankrupt> 
with the objective of resolving the crisis of low profitability. Different strategies have been 
adopted to meet this objective, but all have a common element of strengthening capital vis a 
vis labour and intensifying exploitation. The specific strategiesadQpted by individual firms 
to achieve this will depend on many factors, particularly the history of class struggle in the 
industry and the initial state of labour-capital relations, relations with other firms, and the 
nature of the particular firm's market. However, the underlying strategy, that of 
undermining the strength of labour within individual firms and the labour movement 
. overall, is common to all. 
The existence of different forms of operation is independent of the underlying causal 
mechanism, the pressure exerted on firms by the need to compete. In the same way that the 
eXistence of empirical regularities does not prove causation, empirical ilTegularities do not 
disprove causation. In fact, uncovering causal mechanisms from empirical events is not a 
straightforward process, as contingent conditions can operate in all sorts of ways, and 
counteracting forces may override and conceal the effects of the operation of a particular 
mechanism. 
Co-ops, operating in a capitalist economy, necessarily possess the causal power (or causal 
liability) to degenerate, but whether or not they will degenerate in practice will depend 
upon the impact of a variety of contingent conditions and counteracting influences which 
cannot be predicted in advance. From a marxist perspective, degeneratim:a is not a necessary 
empirical outcome of co-ops existence; it is degenerative pressures on co-ops which are a 
necessary condition of their existence in a capitalist economy, although they can be offset. 
All we can say at an empirical level is that co-ops will experience conflict between their own 
objectives and those which are - more or less sl)arply - imposed on them by the need to 
compete and survive. We say nothing about the outcome of this conflict, because it will 
vary depending on the contingent conditions operating in particular circumstances. What 
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we can say is that co-ops can no more escape this conflict than finns can escape the conflict 
between workers and capitalists, although in both drcumstances the effects and severity of 
the conflict may be mitigated. 
The conflict in the case of co-ops arises because the social relations within the enterprise 
(where workers own the means of production) conflict with those in the economy as a 
whole; co-ops attempts to avoid or reduce worker exploitation will conflict with the overall 
need of capitalists to increase it. This, at an abstract level, is the most fun~ental condition 
of the existence of co-ops in a capitalist economy. At a more concrete level, we can see that 
if, for instance, co-ops attempt to introduce job rotation in order to avoid some of the most 
alienating aspects of capitalist production, there will inevitably be a cost in effidency terms, 
although this can be counteracted by extra worker commitment and productivity or by 
some weak~ing of competitive pressures in that particular market. 
DEGENERATION· A REINTERPRETATION 
Having established that degeneration is a tendency rather than a definite empirical 
outcome, it remains to consider what forms degeneration may take in practice. As a starting 
point we can take the nature of production in co-operatives - broadly interpreted - and 
consider the extent to which it ~ replicates production, from workers' perspectives, in 
capitalist enterprises. Conventionally, degeneration is conceived of in terms of formal 
ownership and power relations within co-operatives; whether ownership passes from 
workers to outside capitalists, or whether class divisions arise internally through the 
employment of a class of wage labour. These were the concerns of the Webbs, and indeed of 
most other commentators who have addressed the issue. 
Earlier on I noted that any mode of production has two distinct levels, the mode of 
appropriation of nature, and the mode of appropriation of the product. In addressing 
fonnaI ownership relations in co-ops, attention is being paid only to the second level, that is, 
who derives benefit from the surplus product· whether it is capitalists, or all or part of the 
worlcforce. FoUowing Braverman, a full consideration of degeneration must consider the 
first level also, 1row production takes place in terms of the organisation of the labour process, 
division of labour, authority and control. 
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The distinction between the two levels can be seen clearly in the following passage where 
Marx describes the capitalist labour process: 
The labour-process, turned into the process by which the capitalist consumes 
labour-power, exhibits two characteristic phenomena. FU'St, the labourer works 
under the control of the capitalist to whom his labour belongs; the capitalist 
taking good care that the work is done in a proper manner, and that the means 
of production are used with intelligence, so that there is no unnecessary waste 
of raw material, and no wear and tear of the implements beyond what is 
necessarily caused by the work. Secondly, the product is the property of the 
capitalist and not that of the labourer, its immediate producer . 
These are charactenstics of both capitalist society and individual enterprises within that 
society. For the moment I am concerned with enterprises themselves. The concern of the 
Webbs, and of socialists since, has been with co-operatives which are anti-capitalist and 
representing some form of movement towards socialism. From this starting point then, 
degeneration can be interpreted as movement away from this ideal. 
Within an enterprise, opposition to the capitalist mode of production, and hence 
degeneration, can take place on both of the levels identified above. It is common for 
attention to be devoted to the second level only - the appropriation of the product, and 
hence surplus product. This is the position taken by both the Webbs and the social 
democrats described earlier. The latter (Oakeshott is a prime example) copsider only formal 
ownership relations within co-operatives; once workers formally own the means of 
production then by definition they are no longer exploited, as they have title to the total 
product of their labour. The Webbs position on the concept of degeneration is the same: 
their interpretation was that as class divisions emerged within a co-operative, members 
would either exploit other workers (by employing wage labour) or would be exploited 
themselves (as control passes into the hands of outside finance capital); The point where the 
Webbs differ from the social democrats is on the conditions for avoidance of degeneration. 
At the first level - the mode of appropriation of nature - social relationships are 
characterised by production techniques, organisation of the labour process, division of 
labour, authority and control. Failure to analyse degeneration on this level is due to ~ 
conception of these characteristics as either ahistorical, or desirable, or both. But by 
exploring the specifically capitaliSt nature of the aspects of enterprises, we can offer a 
broader interpretation of both the possible achievements of co-operatives and the scope for 
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degeneration. This is particularly important for an analysis of the recently-emerging British 
c(H)peratives, which have developed a very different form of socialist challenge to 
capitalism than that of the 19th and early 20th century C<H>peratives which were the 
concern of the Webbs. This is due to the different historical conditions, primarily economic 
conditions, which led to this emergence. 
Participation and Worker Control 
In contrast to the operation of the older 'CPF' co-operatives, the newer co-ops have placed 
great importance upon developing active democratic participation by workers. This 
reflected a different approach towards the exercise of democracy to that of the Webbs. 
Co-operative structures developed in the nineteenth century followed the pattern of 
representative democracy established in Britain's parliamentary structure. Workers in a 
C(H)P elected representatives to a committee which would be the enterprise's sovereign 
body, to which managers would be responsible. Workers' interests would be defended by 
these representatives,_ who would be elected for a fixed period (usually one year), and 
within this period it would be committee members rather than the workers themselves who 
wielded power. Management roles were broadly the same as those in conventional firms. 
The Webbs believed that even this in4irect form of worker control was unworkable and 
would counter an objectively efficient method of production, and this conflict was one of 
their reasons for believing that co-ops would tend to fail. Their influence in the Fabian and 
labour movements was extensive, and the development of public ownership through 
municipal enterprises and later nationalised industries failed to provide any channels for 
worker participation in decision-making or control over management. 
By the 19605 there was some disillusionment with both the monolithic corporations of 
monopoly capitalism and the democratic failures of nationalised industries12 - the latter 
incorporating the bureaucratic structures favoured by the Webbs and other Fabians. This 
dlsillusionment was most widespread amongst those loosely associated with the 
'alternative' movement, which was at times inspired by anarchism and at others simply by 
rejection of the establishment and the status quo. When C(H)PS started emerging from that 
same movement in the 19708, there was concern that representative democracy along 
parHamentary lines would be inadequate, and so the search for 'radical' internal structures, 
72 .. ,.,. ~/1973. 
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which would support active participation, began. A central objective was to move away 
from traditional hierarchical organisation within industry, and this itself required a rejection 
of the traditional role of management as the peak of an internal hierarchical structure. Since 
then the potential for a radical form of management and internal organisation, and effective 
participation by workers, has concerned both co-op activists and researchers73• 
The objective of non-hierarchical organisation and active participatory democracy is not 
supported throughout the co~p field; the opposing views of Oakeshott and Bradley, on the 
need for strong and hierarchical management, have been documented earlier. But once the 
need for non-hierarchical (or at least less hierarchical) management is accepted, there are 
contrasting views on its feasibility. At one extreme is the view that while co-op management 
is problematic, difficulties arise primarily because it is new and undeveloped; in theory at 
least, management which is both efficient enough for commercial survival, and more 
egalitarian than that found in capitalist firms and the public sector, can be developed74. 
Alternatively, the deyelopment of co-op management can be further examined in relation to 
the capitalist labour process and the undemocratic nature of most modem technology. This 
approach locates the derivation of management, technology and the labour process in the 
specific characteristics of the mode of appropriation of nature under capitalism, and 
examines the potential for changes in management structure in the context of these wider. 
constraints. 
Co-operlltioes, Democrtu:y, Technology 11114 the DifJision of lAbour 
Most advocates of the extension of democracy within co-operatives have concentrated on 
the organisational aspects of necessary changes. It is normally suggested that new or 
alternative decision-making structures and methods of communication are the primary 
requirementS for greater democracy75. These changes are undoubtedly important;· in 
particular, ~tricted access to information is one way in which management maintains its 
dominant position in capitalist companies. Wider availability of information is clearly a 
prerequisite for effective participation in dedsion-making by workers76. 
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This approach has much in common with institutional analyses of the conventional firm, 
which tend to concentrate on internal processes of objective bargaining and compromise 
between groups within the firm. What it omits is any serious consideration of the 
constraints on such processes. In part this stems from a conviction that technology and the 
division of labour are neutral, objectively serving the demands of 'efficient' production. 
Alternatively we can conceive of technology as being socially determined, with its fonn, 
and the associated division of labour (together making up the labour process), resulting 
from the dynamics of the accumulation process and the conflict betweerrcapital and labour. 
This has two implications: firstly, a labour process developed with the ~ of profitability 
and the maintenance of capitalist control is not necessarily suited to production on workers' 
terms; and secondly such a labour process may conflict with the aims of worker 
participation in production. 
These implications are not new or remarkable, and have been at the centre of labour process 
debates in recent years. What is new is relating them to the process of co-op development 
and the potential for worker control. The approach locates many more aspects of co-op 
production (and conflict) in their specific relationship to capitalism. 
The labour prOcell and work in co-ops 
Although democratic participation - on the basis of ownership - is an essential element of 
worker control of production, to remain at this level is to rely on a very formalistic 
interpretation of what worker control is about. Nutzinger notes that 
•... there can be no doubt that any strategy of industrial democracy aiming at 
increased workers' participation in decision-making and earnings and earnings 
must contain humanisation of the work conditions as an essential 
component. ...• Co-determination and self-detennination of the working man is 
not exhausted by measures of democratic control and legitimation; it has to be 
experienced personally in everyday work." 
Partidpation in decision-making does not necessarily translate into significantly greater 
control over work, if the nature of that work itself remains unchanged. Braverman's work 
was the first since Marx to analyse in detail the nature of work in capitalist industry, and the' 
first to take account of the massive changes which had taken place with the introduction of 
mass production technology and detaDed (Taylorist) division of labour earlier in the 20th 
century. Such technology was introduced in an earlier period of restructuring (altbough 
77 NNI%i",." 1980, ".146. 
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there are parallels with the restructuring currently taking place), and was part of the process 
of increasing capital's control over the labour process. Reorganising the structure of skills 
required and dividing production into many detailed functions undermined the previous 
power of skilled workers, who could retain some control over production. Detailed division 
of labour and deskilling enabled capital to increase control over the pace of work, thus 
intensifying the exploitation of labour, and also reduced many jobs to repetitive and 
routinised tasks. The division between mental and manua1labour was a crudal aspect of 
Taylorian scientific management. The nature of technology and ohvork thus created cannot 
be separated from capital's need to maintain the conditions for profitable accumulation. 
This process is still continuing, and 'new technology' is no exception: 
New technology impelled by unrestricted market forces not only threatens the 
number of jobs, but also their content and quality. In the USA, the makers of 
numerically-controlled machine tools have recommended that they be .worked 
by retarded people, with a mental age of 12, thus displadng high-skilled 
workers.78 
. Marx was highly critical of the development of the division of labour in capitalist industry, 
this forming an essential element in his analysis and critique of capitalism. He drew a 
contrast between the alienating character of labour performed in capitalist workplaces and 
the richness and freedom that he associated with life in a future communist era. This 
provides a challenge for co-operatives: unless they can successfully transform internal work 
processes and the nature of production (both what is produced and how) then their 
achievements will be limited. Such changes are necessary both for advancing the position of 
labour generally, in tenns of developing socialist forms of production and labour process, 
and for relieving the oppressive nature of work experience for those in co-operatives. 
This need had been previously recognised by the workers at Lucas Aerospace. In 
developing the Lucas Alternative ·Plan, they were not just concerned with the type of 
products made, but also the way in which work was organised: 
Already in the early 1970s it had become clear, the Combine argued,that 
management's attempts to replace human intelligence with machine 
intelligence by, for example, emphasising the universal importance of 
computer-controlled machine tools as against human skill, have had disastrous 
results. One purpose of the Corporate Plan was to campaign for radical job re-
design which would protect Combine members from this desldlling process 
and enable them to extend their skills79 
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And as Oarke points out in relation to the large KME co-operative on Merseyside, "it is 
difficult for co-operative workers to maintain the feeling that they are engaging in a great 
co-operative experiment when their sole co-operative duty is to make several thousand spot 
welds each day!"80. 
The lack of attention which has been devoted to labour process issues by researchers on 
co-operatives is perhaps surprising, as the alienating effects of the capitalist work process 
has been well documented in the labour process literature, since being f!rst put forward by 
Marx in Volume I of Capital and further developed by Bravennan. The latter's work has 
come in for its own share of criticism, but at least there is a debateSl. It is a sad reflection 
that co-operative research has been dominated by bourgeoiS thought and there is little or no 
appreciation of the labour process being historically specific; it is particularly notable that 
although co-ops and industrial democracy are promoted as an answer to the problem of 
worker alienation, there is little understanding of the causes of that alienation. 
This situation also reflects a lack of attention to the development of specifically socialist 
technology and labour processes in the socialist states of eastern europe (although perhaps 
less SO in the socialist states of the third world, particularly China82). In the Soviet Union the 
question of workers control at the factory level was debated during the revolution and in 
the years immediately after. Although the factory committees made impressive 
contributions to the revolution, the question was resolved in favour of hierarchical 
management and the workers control movement dismissed as 'anarchCHyndicalist 
heresy'83. Lenin argued for the introduction of Taylorian scientific management into Soviet 
industry in 191884, and the USSR essentially emulated the capitalist organisation of 
productionB5• Lenin was also concerned that one of the major problems facing the 
revolution was the backwardness of Russian capitalism86, and the introduction of scientific 
management was an attempt to catch up with capitalist industry as quickly as possible. 
Bmulating capitalist industry was not surprising; given that it took capitalism centuries to 
develop its own mode of production, it would be unreasonable to expect socialist 
so 0Irb, 1984, ,.110. 
n ,.,. Ell'" 1979. 
82 1..DcknI,1980. 
~ Siri"",i, 1985. 
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production to develop overnight. Marx had in any case anticipated that socialist revolutions 
would first of all occur in countries with solid democratic and capitalist foundations, which 
would provide the basis of socialist construction. In addition, Russell notes that: 
Actually, both Marx and Lenin had always been inclined to associate a new 
division of labour only with the second, "higher" phase of communism; and 
both had always anticipated that the first phase of postrevolutionary society 
would accept the capitalist division of labour as it found it. Thus Marx wrote in 
Capital that the new society would begin by taking the existing capitalist 
machinery as it is and putting it to public use. And of the scientists and 
engineers, Lenin wrote on the eve of the revolution that "these gentlemen work 
today owing allegiance to the capitalists: they will work even better tomorrow, 
owing it to the armed workers" . That the Russian revolution did not produce 
a new division of labour should not thus be interpreted either as a failure or as 
a surprise. Nevertheless, it has contributed strongly in the West to a tendency 
to treat differences in ownership as irrelevant to the nature of work, and to see 
the division of labour as determined by other factors instead. 
However, the adoption of capitalist organisation of production in the Soviet bloc has 
severely constrained the achievements of self-management in Yugoslavia~ Even in such a 
system of more direct worker control of production, little attention has been devoted to 
developing technology, to reorganising production or restructuring the division of labour in 
a more socially desirable and less alienating manner. The replication of mass production 
technology is in part a response. to a perceived need for competitive efficiency, but is also a 
response to a failure to consider alternatives as even possible. Braverman adds: 
The similarity of Soviet and traditional capitalist practice strongly encourages' 
the conclusion that there is no other way in which modern industry can be 
organised. And this conclusion has already been sufficiently encouraged by the 
tendency of modern social science to accept all that is real as necessary, all that 
exists as inevitable, and thus the present mode of production as eternal89• 
Labour process and participa,tion 
Maintaining the capitalist labour process in co-operatives also has implications for the 
ability to make democratic structures effective. Several studies in Yugoslavia have found 
that despite formal equality amongst workers there are systematic inequalities in the actual 
distribution of . partidpation in workers councils90. In particular, rank-and-file workerS 
87 Lmin, 1961, ,. 237. 
88 Ruudl, 1985".55. 
B9 B"_""., 1974, ,.16. 
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partidpate much less actively than do managerial and technical personnel91• The same is 
reported from Mondragon92. 
For the majority of co-ops production must take place using established technology and its 
'. . . ' 
accompanying inequalities. One strategy adopted by co-ops is to accept the differentiation 
of roles and skills as given but to rotate different workers amongst those roles; thus each 
worker has an opportunity to take a tum at a leadership post, and a distinct class of leaders 
or managers has less opportunity to emerge. Furthermore, workers will ~ach be trained in a 
variety of sldlls, while monotonous and boring tasks - which will still exist - will at least be 
shared amongst a variety of workers. 
'The major problem with this strategy is that it requires skilled positions to be removed from 
workers whose whose abilities, training and experience make them well qualified to fill 
them, and reassigned to individuals who lack experience and perhaps other qualifications: 
In most branches of production some work is highly skilled and rotating workers between 
such posts could be a major problem. This is clearly likely to have a negative impact on 
commercial performance, and reinforce any tendencies towards commerdal weakness 
which co-ops have. 
More ambitious than job rotation are attempts to restructure the division of labour itself 
within co-operatives, aiming to create a more egalitarian organisation of work. In recent 
years, interest in the question has surfaced in such diverse environments as the USSR, the 
Israeli kibbutzim, the Mondragon co-operatives93, and the GLC in London. Although in 
these caSes nobod~ has suggested that the division of labour of some kind can be dispensed 
with entirely, what has been proposed is that work should be restructured in such a way 
that every worker can experience some degree of complexity and autonomy on the job. This 
can be seen as a first attempt to develop the 'Socialist technology' which has been so far 
lacldJ\g in the sodalist states of Eastern Europe. In Mondragon, efforts were inspired by 
dissatisfaction amongst co-op workers; although there had been achievements in reducing 
income differentials and the amount of supervision, there has been. with few exceptions, a 
maintenanc:e of conventional capitalist technology and division of lab0ur94. In the mid-
1970& a number of pilot projects on job redesign were carried out. Although technically 
92 ZtqaDfI, 1'75; t::.7lmuIm1ie, 1975). 
92 7'IItmta I!J Log"" 1982. 
93 RMoell, 1985, p. 63. 
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successful, plans to restructure work at Mondragon's largest plant were blocked by the high 
retooling costs they would involve95• This experience clearly demonstrates the limits which 
the need to compete imposes on the ability of co-ops to restructure production. 
In this capacity the GLC/GLEB~s technology networks were a valuable innovation. Initially 
they aimed to contribute to the development of socially-responsible technology, providing 
"socially useful work that also enhances the quality of life"96. It involved taking control of 
production on terms favourable to labour, and would "build on the existing skills of 
operatives instead of destroying them, and leave initiative in the work process on the 
factory floor97. Following the abolition of the GLC iri 1986 and the consequent restructuring 
of GLEB, the aims of the TechNets have been severely restricted. Rather than attempting to 
change the division of labour, the concern is now with training people, particularly women 
and black wor~, to more skilled positions within the existing structure. 
If successfully developed, there is no reason why such technology should be quantitatively 
less efficient that conventional technology. For technology to be 'efficient' in capitalist terms, 
it "maximises the ability of the ruling class to reproduce its domination of the social process 
of production and minimises producer resistance"98 besides quantitative considerations of 
how much output can be produced from given inputs. Technology is c)losen not just on the 
basis of immediate financial calculations (quantitative ~ficiency), but also on the basis of its 
contribution to the maintenance of class relations. Socialist technology can be as 
quantitatively efficient - and therefore not be a disadvantage in co~l terms - but with 
different implications for class relations, i.e. it "continually develops workers' capacity to 
share equally in mutual responsible and collective socia1 relationships"99. 
Therefore (in theory at least) co-ops could use such socialist technology - if it was available -
to transform relations within the co-op, and not suffer any penalty in terms of conunemal 
efficiency too. However such technology will not be intentionally developed by capitalist 
95 JoImMm iii WIJytI, 1977, ,. 27. 
96 GLC, rul(c), p. s. 
"ii4. 
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industry, as clearly it works against the interests of capital101• Thus intervention by the local 
-
or national state, or labour movement, to undertake such development is necessary. 
Certainly at present the co-op movement is too weak and small to do so. 
A further illustration of the link between worker control and the nature of work lies in the 
concentration of co-ops in certain industries. There are many reasons for this, which will be 
investigated in more detail later, but one factor is the the variation in the nature of work and 
the division of labour from one industry to another. Once formed, the potential for 
co-operatives to make advances in the area of the labour process also depends on various 
factors1az, although these may be different. Oearly the potential for job rotation, skill 
sharing etc. is much greater in, say, retail trade tl'uin in volume car production, although job 
rotation, for instance, may be easier with relatively unskilled or undifferentiated work, in 
view of the productivity 'costs' involved. Co-operative production will be more difficult in 
sectors where mass production is established (and indeed there are few, if any, 
co-operatives established in such areas in Britain). However, in branches where workers 
have established a high degree of control over the labour process, and where bespoke rather 
than mass production predominates (such as in printing), or where work is unskilled but 
unmechanised and with little skill differentiation, reorganisation of production along 
co-operative lines may be more successful. 
This is not to assert that turning, say, British Leyland into a co-operative would be totally 
meaningless. H democratic structures were installed, there would be benefits as political 
participation in itself leads to the acquisition of political skillslm. It is also clear that despite 
(or because of) the alienating effects of capitalist production, workers do have an ability to 
resist and overcome some of the worst aspects of such employment104• The potential for 
gains under co-operative control is further increa~ by the generally poor performance of 
professional management in Britain. The ingenuity of workers at British Leyland is 
illustrated in the foUowing article: 
Night workers at a British Leyland paint shop who were found to be asleep 
during a spot check may face disciplinary action for an alleged breach of safety 
102 H",.." It 11M".,....".., """ rani ratructvrl",. iN ~ 1M ~ o{'f'cdble .",,:WilGitm' ira 
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regulations. The 14 men in Block 38a at the Range Rover plant in Solihull, 
Birmingham, devised a method of completing their workload halfway through 
their shift so they could spend the remainder of their time asleep ..... 
Management made a spot check at 4 a.m. on Friday when most of the workers 
were found sleeping in the locker room. The conveyor track was switched off. 
The men are expected to be called before management today. They will be 
given the opportunity of having representatives of the Transport and General 
Workers Union present at the hearing. Disciplinary action could result in 
suspension or even dismissal. 
BL stressed that the men had been keeping to their work schedules and turning 
in work of the required quality.105 -
While this indicates that BL under worker control might have some flexibility to reorga~se 
work, this is greatly limited while technology and the division of labour employed remain 
unchanged. It might be possible - depending on the severity of competitive pressures - to 
rotate boring and. monotonous jobs, but those jobs would still need to be done. In general 
however the problems of alienation within co-operatives under the capitalist labour process 
will remain. The development of an alternative, socialist technolOgy is clearly a massive 
task, given the immense resources, time and effort which have contributed to the present 
advanced state of capitalist technology. Individual co-operatives are limited in what they 
can achieve, and efforts at a state level are required. 
Management in Co-ops 
The problems caused for neoclassical and behavioural approaches by their fallure to 
consider the nature of capitalist production also lead to difficulties in eonceptualising the 
role and nature of co-operative management. Although there are some who do not consider 
that co-op management should differ significantly from that in capitalist firms, there are 
many for whom a distinctly different form of management is a crucial requirement; if 
co-ops' mode of operation is to improve upon that of capitalist companies, with the purSuit 
of different objectives and working practices, then new forms of enterprise management 
- . . 
and decision-making will be required which allow workers to have real and effective 
control over and involvement in management decisions. 
All too often, though, an ahistorical approach is taken to the question of managaement, as if 
deciding upon an appropriate internal structure was just a question of choosing from the 
selection on offer at the London Business School; there is a consistent fallure to locate the 
lOS fjll41!"" rima 12.11.19. 
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problems of developing co-operative man$ement within co-ops' relationship to the 
capitalist economy, and a tendency to treat these problems as purely internal matters. 
Obviously it is important for co-ops to pay attention to their internal organisation, but it is 
essential that appearances are not confused with causes. Conventional management 
structures are integrally ~ to the issue of control of the workforce, which is in turn 
related to the nature of production technology and hierarchy, and to the needs of 
competition and accumulation. Whilst the issue of control is - to a certain extent at least -
transformed in co-op, many other aspects of the management function remain unchanged, 
particularly those aspects which derive directly from interaction with the eConomy. A major 
part of the management function is to interpret and respond to the dictates of the market, 
and unless co-ops' relationships with the market are transformed then there is limited scope 
for changing the nature of management in co-ops. And if, as some argue, the market 
represents the collective daso interests ,of capital, then questions are I'ilisect regarding the 
class unity of a co-operative workforce, with management representing the internal 
articulation of capitalist interests. I! so, this implies the preservation of class conflict within 
co-ops even once capitalist ownership of the enterprise has been abolished. 
Concluding mtlllrkl 
The aim of this chapter has been to present the foundations for a marxist analysis of worker 
co-ops in a capitalist economy, and to clarify some of the issues involved which have led to 
misinterpretation of the work of previous commentators, some of which has been reviewed 
here. This has of necessity been rather long and involved, reflecting the complexity of some 
of the analysis, and the wide range of issues involved. The analysis is developed further in 
the next two chapters, which present the approach to be used in the rest of the thesis. 
3. Co-ops, small firms and restructuring 
Co-ops AND CONDmONAL DEGENERATION 
In the previous chapter it was established that co-op degeneration had to be viewed as a 
tendency, rather than a definite empirical event. The nature of co-ops in practice - the 
'phenomenal form' of co-op activity - depends upon the interaction of a number of different 
processes, the working out of conflicts, and the strength of forces which can potentially 
counteract degeneration. In other words, degeneration is conditional, and depends upon the 
economic and political environment within which they operate. This does not mean that we 
can say nothing about co-ops without examining these particular circumstances, for we 
know that co-ops will be dominated by the conflict between their own social relations and 
those in the economy as a whole. More detailed, empirical analysis can reveal how that 
conflict develops in particular real-world situations. 
Exploration of the conditions under which co-ops degenerate is integral to the work of 
previous writers in the socialist tradition. The Webbs concluded that while co-ops would 
tend to reflect the market pressures which characterised the 'sweated sector' where they 
were concentrated, in the few exceptional cases where degeneration had been avoided, 
market forces had by some route been softened. In Britain, this was largely due to links with 
the 'tied market' of consumer co-ops, whereas in France and Italy it was typically due to 
intervention in market relationships by the state. 
The importance of market relationships in shaping the degeneration or otherwise of co-ops 
is not surprising. It is through the market that co-ops interact with the rest of the economy, 
and Marx frequently emphasised that competition is the mechanism by which the laws of 
capitalism operate or exert coercion on enterprises. To concentrate upon the impact of 
market forces does not mean that coops have no flexibility in their form of operation; after 
all, "the market is not an undifferentiated entity but a complex of relations which impose 
constraints of varying rigour and arbi trariness" l, whilst the economy is dynamic and 
continually changing2. Instead, it is appropriate to analyse in more detail exactly how coops 
interact with markets and competition in specific situations. 
1 Clarke, 1984, ".104. 
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Such concerns are not limited to the work of the Webbs. Fairclough identifies a similar 
thesis in Rosa Luxemburg's work. She argued that under certain conditions and in certain 
market sectors, co-ops were not only able to avoid degeneration but could also be of service 
to the broader struggle for socialism. The way to achieve this was to secure a degree of 
independence from the operation of free-market forces, and that the best way to do this was 
in establishing allied consumers' co-ops: 
Producer's co-operatives can survive within capitalist economy only if they 
manage to suppress, by some detour, the capitalist contradiction between the 
mode of production and the mode of exchange. And they can accomplish this 
only by removing themselves artifidally from the influence of the laws of free 
competition. And they can succeed in doing the last only when they assure 
themselves beforehand of a constant drcle of consumers, that is, when they 
assure themselves of a constant market .... It is the consumer's co-operatives 
that can offer this service to its brother in the field of production3. 
Lenin also stressed the importance of different conditions on the paths which co-operatives 
followed, although he was concerned more with a political rather than an economic 
evaluation. For him, co-ops could only be a progressive force towards sodalism under 
certain circumstances, and formal arguments about co-ops being more democratic as an 
organisational form did not answer the "much more important question of the particular 
roles that co-ops might play in sodalist struggles in different capitalist societies at different 
times in varying paths of capitalist development"4. 
The Webbs and Luxembourg both emphasised that the development of co-operatives was 
dependent on particular conditions, and especially on specific market and state conditions 
assisting the the avoidance of degeneration. The principles of this market-based analysis are 
still relevant today, although the role of consumer co-ops is perhaps less so. Integral to such 
an analysis is a consideration of specific historical conditions, and the much reduced role 
and importance of consumer co-operatives in the late twentieth century must be taken into 
account. Certainly the Webbs supported consumer co-operatives in part because they had 
been so successful; this is less true today. The importance of market processes does, 
however, remain. 
One possibility raised by the Webbs and Luxembourg is that of the involvement of the state 
in mediating the market pressures which constrain co-operatives. This is noticeably absent 
" LramIIoII", 2900, ,JO, tfUDWl in FairdowgIJ, 1986, ".26-27. 
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from current debates on co-operatives, despite both Thomley and Oakeshott5 recognising 
the importance of state assistance in promoting the large co-operative sectors in Italy, Spain 
and France, and in aiding their durability. Neither follow through to the conclusion that 
there is a role for the state in ameliorating market pressures to assist the emergence of a 
stronger cCH>perative sector in Britain, where the state's role in aiding cCH>peratives has 
been virtually non-existent6. It is only recently that the state has tried to intervene in the 
market, and this has largely been through the relatively powerless local state. 
Without such state activity there may be market sectors where cCH>peratives can, for a time 
at least, survive. The experience of co-operatives operating in different industrial sectors 
will vary enormously. Not only are there different competitive forces, but there are also 
differences in capital-intensiveness, methods of production, and skill structures. Therefore 
the central focus of this thesis is indeed on the experience of British worker co-operatives 
and examination of their experience in different market sectors. 
An analysis of the potential for such survival must take place within the context of a general 
political economy of small firms' dependence on larger firms. In Britain almost all worker 
co-operatives are 'small' (see Chapter 4 for further details), with all except a handful falling 
within the conventional definition of small business1. But before examining the position of 
co-operatives in such an economy today, I will first consider the role of small firms in 
general. 
nn: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SMALL FIKMS 
One of the most important tendencies, or 'laws of motion' of capitalism identified by Marx 
was the concentration and centralisation of capital, under which total capital is fused into a 
smaller number of units and the average size increases. In this process, small firms become 
less important and increasingly marginal in the overall structure of capital. For much of this 
century this process has been evident in the advanced capitalist economies. In Britain, small 
firms were for a long time been perceived as a dying breed, survivors of a bygone age, 
5 TIromlq, 19BI; Odaholt, 7978. 
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without a major role in economies increasingly dominated by large corporations. As 
concentration and centralisation of capital continued, small firms appeared marginalised 
and ineffident. Postwar economic development emphasised the merits of size and the 
benefits of economies of scale; nationalisation and widespread merger activity - fostered by 
state efforts such as the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation in the 19605 - left small firms 
out in the cold. 
As with all tendendes, however, Marx did not present this one as leading to smooth, linear 
progress. Poulantzas summarises the point thus: "I should like to recall here that the 
concentration and centralisation of capital should in no way be seen, in its real historical 
development, as a gradual, uniUnear and homogeneous process. In certain periods, 
generally brief, this process can even undergo relative retreats"8. The process is a historical 
one, involving class struggles, inter-capitalist competition and periodic crises which 
interrupt its progress9. More specifically, small firms may have a role to play for capital in 
times of crisis and restructuring, and it would be wrong, therefore, to characterise small 
firms as surVivors of an 'outdated' form of capitalist production, marginalised and destined 
for extinction. It will become clear that as monopoly capitalism attempted to cope with the 
most deepseated economic crisis for fifty years, the existence and growth of the small firm 
sector was an important element in the restructuring which capital undertook in order to 
overcome the effects of its own contradictions. 
This has been witnessed in Britain in recent years, as the historical trends of concentration 
and centralisation were interrupted in the 1970s as the economic crisis developed. The 
number of small firms began to increase rapidly in the early 19705 after having declined 
throughout the post war period (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2 below). As a result of these dramatic 
changes, small firms have been the objects of much attention in recent years, both critical 
and favourable. 
Although large firms were thought of as necessary, effident and desirable for economic 
$uccess - particularly during the 1960s - they were not universally popular. An early 
counter-reaction came with Schumacher's Small is Beautiful, published in 1973. This 
influential work held that the economy was becoming dangerously wasteful of natural 
resources and that work itself was becoming dehumanised; an eXperience which was 
B PouIallU, 1'75, ,.145,.. 
, TomlbwoN, %02, 22. 
Co-ops, small firms and restructuring 79 
considered to be the experience of both capitalist and socialist countries. The 'Small is 
Beautiful' solution to the problem was for economic activity to be restored to small units, 
operating on a more human scale in tune with the needs of workers, the wider community, 
and the environment. 
Table 3.1 Manufacturing enterprises with ten employees or less 
. % of total 
Year Number of Employment manufacturing 
enterprises ('000) employment 
1930· 93,000 
1968· 35,000 
1971 38,621 196.9 
1975 53,993 259.0 
1981 60,695 281.8 4.9 
1982 56,207 260.7 4.9 
1983 53,067 227.2 4.5 
1984 89,892 311.7 6.2 
1985 98,453 323.7 6.5 
Note: 1984 &: 1985 figures are based upon a revised register of busineaees and are not 
directly comparable with previous years 
Soura: Businns Mlmitor (P A 1 (02). • Data from Prais (1916) 
Table 3.2 VAT-registered businesses, 1979-1986 
Year 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1979-1986 
Stock 
(million) 
1.288 
1.304 
1.336 
1.356 
1.390 
1.419 
1.439 . 
1.468 
Soura: British Busi*SS 31.7.87 
incrttlSe 
(%) 
1.2 
25 
15 
25 
2.1 
1.4 
2.0 
14.0 
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Schumacher struck a chord of popular opinion, and his Christian-socialist vision of the 
future inspired many, especially in the alternative/ co-operative movement. However the 
current widespread enthusiasm for smaIl firms has taken on a different character: 
there is no doubting that the small man commands the centre of the stage. No 
longer reviled as a tax dodger or explOiter of cheap labour, small business 
exemplifies most of the current government's ideals, whether small shop 
(thrift,_ independence) or fast expanding Thames Valley electronics concern 
(risk taking, ambitious, profit orientated)10. 
Previously the British small firm sector had been amongst the smallest in Europell, and 
had decUned over a long period, but over recent years the number of small firms 
has been growing rapidly. Small firms are seen as part of the solution to the economic 
crisis and the restructuring of capital, but not in the direction that Schumacher hoped for. 
Bollard has described their role as follows: 
The value of the small firms' sector revolves around the fact that they provide 
the competitive spirit that a market economy needs for efficiency. They 
provide an outlet for entrepreneurial talents, a wider range of goods and 
services to the consumer, a check to monopoly inefficiency, a source of 
innovation, and a seedbed for new industries. They allow an economy to be 
more adaptable to industrial change through the continuous and less painful 
process of smaIl firm births and closures, with new start-ups embodying new 
technologies, skills, processes or products. These arguments for efficiency in 
the wider economy are frequently cited by Japanese policy makers12. 
Other advantages often dted13 are that small firms create new jobs, aid in the regeneration 
of inner cities, and provide a harmonious working environment, thus reducing strikes and 
absenteeism. 
This picture of small firms contrasts with the now-fashionable view of large firms as 
anchored in the economy of the past, risk-averse, inflexible and, because of their capital-
intensive strategies, negative contributors to employment. 
Small Fi,.",., Cri,i, £:I Restructuring 
Much of the rhetoric surrounding smaIl businesses focuses on the supposed independence 
of the small business owner. Support for them is presented as part of a return to laissez-faire 
capitalism and Victorian values, where hard work and entrepreneurship receive their just 
10 firumcf41 rima 12.6.84 
12 British BtaizH'If 
12 Bollllrtl, 1983, ,.295. 
13,. e.g. RIIinnie, 198511; Bolton 19n 
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reward. The reality, however, is quite different, and small businesses in practice have very 
limited independence. Bollard14 has acknowledged - despite his support for small finns 
above - that large finns are in the dominant position, and largely determine the state of play 
for small finns. in order to understand this relationship, the rise of small finns, and their 
new found role, must be examined in the context of the restructuring of capital taking place. 
The changing relationship ~tween small and large finns has been examined in detail by 
Murray, Rainnie, and Schutt & Whittington1S. The drive towards the decentralisation of 
production is located in the economic crisis accompanying the end of the 'long post-war 
boom' which has afflicted the major western capitalist economies. Murray argues that the 
impetus for this change came in the early 1970s with increased labour militancy, increased 
competition in world markets, and the slump of 1974. 
Decentralisation was then grasped on initially as a short term strategy aimed at 
evading the labour movement's advances, in that it attempted to compensate 
high labour costs and low flexibility in the large and medium factories by 
directly creating or putting work out to small production units, artisans and 
domestic workers, where the influence of the unions was minimal ... it has 
been used in conjunction with automation to begin to dismember the large 
factory proletariat through the increasing division and dispersion of 
production into small plants and into the sweatshop where accumulation is 
unrestrained by organised labour16. 
However there is more to small finns' role than undermining labour militancy and the 
power of trade unions. Poulantzas17 claimed that small firms tend to operate in low 
profit/high risk sectors, thus acting as service agents for large corporations. Small firms 
provide flexibility for the operations of larger ones, absorbing fluctuations in the level of 
output and employment and the deployment of the workforce, fluctuations which Schutt & 
Whittington argue are magnified as a result of crisis and restructuring. This can be related 
to Friedman'slS analysis of centre-periphery relations within large companies, whereby the 
concessions and relatively secure employment won by workers in the centre are balanced 
by a much greater exploitation of less-skilled peripherallabour19• These relations are now 
increasingly being transferred across firm boundaries, as large firms pursue strategies of 
14 BolIlml,I913. 
15 Murray, 1983; RAabt,d" 198511,11; Schutt & WhittmgtoJl, 1984. 
16 Murray, 1983, "".92-3. 
17 Poulatzu, 1975. 
18 Frial",.., 1977. 
19 TIw dqiclitm of ~t lIS sIcilW/IaI sIdlltd is of COIn'SII'IOt ,.,my al«lucical dacriptitm but lllso rt/ata 10 who is 
domg arfIIi" jobs. TIrenftm jobs Mid by IIJOmI1I ",.d hl4ICk VlOrkm 1m more lilzly 10 lit daig1lattd lIS las/lI1I-slcilWl Uta" 
thost htld by JDhit. NIts, II1IratftIer tMiT ttdI"iaal de111II1Ids. 
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fragmentation. Peripheral workers are now more likely to be employed by small firms in 
subcontracting or supply relationships, and are much more exposed to the fluctuations in 
economic activity of which they bear the brunt. In addition the status of central workers is 
being undermined as large capitals contest control over the labour process, introducing 
technology which reduces the need for central workers' established skills. The resulting 
structure bears an increasing resemblance to the dual economy of Japan. 
One characteristic of capitalism in crisis is the bankruptcy of individual capitals, as attempts 
are made to overcome the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. In this process the average 
rate of profit for remaining capitals can increase, as capitals that fail bear the brunt of the 
costs of crisis. Rainnie points out that the tendencies towards concentration and 
centralisation of capitals have had two major influences on the likelihood of crisis following 
previous paths. He cites Hannan, who argues that: 
while there were a large number of relatively small firms, some could go bust 
without damaging others. But with few very large firms, the destruction of any 
of them can do immense damage to the operations20• 
Fragmentation of capitals and the rise of small firms therefore have a role in alleviating this 
tendency. Schutt and Whittington argue that fragmentation at a time of high demand risk 
takes one of three forms: decentralisation, detachment and disintegration: 
1) decentralisation of production: large plants are broken up, but retained under the same 
ownership, by hiving off into smaller plants or by creating new subsidiary companies. Such 
a breakup critically undermines the power of trade union organisation and promotes 
capacity flexibility through closures; 
2) detachment: large firms cease directly to own units, but retain revenue links with them, 
i.e. licensing or franchising. The latter has become increasingly popular in certain areas <e.g. 
fast food, printing, cleaning), and ensures a steady low risk revenue for the franchisor, while 
adJustments to fluctuating demand and control over labour are the responsibility of 
entrepreneurs subject to market discipline; 
3) disintegration of production and innovation: large firms cease to own units of 
production or innovation, but retain control through market power (especially in the case of 
vertical disintegration) or, latently, through the power to repurchase the units. Management 
and worker buyouts are examples of this process. Disintegration through sub-contracting 
20 H""".,., 1981. 
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has always been important in certain industries, taking work out of the stable and expensive 
internal labour markets of large firms into the insecure, low-waged and non-union 
employment of small firms. Friedman21 has detailed the use of subcontracting in coping 
with cyclical demand in the motor industry, and Rainnie22 has done the same for the 
unstable clothing industry. The present government is extending the process from the 
private to the public sector, moving work from stable and well-organised employment to 
small non-unionised firms in highly competitive markets. 
Whereas previously there might have been resistance by trade unions to these changes, their 
power to do so now has been greatly undermined by high levels of unemployment and 
legal curbs on their activities. 
The example of the Italian clothing firm Benetton illustrates two of these processes. 
Their clothes are made by 11,500 workers in Northern Italy, only 1,500 of 
whom work directly for Benetton. The rest are employed by sub-contractors in 
factories of 30-50 workers each. The clothes are sold through 2,000 tied retail 
outlets, all of them franchised. Benetton provide the designs, control material 
stocks, and orchestrate what is produced according to the computerised daily 
sales returns which flow back to their Italian headquarters from all parts of 
Europe. Similar systems are at the heart of the success in the UK of the 'new 
wave' clothiers - Burton's, Next and Richard Shops.23 
The increasing role for small firms in the advanced capitalist economies cannot be analysed 
as the result of unexplained changes in the tastes and preferences of entrepreneurs. More 
frequently, the rise of small firms is explained in terms of changing technology, or changing 
factor costs, which has an impact on the the appropriate size of firms for technically efficient 
production24. This approach is located in the 'social democratic' school of thought outlined 
earlier, and such technological changes remain unexplained. Instead this development must 
be located in the strategy adopted by capital as part of the restructuring process. Small firms 
and large firms do not just co-exist side by side. Friedman notes that "the steady profits of 
large firms ... depend on the instability of profits and wages of small firms and unprivileged 
workers in an unplanned system such as capitalism"25. In a period of crisis, with reduced 
profitability, then an extension of small finns' scope of operation and increases in their 
number is a crucial element in ensuring the survival of larger firms. 
21 F"'rrIIIII, 1977. 
22 RMrmil, 19'5.. 
23 MII1"f8Y, 1985, ".30. 
241.g. BoIUrrd, 19'3; BIIIlrrock.l9B1. 
25 F"'rrIIIII, 1977, ".106. 
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There is clearly little independence for small finns in this set up. According to Rainnie:26 
Sease and Coffee quote Bechhofer and Elliott as arguing that 'small capital is 
menaced from above and below ... Jn all circumstances it is a dependent 
stratum, dependent first and foremost on the dominant groups and 
institutions. It is their decisions, their interests that do most to affect the size 
and circumstances of the stratum'. And Birley agrees, arguing that 'there are 
very few independent small industrial finns; independent in the sense of being 
able to determine their own destiny'27. 
Therefore we can see that given the relationship between large and small firms, possibilities 
for accumulation in the latter are severely restricted by their relationship to large firms. 
The question that this raises for present purposes is whether the situation any different for 
co-operatives? It is important to bear in mind that the recent upsurge of interest in 
co-operatives paraDels the resurgence of smaD businesses in general. To what extent can 
small £inns contribute permanent and secure activity independently of large firms? For 
co-operatives, to what extent can they choose paths independent of the constraints imposed 
by relations with large firms? In approaching this problem, Schutt &; Whittington argue that 
small firms can fit (approximately) into one of three classifications, according to small firms' 
relationships with large finns, i.e. with commercial and industrial capital: 
(a) dependent - complementary and servicing the activities of large firms, for 
instance engaging in sub-contracting. 
(b) independent (i) - competing with large firms often on the basis of intense 
explOitation of labour on antiquated equipment. 
(c) independent (ii) - operating in niches that consist of small local/specialised 
markets ignored by large firms. 
Schutt & Whittington comment that 'although this categorisation is crude, it does help 
distinguish the separate forces that underlay the dynamics of different small firm seclors'28. 
The way in which restructuring affects small firms is largely determined by which category 
they fall into. 
The classification is equally applicable to co-operatives. Rainnie29 notes that: 
26 Rain"w, 198511, ,.152. 
21 Birlq, 1980".23;Sca. &Coff-, 1982; 8«JWJ~ tmil Elliott, 1981. 
28 SdnUt & Wldttin,ltm, 1984, ,.8. 
29 Rain";', 198511, ,.163. 
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Co-operatives exist in the same market as other small businesses and are 
subject to the same rules. In the final analysis they have to compete to survive. 
And they have to survive in a world that is not of their own making. In other 
words, they have to live in a world dominated by large capital and therefore 
must fit into one or other of the three categories Schutt &: Whittington (op cit) 
devised for all small businesses. Co-operatives have no choice about this. 
Alternative internal management structures do not affect this position. 
From here we can draw parallels with the Webbs' analysis in 1914. They too categorised 
small finns, although some changes are necessary in view of developments in the British 
economy since then. In 1914, as today, most co-ops were small, both in Britain and 
internationally, and the Webbs first of all examined the sector of small capitalists, outside of 
large scale factory organisation. Apart from a small number of individual craftsmen 
"needing practically no apparatus or material, or not more than they can themselves easily 
produce"30, they found that "individual producers" were subject to various degrees of 
economic dependence on outside capital. Many were "continuously dependent for their 
wares, their raw materials or their tools on the wholesale dealers or others"31; the most 
numerous, however, were also dependent on commercial capital for their markets: "those 
craftsmen who work 'for the trade', and who are dependent, both for buying their raw 
material and buying or hiring their instruments of production, and also for selling their 
manufactures products, on wholesale or retail traders"32 
For those individual producers dependent on outside capital, as a result of the particular 
circumstances of this dependence they reproduce the worst elements of capitalism in the 
'sweating system'33. The Webbs note that it is in these sectors that most co-operatives were 
located. That is, the desire to escape from that dependence and its consequences gave the 
impetus for individual producers (mostly craftsmen) to fonn co-operatives. They suggested 
that, as in the much later quote from Rainnie above, co-operatives would reflect the market 
pressures which characterised the sweated sector, along with small finns in similar 
positions. They recognised economic dependence of small finns in general as a problem, but 
was for co-operatives it led to additional pressures for degeneration. 
30 WIbb S&B, 1914, ,.2. 
31 ilzi!, ,.3. 
32 iIlifI., ,.3. 
33 ilzi!, ".2. 
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Working Conditions in Sma" Firms 
The conditions of work in small firms today have received little attention either in the media 
or in academic research. For instance, the Guardian Small Business page largely reviews the 
availability of finance and assistance for start-ups and the means by which small-scale 
capitalists have achieved success, rather than what it is like to work in small firms. The 
conventional wisdom is that, the work experience in small firms is superior to that in large 
enterprises; working relationships are supposedly more harmonious, workers are meant to 
feel less alienated and more a part of the business, more committed to a common identity 
and perception of success (noticeably similar to the advantages claimed for co-operatives!). 
This vision of small £inns harks back to that of Schumacher, that somehow the antagonism 
between capital and labour can be overcome in a small firm, and is based on an idealised 
vision of industria1 harmony. The reality of a weakened workforce both within small firms 
and on the wider level is hinted at in the following remark from Bannock: 
Labour relations are less of a problem in small firms than large and when 
individually they run into difficulties there are less painful consequences for 
the rest of sodety34. 
Such a view justifies a reduced role for trade unions in small firms. As Prince Charles has 
said: 
Trade Unions arose in the first place - quite rightly - through combinations of 
people because managements didn't show enough concern. Then it was a case 
of exploiting the labour. But if you don't exploit people, if you bring them in 
and make them feel part of things, there is less need for the extra layer of trade 
union organisation within an institution to reflect the workforce'S views, 
because you're working with them. This is another argument for doing things 
on a small scale.15. 
Assertions that trade unions are less relevant in small firms are essentially political and 
have nothing to do with the reality of working in small firms. Bluestone and Harrison 
comment that 
there is good evidence that, relative to larger entities, small businesses 
(certainly those that employ twenty or fewer workers, pay low wages, offer 
unstable or only part-time jobs, often practice race and sex discrimination in 
hiring and wage policy, and exhibit arbitrary or capricious discipline over 
workers.36 
34 a. .. nock.l981, ,.10. 
35 Syrulq TiM, 22.1Ul. 
36 BI .. "",. .,." HlarrlMm, 1982, ".221-222. 
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Working conditions in particular sectors where small finns are prominent will receive more 
detailed attention in later chapters. Friedman's analysis of the status of central and 
peripheral workers suggests that the latter will enjoy poorer conditions - less skilled and 
more monotonous work, less control over work, less stability of employment, higher rates 
of unemployment and lower pay37. To the extent that small finns occupy this peripheral 
status relative to large finns, it is to be expected that workers in small firms would tend to 
be in this position. In a study of small finns in the clothing industry38, Rainnie, found that 
the reality behind the facade of peaceful industrial relations within small firms, consisted of 
a workforce in a relatively weak position vis a vis capital. Unionisation is lower, not because 
there is less need for trade unions (as Prince Charles would have us believe) but because 
trade unions find it difficult to gain a foothold when workplaces are scattered and 
employers are hostile to outside interference. The Bolton Report found that wages in small 
firms tended to be lower than those in large finns for equivalent jobs, and Rainnie points 
out that according to the Low Pay Unit, industries characterised by low pay tend to be 
dominated by small finns. And the GLC, in an attempt to counter the prevailing enthusiasm 
for small firms39, found that they tended to predominate in technologically backward and 
low productivity sectors, with a limited capacity to generate a reinvestible surplus. 
Murray has compared the situation with that of Japan: 
In Japan the resulting dualism is particularly sharp. On the one hand, there is a 
central core accounting for a third of the workforce (with the celebrated 
corporate welfare systems, high skill levels and jobs for life). On the other, 
there is a peripheral sub-contract and sweated economy, casualised, low paid, 
weakly organised, and restricted to a grossly inadequate public welfare 
system40. 
The restructuring process of which the rise in small firms is a part is largely serving the 
interests of capital at the expense of those labour. In part, the transfer of production from 
large to small firms represents an attack on the gains previously made by organised labour. 
Undermining the collective strength of workers in large firms by dividing them up may 
permit increases in both absolute and relative surplus value as workers in small firms lack 
protection against increases in exploitation. But there is more to the process than a simple 
transfer of production. The nature of work and employment in small firms is different; 
37 Friedmtlll,1977, ",.120-127. 
3B Rairm., 1985.. 
39 GtC, 198311. 
4(J MIm'tlY,198S, ".30. 
88 Theory and methodology 
increasing the proportion of employment which is insecure and unstable gives large capitals 
the flexibility to deal with fluctuations in demand and production, and so maintain or 
increase their profitability at a time of crisis. 
CONCLUDING llEMAllKS 
The widespread support which small firms have been receiving is based upon very dubious 
foundations: their rapid growth has been part of capital's response to crisis, and the 
fragmentation of production which is involved in this restructuring is essentially to promote 
conditions where profitable accumulation can be restored for capital as a whole. There is no 
reason to believe that small firms will be effective in prOviding employment, certainly when 
judged in relation to the massive job losses in large companies in recent years. Furthermore, 
for those who do obtain work in small firms, their working conditions and wages are likely 
to be worse than for comparable workers in large firms, and the collective strength of 
workers to resist capital's demands is undermined. 
Although changing economic conditions over the past few years (since 1980) have favoured 
small firms, the nature of their relationship to the dominant forms of capital means that they 
are highly wlnerable when economic conditions change. This is particularly the case for 
individual small firms. Frequently what matters to large firms is the existence of many 
small firms; if some of these go bust this is of no importance, as long as there are others to 
take their place. If the GLC's analysis is COlTect - that small firms tend to operate in low 
productivity sectors and have a limited capacity to generate a reinvestible surplus, then 
their ability to withstand economic fluctuations and changes will be limited, because of their 
underlying commercial weakness. This is supported by Storey et ai's findings that the most 
reliable guide to those small firms which demonstrate the best commercial performance is 
the amount of retained earnings. This is to be expected: firms which can accumulate from 
re-invested profits will be in a stronger position to compete and secure an advantage over 
rivals, and will be less prone to the economic weakness which afflicts small finns in general. 
In terms of their economic relationships, co--ops and small firms have many similarities; the 
changes which have led to the growth of small firms affect co--ops also. However, co--ops 
will tend to start off in an even weaker position than small firms in general, and face a 
continual conflict between the need to compete and survive commercially and the desire to 
restructure production in favour of labour. 
4. Research Issues and Methodology 
IN1'RODUcnON 
In choosing a research methodology there is even greater pressure to adopt an orthodox 
approach than in theoretical analysis. Whilst alternatives to neoclassical analysis (although 
constantly under attack) are reasonably well established in the·theoretica1 sphere, the same 
cannot be said for alternatives to orthodox research methodology. Developments at the level 
of philosophy and theory have made few constructive contributions on the subject of 
method in empirical research, and texts on method have ignored developments at the 
philosophical level1; while philosophical critiques of orthodoxy have been accepted in 
principle they have failed to make much difference in practice2. However, as the positivist 
school of thought in social sciences generally and economics in particular has increasingly 
come under attack, the whole question of the link between methodology and politiCS is on 
the agenda again. The problem for empirical researchers is this: if we adopt a marxist or any 
form of radical theoretical analysis, can we continue to use the usual empirical methods of 
hypothesis formation and testing, or do philosophical critiques imply that these methods 
must be replaced by different ones? Does rejection of orthodox theory imply rejection of the 
orthodox research methodology associated with it? This is a complex issue, which I attempt 
to explore in this chapter. It has led many marxists to fear that any kind of empirical 
research would inevitably be tainted by empiricism, and as a result there has been a 
'withdrawal from empirical research and a turning inwards towards a continual 
reconstitution of abstract theoretical concepts'3. This chapter begins with a critique of the 
empiricism associated with orthodox economics and then presents a realist alternative. In 
the second and third sections I attempt to develop this to provide the methodological basis 
for the research in this thesis. 
I £_lIt 1M o,.n Unirtmity - TI1MrI socilll scKnCZ emma demonstrIIU II far willer IIJ11I'OfIdt IUIIlIIJ11l1rCilJtitm of competing 
lIPId conflicting ideologies lind views tIrtln is gnanally tM CIUI - 1M RestlIIrdI Iktlcodf MSc. course (DESOI) mruains lin 
am:isc in umatndnlll TJOSititlism. 
2 SIIy~, 1984. 
3 S/Iyn,198I, p. 6. 
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ECONOMICS AND IsSUES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
Amongst all the social sciences in the twentieth century, it has been in economics that the 
link between methodology and politics has been most forcefully denied. This has only 
happened under the dominance of neoclassical theory, and has not always been the case. 
The classical economists accepted the links between the two, notably Ricardo's decisive 
intervention in the debate over the Com Laws in the early nineteenth century, on the basis 
of his Theory of Rent. The link was of course fundamental to th~ work of Marx later in the 
century. 
The subsequent rise of empiricism and the philosophy of logical positivism, however, 
brought in its wake the so-called 'quantitative revolution' and the development of 'value-
free' analytical techniques, which had the aim of making a separation between theory, 
methodology and policy. Mainstream economics - seen as positive (rather than normative) 
economics - is viewed as a scientific discipline prOviding answers to technical questions 
regarding the running of the economy. Thus economics was distinctly separated from 
politics, with economists leaving politicians to resolve the distributional implications of 
alternatives in economic policy. But however 'positive' the economic analysis, economists' 
prescriptions depend on the basic assumptions made about the nature of society and of 
social activity, and these are not independent of value judgements. The resolution of 
technical questions about the workings of the economy - the impact of a particular change in 
an economic variable - depends on the initial conceptualisation of the economy and its 
workings. Thus, economics based upon individuals entering into free exchange in a stable 
and self-regulating market economy will produce different prescriptions to economics 
based upon class relations in an inherently unstable capitalist system. By failing to 
undertake economic analysis in the context of a mode of production, neoclassical theory has 
value judgements built into it; it is in itself a value judgement to separate out the relatively 
peripheral 'decisions' bourgeois economics allows into its field of vision, from questions 
relating to the basis of the mode of production that creates the very constraints necessitating 
'these' choices' •. It is this delusion that exposes the ideological basis of neoclasical economic 
theory. Furthermore, ,. all economic questions have a policy - and hence a political -
dimension, and in practice economists find it impossible to stand back from pronouncing on 
4 LiII_l,n, p. 9 
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the way to achieve improved states of society. This undennines the supposedly objective or 
value-free nature of the subject. 
Positive economics is considered by its proponents as a 'scientific' discipline, on a par with 
the natural sciences. This view has been clearly stated by Milton Friedman: 
Positive economics is in principle independent of any particular ethical 
position or normative judgements. As Keynes says, it deals with 'what is:, not 
with 'what ought to be.' Its task is to provide a system of generalisations that 
can be used to make correct predictions about the consequences of any change 
in circumstances. Its performance is to be judged by the precision, scope and 
conformity with experience of the predictions it yields. In short, positive 
economics is, or can be, an 'objective' science, in precisely the same sense as 
any of the physical sciences.5 
This analogy with the physical or natural sciences is crucial for positive economics; besides 
imparting an epistemology (empiricism), it gives it an appearance of academic respectability 
and professional credibility; it is a 'serious' science, somehow above the melee of competing 
value judgements. This is particularly ironic, given that the failure of neoclassical theory to 
offer a serious analysis of the workings of the economy means that any meaningful scientific 
work in this context is inhibited, confused and misdirected. 
Empiricism and its problems 
Positive economics rests upon a particular theory of knowledge, or epistemology, that of 
empiricism. The crucial tenets of empiricism have been described by Hollis &: Nell: 
Empiricism is, negatively, the denial that anything can be known about the 
world a priori or without the benefit of experience. The history of the world, as 
an empiricist sees it, is the story of a series of states in which there happen to 
be patterns. Nothing must be as it is, no event must have any particular cause, 
no state must be followed by anyone other state. Consequently we can never 
know a priori what will happen next and science has to progress by 
generaJising from experience. Logic or reasoning alone cannot tell us which of 
infinitely many possible worlds we live in, nor which of infinitely many 
possible continuations from the present state will, in fact, occur. . .. There is, 
therefore, no room for the idea that causal laws are in any sense necessities in 
nature ....• We can thus pick out two crucial tenets of empiricism: (i) claims to 
knowledge of the world can be justified only by experience; (ii) whatever is 
known by experience could have been otherwise.6 
5 FrietlmIm 1953, p. 4 
6 Hollis & Nell, 1975, p. 4. 
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Therefore in positive economics, theory is intrinsically linked to empirical observation. 
From a set of initial assumptions, a set of hypotheses is generated which are open to 
potential empirical falsification (assuming that the process of logic is not being questioned, 
testing hypotheses is the same as testing the assumptions from which they are generated). 
The body of theory consists of those hypotheses which have not been falsified by 
observation; hypotheses are tested against the data of empirical observation - if they are not 
rejected they stand as generalised truths until rejected on the basis of new or different data. 
This follows Popperian criteria for sdentific knowledge: that providing a theory can 
potentially be exposed to falsification through observation, the theory can stand as 
explaining how the observation was generated. 
One crudal element of empiricism is the notion of the objectivity of facts, or that observation 
is theory-neutral. This view is widely held by neoclassical economists. Data, however, must 
be pre-eonceptualisedi soda! sdentists who treat 'data' literally as 'given things' 
unknowingly take on board and reproduce the interpretations implidt in the data. In 
dealing for instance with wages, we must already have concepts of money, workers, and 
employment, and all of these presuppose a particular conception of society and social 
relations. 
It is also clear that the criteria for accepting or rejecting theory is its predictive ability, not 
how 'realistic' the initial assumptions are. However, much of the attack on positive 
economics has been on this basis - criticising the 'unrealistic' assumptions used, such as that 
of perfect competition. Friedman however rejects such criticism: 
Such a theory cannot be tested by comparing its assumptions directly with 
'reality'. Indeed, there is no meaningful way in which this can be done. 
Complete 'realism' is clearly unattainable, and the question whether a theory is 
realistic' enough' can be settled only by seeing whether it yields predictions 
that are good enough for the purpose in hand or that are better than 
predictions from alternative theories. Yet the belief that a theory can be tested 
by the realism of its assumptions independently of the accuracy of its 
predictions is widespread and the source of much of the perennial criticism of 
economic theory as unrealistic. Such criticism is largely irrelevant, and, in 
consequence, most attempts to reform economic theory that it has stimulated 
have been unsuccessful1. 
Friedman was writing in 1953, when positive economics was perhaps at the pinnacle of self-
confidence. However the neoclassical approach and its positivist foundations have been 
7 Fn.tlmllll, 1953, p. 41. 
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severely shaken over recent years and no longer enjoy the unrivaled supremacy which they 
once did - at least on a philosophical level, if not on a practicallevel8• There are a number of 
inconsistencies in the application of empiricism to to social sciences, which derive from the 
assumption that social sdence is analogous to natural science. Empiricist methodology can 
only be justified - in its own terms - if this is the case. 
One fundamental assumption behind the methodology of positive economics is that social 
phenomena can be analysed in the same way as physical phenomena9• This assumption 
cannot itself be tested by its own method. Suppose that there is an alternative economic 
theory which does not rely on empiricism. The methodology of positive economics cannot 
make a judgement between the theories, as in its own terms this is a conceptual 
(metaphysical) and not an empirical question. It is not potentially falsifiable because in this 
case it is not known by experience - it is assumed. If it was tested empirically and falsified 
by observation, then the entire methodology of the test would have been invalid anyway. 
The assumption that empiricist methodology is appropriate, is not scientific by Popperian 
criteria; in the empiricist schema it is not potentially falsifiable. It is therefore circular in its 
justification of its own method: the methodology is correct because the methodology is 
assumed to be correct. 
Therefore an inconsistency is exposed within empiricism: there must be at least one true 
theoretical statement independent of the result of testing against experience, but as we have 
pointed out above, empiricism assumes that there are no a priori irrefutable truths. Or, as 
Samuelson says: 
If a thing has a priori irrefutable truth, it must lack factual content. It must be 
regarded as a meaningless proposition in the. technical sense of modem 
philosophy.10 
There are other fundamental assumptions of positive economics with the same status. 
Consider neoclassical theory, with the fundamental category of analysis being individual 
economic agents - producers and consumers. Counterpose this with an alternative which 
views classes as the fundamental category. One approach views profit as an exchange, the 
other views profit as exploitation. Neither approach counts as a 'scientific hypothesis' by the 
B Crura, 1977; Hollis & Ntll, 1975; BlulSIaJr, 1979; Sllytr 1984. 
9 Although tIJerr iru.ftIIsmg doubts in tilt philosaplry of scitna a!mIt t1rUlitilmtll vitrDs of lCiDltifjc objtcfivity /Jnd progress -
fur m.la,," to do wit tilt tIItory-1IftItnIlity of o&stmatitm; /J'JIlmtftts about fDltttlltr socild scitntz Mould be liU rt/JhIral 
scimtz no Iongtr taU plaa on tilt bais of /Jgrumnrt a!mIt tilt Mlllre /Jnd mtlltotls of tilt latter (SIytr 1984, p. m. 
10 SclmvtIson 1966, p. 1751. 
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positivist definition of the term - it is a conceptual rather than empirical point which cannot 
be settled by observation. Key assumptions and categories of each theory thus fall outside 
the scope of empirical testing of rival consequences. 
Bhaskarll denies that the natural and social sciences can be equated in this way and points 
out that phenomena in the social sciences only manifest themselves in 'open systems'; that 
is in systems where invariant empirical regularities do not hold. Bhaskar holds the realist 
view, that mechanisms and. their conditions are independent and hence that causation need 
not imply regularity in patterns and sequences of events. In the natural (physical) sciences 
and in theories of the orthodox philosophy of science, methodology presupposes dosed 
systems, with empirical regularities. Because of this they are totally inapplicable to the 
social sciences, or, if attempts are made to apply them the results are disastrous. 
Therefore, neoclassical economics is unscientific by Popperian criteria, for four reasons 
stemming from the presentation of theory: 
• in terms of unobservable variables, without any dear means of relating the different 
(measurable) variables to those in the theory; 
• in an equilibrium formulation - but there never is equilibrium; 
• in a general functional form (e.g. Q=f(K,L» without specifying the actual functional 
form to be tested; 
• with unrestricted but unstated ceteris paribus assumptions. 
Any testing of neoclassical theory in these terms is a test not just of the theory but also of the 
auxiliary assumptions, and effectively the theory itself is untestable. 
As a result, the quality of prediction based upon neoclassical theory has been very poor. In 
order deal with this and bridge the gap between theory and the real world, the response has 
been to develop a more and more detailed and intricate (not to say unrealistic) set of 
assumptions. Advocates might see this as an increasing refinement and accuracy of the 
theory, but what it means in practice is that predictions are hedged by so many 
qualifications that empirical testing is virtually impossible. As a result, amongst neo-
classicists the failure of predictions does not count as refuting neoclassical theories, but is 
11 """',2'7', ,.227. 
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met with a philosophical account of the function of ceteris paribus clausesl2. "All to often, it 
would seem, the Popperian criterion for science .... that knowledge is only scientific when 
pursued critically in the face of observable falsification, is honoured in principle, not in 
practice."13 
Bhaskar uses this to make a simple but powerful point: 
The real methodological import of the absence of spontaneously occurring, and 
the impossibility of artifidally creating, closed systems is strictly lin!ited: it is 
that the social sciences are denied, in principle, decisive test situations for their 
theories. This means that the criteria of the rational confirmation and rejection 
of theories in soda} science cannot be predictive, and so must be exclusively 
explanatoryl4. 
Natural phenomena and social phenomena 
What is distinctive about the nature of the object in social science research which makes this 
point so crucial? Essentially it is that the relationship between subject and object in social 
science is different to that in natural science. [The 'subject' is the observer or investigator, 
while the 'object' is the thing being studied (in social sciences the object is 'society' or some 
aspect of it).] SayerlS explores the relationship at length, with the argument that in social 
sciences the subject is not separated from the object but part of it, contrasting the separation 
between researcher and object in a laboratory physics experiment. 
One aspect of this interdependence is that the results or outcome of social science research 
affect the object under study (calling into question the traditional role or vision of a social 
scientific researcher). Sayer points out that in social sciences the situation regarding material 
intervention in the object is much more complex than in natural sciences, for two reasons: 
• the unavailability of experiments makes it more difficult to use such material 
interventions for scientific purposes; 
• social phenomena can be changed intrinsically by leaming and adjusting to the 
subject's understanding. It is not just that social experiments may be deemed undesirable, it 
22 HoUis iii NIlI, 2975, JI. 20. 
II Col, Ourrmm iii EtlWtlrtls, 1983, JI. 78. 
14 BIwubr 1975, JI. 128. 
IS SIryIr, 1984, chaJlter 2. 
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is also that social phenomena are likely to be irreversibly changed by them in a way which 
does not happen with non-sodal phenomena, which learn nothing from being manipulated. 
Sayer's second point is that social phenomena are concept-dependent; that is, what the 
practices, institutions, rules, roles or relationships are depends on what they mean in society 
to its members. Not only is physical behaviour important, but also the meanings behind the 
actions involved. Take for example the rapid rise in the number of co-operatives in Britain 
. . 
since 1975. We could endlessly observe tbe physical behaviour of people forming 
co-operatives and use every known statistical technique to process our observational data, 
but unless we understand the meaning of forming a co-operative to those in it we would 
have no idea of what was actually happening or what kind of action it was. This kind of 
understanding requires not the amassing of empirical data but a conceptual or 
philosophical analysis of the action and the rules implicit in it16• 
The first implication of the above is that such phenomena cannot be understood solely by 
observation, but only by combination of observation and explanation based on (a prion1 
theory. A second implication is that the orthodox view of causation as regular and 
predictable occurrences of an event also no longer stands. This refers to Bhaskar's point 
earlier : that the criteria for rejection or acceptance of theories in social science must be 
exclusively explanatory. Empiricism cannot help us explain the phenomenon in question, 
and so an alternative epistenlology is needed . 
. A Realist vUnuof carlsmon . 
~". ~ . . 
....... ' : .... 
Rather than viewing causation as a diSCrete event (cause and effect) realism refers to the 
causal powers of an object. Causal powers exist and are a characteristic or capacity of the 
object in question whether or not they are exercised. For instance, an unemployed person 
has the capacity to work, even if they do not actually work; a bomb has the capacity to 
destroy even if it is not set off. On this view then a causal claim is not about a relationship 
between things or events but about what an object is like and what it can do; it does not say 
that it will do it in any particular situation. Such causal powers are therefore an attribute of 
objects independently of any pattern of events. 
26 WirlClJ,I956. 
Research issues and methodology 97 
This concept of causality is linked to the concept of internal or necessary relations, as 
distinct from external or contingent relations. External relations are neither necessary nor 
impossible; for instance, the relation between a person and a book is external, in the sense 
that either object can exist without the other. It may be that the person is reading the book, 
but they are not necessarily related; the relation is contingent on particular circumstances. 
Contrast with this the relation between a co-operative and its members, which is internal or 
necessary - what one object is, is dependent on its relationship with the other, that is, a 
co-operative cannot exist without its members and vice versa. Other examples are landlord 
and tenant, master and slave - the existence of one presupposes the existence of the other. 
The nature of an object and its causal powers are necessarily related - causal powers exist as 
a result of the nature of an object. However, whether a causal power is actually manifested 
on a particular occasion depends on the presence and configuration of contingent 
conditions. Although a cloud has a causal power or liability to produce rain, whether or not 
it does actually rain is dependent on a range of other meteorological conditions separate 
from the presence of the cloud. Although an unemployed person has the power to work, 
whether or no they actually do might depend on whether there is a job available for them. 
Although causal powers exist independently of their effects, the observable outcome of an 
object's causal powers depends both upon this necessary relation and the object's 
contingent relation with external conditions; it is not possible to observe the causal powers 
in isolation from these contingent conditions. Therefore the relationship between causal 
powers and their effects is not fixed, but contingent. 
This view of causation and effect differs crucially from the empiricist view, both in the 
perceived nature of causation and empirical outcomes. Most real world processes involve 
the operation of several causal mechanisms which may only be contingently related. 
Therefore the operation of a particular mechanism may have different effects, depending on 
conditions, and different mechanisms may produce the same empirical result. The 
resistance of workers and trade unions to a factory closure can have a variety of different 
results - the formation of a co-operative, takeover of the factory by another finn, 
nationalisati()ft, or it may not prevent closure at all. Conversely, a particular effect can have 
multiple causes - unemployment amongst black people is due to both their class position 
and to racial discrimination. 
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Therefore there are no necessary empirical regularities as a result of causal powers. 
Typically (in the orthodox account at least) causation is associated with regularity, but in the 
realist view the exercise of causal mechanisms is often unclear from patterns of events. 
Causation has nothing to do with the number of times an event has occurred or is likely to 
occur, and processes of causation cannot be discovered from observing regularities. Instead 
discovery of what a given causal mechanism will do requires a different sort of 
investigation. 
In particular, theory cannot be assessed on the basis of its predictive ability: empiricists 
consider that the theory 'If A then B' can be accepted or rejected on the basis of observing 
whether or not B occurs. Realists are interested in more than the recognition that A has 
some effect(s) and produces change; what is important is what it is about A which causes 
these effects, what are the processes by which A produced B. Theory is essentially about 
explanation rather than prediction. Crucially though explanation is not just about the 
immediate causes of events, but includes reference to the necessary conditions for the 
existence of causal mechanisms. It is all very well noting the association between the sharp 
rise in the number of co-operatives in the 1980s and the formation of Co-operative 
Development Agencies throughout the country, but unless we note the necessary conditions 
leading to both of these developments - lengthy recession and high levels of unemployment 
- then our understanding of the process of co-operative formation will be minimal. 
The contrast between empiricism and realism can be illustrated with reference to 'laws of 
tendency' in marxist theory. The most famous of these is the Law of the Tendency of the 
Rate of Profit to Fall, and its Counteracting Influences. This concept of 'tendency' has been 
interpreted by many non-marxists to be an empirical prediction that there will be 
observable falls in the rate of profit as capitalism develops. That this has not happened (as 
Marx is considered to have predicted) is taken to be a rebuttal of this central tenet of marxist 
political economy. Oearly this interpretation is based upon empiricist epistemology, and so 
not surprisingly the interpretation is false. Marx presented the Law as a mechanism which 
existed necessarily by virtue of the nature of capital (the 'Law As Such'), but whose effects 
would be mediated in practice by other mechanisms and particular conditions (the 
'Counteracting Influences')17 there were no predictions about what would happen 
empirically to the rate of profit itself. The only prediction made was that the contradictory 
17 M.r:r:,1I59, duI,tm 13 & 14. 
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operation of the Law and the O's would be manifested as crises of accumulation; this was 
not an empirical generalisation about a regular sequence of events but an explanation of the 
crises which were endemic to capitalism. 
This approach also provides us with an alternative interpretation of co~p degeneration, 
another concept with its origins in marxist economics which has been widely misinterpreted 
from an empiricist position. I noted in chapter 2 that degeneration could not be perceived as 
a deterministic iron law, but had the status of a tendency. This interpretation can be more . 
rigorously presented in terms of the preceding argument. 
Co-ops, operating in a capitalist economy, necessarily possess the causal power (or causal 
liability) to degenerate, but whether or not they will degenerate in practice will depend 
upon the impact of a variety of contingent conditions and counteracting influences which 
cannot be predicted in advance. From a marxist perspective, degeneration is not a necessary 
empirical outcome of ~ps' existence; it is degenerative pressures on ~ps which are a 
necessary condition of their existence in a capitalist economy, although they can be offset. 
All we can say at an empirical level is that c~ps will experience conflict between their own 
objectives and those which are - more or less sharply - imposed upon them by the need to 
compete and survive. We say nothing about the outcome of this conflict, because it will vary 
depending on the contingent conditions operating in particular circumstances. What we can 
say is that c~ps can no more escape this conflict than firms can escape the conflict between 
workers and capitalists, although in both circumstances its effects and severity may be 
mitigated. 
PRAcnCAL RESEARCH ISSUES 
Marx's concept of a science was that of a process whereby knowledge was produced by 
going behind the superficial appearance of things so as to understand the hidden, 
underlying phenomena. This involves producing concepts which are appropriate to the 
hidden phenomena, and the process by which these give rise to observable phenomena and 
experience. For Marx, what was generally accepted as a science was not necessarily 
'scientific', for scientific beliefs - like all others - were subject to material and ideological 
influences. The key to Marx's scientific method was its objective basis in material 
conditions. 
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Oearly neoclassical economics is not a science by marxist criteria; it is concerned solely with 
the appearances of capitalist society and fails totally according to the criterion of 
explanation rather than prediction; as such it becomes nothing more than an ideological 
smokescreen geared to concealing (rather than revealing) underlying economic phenomena. 
What are the implications for empirical research of adopting a marxist perspective? Disdain 
for knowledge based upon mere appearances should not lead to a withdrawal from 
empirical research. Indeed, marxism relates fundamentally to the real world and must be 
informed by analysis of concrete situations. For D. Sayer, 'marxism is a sdence whose object 
of analysis is productive forms, and whose method is empirical investigation' IS, and after 
all, Capital itself makes extensive use of empirical work. 
The question then is what form should empirical research take, and how should it be carried 
out? It clearly has to take a different approach to that of orthodox empiridst research, but 
for researchers there is little guidance on the specifics of how it is carried out. General 
statements provide a starting point, for example: 
the observable characteristics of capitalist society must be explained in terms of 
unobservable structures and mechanisms in such a way that these latter 
explain both how and why the observable characteristics take the particular 
forms that they dol9. 
The objective of research can be seen as contributing to the understanding of causal 
mechanisms - the necessary properties of objects - and how they operate in particular 
contingent conditions. Thus research integrates both theory and empirical work. More 
specifically there are perhaps three distinct elements to the process: 
• investigation of actual, concrete events (phenomenal forms); 
• theorising the nature of underlying/hidden mechanisms through the process of 
abstraction and reasoning; 
• interpretation of the links and processes whereby mechanisms give rise to apparent 
phenomena. 
This is a difficult task; operationalising marxist concepts, and relating these at different 
levels of abstraction, and to theoretical debates has caused problems to many researchers. 
18 Stlyn 1979. 
19 MoiIIDI 1979, p. 267. 
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An important question to be addressed is how exactly are empirical findings to be 
interpreted. Appearances themselves do not reveal the nature of underlying mechanisms, 
for they incorporate the impact of both those mechanisms and of any contingent conditions 
which may be operating at the same time. However, this means that the exerdse of causal 
mechanisms is often unclear from patterns of empirical events, as contingent conditions can 
operate in all sorts of ways; and counteracting forces may override and conceal the effects of 
a particular mechanism. It is also important to clearly.spedfy the relationship between 
abstract theoretical categories and observable oBjects; the obvious example is theoretical 
debate at the level of values, which are not directly observable, although the effects of 
mechanisms involving values are everywhere observable. 
The same applies to co-ops in a capitalist economy, which possess the causal power 
(liability) to degenerate. However degeneration is an abstract concept, a causal liability 
which is only manifested in association with contingent conditions, and can take various 
forms and degrees. There are four main forms (1) poor commercial performance (2) the 
subordination of co-op objectives to commercial objectives (3) conflict within the co-op over 
the contradiction between the pursuit of co-op and capitalist objectives, and (4) the 
emergence of internal class divisions - through the employment of wage labour, or the 
encroachment of capital directly through external share ownership. 
Previous empirical research on British co-operatives 
Previous research on the performance of co-operatives has generally been of one of three 
kinds. The first is in the empiricist tradition of neoclassical positive economics. Using some 
aspect of theory, hypotheses are generated which are amenable to empirical falsification. 
Data is collected on a variety of relevant variables for a number of co-operatives, and used 
to statistically test the hypotheses which have been generated from theory. An example 
would be the testing of Vanek's20 theory concerning the financing of co-operatives - that a 
collectively financed co-operative will under-produce and under-invest relative to its 
comparable capitalist 'twin'll. Alternatively a rather more general hypothesis is set up, such 
as 'co-operatives are more (or less) efficient than comparable capitalist firms', or 'employee 
participation has a positive influence on productivity', and the regression estimation of a 
20 Va,,"- 1971. 
2l/tma & B11c.b111977; ". ar.,,1Ir 1 
102 Theory and methodology 
production function carried out to confirm or reject this hypothesis22. This approach 
dominates work by economists on worker co-ops (as it does empirical economics generally), 
even in many socialist countries. 
The second approach is that of the behavioural school. This concentrates upon purely 
empirical case studies of individual co-operatives, and tends to place less emphasis on 
analysis of why particular events took place. 
More recently, researchers have focused on setting the experience of individual 
co-operatives within a wider framework which could take account both of underlying 
capitalist social relations and of the broader context of shifts in the national and 
international political economy. Notable examples are Clarke's and Fairclough's, case 
studies of the Scottish Daily News and Triumph Meriden co-operatives respectively23, 
which are finnly located within an analysis of the political economy of British capitalism, 
and Bennett's examination of the perfonnance of three sectors of older British co-ops24• 
In the first type of research, the analytical categories adopted tend to be purely descriptive 
rather than causal. If derived from neoclassical theory, then the main causal influence on the 
performance of co-operatives • their interrelation with a specifically capitalist economy - is 
necessarily excluded from the research hypothesis, as it is from the theory. Alternatively, a 
general estimation of a production function runs into two other problems. Firstly, the 
categories of analysis tend to be derived from relationships of correlation or association 
rather than explanation. This can lead to a problem with regression estimation: the validity 
of this technique depends on the regresSion equation being correctly specified i.e. the 
independent variables must be a full and complete specification, in the correct functional 
form, of the causal determinants of the dependent variable. In practice this requirement is 
rarely met in econometrics, and although there is disagreement amongst econometricians as 
to the implications of misspedfication of functional form, virtually all activity in 
econometrics consists of attempts to overcome the problems caused by misspecification. 
In general this type of research concentrates on a very narrow and fonnal interpretation of 
the causal determinants of performance. For instance, it is likely that poor perfonnance is in 
part due to undercapitalisation; what it does not do is analyse the reasons for that 
22 sa ,.g. E.m, /01Ift & Swjrurr, 1984; De{oumy, Esm & TOMS 1985. 
23 O4,u, 1983; fairclougll, 1986. 
24 s.n.,t, 1984. 
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undercapitalisation. Shortage of capital for co-ops needs to be located in the practices and 
attitudes of capitalist finandal institutions, and the lack of access to own capital for the type 
of people who fonn co-ops. Orthodox research focuses on associations between internal 
characteristics of co-ops and performance - not looking at reasons for co-ops being the way 
that they are. The tendency is to assume that the perfonnance of individual agents 
(co-operatives) is the result of attributes of or decisions taken by those agents. As with 
neoclassical theory, the spedfically capitalist nature of the economy is not recognised, and . 
there is no political analysis of the position of co-operatives under capitalism. It follows the 
neoclassical tradition of economics as a value-freesdence, merely making judgements on 
the basis of degrees of commerdal' efficiency'. 
Some such work has now moved away from a rigorous specification of hypotheses derived 
from theory, to be tested in the tradition of poSitive economics25. There are two reasons for 
this which reflect the general points made earlier (i) the theory does not always generate 
testable hypotheses and (ij) institutional conditions assumed in the theory do not apply in 
practice. The task then becomes a search for correlations or causal relationships which 
might throw light on whether or not predictions from theory are borne out in practice. This 
is not 'scientific' in the positivist sense, and although it potentially represents a step 
forward, such analysis remains confined by the continuing· reliance on the neoclassical 
framework. Statistical correlations and regressions may show interesting and useful results, 
but unless results are analysed within an appropriate conceptual framework - that is, in 
which the economy is conceptualised as capitalist with specific social relations - then they 
are unlikely to contribute to explanation and our understanding of the processes affecting 
co-ops. 
Behavioural research suffers similarly from a lack of political analysis. Whilst these studies 
can offer useful background information and empirical details, they fail in any other intent, 
particularly explanation, because they do not locate individual co-operatives within the 
social and economic relations Specific to a particular capitalist economy. Consequently one 
characteristic of these behavioural studies is a preoccupation with the internal dynamics 
and organisational problems of co-operatives. Co-operative performance is perceived as 
depending on events, processes and personalities internal to the enterprise, rather than on 
25 .. for,."",Ic the ,.,., by Estrin If; Jcma lit 1M SCS/OU ~ Oft co-ops NSeIU'dt (l986), .." my CDIImIDIts Oft tIIiI 
,.,., (TIfferU 1986). 
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its interaction with a specific political economy. The approach is 'voluntaristic' in that what 
happens is perceived as a function of unconstrained human will. This approach does reflect 
the actual day-to-day problems and decisions facing co-op workers. But unless it can go 
beyond this it remains purely descriptive of the processes of decision-making etc. within 
co-operatives. Behavioural studies typically lack any analysis of why co-ops have to make 
the decisions that they do, decisions which are the result of the conflicting interaction of 
co-operative objectives and the constraints imposed by operating· within a capitalist market 
economy. Unless this is taken account of then there can be no explanation, no 
understanding of the causes of why co-ops act in the way that they do. 
The above approaches can be clearly contrasted with that of Oarke and Fairclough 
mentioned above. Both authors analyse the fortunes of the respective co-operatives within 
the context of processes at work in the relevant sectors of British industry. By relating 
specific features of these individual co-ops to the economic and political environment which 
formed the context of their formation and operation, these authors succeed in presenting a 
full picture of the causal factors determining the performance of these co-ops. Perhaps the 
major drawbacks with these studies are that firstly, the methodology used is not made 
overt, and secondly, the concentration on one co-operative in each case limits the ability to 
generalise from the findings, although, as has been explained earlier, this is not necessarily 
the aim. 
Extensive and intensive research 
The different approaches can be located within broad categories of research identified by 
Sayer It Morgan26. They have usefully characterised research as either extensive or intensive. 
The contrasts between the two are illustrated overleaf. 
Extensive research makes use of aggregate statistics, surveys and statistical analyses, with 
the aim of making empirical generalisations for a whole population on the basis of statistical 
analysis. It is Vf!!I"J reliant on quantitative techniques and formal methods. Intensive research 
explores in detail how causal processes are structured and work out in specific cases, with 
an emphasis on abstraction rather than empirical generalisation. Research methods tend to 
be qualitative and infonnal, and less standardised than those of extensive research. 
26 Srpr, 1984; s.y" I; MoIp1t,I9B5. 
Intensive and extensive research: a summary 
Research question 
Relations 
Type of groups 
studied 
Type of account 
produced 
Typical methods 
Are the results 
generalizable? 
Disadvantages 
Intensive 
How does a process work 
in a particular case or 
small number of cases? 
What produces a certain 
change? 
What did the agents 
actually do? 
Substantial relations of 
connection. 
Causal groups. 
Causal explanation or 
the production of certab"l, 
objectS or events, though 
not necessarily a 
representative· one .. 
Study of individual 
agents in their causal 
contexts, interactive 
interviews. ethnography. 
Qualitative analysis. 
Actual concrete patterns 
and contingent relations 
are unlikely to be 
• • t c • 
representative. average 
or generalizable. 
Necessary relations 
discovered wiD exist 
wherever their relata are 
present. e.g. causal powers 
of objects are 
generaliz.able to other 
contexts as they are 
necessary features of 
these objects. 
Problem of 
representativeness. 
Extensive 
What are the regularities. 
common patterns. distinguishing 
features of a population? 
How widely are certain 
characteristics or processes 
distributed or represented? 
Formal relations of 
similarity. 
Taxonomic groups. 
Descriptive -representative' 
generalizations. lacking in 
explanatory penetration. 
Large scale survey of population 
or representative sample. formal 
questionnaires. standardized 
interviews. Statistical 
analysis. 
Although representative of. a 
whole population. they are 
unlikely to be generalizable 
to other populationS at 
different times and places. 
Problem of ecological fallacy 
in making inferences about 
individuals. 
Lack of explanatory 
power. Ecological fallacy 
in making inferences 
about individuals. 
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Sayer and Morgan point out that the contrast between the two methods is further reflected 
in the kinds of groups and categories which are discerned and studied, and the contrast 
between degree of descriptiveness, 'representativeness' and causal explanation. Extensive 
research tends to focus on groups which share similar attributes although not necessarily 
any other connection, with the aim of discovering common features and patterns which are 
empirically observable. Therefore the formal quantitative regularities discovered are those 
of similarity, dissimilarity and correlation etc., rather than substantial causal relations of 
connection. As such, research results tend to be primarily descriptive rather than 
explanatory - describing formal relationships between objects which have no real 
connection even if they have similar attributes. 
Intensive research focuses mainly on groups which are are causally connected (e.g. co-ops 
related 'horizontally' through competition). It aims to discover the underlying causal 
mechanisms. In each particular case the research should uncover the necessary relations 
between phenomena or objects. These necessary relations can be generalised, in that 
wherever those objects exist then so will those relations or properties. This does not mean 
that ~uch generaliSation will be manifested in empirical regularities; as we have seen above, 
actual conCrete processes or observable events are produced through a combination of 
necessary and contingent relations. Research findings describing actual outcomes are 
unlikely to be generalisable to other contexts with a different combination of contingent 
conditions. The results of intensive research cannot therefore be generalised in the same 
way as those of extensive research (although this is not their intention). However, they do 
allow the identification of causal agents in the particular contexts relevant to them and so 
provide a much better basis for recommending policies which have a 'causal grip' on the 
agents of change. 
Uses of intensive and mensif1e research, and their compatibility 
It should be clear from preceding sections of this chapter that given the characteristics of the 
two types of research, they will tend to be used in certain ways. Extensive research is 
particularly suited to empiricism: it concentrates on relationships of association (rather than 
causation) between variables, it is fundamentally quantitative and it usually covers a large 
number of observations, enabling statistically rigorous testing of those relationships at its 
most sophisticated in econometrics. The type of data generated is therefore particularly 
amenable to empirical generalisation, prediction and hypothesis testing (although this is not 
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necessarily the use to which it is put), and the type of relationships considered are those of 
orthodox theory. Intensive research is much more suited to a realist approach, aimed at 
uncovering necessary relationships and explaining social phenomena rather than describing 
or predicting them. It is well suited to an analysis of the tendencies of marxist theory. 
Although extensive and intensive approaches do have suitability for research based on 
s~fic epistemologies, does this mean ~t the two are conflicting or incompatible? Sayer 
and Morgan deal with this question and conclude that compatibility is neither assured nor 
impossible, but is likely to be somewhat elusive27. The key to compatibility is in the 
conceptual framework used - the main contrast between the two is generally in terms of the 
framework of explanation underlying the research. Extensive research, for instance, could 
be used perhaps in the initial exploration of data, in the exploratory phase, to uncover 
relationships between variables which require explanation, as a prelude to the explanatory 
analysis of intensive research. Compatibility would be dependent on the categories used; if 
extensive research is used to to uncover relationships between variables linked by attribute 
and association, it is unlikely to be compatible with intensive research aimed at uncovering 
causal relationships. Compatibility in terms of explanation is not easy, and the categories 
used in extensive research need to be meaningful for explanatory analysis. 
Alternatively, the intensive research could come first; "if a particular kind of mechanism or 
process has already been discovered by intensive research, then provided adequate data 
exist it might be possible to use extensive methods to discover its incidence and extent"28. 
Deriving the sample or population for the extensive analysis from the intensive analysis 
should ensure that the population is homogeneous. 
Given these provisos: choice of explanatory or causal (rather than descriptive) categories for 
extensive research, plus the availability of adequate data, then it should be possible to use 
the two research methods in a complementary manner. This could perhaps enable 
overcoming the shortcomings of each: the intensive element would provide the explanation 
of why certain events or processes have taken place; conversely, the extensive element could 
tell use how widespread or 'representative' are the results produced by the particular 
processes which it is focused. The key to this is the satisfying of two conditions: 
27 MaNY & MMp",2985". 7. 
21 iJIl.., ,.252. 
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• that the conceptual framework or framework of explanation used is common to both 
types of research, and 
• that the categories of analysis are related to explanation rather than just description. 
RESEARCH STRUCTURE FOR TJUS PROJECT 
The broad aim of this research is an analysis of the position of worker co-operatives. in a 
capitalist economy, the processes at work which affect this position, and the relevance of 
co-operatives as part of radical socialist polides. This must be more clearly defined and 
narrowed down to deliver a manageable research topiC; the first part of this process is to 
limit the object of the investigation to worker co-operatives in Britain, and more specifically 
to the 'new' co-ops, which have emerged since the mid-1970s. 
The theory sections in earlier chapters dealt at length with the pressures towards 
degeneration to which co-operatives would be subjected. The pressures would be 
manifested as a conflict between commercial success and the maintenance of the sodalist 
character of worker co-operatives, in terms of both production and appropriation. As the 
market is the key area in which degenerative pressures are transmitted, the manifestation of 
this conflict would depend crucially on the extent to which individual co-operatives are 
exposed to market pressures. 
The central argument is that co-ops start in a relatively weak position when competing with 
capitalist firms. Shortage of finance affects them from the beginning, and this is likely to be 
compounded by a shortage of skills. But in addition to this all of the objectives centered on a 
restructuring of the labour process will have a further cost in commercial terms (except in a 
few exceptional circumstances), although this cost will vary depending more specifically on 
the competitive situation in which the co-op finds itself. 
Degeneration as a research topic 
An examination of degeneration has been central to a great deal of research on workers 
co-operatives, although it can be interpreted in various different ways. Behaviouralists tend 
to concentrate on the break up of internal democratic forms and partidpatory structures, 
usually explained by inappropriate internal communications and dedsion-making 
structures, personality clashes or simply the inherent difficulties of implementing and 
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maintaining workplace democracy - all factors of relevance to co-operative workers but 
essentially symptoms of causal processes, rather than causes of degeneration themselves. 
Explanation remains ahistorica1 and voluntaristic. 
Those of an orthodox neoclassical persuasion tend to concentrate on the commercial 
'inefficiencies' of co-operatives compared to capitalist firms; arguing that co-operatives are 
inherently unworkable or inappropriate (Alchian & Demsetz, Furubotn & Pejovich); that 
they are workable but need the correct institutional and financial structure (Vanek's ~eory 
of financing, Oakeshott), or that evidence of degeneration in the past is incorrect (Jones). 
There has been very little empirical research on workers co-operatives from a Marxist 
perspective. I have already mentioned the research by Clarke and Fairclough on SDN and 
TMM respectively; in both cases the research was centered on one particular co-operative; 
instead of merely describing internal events, personalities, relations and processes, these 
were explained (as was the ultimate collapse of both co-operatives) in terms of their 
relationship to processes taking place in the specific industries, the British and international 
economies, and state policy towards co-operatives. Oarke, for instance, found it necessary 
to produce one volume examining the British press and newspaper industry, and another 
on the experience of the British worker co-op movement, in order to explain the findings of 
his volume on the experience of the Scottish Daily News, whilst Fairclough carried out an 
extensive investigation of the motorcycle industry in the context of the 1MM experience. 
Central to this present thesis is an analysis of pressures towards degeneration and 
conditions for its avoidance. The aim is to build upon the work of Oarke and Fairclough in 
two particular ways: 
• to examine the experience of the 'new' British worker co-operatives, formed since 1975, 
rather than the 'Benn' co-ops. The newer co-operatives contrast with the Benn co-ops: they 
are smaller, are not generally formed out of the collapse of existing companies, operate in 
different industries and with a somewhat different dynamic, subject to different relations 
with the rest of the economy. 
• to examine a wider range of co-operatives than can be achieved by a case study of one 
or two; that is, to determine how widespread are certain processes affecting British 
co-operatives. 
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The first of these objectives does not raise any particular difficulties; by 1987 there were 
nearly 1,000 co-ops in Britain, compared to less than 30 in the mid-1970s. There is therefore 
an ample number of co-operatives to choose from as the object of the research. 
The second objective is more contentious, because of its implications for the nature of the 
research carried out. In terms of the debate of the previous section, it requires a combination 
of intensive and extensive research. Inevitably this means sacrificing some detail about 
individual co-operatives; the aim, however, is to not sacrifice explanation. 
I have chosen to examine the commercial performance of British co-ops since 1975, and to 
analyse this performance in the context of their relationships with the capitalist economy. 
This makes it unusual in relation to previous pieces of empirical research on co-ops (which 
is indeed its aim). Bennett notes that there is a 
tendency to study co-operatives in isolation from their markets.One result of 
this has been .... to centre on internal co-operative problems, rather than the 
conditions they face outside29. 
The analysis here adopts a similar approach to that of Bennett, but instead of considering 
the position of co-operatives solely in relation to product markets, its wider approach takes 
into account relationships with finance markets and the nature of the labour process in 
particular industries. Therefore, although Bennett's concern with co-ops' external 
relationships is taken as a starting point - and this essentially means examining the 
operation of the sector or industry in which co-ops are located - I take a wider perspective 
on the scope of those relationships. 
like Bennett's research, this project concentrates upon the financial or commercial aspects 
of co-op performance, as knowledge of this is necessary for an understanding of their 
overall position. It primarily investigates two questions, which result from concern with the 
impact of competition and accumulation on the poSition of co-ops. Theoretical analysis 
suggests that co-ops will perform less well than capitalist firms, but also that relative 
performance will vary depending on the operation of market relations (as well as other 
factors) across industries. Therefore, the first question addresses the comparative 
performance of co-ops and capitalist firms in an industry; the second addresses variations in 
co-op performance across industries. 
29 .",.." ]984, p. 3]0. 
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Such an approach involves a combination of intensive and extensive research. The intensive 
element consists of an analysis of certain industrial sectors in which co-operatives are 
operating, while the extensive element consists of analysing the broad patterns of 
co-operative performance within each sector. The aim is to use a marxist analysis 
throughout, so as to meet the first condition of compatibility above - that the framework of 
explanation is common to both the extensive and intensive research. 
The intensive element - sectoral analysis - stems from the theory that the performance of 
co-operatives is primarily determined by the relations between co-ops and the market. All 
co-ops operate in a particular social formation - British capitalism in the 19805 - but the 
actual form of the interaction with that social formation is determined by the market 
processes through which ~ contact takes place (including labour,product and finance 
markets). An analysis of the political economy of industrial sectors is therefore essential for 
an understanding of this major influence on how co-operatives operate. 
Choice of industrial sectors 
Co-operatives operate in most sectors of the economy, although they are distributed 
unevenly (as are small firms generally). One option would be to make a random choice of 
sectors - a sampling approach. This would be necessary if the intention was to carry out a 
statistically rigorous testing of the data from these sampled sectors with the aim of 
generalising the results to the population as a whole (i.e. all sectors). However, it is not the 
intention to generalise in this way; it may be that some conclusions represent the necessary 
relations which are applicable to all co-ops whatever their sector; other conclusions will be 
derived from the additional operation of contingent conditions, which characterise the 
specific sectors at specific points in time only, and are therefore of limited general 
applicability. The essential aim is to isolate the characteristics of industrial sectors and the 
processes operating within them, and to draw conclusions applicable to the specific sectors 
chosen, with which the performance of co-operatives in these sectors can be explained. For 
this purpose a random sample is meaningless, and much more useful results can be derived 
by a careful selection of the sectors to be examined. 
The choice has therefore been made with two aims in mind: 
• sectors where the experience of co-ops is likely to provide contrasts; 
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• those contrasts should attempt to cover as wide a range as possible of likely co-op 
experiences. 
I have used the classification of small firms by Schutt &t Whittington (S&W)30, which 
classifies all small firms with reference to their relationship to large capitals. S&W identify 
three possible types of relationship (and therefore all small firms, including co-ops, must fit 
into one of these). Given that the experience of small firms is likely to be largely detennined 
. . 
by the activities of large firms and the type of relations between the two, covering all of the 
S&W categories should provide examples of all the causal processes operating on 
co-operatives. 
The three categories applicable to small firms identified by S&tW were: (a) dependent -
subcontract/suppliers - vertical relationships with large capitals; (b) independent (i) -
competitive - often on the basis of intense exploitation and outdated equipment; (c) 
independent (ii) - usually operating in specialised market niches ignored by large capitals. 
The respective co-operative sectors chosen are: 
(a) Clothing manufacture - the majority of small clothing firms are both supplied by and 
supply to larger companies who co-ordinate the production process. 
(b) Printing - small firms in predominantly competitive relationships with both small and 
large firms. 
(c) Wholefood (distribution) wholesaling and retailing - a very limited presence of large firms 
(until recently at least). 
These sectors fit the categories reasonably w.ell (detailed reasons for locating these sectors in 
applicable categories are given in the relevant chapters). It is important to remember that in 
practice it is unlikely to be possible to find CCH>P (or small firm) sectors which correspond 
exactly with these definitions, although almost always a sector win fall more suitably into 
one category rather than the other two. This is because in no sector would firms experience 
a 'pure' relationship with large capitals of only one kind, there will always be elements of 
other relationships. Part of the reason for this is that the economy operates dynamically, and 
relations within it are constantly changing and adapting. Unlike the emphasis of 
neoclassical economics, we should not expect the economy to be in equilibrium, but 
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adapting to the various contradictory pressures which are always present and which capital 
will be attempting to ameliorate. 
Besides matching the required categories, these choices do have the advantage that they are 
sectors where co-operatives have been or are prominent: the older (CPF) co-ops from the 
19th and early 20th centuries were traditionally strong in clothing &: footwear, and printing. 
The 'new wave' of worker co-ops in the 19705 grew first of all in wholefoods, and has 
subsequently seen substantial grow~ in both printing and clothing. These sectors also have 
the advantage that they offer Significant amounts of data, and cover a substantial proportion 
of the whole co-operative sector. 
Choice of variables in extensive analysis 
The extensive element of the research consists of isolating sectoral characteristics by 
analysing aggregate data covering co-ops within each sector. In looking at all of the co-ops 
in a particular sector we clearly satisfy the requirement stated earlier (for compatibility) that 
the sample is homogeneous and causally related; they are firstly related through 
competition in the same market, and secondly through their relationship with large capitals. 
The most problematic aspect of the approach is the choice of varia~les which will form the 
basis of the extensive analysis. They must be relevant to the conceptual framework adopted, 
and should therefore relate to the tendencies towards degeneration identified earlier. I have 
interpreted the degeneration issue as the tension between commercial performance and 
survival in the capitalist market, and maintaining the socialist character of co-ops which 
potentially stems from worker ownership and control of the means of production. 
Emphasis is on the commercial aspect of co-op degeneration: to what extent have co-ops 
been able to achieve a sufficient level of commercial success to ensure survival? At the same 
time commercial performance must be analysed in the context of changes in social relations 
which co-ops bring about. The question of how to measure commercial performance for 
workers' co-ops, and which specific variables should be chosen, is addressed in chapter 7. 
Source. of data 
The major source of general information on co-ops was the database established by London 
IeOM covering all British co-ops, which carries data on co-ops' age, location, employment, 
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and activity. A substantial amount of time was spent maintaining and updating this 
database in order to provide an accurate picture of the overall co-op sector, and it was used 
as the basis for locating co-ops in the three chosen industries. The main sources of financial 
data were returns deposited at Companies House and the RegiStry of Friendly Societies. The 
main elements are financial data on co-ops' revenues and costs, distribution of surplus, and 
financing. These data sources and characteristics are described in detail in Appendices 2 and 
4. A secondary objective of the research was to establish a database of co-ops' financial 
performance, which could then be used by other researchers. 
Quantitative data of this kind is primarily descriptive; it presents a picture of the 
commercial experience of co-ops. The task is to explain this picture. Some aspects of 
explanation can be located within financial data. For instance, poor performance may be 
associated with undercapitalisation, which will be evident from this data. Obviously this 
does not explain the undercapitalisation, but it does suggest which of several possible 
causal processes is in operation. Poor performance due to undercapitalisation is not the 
same as poor performance due to the establishment of an alternative to the capitalist labour 
process within the co-op, although both are ultimately due to the conflict between 
co-operatives and the capitalist economy. 
Previous research using financial data has concentrated on efficiency arguments - are co-ops 
more efficient than capitalist firms as commodity producing enterprises? This focuses solely 
on their commercial performance (although is sometimes extended to employment creation) 
and does not address the qualitative aspects performance. 
The problem with orthodox approaches is not that they address the question of 
co-operatives' commercial performance. If CO-Ops are to secure any achievements they must 
survive commercially. Their mistake is that they consider solely commercial performance; it 
is considered in isolation from social factors. This reflects the conventional economists' view 
of economics as a technical discipline, abstracted from soda! or political questions, and 
contrasts totally with marxist political economy. The latter does not ignore commercial 
performance but addresses the question of the nature of the relationship between 
commercial and social performance. That is, under what circumstances does success in one 
imply failure in the other? What is the relationship between commercial perfonnance and 
social relations? Social and commercial perfonnance for co-operatives are two sides of a 
whole and it is meaningless to analyse one without the other. To ignore sodal perfonnance, 
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when we know that it may represent achievements made despite poor commercial 
performance, is to ignore the essence of worker co-operatives. 
Other parts of the explanation must be derived from outside of financial data, and must be 
related to other aspects of the operation of co-operatives. Ultimately the aim is to determine 
to what extent co-operative commercial performance is associated with gains or losses in 
other areas. Referring back to the central question of the degeneration argument: to what 
extent, and ~hy, is commercial success achieved only at the expense of abandoning 
'socialist' aspects of co-operatives7 Or, under what conditions can commercial survival and 
socialist success be maintained? 
Given the broad range of co-operatives being looked at, it is obvious that it is not possible to 
collect data on this question in the same depth or detail as is possible when undertaking a 
detailed case study of a single co-operative. This kind of data is not readily available in the 
same way as financial data, nor indeed is it by nature quantifiable like financial data. It was 
therefore necessary to derive information from a range of different, mostly secondary, 
sources. 
Two main sources were used. The first was a questionnaire sent to all known worker 
co-operatives early in 1986. The aim of this was to find out more-descriptive information 
about co-ops but which would give information about their methods of operation - such as 
the level of wages and wage structure (differentials); relationship and attitudes to the trade 
union movement; type of origin (e.g. 'new start', 'rescue', 'conversion'); and objectives of the 
co-op. The second major source is interviews with and case studies of co-operatives. 
Although these were carried by different people at different times and for a variety of 
'research purposes, they do provide a wide range of contextual information which can be 
used to locate commercial experience. In particular, the nature of the labour process in 
co-operatives, and relations with other co-operatives, competing finns, the community and 
the wider labour movement can be ascertained. 
'The results of co-op performance are contained in Part Two. The first chapter includes an 
overview of the economic circumstances surrounding the growth of co-ops, and of the 
character of the co-op sector. FollOwing this, the bulk of primary data collected concerned 
the commercial performance of co-operatives.Results based upon this data are presented in 
Research issues and methodology 115 
chapters 6 and 7, concerning the financing and commercial performance of co-ops in the 
three sectors. As the main focus of interest is the co-op sectors and the processes at work in 
the sector or industry, rather than those acting upon individual co-ops, the presentation is 
largely in terms of sectoral-level data. The chapter on the financing of co-ops analyses their 
relationship with finance capital, different sources of finance used and the relative positions 
of the three sectors, and changes over time. This provides the basis for an analysis of the 
commercial perfonnance in the three sectors in the follOwing chapter .. 
The first part of analysing commercial perfonnance involved the development of an 
alternative accounting framework for co-operatives. This was necessary because, whereas 
profitability is all-important for capitalist firms, it does not have the same status in co-ops; 
although co-ops are forced into 'profit-maximising' behaviour by the need to compete, 
workers have some discretion over the distribution of any surplus between wages and 
reserves. Therefore the alternative framework is based upon value-added rather than profit, 
and analyses both the generation of value added (in relation to skill levels and the amount of 
machinery used) and its distribution (between wages and reinvestment). 
Secondly, this framework is then applied to the performance of co-ops in the three sectors. 
Capacity to generate a 'return to labour' is analysed in terms of the results of the previous 
chapter on financing, and the ability of co-ops to accumulate in the same way as capitalist 
firms, whilst maintaining adequate levels of wages. Co-ops' financial perfonnance is 
analysed throughout in comparison with capitalist companies. 
The following three chapters - one on each sector - explore the historical development of the 
sectors and of co-ops within them. In these chapters the previous results on commercial 
performance is explained in terms of market structure and co-ops' position within it, the 
historical development of the labour process, and how both of these affect co-ops ability to 
both pursue 'co-op' objectives and meet the capitalist requirements for survival. 
Relating conclusions (outcomes) to questions 
The conclusions concern the ability of co-ops in different sectors to achieve commercial 
survival, whilst achieving wage levels comparable to other workers, and the factors which 
have a major influence on this. In terms of the realist framework outlined earlier, the 
conclusions relate to the way in which contingent conditions affect the exercise of co-ops' 
causal liability to degenerate. The political role of this is to investigate the specificities of the 
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concrete so as to strengthen attempts to infonn practice. Being able to isolate these factors 
has implications for the extension of co-operative activity, and the replication of past 
successes in other industries or sectors. Or, the finding can be inverted: what are the 
constraints which lead to poor perfonnance, and which must be removed if successes are to 
be generalised? The conclusion goes beyond a mere listing of these constraints, but aims to 
examine the political and economic conditions which lead to their intensification or 
relaxation. 
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5. Worker Co-operatives in Britain 
Origins and Characteristics 
INTRODUCTION 
The [worker co-operative] movement has grown beyond all expectations since 
1976. We have witnessed a 26-fold increase which has brought 1,400 co-ops 
and 12,000 worker-owners into being, the greatest increase in Europe, 
(superseding even the much-praised co-operatives of northern Spain). 
Currently the failure rate for co-operative companies is running at about 14% -
a staggering contrast to the 75% failure rate for small businesses in the first 
three years.1 
This paragraph sums a widely held view - now passing into co-operative mythology - that 
the co-op sector is booming, firmly established, and more successful than capitalist firms. 
Unfortunately, virtually all of the statistics quoted to put this view across are wrong; while 
the co-op sector does indeed embody some remarkable successes and achievements, these 
do need to be assessed critically. In particular, more accurate data is required to give a firm 
basis (or otherwise) to some of the more ambitious claims, as well as a suitably grounded 
analysis of the experience of co-ops. That is, the growth in co-ops to date must located 
within changes taking place within British capitalism, and the prospects for the future of the 
co-op sector assessed on the same basis. 
The lack of accurate statistical information about co-operatives is a major problem for 
researchers and activists, although often not acknowledged as such2. Macfarlane bluntly 
notes in Councils Support Co-ops that "statistics about co-ops are of doubtful quality''3. There 
are three main reasons for this. Firstly, small businesses generally are renowned for a poor 
quality of statistical information4, and this applies equally to co-ops; in both cases there is a 
lack of resources to collect and process more accurate data, a problem which is being 
exacerbated by reductions in data collection from the private sector by government 
departments. Secondly, there is confusion as to what exactly constitutes a co-operative. 
Thirdly, there is a strong tendency within the co-op movement to accept the most 
favourable figures unquestioningly. As Thomley notes: 
2 AmI4I WIIy.t, New SociIIlist slqlplement on co-ops, 2987. 
2 AJtIIougIJ 1M t.ck of .,. /IIUt(IuJ" tlwtmticlll framework is perluJ", IDIIMI more wious proW"" 
3~,2986. 
4 ruc, Mi Gwrtlilm 16.22.87. 
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How many times have the same uncritical speeches been trotted out, boasting 
of the staggering growth of <XH>peratives co-operatives supported by an 
impressive and integrated network of agendes across the country. The reality 
is much less satisfying.s 
The growth of the co-op sector is an example of a crudal and basic piece of information 
which is characterised by both excessive claims and a lack of analysis. Undoubtedly there 
has been a substantial growth in the number of workers' <XH>peratives over the last decade, 
but exactly how large is this growth, what form does it take, and why has it taken place? 
Figures quoted in the bi-annual directories published by the national Co-operative 
Development Agency are reproduced below in Table 5.1 and suggest rapid expansion of the 
sector, to over 1400 co-ops by 1986. 
Table S.l UK worker co-operatives (CDA Figures) 
1980 1982 1984 1986 
No. of 30S 498 911 1476 
co-ops 
Annual 27% 35% 27% 
growth 
Sosuce: National DIrectory of Co-operatives and Community Businesses 
(CDA 1986), and my own calculation •• 
Some very dramatic extrapolations have been made on the basis of these figures, leading to 
statements such as "if the growth continues at the same rate, there will be over 2SO,OOO 
co-operative businesses by the end of the century"6. Such statistical interpretations are 
unhelpful and pay no attention to the reasons for this growth, tending to treat it as some 
form of uncontrolled multiplication, as if the amoeba of the <XH>perative movement were 
spontaneously dividing. It is a ,view which lacks an understanding of the reasons for the 
growth that has taken place. My own investigations suggest that the actual number of 
co-operatives is substantially less than this, and that there is little prospect of growth 
continuing at the rate of the past few years; in fact the signs are that the growth is tailing off 
already. 
5 NfW Sqd4li1t.2UiJ.. 
6 CDA, 1984, 'P' fl. 
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While such statistics can be useful they do not in themselves constitute an explanation; this 
requires a historically grounded analysis of the circumstances in which growth has taken 
place. Statistical findings are highly suggestive but in themselves they do not necessarily 
reveal the underlying' causal mechanisms'7. A cursory glance at the historical experience of 
co-ops reveals a cyclical process of growth and declineS; what reason is there to suppose 
that this will not be repeated? The aim of this chapter is to present accurate and justified 
statistics and data on the present state of the co-operative sector, and to relate these to the 
changes taking place in the British economy. Therefore statistics will not be presented for 
their own sake, but attempts will be made to explain as well as describe the changes and 
processes taking place. 
1976-86: A DECADE OF CROWI'H 
The growth of the worker co-operative sector in Britain from 1976 to 1986 is shown in 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2, and Table 5.2. The number of co-ops started growing from 1970 
onwards, albeit relatively slowly until the mid-1970s. The real boom came during the 1980s, 
with the total number of co-operatives increasing from around 200 in 1980 to nearly 900 by 
the end of 1986. However, it would appear that this growth is by now tailing off; the peak 
years were 1982-4, when new co-op registrations took place at a rate of around 45-50% of 
the number of co-ops existing at the beginning of each year. Although the number of new 
co-operatives formed remained fairly constant over 1984-6 - at just over 200 per year - the 
growth rate of the sector declined to 33% in 1985 and 29% in 19869. More recent evidence 
suggests that by the end of 1987 the formation rate of new co-ops was also declining in 
absolute terms10• The most active period immediately followed a time of rapidly rising 
unemployment, and coincided with the peak of the economic activities of Labour local 
authorities, which itself led to rapid growth in the number of lOCal COAs (Co-operative 
Development Agencies). 
7 Sdnltt & WIIitti1lgftm, 1987; SItyer 1984. 
8 ComforIh, 1987; Ba" & CMIIr 1986. 
9 .",.1986 fip" mil'! ZIt NNdIlJKm 1101 lfJIiII com,." UbI. HDfM1If', it is rqorIItl by ICOM (wIlD 1rutdU 1ItOU1I4 75" of 
1111,.,., CIH1p {orrrutiDru) thal 1M .. " of MIl ,.,utnatimu Ita ".,. fairly slltuly, /fuctUlltiftg IItOIllf41g.20 ,.., IfIIIfItII {rom 
1984 to 1M first hAlf of 1987 (New Cq-ortmtgr, tIIIriou.). This sugg,.,. IMt my figu". far 1986 ., 1WIISt1Mbly /lCCUNII. 
10 TM wint" 1987111ititm of New Co-qpmrtgr 1fJ1OI'II4 tlllt 4uri1tg tlte ptriotl AUplt·OclDkr 1987, tIw mD1Itllly .... " of 
,.,., ,.,istnatiGu.,.. 25" Im.Der tJwc in tIw first 7111DP1t111 011987. 
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Table 5.2 Formations of worker co-operatives, 1975-1986 
Yeilr Co-ops Co-ops Survival Co-op Sector 
formed surviving rate stock growth 
(%) (y/e) (%) 
1946 to 
1975 44 29 65.9 32 
1976 19 10 52.6 48 58.8 
1977 32 13 40.6 75 66.9 
1978 67 33 49.3 134 89.2 
1979 46 26 565 165 34.3 
1980 70 38 54.3 217 425 
1981 73 37 50.7 267 33.6 
1982 128 59 46.1 366 48.0 
1983 181 100 55.2 506 49.5 
1984 229 154 67.2 651 45.3 
1985 232 189 815 765 35.7 
1986 223 206 92.4 894 29.2 
Total 1343 883 66 
Source: London IeOM (1987) (Worker Co-op Database>, and my own calculations 
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Figure 5.1 Formation and survival of co-ops 
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Figure 5.2 Worker co-op sector: size and growth rate 
c 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
% 
40 
30 
20 
10 
Despite all this activity and rapid growth, the overall impact of co-operatives in 
employment terms has been, realistically, minute. By the end of 1986 there were around 
560011 full-time (or equivalent> jobs in 'new' worker co-operatives, plus another 600 or so in 
the older 'CPF' co-ops remaining from the 19th century12, relative to the British labour force 
of some 25 million and unemployment of 3 million. In London there are perhaps 1500 jobs 
in co-operatives; this must be considered relative to the estimated 500,000 jobs lost in the 
capital between 1973 and 198313. 
This data suggests that the figures quoted above from the CDA are vastly over-optimistic. 
Firstly, the widely accepted figures on the size of the co-op sector are much too high, based 
as they are on data for co-op registrations rather than co-ops known to be actually trading14. 
As with all forms of businesses, many co-ops register but do not actually commence 
11 This is probAbly an underestimllte, !Jut not by all th4t much. Due to ineviUlblt time IIlgs tllm is a dellly in obtaining 
accurate data on the number of workers in newer and in rapidly growing co-ops. HowtTJeT, it is unlikely that despite tM 
rJerY high number of co-ops in Britain by historical standards tM number of co-op workers exceeds tM historical peak of 
10,000. 
12 Almost all suruitring co-operatiTJts were members of tM eo.cperatiTJt ProductiTJt Federation, affiliJlted to tM Co-operatitJt 
Union. See Appoulix 9. 
13 Census of Employment, quoted in GLC, 1985. 
14 For more details on data Set Appendix 2. 
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trading; I have therefore used data based on co-ops which have registered and which are 
known, from one source or another, to have at least one full-time worker. The COA's 
figures, for example, include co-ops whether or not this applies, and also some community 
businesses and community co-ops. Both co-ops and community businesses are likely to 
have economic, sodal and political objectives, but the internal dynamic by which these are 
pursued is different15• Secondly, my results suggest that the very high growth rates in the 
co-op sector in 1983-4 are not being maintained, and therefore that predictions for a vast 
co-op sector within a few years are not justified. Throughout the rest of this chapter I will be 
presenting both information on the nature of the co-op sector in Britain, as well as the 
explanations for its development, which have been missing up till now. 
The limited impact on unemployment is not only because the total number of co-ops is low, 
but also because the vast majority are very sma1l16. Table 5.3 & Figure 5.3 show the 
distribution of co-ops by size of workforce. At the end of 1986 more than 50% had 4 workers 
or less, and in 1984 the average (median) turnover was £80,00017; total turnover was 
perhaps £200 million, relative to GOP of over £300 billion. Clearly, in terms of workers or 
turnover co-operatives are yet to make an impact of the economy nationally; their impact on 
regional or sectoral economies will be considered in later sections of this chapter. 
Table 5.3 Distribution of co-operatives by size 
Size No. of Total 
(no. of co-ops workers 
workers) (FTE) 
1-4 520 340 
5-9 240 1337 
10 -19 88 992 
20-49 28 704 
50 -100 3 165 
over 100 4 1018 
Total 883 5556 
Nou: PTE = full-time equivalent. 
Source: as Table 5.2 
15 Milcfllr/il1lt, 1986, p. 10. 
16 8nI-nn, 1988, comments that the size of co-cps in Qlrious countpUs 1uu L__ tt ' __ ,,_ L_ .1_.1_ d 
. ~n gt mg SfJUUlCT Ot1e1' tnc past ""Cll"", ue 
largtly to the formlltlOrt of 7fIIlI'Iy small, new co-ops from scrlltch. 
17 TunlOt1e1' figure bastd upon questionnairt daUz 1l7ld t%JIminlltion of rn.mo IlCCOU t " .1_ 
- -r n s, gIVIng ""Uz on 295 co-ops. 
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Figure 5.3 Distribution of co-ops by size of workforce, 1986 
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WORKER CO-OPERATIVES: mSTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Boom and bust - co-ops and crisis 
The historical record of workers co-operatives in Britain has until very recently been 
decidedly poor. The sector always has been and remains small in national terms; even in the 
nineteenth century co-ops never existed in large numbers and "have rarely exceeded 200 at 
anyone time"18. The failure to develop a thriving co-operative sector in Britain has several 
causes. Firstly, the labour and worker co-operative movements parted company in the late 
nineteenth century. Secondly, the co-operative movement received little or no government 
support, contrasting with the experience of sectors in France, Italy and later Spain, where 
interventionist government policies acted strongly to support emerging co-op sectors19. 
Thirdly, the structure of British capitalism has been until recently relatively unfavourable 
18 T1umtley,1981, p.l0. 
19 Worker CtHJperatintS in Frana and ItIlly also IuId the support of thost countries' Communist Parties Il7ld major sections of 
the trade union moT1t11IDIts, support which was importll7lt in generating gcwernmmt inftrtlmtion in fafJOUr of 
CtHJptrrltitfts. 
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towards small firms, with the small firm sector in Britain being relatively the smallest 
amongst OECO economies20. 
Historically the formation rate of worker co-operatives in Britain has varied cyclically, and 
evidence of the recently declining growth rate suggests that this pattern is perhaps being 
repeated. Rather than the boom in co-operative formations over the last decade forming the 
basis for a transformation of the economy, or even a substantial co-operative sector within 
Britain's capitalist economy, previous experience suggests that the current activity and 
interest is li1cely to be short-term. But this is not necessarily the case. The fortunes of the 
co-operative sector are largely determined by the changing nature of its relationship with 
the capitalist economy, but as that economy develops the role which co-operatives play 
within it also changes. Cycles of growth, recession and restructuring have always plagued 
capitalism and are inherent in its structure. Although it is the tendency of the rate of profit 
to fall which is at the root of such crises, the actual form which any particular crisis takes 
will vary, depending on which contradictions within capitalism are most severe and where 
the circuit of capital is disrupted. Therefore the exact relationship between capitalism, crisis 
and the growth of worker co-ops will also vary. In the context of cyclical developments in 
the co-operative sector, it is interesting to note that wider developments in worker 
participation have shown similar cycles of interest and decline, although for different 
reasons21. 
Throughout the nineteenth century there were waves of co-operative formation and 
collapsej they were formed in mostly in periods of growth, but the sector was periodically 
dealt serious blows by slumps which caused extensive co-op faiIures22. By 1918 there were 
perhaps 100 co-operatives in Britain, with less than 10,000 workers. From the tum of the 
century until the mid-1970s there were virtually no new co-ops formed23, and numbers 
gradually declined. Jones24 makes a brave attempt to analyse their performance in both 
survival and participatory terms, and considers that they were more successful than 
capitalist firms, but as Carke points out, he was examining nothing more than "the geriatric 
20 Gianguly, 1982. 
21 IM16 & cm.r, 1986; RIJ"""Y, 1977& 1983; Poole, 1986, ,. 100. 
22 TIumtlq, 1981, cllqter 111114 IM16 & c.m, 1986,,,,. 58.9,giw mort utllils. 
23 Ezupt • .",-liflfd boom of ltuil4itJg co-opINtifJa in 1920-21, lmad to 1M gvil4 sodIIlist 1ffDMPImt and suJ'1Iorl44 by 
".rddJItd etmlNcll. 
24 Tona, 1975. 
Worker Co-operatives in Britain 129 
survivors of a decimated movement"25. The number of these CPF co-operatives continues to 
decline, and by 1988 only 5 remained. 
The severe crisis of the 1920s and 19305 led to no new co-operative formations and 
contributed to some failures of co-ops remaining from the previous century, and yet the 
nature of the restructuring process adopted at that time laid some of the foundations for the 
growth of co-ops in the last decade. 
The 19305 depression was marked by a realisation crisis, whereby capitalists could not sell 
all commodities produced. They attempted to reduce real wages and employment so as to 
reduce selling costs, and increase profits. But this led to a further reduction in aggregate 
demand, and a downward spiral of low profitability, reduced wages and increased 
unemployment, leading to further reduced demand and so on. The unregulated market 
economy could not be relied upon to produce a full employment equilibrium; Keynes'26 
theoretical analysis showed how equilibrium in the economy was possible at less than full 
employment, and proposed that the state should intervene - through public expenditure 
and taxation policy etc. - so as to maintain aggregate demand at the full employment level. 
Macroeconomic demand management formed the foundation of postwar economic policy 
and led to a prolonged period (1950-1970) of high profits and a high rate of capital 
accumulation. Concentration and centralisation of capital took place rapidly, often 
encouraged by governments, as monopoly capitalism became more firmly established. The 
role of small firms in the economy diminished,21 and there was little or no role for 
co-operatives as nationalised industries and large firms became the order of the day. 
The reasons for the end of the long postwar boom are complex28, but ultimately this regime 
could not be maintained. Demand management enabled high rates of profit and 
accumulation, plus some gains shared with privileged sections of the working class, 
through increased real wages and welfare state provision; eventually there was downward 
pressures on the rate of profit as the organic composition of capital rose, but capital could 
not impose sufficient increases in relative or absolute exploitation to counteract this and 
maintain profits. Falling profitability was accentuated by the oil price shocks of 1973 and 
1979 which caused industry's costs to rise sharply, deepening the recession and pushing 
25 a.,b, 1983c, ,.16. 
261Cqna, 1936. 
27 Pndt, 1976. 
28 S. ,.g. C,.,. _d Sutcliffe, 1987, dUlpter 16; Smith til AArrmovitch, 1981; A"",,",",, Cly1I til Hmisorc, 1984. 
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unemployment up even further. In this situation, continued attempts by the 
Heath/Wilson/Callaghan administrations during the 19705 to implement Keynesian 
policies failed to avert a deepening crisis of high inflation, high unemployment and low 
profitability. The severe dislocation suffered in the 1970s led to the radically different 
restructuring policies adopted by the Thatcher government since 1979, which were drastic 
in themselves but attempted to lay the foundations for a renewed period of capital 
accumulation. 
A second important measure adopted by the postwar Labour government was an extensive 
programme of nationalisation of strategic industries, including the railways, coal, steel and 
road haulage. This measure represented the fulfilment of a socialist commitment to public 
ownership which was long-standing in the Labour Party29, but the subsequent development 
of nationalised industries fell far below the initial socialist ambitions and expectations, with 
a failure develop socialist principles in their operation. 
The interwar period was one of great confidence in bureaucracy and managerialism as an 
organisational form, under the analytical influence of Max Weber and the practical 
experience of rapid industrialisation achieved under Stalin in the USSR and by Fascism in 
Italy and Germany30. This meshed with similar Fabian conceptions of public ownership to 
produce large, bureaucratic pubUcly-owned corporations with minimal democratic 
accountability to either workers or consumers. There were some gains for labour, as both 
real wages and job security improved under public ownership, but beyond this the labour 
process was little different to that under private ownership, with the same hierarchy of 
unelected managers, the same technology and production processes. Furthermore, failure to 
restructure the labour process in the nationalised industries was matched by a similar 
failure at the level of the economy. Instead of being a vehicle for restructuring for labour, 
the nationalisation programme in practice offered far more benefits to capital. The 
industries taken into public ownership were largely ailing and unable to make sufficient 
profits for capitalists; when nationalised, these strategic industries provided subsidised 
inputs to a wide range of privately owned industry, and saved capital from having to bear 
the burden of produdng these inputs unprofitably and from having to deal with opposition 
from a highly organised workforce. 
21 tliIcuuItl.,,1. i" tIM crmtcct rf tM W""" inflllltfU 011 palfda tmuGnlIlOCiId I1rDfW,s/li,. 
30 0*, 0Immm IJJ EIlwrmll, IISI, ,.161. 
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The failure of the nationalisation programme to benefit the working class significantly, and 
the undemocratic bureaucratic structure of the large publicly-owned corporations, 
contributed to a major loss of confidence in nationalisation as a strategy for achieving social 
ownership31. In the light of the perceived failures of nationalisation the Labour party turned 
increasingly to consideration of other forms of social ownership; in this workers 
co-operatives have played a prominent part, with the hope that they would provide a form 
of socially owned enterprise accountable to both the workforce and local community. This 
has been the strategy of the centre and right of the party; coupled with a failure to analyse 
the nature of British capitalism, they have supported co-operatives as necesSllrilyachieving 
these objectives rather than examining the conditions under which the progressive nature of 
co-operatives would be realised - just as there is a limited and unsatisfactory analysis of the 
reasons for the failure of nationalisation, merely a simplistic response to the undoubted 
unpopularity of nationalised industries. This mainstream Labour party view has been 
shared by Eurocommunists and many 'municipal socialists', with the partial exception 
perhaps of the GLe; the latter's policy of 'restructuring for labour' endorsed co-operatives 
as a potentially democratic and locally accountable form of worker-controlled enterprise, 
but in relation to an overall policy which viewed some form of intervention in the market 
and in the management of capitalist enterprises as necessary conditions for this to be 
achieved. The differing strategies of Labour local authorities and their effectiveness will 
receive more attention in Part m. 
Support for co-operatives was also built upon the experience generated by the wave of sit-
ins and worker occupations which swept the country in the early 1970s32, After the impact 
of the famous Upper Oyde Shipbuilders work-in in 1971, it is estimated that over 150,000 
workers had participated in over 200 occupations between 1971-197533. Such occupations 
and work-ins involved workers in more than economistic demands for better wages and 
conditions, provoking calls for greater worker control over production34• Similar processes 
had taken place in Europe, manifested in the upheavals of 1968 in France, and Italy's 'hot 
autumn' of 196935. In Italy, the success of shopfloor struggles led to demands for greater 
31 I.g. HodglDfl, 1984 
32 &JU & c.rt.r,19B6; Coata & TorN"', 1972, Coata,I9Bl. 
33 HE TnuU U"icm ShUliM l"{mnlltiDn U"it, 1976. 
34 Coata, 1976. 
35 MIlt,.,., 1980. 
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control over the organisation of work, and interest developed in conditions of work which 
reinforced solidarity rather than those which induced individual competitiveness. 
The reassertion of demands for workers' control paved the way for a renewed interest in 
and sympathy with co-operatives. In Britain this was manifested in the first co-op 
formations as workers' initiatives in the face of factory closures and redundancies for nearly 
a century. These will be discussed shortly, but first I will examine the nature of the crisis 
and restructuring facing Britain in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Cllpittdist restructuring 
The crisis of the 19708 and 1980s has been the deepest and most long-lasting since the 1920s 
and 19308, both in Britain and internationally. Throughout the capitalist world (and indeed 
elsewhere) attempts are being made to restructure capital to permit an increase in 
exploitation and the rate of profit. The primary means by which this is being achieved in 
Britain are36: 
Private sector monetarism. A tight money supply policy forced up interest rates and the 
exchange rate; both measures put pressure on industry, forcing up costs, making exporting 
more difficult and importing easier and hence reducing demand. Domestic profits were 
squeezed, forcing some firms out of business and others to cut back on employment and 
resist pressure for wage rises. Unemployment trebled, and while this policy did not cause 
the recession it made it more severe. The main benefit of the recession for employers was 
the discipline that large scale unemployment exerted on those still in work. 
Public sector cuts and privatisation. In order to achieve the same result in the public sector a 
variety of policies were introduced. Funding for public services and local government was 
reduced <e.g. through the imposition of cash limits and ratecapping> and many functions 
were contracted out or subjected to competitive tendering. Where this has reduced costs -
whether or not privatised - it has largely been at the expense of wages, employment, 
working conditions, and the quality of service provided. Many nationalised industries have 
been privati sed, leading to redundancies and price increases either before or after 
privatisation (e.g. British Aerospace, British Telecom, electricity) and others have had their 
funding reduced (e.g. British Rail). 
36 AtlIqItMI from GLC,l985, ",.70-11. 
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InternationaIisation of the Economy. One of the Conservative government's first measures was 
to remove restrictions on international capital flows. This enabled large quantities of finance 
capital to move abroad in search of the most profitable outlets, rather than being invested 
domestically so as to increase production and employment in Britain. It has also enabled 
multinational capital to further dominate the economy, tying British production into a 
restructured international division of labour, in which investments serve international 
ratJ:ter than national markets. This changes the position and power of national workforces: 
they can more easily be played off against each other, but their ability to disrupt production 
on a larger scale is much greater37• 
Removal of workers legal rights. Legislative changes have imposed restrictions on collective 
action by workers and trade unions - such as the banning of secondary picketing and the 
insistence on formal balloting as a precondition for industrial action. Other attacks on 
employment include undermining the ability of wages councils to protect workers in badly 
paid sectors, and weakening protection against unfair dismissal. 
In general there has been an increase in the scope of operation of market forces, as a means 
of disciplining labour and promoting capital restructuring, so as to facilitate future 
profitability and accumulation. As an indication of the impact of these measures, the Bank 
of England reported that the rate of return on capital was by mid-1988 above the average of 
Britain's industrial competitors38. 
PHOENIX FROM THE ASHES? THE RISE OF THE NEW CO-OPS 
It is no coincidence that the co-ops boom has come about at a time of great social and 
economic change; the 'material context' of the current crisis - its contradictions and 
attempted solutions - has contributed to formation and growth of co-ops. Those aspects of 
crisis and restructuring which are of particular importance to co-ops are: 
• Unemployment 
• Privatisation 
• Restructuring of large firm/small firm relations 
• The legacy of nationalisation 
37 At""",.". wry tpIidcly during 1M 1988 Ftmi ,trike (FiMncj4l lima 16.3.88). 
38 O!wtcrlV Bulletin. 19BB. 
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• 'Municipal socialism' 
• Support for employee ownership and 'worker capitalism' 
Unemployment. The bankruptcy of many firms and major restructuring of others which led 
to redundancies and record levels of unemployment, especially amongst the young. This 
has left many workers desperate for any possibility of work, with co-ops being promoted on 
the basis of their job-creation potential. 
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Figure 5.4 Small firm and co-op sector growth, 1979-1986 
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The rise of small firms. An important element of restructuring has been the changing 
relationship between large and small firms (detailed in chapter 3). This has led to a much 
increased economic role for small firms. In the past, small firms and self-employment have 
been relatively less important in Britain than in other comparable countries, but the 1970s 
and 1980s have seen a reversal of two previously well-established trends - the trend towards 
increasing concentration by the top 100 manufacturing firms on the one hand, and the 
secular decline of small firms on the other39. Small firms and self-employment are now 
increasing their role in both manufacturing and services, with this growth concentrated in 
areas of relative prosperity rather than those worse hit by industrial decline. These changes 
39 Schutt & Whittington, 1987. 
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have provided a new role for small firms in the economy and stimulated their growth, and 
provided an environment which similarly facilitated the establishment of co-operatives, 
providing openings for co-ops formed in response to the other pressures described here. 
Although co-ops started from a much lower base, their increasing number has clearly 
paralleled the growth of small firms (see Figure 5.4). 
Privatisation. Besides the restructuring of nationalised industries, either as a prelude to 
privatisation or at the very least operation according to market criteria, many local authority 
services have been put out to the private sector. Direct labour forces have been cut back as 
capitalist firms have taken over many council functions, and co-ops have been promoted to 
take over such operations. 
Nationalisation and social ownership. The failure to consolidate the political and economic 
gains of nationalisation to benefit the working class, and the subsequent degeneration of 
nationalised industries into unresponsive bureaucracies, also changed perceptions of social 
ownership on the left. There has been widespread support for alternatives to capitalist 
forms of ownership which would bring production more efficiently under workers control, 
and workers' co-operatives have figured prominently in such thinking40. Such an approach 
has long been favoured by, for instance, the Institute for Workers Control awC). 
Municipal socialism. In the early 1980s local authorities emerged as the main power base of 
the left in opposition to Tory policies, particularly the metropolitan counties and the GLe. 
These councils attempted to move beyond traditional areas of local authority activity, and 
saw economic intervention as a legitimate and necessary part of their role, particularly in 
response to high and rising unemployment and the devastation of established industrial 
activity. Promotion and development of co-ops was widely seen as part of the 'municipal 
socialist' strategy. This led to further important support for co-ops through the 
establishment and development of a support network, consisting of CDAs and other 
organisations providing advice, training in both co-operative and business skills, and 
finance. The fact that circumstances leading to the emergence of co-ops has also led to the 
establishment of a wide support network is one of the most distinctive characteristics of this 
period of co-operative growth. 
4(} AJlhDuglt 1M tUbtaIe /J1'OUrul ,..timlllliMtimt ".. Hen "..,W "y II amspicuolls absm" of COJtsilUrrtlllPltllysis, TDIticIt ".. not 
Iwl,.tl 1M SMf'dt for IIltmrlltiw forms of soci/ll OfI»fmItip. 
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Employee ownership and worker capitalism. The 19805 have also been characterised by 
enthusiasm for profit-sharing and employee-shareholding schemes. These initiatives -
generally aimed at concealing underlying class conflict, undermining the role of trade 
unions, and strengthening the link between pay and profitability - encompass workers 
co-ops as well as a broader range of developments. 
It is important to note that these factors have become important over the past decade, and 
these historically specific circumstances must be taken into account in any assessment of the 
likely durability of the co-op sector. 
ORIGINS Of THE NEW CO-oPEltA11VES 
There have been three types of co-operative origin in the present wave: completely new 
starts, conversions from stable capitalist companies, and rescues of failed or failing capitalist 
businesses. Figure 55 shows the proportion of co-ops, and workers in co-ops, of different 
origins. The majority of co-ops (12%) are 'new starts' , with far fewer conversions (10%) and 
rescues (14%). Understandably the new starts are smaIl, and account for a relatively smaller 
proportion of workers (47%) than rescues or conversions of existing companies (29% and 
19% respectively). Conversions and rescues originate from capitalist companies in very 
different circumstances; new start co-operatives tend to stem from either the alternative 
movement or, more recently, specifically as attempts at job creation. Each will be discussed 
in more detail below. 
Ccmvnsio1ll 
In 1951 the Christian Socialist Ernest Bader became the first contemporary capitalist to give 
his company away to the workers, when he established the Scott Bader Commonwealth 
from his successful chemical company. Bader considered that the best hope of establishing a 
co-operative commonwealth nationally lay in persuading other benevolent capitalists to do 
the same, and established an organisation which later became known as ICOM (Industrial 
Common Ownership Movement) to promote this objective. Bader hoped to appeal to a 
philanthropic motive amongst his fellow capitalists, and failed to recognise that the 
circumstances under which capitalists would be tempted to give away or even sell their 
companies to the workers are extremely limited. Even so, this strategy was pursued by JOL 
(Job Ownership Ltd), formed in 1978 under the guidance of Robert Oakeshott. JOL 
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considers that co-operatives are formed out of enlightened self-interest, and that their main 
benefits will be higher productivity and greater efficiency than in the conflict-laden 
environment of a capitalist firm. Their favoured strategy was to focus attention on the 
owners and managers of small and medium-sized businesses, in the hope that they could be 
persuaded to convert to a co-operative form. However, JOL's attempts have generally failed 
to generate a response and there have been very few conversions. 
Figure 5.5 Distribution of CO-OP! and workers according to co-op origins,1986 
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In the mid-1970s the co-operative sector received a boost from another quarter. Many of 
those who had formed collectives from the 'alternative culture' of the 1960s began to seek a 
formal legal structure which accommodated aspirations of a non-hierarchical and non-
authoritarian way of doing business, and began to establish workers' co-operatives, often in 
wholefood distribution and radical printing, publishing and bookselling. This movement 
had an anarchist and utopian ideology, and grew from the protest movements of the sixties 
and a more general concern with environmental issues and an emphasis On human-scale 
organisations, in another link with Bader's mentor E.F. Schumacher. 
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This impetus to establish co-operatives was given a boost by the passing of the Industrial 
Common Ownership Act in 1976, with all-party support. This Act was the first major piece 
of new legislation affecting specifically co-operatives since the Industrial and Provident 
Sodeties Acts in the nineteenth century, which first allowed their incorporation with limited 
liability. The ICO Act defined 'common ownership and co-operative enterprises'41, and 
gave access to certain government funds for organisations meeting this definition, through 
Industrial Common Ownership Finance (ICOF). ICOM also drew up a set of 'model rules' 
which, besides making the incorporation of co-operatives more straightforward, provided a 
structure which was more egalitarian than that of 19th century co-ops, and discouraged 
degeneration through control passing into the hands of external shareholders or through the 
employment of non-member workers. 
The 'alternative' co-operatives marked a sharp break with past co-operative tradition. 
Opposed equally to monopoly capitalism and the bureaucracy of the state they attempted to 
develop egalitarian intemal structures, which contrasted with the hierarchies characteristic 
of both public and private sector organisations. Unlike the older CPF co-operatives and the 
newer conversions, they attempted to restructure the labour process. Their objectives 
included principles of skill equality rather than hierarchy, job rotation rather than detailed 
division, reduction of skill and income differentials, and direct participative democracy 
rather than indirect representative democracy. Furthermore there was frequent concern 
with the nature of the product as well as with the production process. Hence the promotion 
of a healthy diet through wholefoods, and the promotion of radical views through 
publishing and printing, and ventures into energy conservation. They tended to support 
efforts to develop a strong and coherent co-operative sector, and have been active within 
ICOM. 
Despite their collective ethic, such alternative co-operatives retained a peculiarly isolationist 
perspective towards links between the co-operative movement and the labour movement 
and other progressive forces. Their rejection of many aspects of the economic and social 
structure extended beyond public and private sector corporations to include the trade union 
movement and state organisations. Most alternative co-operators ~ere (are?) middle class 
idealists with little experience of the labour movement, sharing bourgeois suspidons of 
trade unions and the working class, and their concern has been with internal organisational 
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refonn rather than building up links outside of the sector. Like those promoting 
conversions, alternative co-operatives saw the co-operative movement as a third sector of 
the economy, which would grow without the need for strong political links and economic 
support. In fact this 'third sector' approach has characterised much of the co-operative 
movement, and is still a strong influence within ICOM. It is associated with a political 
neutrality and a conception of a 'Co-operative Commonwealth' which harks back to the 
ideas of nineteenth century Christian Socialists such as E. V. Neale and Thomas Hughes. 
The isolationist position of the co-operative movement has altered since 1980, as two new 
areas of co~perative growth have emerged. The first is the establishment of co-operatives 
as 'rescues' of failed or failing capitalist businesses; the second is new co-operatives set up 
in response to increasing levels of unemployment (sometimes referred to as 'job creation' 
co-operatives). The latter are generally associated with local authority intervention, either 
directly, or indirectly through local CSOS (Co-operative Support Organisations). Whereas 
the two forms of co-operative growth just described characterised co-operative 
development in the 1970s, the changed economic environment and much more serious 
recession has stimulated these new initiatives. Both have been aimed at securing a greater 
degree of worker control over production as well as the more limited objective of saving or 
creating jobs, and both have required the building of links with the labour movement. 
'Rescue' co-ops 
The first rescue co~peratives of recent times were established in the early 1970s - Fakenham 
Enterprises in Norfolk, Leadgate Engineering in Co. Durham, and Bardrec Engineering in 
Lanarkshire42. These efforts resulted from worker occupations and were part of the much 
wider wave of occupations in the early 1970s described earlier. 
Much better known are the three established with with government assistance while Tony 
Benn was Minister of Industry in 1974-5 - Scottish Daily News, Kirkby Manufacturing and 
Engineering, and Triumph Meriden Motorcycles (SDN, !<ME & TMM). These efforts have 
been reviewed extensively elsewhere43, but certain points are worth mentioning here. 
Firstly, in all of these cases there was strong shopfloor resistance to the original closure, but 
not necessarily any strong initial feelings in favour of establishing a co-operative. The initial 
42 o.kaIIott, 7978, ,.7OB. 
43 S. Eccla,79Bl; OdnIrott 7978, t:IuqMr 7; OM". 7976 Mtl CWkl7983cOIIIIll til,. 'Ba .. I' ctH1I";CWkI, 19'&,011 
SDN; Falrdougll, 1986, 011 TMM; WajcmIUI, 1983, 011 FIIlrmJraI; Palmi, 1987; 77tcmm 81 'l1ttwrtl6y,7988. 
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suggestion usually came from local trade union officials, sometimes with the backing of the 
Institute for Workers Control. Secondly, in none of the cases were the external market 
conditions which contributed to the failure of the capitalist firm addressed. Thirdly, none 
received sufficient capital funding, from the state or elsewhere, to give them any realistic 
chance of becoming established on a sound commercial basis in these difficult 
circumstances. Fourthly, very little attention was paid to establishing new co-operative 
working methods (except perhaps at Meriden) and organisational structures, nor to 
involving the mass of the rank and file workers in the running of the co-op. The 
combination of these difficulties made success in either commercial or co-operative terms 
elusive. The more radical supporters of these ventures hoped that they would provoke a 
crisis of dual power and the beginnings of a restructuring of industry under worker control. 
Instead their achievements were more limited: jobs were provided for several hundred 
workers who would otherwise have been unemployed (750 at KME, 400 at Meriden), and 
the co-operative option was raised as a possibility for taking over capitalist firms. The 
experience did demonstrate the severe limitations on restructuring possible within 
individual firms while their relationship to the rest of the capitalist market economy 
remains unchanged. 
From the mid-1970s until 1986 some 80 rescue co-ops have been established in Britain44• 
These have all been smaller and more limited in scope, generally (but not always) aiming to 
convert only part of the failing company into a co-operative - and consequently offering 
employment for only part of the workforce. While some job losses and restructuring prior to 
setting up a rescue co-op are now standard practice - and are exactly what many capitalist 
employers have attempted to achieve - saving at least some jobs under worker control may 
be an acceptable strategy if worker resistance to any redundancies has failed. Given the 
almost total lack of central state funding for co-operatives, such rescue co-operatives are 
probably the only ones with any chance of survival. 
Rescues are one area where co-operatives, COAs and trade unions have been working most 
closely, and their growing experience of establishing such ventures is valuable. However, 
much remains to be done to promote the conditions under which rescues can take place 
successfully. A few COAs have concentrated on rescues on the basis that, if suitably 
restructured, rescue co-ops will have a greater chance of survival and create more jobs than 
"P"",1987. 
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the very small new starts. Certainly there are grounds for arguing that development 
workers' attention is more productive when devoted to a small number of rescues than 
spread thinly across a larger number of small, new co-operatives, each of which requires a 
fairly high level of support. Sheffield COG has adopted this approach, promoting the idea 
to trade unionists as a strategy for dealing with threatened business closures if more 
traditional methods of defence fail. Although there have been some successes, rescues face 
very difficult problems, because of the very short time available to establish a c(H)perative 
before the liquidator of a collapsed finn sells off valuable assets, and the complex 
negotiations necessary with the previous owners. There are also problems securing 
adequate finance for what remains a high-risk venture, and in a large rescue substantial 
amounts of external finance may be required. Finally, the conversion to a co-operative 
involves introducing new forms of organisation and control in a short space of time, often to 
workers who have considered the co-operative option as a last resort. 
A further attraction of rescue C(H)PS is that they involve strengthening the links between the 
trade union and C(H)P movements, which is essential if the sector is to grow to become a 
significant force. Much can be learned from the experience of Italy, where since 1970 trade 
unions have supported efforts to fonn co-operatives from collapsed firms, and rescues have 
become commonplace45. In many cases the co-op federations and trade unions have been 
far more interventionist than has been the case in Britain, where CDAs tend to support 
'bottom-up' development strategies responding to grass-roots initiatives. Support for 
rescues and links to trade unions are major reasons why the co-operative sector in Italy has 
expanded so rapidly and is now the largest in western Europe. 
loCAL AUI'HOlUTY INTE1lVENTION AND THE GROWTH OF CSOs 
The economic crisis of the 19705 and 19805 has seen an expansion of the interventionist role 
of local authorities. In the past their activities had been limited to a widely accepted range of 
municipal service provision - public transport, roads, housing, education - and local politics 
consisted largely of debates over which party could deliver this provision more 
effectively46. But as a result of the depth of the economic crisis, and the accompanying 
political polarisation, local government too has become an economic and social 
45 GMrIuItli, 1987; TItDmIey, 1981 & 1983. 
46 CDr:ItnN 1988. 
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battleground between left and right. One manifestation of this is the new phenomenon of 
economic intervention, or the development of 'Local Economic Initiatives' (LEI's), by 
Labour-controlled local authorities. Faced with massive increases in unemployment from 
1979-81, factory closures and a rapid contraction of the industrial base of many areas, some 
authorities have attempted to develop economic policies of their own in order to counter 
this decline. 
By 1981 all of the major metropolitan county councils47, the Greater London Council, and 
many other town and city councils were controlled by Labour, and represented the party's 
main power base of opposition to the radical policies being adopted by the Conservative 
central government; especially as the trade union movement was on the defensive against 
the impact of rising unemployment on their economic and political role, and legal curbs on 
their activities. 
Local economic policies had a variety of objectives, ranging from employment creation 
measures, the decentralisation and democratisation of service proviSion and of 'social 
ownership', to a more radical restructuring of the (local) economy with the objective of 
'restructuring for labour'. In many cases local economic strategy came to be described as 
'municipal socialism', particularly in coundls on the left of the Labour Party. Although the 
mix of these policies varied from one authority to another, most were at least partially 
influenced by the more radical ideas on the left. The broad thrust of these ideas was to 
provide a local level alternative to both the policies of the Conservative central government, 
and to the experience of labour in power in the 19608 and 19708, rejecting its centralised and 
bureaucratic method of operation as well as its failure to introduce socialist policies. 
On economic policy, the new left authorities deliberately countered the 'new right' 
arguments against state intervention in the economy, aiming to prove that such intervention 
could create jobs whereas laissez-piTe policies created unemployment. Local economic 
strategies were also intended to develop an alternative to traditional Labour policies, which 
had usually been centralist and concerned with planning from above, with little concern 
either about the local impacts of national decisions or about the position of the workers in 
state supported enterprises. The new strategies were intended to create jobs, and to 
encourage new, more democratic, forms of work, the development of socially useful 
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products, and the increased employment of systematically disadvantaged groups, such as 
women, black workers, the disabled, gay men and lesbians. 
The form of these policies varied from one authority to another, depending on political 
position and local needs. The most detailed and coherent strategy for economic intervention 
was worked out by the GLC, whose London Industrial Strategy specifically aimed to 
restructure for labour rather than capital. More generally it represented an attempt by local 
authorities to gain some influence or control over the massive economic changes taking 
place. 
The analytical basis of these policies will be examined more thoroughly in Part ill, along 
with an assessment of their impact on co-operative development. C<H>PS were promoted 
widely by Labour local authorities, as they complemented all three of the strategies 
mentioned above (employment creation, decentralisation, restructuring). In most cases there 
was a strong commitment to co-ops as a form of social ownership, providing a contrast to 
the corporatist bureaucratic past of the Labour party which they wished to avoid, but also 
as a means of extending democracy at work, part of the concern for grassroots democracy. 
Thus local authority intervention has included the funding of local C<H>perative 
Development Agencies (CDAs) or other support organisations. 
The first of these were formed in Scotland and West Glamorgan in 1976 and 1978 
respectively, but most were formed in the early 1980s, the period when municipal socialism 
was at its most active. Although the initiative for the establishment of CSOS has typically 
come from local C<H>P activists, the funding and resources to implement this have almost 
always come from local authorities, most frequently under Labour control48• In a 1986 
study, Cornforth and Lewis found that 33 out of 36 CSOs studied were funded by some 
combination of local authorities in their area, and over half reported that a local authority 
had played a 'major part' in their establishment. In addition other local authorities have 
funded c<H>perative development workers within their own economic development units. 
Most CSOs are constituted as independent organisations controlled by a management 
committee with representatives of local co-operatives and local authorities, and sometimes 
community activists, trades council and consumer C<H>P representatives, and private 
individuals. By 1986 there were 85 CSOs in Britain, although 30 of these were voluntaty 
48~,19B6. 
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organisations without full-time funded staff49. Their function is broadly to help develop the 
worker co-operative sector, including assisting the establishment of new co-operatives and 
the servicing and support of existing ones. Given their small size - the average (mean) 
number of workers in funded CSOS is 3 - this is a demanding requirement. Local authorities 
tend to favour the establishment of new co-operatives as a priority, in order to make the 
most impact in job creation terms; co-operative development efforts are generally 
concentrated on the unemployed, women and ethnic minorities as groups most 
disadvantaged in the labour market. While CSOs are sometimes called upon to assist in the 
establishment of conversion or rescue co-operatives, the majority deal primarily with 'new 
starts', responding to and developing initiatives brought to them by individuals or groups 
wanting to form co-operatives. This 'bottom-up' approach has been a strong characteristic 
of most CSOs, but makes their development strategy mostly responsive; some CSOs - e.g. 
SCOC in Scotland - have attempted to be more direct in promoting co-operatives. 
The establishment of such a wide network of CSOS is one of the most remarkable features of 
the present co-operative boom, and gives grounds for optimism that the sector will become 
self-sustaining and less likely to follow previous cyclical trendsso.1t is a new development 
in the history of worker co-ops, although the retail co-op movement has long emphasised 
the importance of support organisations to provide both advisory and trading services. But 
whilst intervention to support co-operatives with training, advice and finance along with 
efforts to develop more coherent links within the sector are valuable, they are also 
vulnerable. The ability of local authorities to intervene economically is being restricted by 
central government-policies of funding cutbacks, ratecapping, and legal measures, such as 
the outlawing of 'contract compliance' policies. The largest and most active local authorities 
- the GLe and the metropolitan counties - have been abolished, and prospects for the 
continued existence of CSOs on such a wide scale are less optimistic in the second half of the 
19805. Few, if any, CSOs could survive independently of local authority funding. 
The expansion of CSOs mirrors the proliferation of various small business advice and 
development agendes over the same period. Although the motivation for CSOs is 
somewhat different,and they face a wider range of problems, the actual functions of the two 
49 Omtfrwth & lNi., 1985. TId. cam,.". with /III ",i",.,.4280 ,,",ma. ~, .nu:ta in 1987 (GHf!!'tiien 11.4.88). 
50 CDm(rIrth, 1987. 
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are very similar. Crucially, CSOs are likely to be competing for the same limited funds as 
business development agencies, which could compound CSO's funding problems. 
It is widely thought that CSOs can boost the creation rate of co-operatives in an area, 
although the effect on the survival rate of these co-operatives is less clear-cut. In the next 
section I examine the durability of the many co-operatives formed over the last decade. 
SURVIVAL KATES 
It has become part of co-operative mythology that the survival rate for worker co-operatives 
is superior to that of small businesses in general. For instance, in the special edition of The 
New Co-operator published in Summer 1986, ICOM claimed that the co-op sector "has 
already proved its worth over and over again in cost effectiveness and durability, with a 
staying power demonstrably better than that of small businesses in the private sector. In its 
Charter for Co-ops, the Labour Party claimed that "they have a better record of survival than 
other small businesses, because co-op members are highly motivated and committed to 
their enterprise"51. Such claims are generally made without any further evidence, but the 
same is characteristic of small businesses, where varying claims of high/low failure rates 
are widely aired. 
In part such claims by co-operative advocates reflect a need to secure increased funding and 
hence to present the co-op experience in the most favourable light possible. The extreme 
sensitivity with which relative co-operative/small firm survival rates are regarded is 
illustrated in the heated debates in The New Co-operator on the subject in 1986/7. 
Widespread confusion does reflect genuine difficulties in prOviding uncontroversial 
evidence to support or rebut such claims. Typically the phenomenon in question is not 
quantified exactly by available data; however, I have attempted to make the best use of 
what is available in order to provide an analysis of the survival experience of co-operatives. 
The work draws upon a similar exercise carried out by Thomas52• 
The survival rate and lifespan of small firms has been the subject of numerous articles in the 
Department of Trade and Industry (OT!) magazine British Business since 1982. Based on data 
57lAot1r PIrty, 7985,,,. 7. 
52 in Com{ortJt ruL 1918. 
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from registrations of businesses for VAT purposesS3, these have generally supported the 
claims for a relatively high failure rate for small businesses in general54• Table 5.4 (column 
A) presents data on the proportion of small businesses registered in each year from 1974-
1985 which remained registered until the end of 1986. 
Table 5.4 Survival rates of small firms and co-ops to end 1986, % 
Year Firms Firms Co-ops 
formed A B C 
1975 26 42 
1976 30 45 
1977 33 47 41 
1978 3S 49 49 
1979 40 53 57 
1980 43 55 54 
1981 47 58 51 
1982 51 61 46 
1983 58 67 55 
1984 68 75 67 
1985 81 85 82 
NoUJ: 
A - " of V AT-buaineesee registered in each year, still rt!gist4n1l at the end of 1986 
B - '" of VAT-businesses registered in each year, still trrulmg at the end of 1986 
C - '" of co-ops registered in each year, still trading at the end of 1986 (from Table 5.2) 
~: London ICOM (1987), amended; British Bus.ss 
The main findings of the OTI analysis were as follows: 
(i) one quarter of firms de-registered within 2 years of initial registration, one half within 5 
years and two-thirds within 10 years. The median lifespan of small businesses (registration 
to deregistration) is therefore 5 years. 
(ti) there is a very high degree of consistency in the results over time, i.e. de-registration 
rates do not appear to depend on the starting year - for a firm registered in 1975, there is a 
50% probability that it would have deregistered by 1980; similarly there is a 50% probability 
that a firm registered in 1980 will have deregistered by 1985. That is, the rate of de-
53 TIw dAtA COIlm till VAT-rtgistmtl bust""",. Although 1M VAT dAtA r1Du not I'ICDf'Il "",,'oymnll fipm - tRIll so it is 
imposs" 10 1mtnD 1row mIIIIY rt!gistmtl firms IuJw las than 200 workm - it i. k1Ioam that 90% Iuul tRllmmW tur7lOl¥1' 
of las than £500,000 ire ire 1985 (Bmplwmmt Gmt" AprllI987). TM VAT dAtaINw iI eff«tiwly /I muJll firm dAtaINw. 
54 British BHljnm 3.4.87 & 31.7.87; Emplgmwnt Gmt" Aprll1987. 
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registration does not appear to have been markedly affected by the recession since 
1979/80.55 
(iii) the likelihood of deregistering is much higher in the early years, and firms are most 
vulnerable to collapse within years two and three, with a probability of around 15% of any 
one firm deregistering in each of those years. So about one third of firms which survive their 
first year deregister in their second or third years. The deregistration rate falls away to 
about 8% p.a. after 10 years. The average annual deregistration rate for firms is about 11-
12% - or about 1 in 9 each year. 
Registrations and de-registrations are not the same as business stops and starts, however, 
and adjustments need to be made to obtain the latter56• Table 5.4 (B) presents data on 
business failures rather than deregistrations. From this it appears that the median lifespan for 
small businesses (i.e. the time taken for 50% to fail) is 7-8 years, and that the annual failure 
rate is about 12% in early years, falling to 6-7% over the longer term. Thus small businesses 
have a lower failure rate when assessed - more appropriately - by closures than by 
deregistrations. 
55 This ralllt is sw-prismg,,,nd does not tie m with figura on 1M numbtr ofbtm1avl'tdes and ctnrqMtry lilplitUUitms; thai 
haw mcrased by 180l1li from 1979 to 1984 (British Business 24.7.87), while VAT tUregistrlltitms i1l&1flWll by only 22l1li 
wer 1M S/J1M ",nod (British Bllsiness 37.7.87 "nd12.8.83) (1M latter rqruentmg .,. IIndumglll """ of tUregiSlnltion /IS 
1M toW nlimbtr of V AT-rtgisteml firms Ira mCJ'Wlll). One J'OSsible """"""tion is that 'IIlithm the aomlJ trtntl of VAT 
rtgistNtitms, tJre rttlIIction in 1M nllmbtr of lIn'ge firms TD/JS amIJ'C1IS4ted for by grawth in the small fimu. Changa i" tM 
nllmbtr of "'rge firms "rt mtm libly to be reflected m.insolwncy _III. 
I find 1M VAT tlIJt" wry tleceptiTJll! on this cormt, flS srmly tM """ ofbusiness /drms must haw mcrased m19BO-1982 
flS tJre recasion tUqenetl. This uicTD is 1II)t sIumtl by 1M DTl, who"rt comJincetl that tMir VAT _III is mtm IICCIIN" than 
tJre insolTJll!JtCia _III. 'I'M;' fllStifit:ation is that 1M VAT sam"', is mIlCh bigger, antl that ituolTJ/I!JICia may haw z-n 
affoctlll by tldmiclll changes m company antl f4Dtion liITD (C01I17mIltion with Michul Doly, DTl Small Firms Statistician, 
22.9.87). 
56 'I'M VAT _1fl1JaI IICtIIfllly records rtgi.lnltitms ""d Urtgislnltitms ofbllsifrasa for VAT 1'II1J1O"S, while "" fI1is1t to 
blow 1M openbtg"nd closllrt ofbllSmasa, which may 1II)t be 91lit6 1M S/J1M thing. 'I'M mam tliffrmrca art: 
(0 wry small businma may be aclwW from VAT _III, a only thoN 'IIlith tIInIoDIr allow " cwrt;am thralTDltl _III aN 
Clbliglll to register for VAT (1.21,000 in 7987). HDTDI'OIr t1irhuJlly any businal which is S1IbslllntillllMllglI to SIIJ11IOrl 0fII 
fvll-li1M ~ will be IIbow 1M thrtsIIold, .,.d thosI fallmg below at" thmfrn"I be MfIly erclwW. 
(il) wIIile fomuatitms ofbtuinasa and VAT regislnltitms art""""'ly JYIIO'IY"IOIIS, """.,'18litms ""d closIIra aN1as 
so. ~gislnllitms may tIIkI pilla for" TNJriety of rauons baida closurt, incllldmg ~ by ,,7fDther firm,,, t«Imiclll 
cluing' of legal idenlity (,.g. so" trruIer to limi"dliability), ar tIInIoDIr falling below the regislnltion thrcsllold. British 
BlISinlss (3.4.87) pr'OfIitla atimflta of 1M pm:m"'g' of .rqislnltitms wIIich rqmsent IId1W clostms; thai fM1Y from 
80l1li for tlmgi$"."itms in the fint ytIIIo, to 60l1li m the si%tJI y." and 50l1li m tJw Imcg nm.llr8w ruM ILW of this 
inforruliort to atimat, the proportion ofbllSinIssa slilllnldmg (a opposed to still registmd far VAT), antl this _III i$ 
",..,.ted m Tllble 5.4, coilimn B. 
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This second series (B) is likely to be reasonably accurate57; on this basis the average failure 
rate for all businesses is probably 9-10% p.a .. Whether this is considered to be 'low' or 'high' 
is entirely subjective; however it is much below the claim of a BBC 1V programme of 6 
August 1980 (Can We Make Jobs) that "three-quarters of new businesses don't survive the 
first two years"S8. There is uncertainty associated with such interpretation of VAT data, but 
it does at least provide a comparative starting point for co-operatives. 
Figure 5.6 Survival rates of co-ops and small firms, to end 1986 
% 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Year of formation 
Table 5.4 (C) also gives survival figures for co-operatives, calculated on the same basis, 
whilst survival rates for co-ops and small businesses are both presented in Figure 5.6. From 
this we can conclude that: 
• the survival rate for co-ops appears to be worse than that for all small businesses; 
certainly there is no evidence to back up the widespread claims that co-ops have a superior 
survival rate; 
57 ttl/hough any trTO'f is likely /0 be in /he direction of OfJe1'-estimating the failure rate (i.e. undtr-estimating the lifespan) - see 
British Business 3 April 1987). 
58 quoted in Scott, 1982. 
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• only for 1979 is the co-op survival rate better than that for small businesses formed in 
the same year; 
• the survival rate for co-ops deteriorated sharply between 1979 and 1982. 
• the overall survival rate for co-ops is 66%59 - that is, two thirds of all co-ops set up 
between 1945 and 1986 were still trading at the end of that period. No comparable figure for 
all businesses are available, as the formation of co-ops is heavily concentrated in recent 
years. 
These findings must be qualified by the knowledge that data on failed co-ops is much less 
complete than on surviving ones, leading to an underestimate of the co-op failure rate. 
Survival rates for co-ops have not demonstrated the same consistency over time as those for 
all businesses. It is striking that in both absolute terms and relative to all businesses survival 
rates improved over the period to 1979, and then declined until 1982, before starting to 
improve again. Thomas has carried a more extensive and detailed analysis of survival rates; 
calculating an alternative measure of survival, that is closures in any year as a proportion of 
the stock of co-ops in that year. He reaches the same conclusion as above, that failure rates 
for co-ops became significantly worse after 1979, particularly in 1983 and 1984, before 
improving slightly in 1985. However, the problem with this measure is that it can an 
increasing failure rate if the co-op sector is rapidly expanding (which has been the case over 
the last decade) even when the median lifespan is constant. 
The increased failure rate can also be related to the growth of CSOs. It was during this 
period (1981-1984) the bulk of local CSOs were formed60, with the biggest increase in 1981 
and 1982. In their early stages CSO's tended to be concerned with assisting in the formation 
of the maximum number of co-operatives, and at the same time lacked experience; more 
recently the situation has stabilised, so that the formation rate of co-operatives has been 
reduced, but the survival rate has increased, as CSO development workers have gained 
experience and undertaken more intensive support strategies. Furthermore, CSOs were 
concerned primarily with groups suffering discrimination in the labour market, who tended 
to lack skills and experience, and their co-ops had a high failure rate, particularly before 
CSO experience was developed. 
59 .. TIIble 5.2. 
6() Cornforth & Lft1i1, 1986. 
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It therefore appears that the fonnation rate of co-ops increased in response to : 
(a) recession and crisis in the economy leading to 
• restructuring by capital which provided a new role for small firms 
• rapidly increasing unemployment 
(b) the emergence of local authorities as the main electoral power base of the Labour 
Party and the adoption of 'local economic initiatives', which in tum led to 
• attempts to combat unemployment and more radical intervention polides 
• the establishment of local CSO's to assist co-ops. 
Circumstances giving rise to an increase in the co-op fonnation rate are different to those for 
co-op survival. Whilst co-ops have arisen as a reaction to adverse economic circumstances 
Oeading to unemployment and restructuring), those same economic conditions are not 
favourable to the survival of co-ops. Although CSO's appear to have contributed to an 
increase in the fonnation rate of co-ops, they were also initially associated with a reduced 
survival rate. 
Moving on from this broad picture of the co-op sector as a whole, we can examine the 
characteristics of its recent growth - where has it taken place regionally, and in terms of 
industrial sectors, and how does this also compare with the experience of small firms? 
Certainly the wider process of economic restructuring taking place has had a varying 
impact on both different regions and sectors, and given that the growth of co-ops is a 
product of that restructuring then it is to be expected that their occurrence and survival will 
similarly vary. 
THE GEOGRAPHY OF CO-OPEllA11VE DEVELOPMENT 
Economic restructuring in the 19808 has had very different effects across Britain. Despite 
denials from senior Conservatives, the North-South divide is a real and growing 
phenomenon. A glance at a regional breakdown of economic statistics - unemployment, 
income per head etc - as well as sodal statistics relating to health and living conditions 
reveals a distressing picture. Relative to the south, people living in Scotland, Wales and the 
north of England, and in inner dty areas generally suffer from a higher rate of 
unemployment, lower wages for those in work, much greater dependence on state benefits, 
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and gain less from economic growth. They are less healthy, have less material possessions, 
and die younger. 
Co-ops and regional economic inequalities 
The explanation for this must be located in events occurring at the national and 
international level, rather than blaming the inhabitants of these regions. Attempts by capital 
as a whole to restore profitability have led to the closure of many individual firms, with a 
consequent impact on the level of unemployment. The most vulnerable firms have been 
those in manufacturing; not only have the traditionally declining shipbuilding, textiles and 
clothing sectors continued to contract sharply, but they have been joined by the engineering, 
electrical and vehicle industries, precisely those industries which provided the basis for the 
long postwar boom. Regions of the country which had concentrations of such industries 
suffered more severely from recession than those based on newer industries, and the 
limited compensatory growth in services has tended not to be in the older industrial 
regions. However, Uoyd &t Schutt point out that: 
much of what happens in a region ..... is powerfully associated not simply with 
the industrial sectors to which its capital stock is structurally assigned but with 
the 'structure' of trans-national and national companies' branch plants, 
divisional headquarters and corporate control centres ..... the incidence of 
redundancy ..... while it has some clear sectoral elements and is also clearly 
some function of the age of the capital stock, is more clearly interpreted 
through a perspective which focuses on corporate responses to recession and 
restructuring as a time of emerging new process technology61 
According to this view the fate of regional economies is dependent not only on the age and 
sectoral characteristics of their industries, but also of the way in which firms or enterprises 
in different areas fit into the national and international division of labour. At a time of major 
restructuring this division of labour undergoes substantial change, and regions (or even 
countries) characterised by branch plants will have their fate determined by economic 
processes and corporate decisions originating outside of the region. Past processes of 
centralisation and concentration of capital have increasingly left industry in the hands of 
national and multinational corporations, particularly in regions where 19605 and 1970s 
regional policy had as an objective the attraction of such inward investment, to compensate 
for regional decline as heavy industry (coal, iron " steel, shipbuilding etc.) was closed 
down. Such industry is vulnerable to decisions taken outside of the region taken in the 
61 Lloyd & Schutt, 1985, p. 20. 
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interests of company profitability regardless of the impact on the locality. As an example, 
the perceived success of Scotland's attempts to attract inward investment in the area of 
high-tech electronics (the 'Silicon Glen' syndrome) is unlikely to provide a sound basis for 
long-tenn prosperity; such 'footloose' investment can depart as quickly as it arrives (witness 
the decision of US multinational National Semiconductor in 1985 to commence 
retrenchment in response to a perceived dip in international demand for its chips, before a 
much heralded £100m expansion at its same Greenock plant was even complete)62. 
Furthennore many overseas companies have been explicitly anti-union (including most if 
not all foreign electronics companies in Scotland), a policy which is easy to implement when 
demand is high and business is booming, but leaves the workforce with little defence when 
redundancies are announced. Whilst multinational investment in such regions does provide 
openings for small firms (and co-ops), the latter will always be vulnerable given their 
peripheral role (providing flexibility> in firms' overall accumulation strategies. 
Schutt and Whittington63 have analysed in more detail the restructuring strategies of large 
firms, particularly with reference to their impact on North-West England. Fragmentation 
strategies have been described in chapter 3 in general terms, but it is instructive here to 
follow through their regional impact. Schutt and Whittington point out that areas with high 
concentrations of large manufacturing plants are particularly vulnerable to fragmentation 
by 
breaking up old concentrations of employment and freeing capital and 
contracts for renewed locational competition [which] may exacerbate inter-
and intra-regional differences ...... Indeed, where the motive for fragmentation 
is the reassertion of control over the labour process, firms may deliberately 
disperse investment and contracts as far away as possible in order to inhibit 
inter-plant combine organisation64. 
The vulnerability of such regions to economic processes and corporate responses 
originating elsewhere provides an impetus for reasserting localised control over production. 
This argument has been used as support for decentralised economic activity, under local 
control, and in particular has been used in support of the development of co-operatives. The 
COA, for example, quoted the following hypothetical example in its 1984 directory: 
The international oil-based company comes to a midlands town with a blaze of 
publicity. "Hundreds of new jobs" shouts the local paper. Only three years later 
621ef/1ri1, 1984. 
63 Scltutt tmd WIIittin,tmI, 1984, 1987. 
64 Scltutt arul WIIittin,tmI, 1987, ".ll. 
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a small announcement reads, "The Northampton branch is to be closed and the 
work transferred to our office in Holland. n Contrast this with the five worker 
co-operatives formed in the last few years, creating SO new jobs. These fifty 
decision-making members live in the town, with their families and friends, 
their roots are deep in the local community and there is no more likelihood of 
them deciding to transfer their own jobs to Holland than fly to the moon6S• 
Co-ops which have been formed locally are much less likely to relocate outside of the region 
than branch plants controlled from elsewhere, and are likely to have stronger links with and 
attachment to the community, although this argument can also be applied to small 
businesses in general. Schutt & Whittington's analysis suggests that large firm 
fragmentation strategies will lead to small firm growth which is highly vulnerable, and that 
"because of the dependent nature of much small firm growth, high 'birth rates' in particular 
areas need not indicate a healthy, entrepreneurial economy so much as reflect the breaking 
down and shifting of employment, whether locally or elsewheren66 and that such small 
firms are nunlikely to achieve secure and locally controlled economic development" because 
of their dependent nature and vulnerability to large firms, despite the distance between 
them in formal ownership terms. 
Despite being under nominal local control, all types of small firms are vulnerable to 
changing large-firm strategies. Sub-contractors and suppliers servicing the activities of large 
firms are directly vulnerable - indeed the use of such companies to complement large firm 
activity is often specifically to can absorb fluctuations in demand and output. Alternatively, 
'independent' small firms may find new market niches opened up by the restructuring of 
large firms, but these are always liable to attract renewed competition from large firms if 
they prove successful - for an example of this see the later chapter on wholefood 
co-operatives. Other small firms may find new opportunities for competition, for instance if 
cheap, redundant capital equipment is available from large firms, or skilled workers made 
redundant in the face of changing process technology may attempt to establish their own 
businesses, but frequently have to compete on the basis of low wages or poor working 
conditions. Small firms competing on the basis of such intense exploitation are always 
vulnerable to sudden shifts in markets or costs. 
An example of a co-operative emerging from large firm rationalisation is the Traffic Systems 
Co-operative in Sheffield, established by four engineers made redundant by GEe Traffic 
65 CDA, 1984, ". 17. 
66 Schutt III Wltitthtgton 1987, ". 21. 
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Automation. The co-op has won contracts for traffic signal maintenance in the face of fierce 
competition from their former employers. The workers have managed to avoid the worst 
aspects of self-exploitation and pay themselves at union rates, but it is instructive that an 
important element in their success was securing a major contract from Sheffield City 
Council. Nevertheless even effident small firms or co-ops are ultimately vulnerable if they 
become successful and are viewed as a threat by their major competitor(s), who can always 
start and win a price war. 
The type of small firm growth which results from restructuring in a particular locality, and 
the extent of that growth, will depend upon the existing sectoral characteristics of industry, 
and the changing role of geographical distribution as the nature of production and 
accumulation changes. Recent years have therefore seen very different formation rates for 
new businesses across regions. The regional distribution of small firms67 and co-operatives 
is shown in Table 5.5, with more detailed figures for co-ops in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.5 Regional distribution of co-ops and small businesses, 1986 
All VAT-Registered Businesses Co-operatives 
% total FOrrtUltion rate % total Co-ops Co-ops Survival Co-op 
Region Stock (gross) (net) stock formed trading rate jobs 
% % 
Scotland 7.9 66.9 9.7 8.4 100 74 74.2 443 
North 4.3 71.4 8.6 7.2 93 63 67.9 285 
Yorks Ie Humbs 8.3 74.4 8.6 10.1 132 89 67.3 545 
NorthWest 10.3 80.2 6.7 9.5 125 84 67.1 430 
Wales 5.7 63.7 9.0 7.0 93 62 66.6 337 
West Midlands 9.0 78.7 11.2 7.0 96 62 64.3 269 
East Midlands 7.0 75.1 12.1 9.0 111 79 70.9 953 
East Anglia 4.2 70.4 12.2 2.6 31 23 73.9 116 
SouthWest 9.9 71.0 11.7 4.0 49 35 71.2 252 
London 33.6 94.3 14.9 31.1 444 274 61.7 1528 
SouthEast· 4.1 56 36 64.8 398 
Total 100.0 100.0 1331 883 66.2 5556 
No": London and SE are grouped together in VAT data. See Appendix 10 for details of standard regions. 
Sowrc6: .. for Table S.4 
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There have been differential formation rates of new firms across regions over the period 
1980-1985; the highest rate was in London and the South East (15% increase), around 
average rates in the South West, East Anglia and West and East Midlands, and below 
average rates in Yorkshire, the North and North West, Wales and Scotland. Similarly, the 
rise in self-employment has been concentrated in the South68• Those areas which have 
suffered most during the recession have also demonstrated the lowest rates of net new 
business formation. In addition, in Yorkshire, the North and North West, the low growth 
rate is not due to a low gross formation rate (which is comparable with that in other areas), 
but to a low survival rate for businesses once created. This suggests that the economic 
decline caused by restructuring in these regions is widespread, and not limited to the 
industries which formerly dominated these areas. Wales and Scotland are different: they 
boast low gross formation rates but a survival rate which is similar to that in the midlands 
and South-West, reflecting the impact of the highly interventionist, publicly funded, 
Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies in these depressed areas. More generally the 
figures confirm that a shift in economic activity from the North to the South is taking place. 
Given that the growth of co-operatives has been stimulated by the severe recession, it might 
be expected that formations of co-ops would be concentrated in the more depressed regions. 
The largest single concentration of co-ops is in London, with over 30% of the total. 
However, this is in line with the proportion of all businesses based in London and does not 
represent an unduly high proportion of the total; in fact the overall distribution of 
co-operatives is very similar to that of small firms. The main exceptions are the South West 
and East Anglia, which have the smallest number of co-ops in both absolute terms and 
relative to all firms, and the North, which has a relatively high proportion of co-ops. This 
suggests that co-ops are also subject to the general economic environment and respond 
primarily to the same influences as all small firms; that is, the major part of the regional 
variation in co-op formation rates is explained by the variation in small firm formation 
rates. On a regional level at least these general trends are more important than any co-op-
specific factors. 
It is surprising that no evidence of a regional 'co-op culture' is revealed. The history of 
British worker co-ops suggests that they have traditionally been strong in the East 
Midlands, particularly in Leicestershire and Northamptonshire, and yet there is no strong 
68 Benl Trm4 •• 23 (1988). 
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evidence of a concentration there today. Other European countries have regional 
concentrations. Attempts to inspire co-operative development in Wales have drawn heavily 
upon the experience of Mondragon, where co-ops are firmly implanted in the regional 
culture. Elsewhere in Spain, Catalonia had a strong tradition of collective organisation 
during the Spanish Civil War69, and today boasts a flourishing movement of co-ops and 
SALs (Sociedad Anonyme Laboral). In northern Italy, co-ops are common in the Emilia 
Romagna region around Bologna. 
Table 5.6 Distribution of co-ops by eltylborough, 1986 
Co-ops Co-op Co-ops Co-op 
Trading Jobs Trading Jobs 
SCOTLAND 74 443 EAST MIDLANDS 81 953 
Glasgow 35 132 EASTANcLIA 23 116 
Edinburgh 17 50 Norwich 9 28 
NORTH 65 285 Cambridge 13 82 
Tyne& Wear 35 168 SOUTHWEST 35 252 
Cleveland 13 34 Bristol 20 114 
YORKS & HtJMB 91 545 LONDON 273 1528 
Sheffield Brent 9 56 
ElS.Yorks 37 294 Camden 39 198 
Leeds 15 64 Hackney 42 121 
Bradford Haringey 18 90 
& W.Yorks 28 141 Islington 35 221 
NORTHWEST 85 430 Lambeth 27 91 
Merseyside 14 51 Southwark 14 66 
G.Manchester 40 205 Wandsworth 5 91 
Lanes 23 102 Tower Hamlets 8 67 
WALES 62 337 Newham 5 20 
W.Glamorgan 31 162 SOUTHEAST 36 398 
S.Glamorgan 7 35 
WEST MIDLANDS 62 269 TOTAL 883 55S6 
Birmingham 16 54 
Coventry 22 88 
Black Country 17 87 
Sourc6: a. for Table S.2 
Infonnation on British co-ops is characterised by a lack of detail at a regional level. There 
are concentrations of co-operative activity in areas within regions, particularly in urban 
areas, as Table 5.6 demonstrates. As these are generally the areas where CSOs are active, 
this raises the question of what impact CSOs have had on co-op sector growth. 
69 DoIga{f, 2974. 
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The impact of CSOs on co-op growth 
The impact of CSOs on the growth and development of the co-operative sector is not 
straightforward. To a certain extent the establishment of CSOs and an increase in the 
number of co-ops are both outcomes of the same phenomenon - a local level response to an 
economic crisis in which the policies of the central state are aimed at reinforcing the power 
and wealth of the capitalist class at the expense of the interests of the majority. Therefore it 
is to be expected that the two would be associated. However, there is also reason to believe 
that the establishment of CSOs does reinforce and encourage co-operative sector growth. 
Taylor has long held that a CSO will increase the rate of growth of co-operatives in an area 
above what it would have been without the CSOi'O. He examined the growth of co-ops 
between 1980 and 1982, when their number increased from around 200 to around 350. He 
found that in areas without COAs, the number of co-ops had grown by 24%, compared to 
131 % in areas with CSOs. However, it is important to remember that correlation does not 
imply a causal relationship. Certainly Cornforth and Lewis in their survey of CSOs found it 
difficult to isolate the influences on co-operative growth: 
... our own survey suggests that higher rates of co-operative formation can be 
expected in urban areas with high levels of unemployment. For example CSOS 
in these areas had a higher formation rate of co-operatives than those in 
smaller cities and rural areas, with lower unemployment levels. This finding 
supports the view that many co-operatives are being created by the 
unemployed in their desire to create jobs71 
although they do conclude that CSOs have been substantially responsible for this growth. 
Co-ops are more likely to be formed in urban areas with high unemployment, but then 
CSOs are more likely in these areas as well (particularly if there is also a Labour local 
authority). Cornforth & Lewis attempted to investigate this further by looking at the 
number of co-operatives assisted by CSOs. In 40 areas, they found that only 23 out of 450 
co-ops fonned over the period had been established without the assistance of CSOs. My 
own survey evidence supports the active role of CSOs, even if not to the same degree, with 
50% of responding co-operatives receiving assistance from a CSO during formation, and 
55% since being fonned. However, demonstrating this does not mean that the same 
co-operatives would not have been formed without the presence of a CSO, if other factors 
were important. 
70 Taylor, 1984. 
n Com{t1rtll & Cn1iI, 2985, p. 34. 
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In London for instance, some 64% of all co-operatives were concentrated in 6 out of 32 
boroughs in 1986 (see Table 5.6). Six of these boroughs have active CSOs, and one has an 
active section within the coundl's Economic Development Unit in support of co-op 
development. Certainly the contrast between Tory-controlled Wandsworth, with no CSO 
and 5 co-operatives, and Labour-controlled Islington, with a long-established CSO and 35 
co-operatives, is striking. One example is hardly conclusive, however, and it is easy to find 
counter examples - for instance Waltham Forest with only 1 co-op, Newham with 5 and 
Tower Hamlets with 8, all of which have both a CSO and high unemployment. 
It is very difficult (if not impossible) to show empirically that CSOS have had a major impact 
on co-operative formation. However, circumstantial evidence certainly suggests that this is 
the case. In addition, a priori reasoning gives strong grounds to believe this to be true: CSOs 
are active in promoting the idea of workers co-ops, offer intensive advice, support and 
training, can assist in the securing of finance and the developing of links with other co-ops. 
There is no reason to believe that this can have anything other than a positive effect on the 
formation rate of co-ops. 
However, the emphasis of CSO activity on the formation of co-ops may have an adverse 
effect on the survival rates of co-operatives. Given that many recent co-ops have been 
formed by the young unemployed, often with enthusiasm but little in the way of training 
and skills, a high failure rate would be expected. Although continuing support is recognised 
by CSO workers as important, the pressure from local authorities as the main source of 
funding is to maintain job creation rates rather jobs saved. Pressure on limited CSO 
resources means that inevitably, less time is devoted to servidng existing co-operatives than 
would be desirable; if it is true that CSOs do increase formations, but can maintain only 
limited support, then it is likely that the failure rate in CSO areas would be higher. In this 
context it is interesting to note that the regions with the lowest number of co-operatives 
(both absolutely and relative to the share of all businesses in the region) have the highest 
survival rates. 
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Figure 5.7 Regional survival rates of co-ops to end 1986, relative to average of 66% 
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Whilst the proportion of co-ops in the South West and East Anglia is low compared to the 
proportion of all businesses in those regions, they have the highest survival rates (see Table 
5.5 and Figure 5.7). These two regions have also had the most limited CSO activity until 
very recently, thus supporting the conclusion that whilst CSO's have a positive impact on 
co-op formation rates, in periods of rapid expansion survival rates decline. This is further 
supported by evidence that the region with the highest relative proportion of co-ops (the 
North) has almost the lowest survival rate. In fact an inverse relationship between relative 
concentration of co-ops and survival rate holds for all regions except for the West Midlands 
and Scotland. The reason for a combination of low concentration of co-ops and low survival 
rate in the West Midlands is a mystery, but the opposite in Scotland - high on both counts -
is likely to be due to the intensive support offered to both new and existing co-ops by 
SCOC. Figure 5.7 shows the survival rates of co-ops in different regions, compared to the 
overall figure of 66%. 
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INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION OF CO-OPEIlA TIVES 
There has always been a tendency for co-operatives to be concentrated in particular 
industrial sectors. In the nineteenth century they operated widely in printing, bootmaking, 
metal-working and building, all industries where hand-craft and slnaH-scale production 
predominated. Some of these areas - particularly where production technology and the 
dominant form of the labour process have remained largely unchanged - are still important 
today. This not just a British phenomenon, as concentrations of co-ops are found in 
particular industries in many countries72, although the specific industries do vary 
depending on the particular relations between co-ops, state and markets. 
Table 5.7 demonstrates the current sectoral distribution. Relative to the activities of all 
businesses, co-ops are concentrated in production and general services. They are under-
represented in agriculture, building, wholesale distribution, transport and motor trades. But 
these broad classifications conceal further concentrations - production co-operatives operate 
largely in printing, publishing, engineering and clothing trades; service co-ops are in media, 
arts and entertainment. wholesale and retail in food (particularly wholefoods). It is these 
more detailed concentrations which are interesting, as the broad categories conceal huge 
differences in the nature of work and the production process. The characteristics of the 
secton with a large co-op presence suggest the nature of industries which favour co-op 
establishment and growth· they are still relatively small scale and dominated by labour-
intensive craft production on a medium or small batch basis, rather than mass production. 
In addition light engineering and clothing are sectors in decline. Co-ops are noticeably 
absent from the industries which dominated the postwar boom - chemicals, large scale mass 
production industries (motor vehicles, electrical and consumer goods) or even the older 
capital intensive (but not mass production) craft-based industries, such as shipbuilding and 
heavy engineering. Recent growth has also produced a concentration in (labour-intensive) 
services, particularly in food distribution, bookselling, arts &t media, and business services. 
72 8,,'1-1"", 1988. 
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Table 5.7 Distribution of co-ops and small firms by industrial sector 
% VAT-Reg Co-ops Co-ops Co-ops Co-ops 
businesses formed trading % of total Survival Co-op 
(end '85) (end '86) (end '86) stock rate jobs 
AGRICULTURE 12.5 2S 17 1.9 68.3 
BUILDING 14.6 132 66 7.5 49.9 300 
Gen.building 84 38 4J 44.9 201 
CATERING 8.5 71 46 5.2 64.6 192 
FINANCE & PROFFSSIONAL 7.2 80 56 6.4 69.6 312 
Education & training 44 28 3.1 62.5 180 
MOTOR & TRANSPORT 9.1 48 31 3.6 64.5 209 
PRODUCTION 9.7 361 243 27.6 67.3 22SO 
Clothing & footwear 75 40 4.6 53.7 380 
Engineering 52 34 3.9 65.5 407 
Printing 82 60 6.8 72J 282 
Publishing 51 29 3J 56.5 153 
RETAIL 18.1 216 147 16.7 68.2 730 
Food 97 n 8.1 73.2 399 
Books 47 31 3.5 66.3 138 
SERVICES 12.1 361 249 28.3 69.0 1266 
Media, arts etc. 159 116 13.2 72.8 512 
Computing 56 36 4.0 63.4 126 
& business services 
WHOLFSALE 7.9 36 2S 2.8 69.4 196 
Food 21 16 1.8 77.2 170 
TOTAL 100.0 1330 880 100.0 66.2 5455 
Note: Totals may not agree exactly with those In other tables because co-ops not classified to a sector have 
been omitted. 
Sowrce: As for Table 5.2 
Table 5.7 shows that there are wide variations in the survival rates of co-operatives across 
sectors, and that the distribution of these is different to concentrations of co-operatives. Both 
clothing manufacture and wholefood wholesaling have high concentrations, but the former 
has a much higher failure rate. This again suggests that there are different factors at work 
influencing the creation of co-operatives and their survival. 
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What are the crucial factors which influence the industrial sectors in which co-operatives 
operate71n examining first of all the sphere of production, it appears that within a capitalist 
economy co-ops are suited to a labour intensive, small scale, craft based production process, 
and find it more difficult where production is capital intensive and/or large scale and/or 
dominated by mass production with a detailed and hierarchical division of labour on 
Taylorian prindples. There are a number of reasons. Firstly, co-operatives face fundamental 
problems in raising finance7.3, This will inevitably tend to push them into labour intensive 
rather than capital intensive areas of production. Secondly, capitalist competition will tend 
to displace production in the older craft-based industries where skilled workers are 
important. For much of the twentieth century the tendency has been to deskill craft workers, 
and replace craft production with large scale, mass production methods based on semi-
skilled and unskilled labour. More recently, production based upon 'flexible specialisation' 
and computer-aided manufacturing (CAM) processes have enabled deskilling in industries 
where batch production predominates74 - for instance clothing and engineering. 
Resistance to these processes by craft workers takes many forms, but one option has always 
been for the threatened workers to establish co-operatives in an attempt to put themselves 
beyond the reach of capitalist control. Many craft workers have a history of collective 
organisation - from the medieval guilds to the emergence of craft unions during the mid 
19th century - and which draws them towards co-operative production. If they do this the 
co-operatives will replicate existing production methods rather than employ the new ones 
which capitaliSts are trying to introduce, and so will tend to be small scale, labour intensive 
and craft-based. When this happened in the last century, continuing competition meant that 
survival could only be achieved in co-operatives on the basis of intense physical effort on 
old machinery. They were assisted by securing protected markets in the consumer 
co-operative movement, but there constantly remained the threat of more intense 
competition as mechanisation developed elsewhere. For many of the craft workers who 
established co-operatives in the nineteenth century, their position could only be maintained 
by the employment of outworkers and wage labour within the factories, and made little 
effort to introduce new production methods7S. 
73 For ".". .fllil .. cllqt6 6. 
74 .",..tatuI of skilW TDDP'k WI" 'fI-'- 'J'ICiIIlillltitm' i •• CMltroDmial.I'ftI, with with some lJ1t1Iing that it ~. 
,.""""" "". for skilW tIXWkm. Whilst this mt'Y N trw in cmai" QUIS it ;, doubtful that it can be gmmaliled • .",. ww 
" takIft ", ."in i" Pm m. 
75 '17rDrttlIy, 1982; !DIVI, 2894. 
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The third reason relates to the very different nature of large-scale prodUction, which makes 
a co-operative more difficult to operate. Organisational theory suggests that collective 
organisation is much more difficult the larger the unit becomes. This is true, but I would 
resist a solely ahistorical interpretation of very real problems. Even if large scale collective 
organisation is difficult to organise, it is the need to survive in the market which does not 
allow the opportunity to develop alternatives along these lines, and the needs of the 
capitalist economy do not accommodate such processes. More important, however, is the 
nature of large-scale production and of the development of capitalist technology and its 
requirements for the control of the conflict inherent in production. The technology and 
associated division of labour in large scale industry has been developed on the basis of a 
hierarchy of skills and authority, and it is this which makes egalitarian organisation of 
production and decision-making particularly difficult to organise. Although the 
organisational explanation does have some validity, it is important to recognise that the 
problems of organising co-operatives in large-scale production are largely for historically 
specific reasons • 
Small firms are not confined to these older craft-based production industries. The expansion 
of service industries has involved many small companies in labour-intensive operations; 
catering is one example which has shown rapid growth generally and in particular for 
co-operatives. Most services involve unskilled or semi-skilled work with small skill 
differentials, and thus are amenable for co-operative production. Therefore, although 
co-operatives are concentrated in small scale, labour intensive production, the particular 
industrial sectors where this type of production predominates is dependent upon wider 
processes taking place. Current restructuring involves a shift of production generally from 
large to small firms, but the nature of these changing relations varies from one industry to 
another. An understanding of why co-operatives are concentrated in certain sectors is 
dependent upon following through economy-level changes to the specific forms they take. 
It is also necessary to look at the nature and impact of exchange relations as well as 
production relations. The recent co-op movement growth has been characterised by a much 
broader (and more radical) interpretation of co-operative objectives, and for the first time 
this includes an emphasis on production for need, and a desire to move away from 
profitability as the main determinant of the nature of products manufactured or offered for 
sale. This has been important as it has intervened in normal competitive capitalist market 
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relations. Production of goods for need - whether for diet and health (wholefoods) or 
political need (radical printing and publishing) has led to a market segmentation which has 
to a certain extent shielded co-operatives in these areas from competition. Particularly in 
printing, there is a substantial body of customers who specifically prefer to buy from a 
co-operative than a capitalist firm, with less importance attached to price competition. 
While there is the potential for this to take place virtually throughout the co-op movement 
(through intertrading, or supplying consumer co-operative stores) it has more readily 
occurred with products which have an overtly political nature in their use, rather than 
simply in their production relations (such as clothing). 
Exchange relations have a particular importance when considering the prospects for 
co-operatives in different sectors, because it is through the market that pressures towards 
degeneration are transmitted. Their role has been previously illustrated in the case of 19th 
century co-operatives, where degeneration was avoided through links with consumer 
co-operatives. More striking is experience from France and Italy. Co-operatives in these 
countries are heavily concentrated in certain sectors; in common with Britain, they are in 
active in labour intensive small scale production, as well as in declining industries. Unlike 
here, there are many co-operatives in building, construction and civil engineering, where 
preferential awarding of state contracts for public works have provided many co-operatives 
in these sectors with a partially assured market. 
The contrast between the distribution of co-operatives across geographical regions and that 
across industrial sectors is striking. The regional pattern of co-operative development and 
growth is very similar to that of businesses as a whole. However there is a much greater 
relative concentration of co-operatives in certain industries, and also a wide variation in 
failure rates, illustrated in Figure 5.8 overleaf. 
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Figure 5.8 Survival rates of co-ops in different industries to end 1986, relative to average 
rate of 66% 
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The tables illustrate much greater variation in the past performance of co-operatives 
according to sector rather than to region. The sectoral distribution of co-operatives is much 
less similar to the sectoral distribution of all businesses than is the regional distribution of 
co-ops compared to the regional distribution of all businesses. There is also a much greater 
variation in survival rates across sectors than across regions. The apparent relative 
importance of sector for co-operatives is not especially surprising, as even for businesses as 
a whole there is much more variation in formation and survival rates across sectors than 
across regions76; this raises the possibility that even regional variations could be mostly due 
to the different sectoral characteristics of regional economies. This finding is not surprising; 
the factors which influence performance vary much more across industries than they do 
geographically. An examination of some aspects of the experiences of co-operatives in 
different industries provides the basis of chapters 8-10, and the role and importance of 
industrial sector will be addressed again in Part m. 
76 BritiM B",jnq,3.4.87. 
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WORKING eONDmONS AND RELATIONS WITH TRADE UNJONs71 
The concept of co-ops as worker controlled enterprises includes certain essential elements. 
Firstly, within the co-operative, a central aim is to increase the degree of workers' control 
over work and production, and to improve working conditions. Secondly, the extension of 
worker control within co-ops is dependent on changes in the wider political and economic 
environment, and in order to achieve this co-ops must build up links with other parts of the 
labour movement, particularly the trade unions. Despite these two important aims, there is 
an almost total lack of information on the extent to which they have been achieved. The 
lack of 'hard' information is very noticeable for particular trade union 
concerns, noticeably the extent of trade union membership and the rates of pay 
among co-operatives78 
Some information is available from case studies, but the overall situation is characterised by 
uncertainty and partial evidence being used to develop policy. This particular situation is 
exacerbated by a lack of information regarding trade unions as well as co-operatives; 
neither the roc nor individual unions have accurate figures on total membership or its 
distribution between firms and industriesi'9, and so it is difficult to detennine the relative 
strength of unionisation in co-ops. 
In this section I present the results of research in this area gathered from a questionnaire 
mailed to co-ops in 1985. There are obviously inaccuracies and faults in this data; there is 
almost certainly a bias in that co-ops responding were not representative of all co-ops, and it 
has been suggested that the larger and better established co-ops were more likely to reply -
and these will be more highly unionised than co-ops in general. However, to my knowledge 
it stands as the only evidence of its kind currently available for the whole of Britain. The 
intention is to help inform the general debate and also to consolidate the relationship 
between trade unions and worker co-operatives. Further evidence from other sources will 
be presented in the chapters on individual industrial sectors. 
78 rue,"d. 
79 Cmnlrmat_ fIIitJI/.,. Brl1'llcl6y, rue ectmtmIilt, Dam"., 1985. 0.,. i.1W4 em Nllfbmhip by u"_ rath6r tItIm by 
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Worker co-operatives and trade unions - historical background 
Throughout most of the 20th century, the trade union movement in Britain has shown little 
interest in worker c(H)peratives. This has not always been the case; in the 1860s the 
developing trade unions gave their enthusiastic support to several mining and engineering 
C<H>peratives in the north eastBO, and in the 18905 to numerous C<H>peratives which 
emerged in the east midlands. At that stage unions accepted C<H>peratives as working-class 
initiatives aimed at opposing capitalist control of the means of production, but for a variety 
of reasons their enthusiasm subsequently waned. 
Firstly, many C<H>peratives collapsed with huge debts in the recession of 1874/5, and after 
losing money in these experiments the unions became more wary of such close 
involvement. In particular the Ousebum Engineering Co-operative had debts of £10,000, a 
huge sum in those days. Secondly, c(H)peratives became more and more associated with 
bourgeois philanthropy and the middle class enthusiasm for profit-sharing, and the radical 
edge of these working class initiatives became blunted by both this involvement and the 
need to compete in the capitalist market. Thirdly, the development of the labour 
movement's strategy for achieving public ownership of the means of production 
concentrated on nationalisations carried out at the state level, rather than through 
C<H>peratives. 
The lack of enthusiasm for co-operatives in Britain - which applied to the state as well as the 
trade unions - contrasted with the experience of France and Italy. Communist parties and 
trade unions in both countries maintained support for C<H>peratives, and actively promoted 
them. Combined with extensive state support, this was an important reason why 
C<H>peratives in those countries maintained a vitality which contrasted with their almost 
total disappearance in Britain. 
Trade unions and the co-ops boom 
The resurgence of worker co-operatives in the late 19705 took place without any significant 
involvement by the trade union movement. Local union officials had been involved in the 
wave of factory occupations and sit-ins in the early 19705, and in the establishment of the 
three major co-operatives with Department of Industry (Dol) support in the mid-1970s, but 
80 7'ltam1q, 1981, chApter 1. 
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this had little impact at national level, and indeed the unhappy experiences of the 001-
funded co-operatives probably served to confinn entrenched trade union suspicions rather 
than herald a new dawn in worker control and public ownership strategies. Problems also 
arose with union involvement in other ventures, such as Taunton Shirt Co-op and 
Minehead Shoe Co-op81. At Taunton, the TGWU contributed finance, management and 
marketing, but the eventual failure of the co-op left both workers and union with bitter 
memories of the experience. 
As the co-operative sector continued to grow, however, the trade union movement finally 
began to take an interest in the early 19805. There were several elements contributing to this, 
particularly the Labour Party's reassessment of its nationalisation policy, and the promotion 
of co-operatives by Labour local authorities. Widespread factory closures and redundancies, 
and rapidly increasing unemployment, stimulated consideration of virtually any means of 
creating employment, and co-operatives were suddenly becoming attractive as a means of 
both creating jobs for the unemployed, and of rescuing jobs at capitalist firms in difficulties. 
Also important was the continued involvement of local union officials in individual 
co-operatives, particularly in 'rescues'. This included the NGA and SOGAT assisting in the 
establishment of a printing co-operative in Newcastle (Printers Inc.); TGWU involvement in 
the establishment of the Taunton Shirt Co-op and Minehead Shoe Co-op; the NGA with a 
typesetting co-operative in Widnes (Parados Graphics); and USOAW has been active in 
helping ex-Pine Pare workers in the north-west set up co-operatives in the company's 
unwanted stores. Local authorities establishing CDAs in the early 1980s were often 
ideologically committed to involving trade unions, and many called for trades council 
representatives on management committees. In London, the GLC's London Industrial 
Strategy was developed with the unions playing an integral role, and as a result support 
from GLEB or the LCEB was made conditional upon co-operatives (or indeed any finn) 
allowing trade union recruitment of workers. The GLC was also instrumental in the 
establishment of a TGWU branch in north London specifically for co-op workers. 
These grassroots initiatives required a co-ordinated response by national trade union 
leaderships if local initiatives were not to develop in a vacuum. The most systematic 
attempt to bring the co-operative and trade union movements closer together came 
relatively early on, when the Wales TUC commissioned a feasibility study on co-operatives, 
81 OzrlIr, 7987. 
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mainly in response to pressure from redundant workers wishing to set up co-operatives82. 
As a result of this a resource centre was established by the Wales TUC in 1983 to promote 
co-operative development, with a trade union majority on the management board. Finally, 
in 1985 both the TUC and the GMBU published guidelines on the conditions under which 
trade unions should become involved with the establishment of co-operatives. 
The TUC guidelines showed some limited enthusiasm for co-operatives as a means of 
providing jobs and for extending industrial democracy. However they also illustrated the 
two major concerns which trade unions retain about the development of co-operatives. The 
first is co-ops being used to undermine other trade union strategies, particularly opposition 
to privatisation, and becoming involved in attempts to develop or extend the non-unionised 
areas of the economy. The second is 'self-exploitation' by co-op workers, working long 
hours for low wages, and the impact this might have on undermining union-negotiated 
rates of pay and conditions in other enterprises. 
The trade union movement's concern that co-ops will be used to undermine union strategies 
is a very real one. Proponents of privatisation have unashamedly used the prospect of ex-
public sector workers forming themselves into co-operatives to carry out contracted-out 
functions, as the following quote demonstrates: 
The Government has emerged as a champion of workers' co-operatives, 
especially those that would be formed round the privatised parts of the public 
sector. Local authorities and area and regional health authorities are examining 
the possible attractions of workers' ownership of hived-off services such as 
laundry, cleaning and maintenance. It is thought such arrangements could 
defuse some problems frequently attending such moves. Mr Tebbit, the Trade 
and Industry Secretary, often thought of as a hard-line Right-winger, has given 
such initiatives his blesSing. The two main bodies involved ..... the 
Co-operative Development Agency, headed by Mr George Jones, and the Job 
Ownership Organisation, headed by Mr Robert Oakeshott, have been 
impressed by the public bodies' enthusiasm. Mr Jones said [that] trade union 
hostility to privatisation could be deflected by using workers co-operatives83• 
As a result the TUC has explicitly stated its opposition to this: "under no circumstances 
should worker co-operatives bid for work currently being done by direct labour"84, 
although it does reluctantly permit workers to form co-operatives to bid for privatised work 
once all other strategies have failed. 
B2 LoguIIIIUl Gregory, 1981. 
83 ffrumcial If"'" 15.2.84. 
84 Tue, PIll, p. 7. 
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There is also a more general concern that an expansion of the co-operative sector will 
undermine the role of trade unions within the economy. If conventional management 
structures are removed within co-operatives, the immediate basis for trade union 
bargaining is changed. As Tony Eccles put it: 
how do you sustain the collective bargaining role if you are bargaining with 
yourselves?85 
The structure of co-ops also challenges the representational role of trade unions. If a worker 
has a grievance, she/he can take it to a co-operative meeting rather than to a shop steward. 
Many co-op members have therefore taken the view that trade unions were irrelevant to 
them, given that the division between workers and capitalists had disappeared within the 
enterprise. This view is typical amongst those taking a 'small business' or 'participative' 
approach to co-ops86, and particularly characterises paternalistic co-operatives (such as 
Scott Bader) which had been sold or given to the workforce by their owners. It is a view 
which rejects the social relations of which co-operatives in a capitalist economy are a part, 
whether they like it or not, and does not consider that links with the labour movement are 
necessary to bring about a successful co-operative sector. This approach is also found at 
Mondragon in Spain, where the general view is that there is no need for trade unions within 
co-ops87. Opposition to trade unions was also strong amongst the 'alternative' co-ops, 
which had anarchist orientations and rejected trade unions as bureaucratic elements of the 
corporatist state. Even in rescues, there is some evidence that support for unions weakens 
after a co-op is established88• In recent years however the predominant view within the 
British co-operative movement has changed, and the need to develop links with the labour 
movement is now recognised. Thus IeOM recommends that all co-op workers should 
become trade union members, both for reasons of general solidarity and in recognition that 
conflicts do exist between the interests of the co-operative as an entity engaged in 
accumulation, and those of the workers. Furthennore, the substantial involvement of local 
authorities since 1980 has helped change the perspective of co-operatives towards trade 
unions. 
85 CIWdlqn 17.11.82. 
86,.,. OUraholt,1978. 
87 Bnullq & c.lfl, 1983. 
B8 tJi.i ElIrln, 1985. 
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Union membership in co-ops 
The evidence so far on trade union membership in co-ops is reasonably optimistic. One 
study carried out at Cardiff University in 198489 surveyed worker co~peratives in Wales, 
and found that 30% had some trade union members, although not all of these co-ops were 
fully unionised; overall, union members accounted for only 18% of total employment. My 
own evidence for co-os throughout Britain suggests that union membership is much higher, 
or has increased in recent years. Useable results were received for 231 co-operatives, 
covering 1900 full-time workers - probably 30-35% of all co-ops in existence at that time. 
These suggest that 55% of all co-ops have some union members, and that overall union 
density (percentage of all workers who are union members> is 34%. The full results are 
presented in Tables 5.8a-d. 
The impact of the GLe's and London borough's policies in London are quite clear, as union 
membership is nearly twice as high as in the rest of the country. 80% of London 
co~peratives had at least one union member, and 50% of all workers are members; outside 
of London the respective figures are 45% and 28%. 
The evidence that union density is less than the proportion of co-ops with some union 
members shows that many are not fully unionised; if only a small proportion of workers are 
members, then the impact is much less than if all (or nearly all) workers are members. 
Again, the evidence on this is encouraging; two thirds of co-operatives with some union 
members were more than 75% unionised, and over one fifth were 100% unionised. 
The final figure in Table 5.8b excludes 'conversion' co-ops from the data, that is, co~ps 
which have been formed from active private sector firms. Such co-ops usually result from 
the actions of paternalistic capitalists, 'giving away' or (more usually) selling the company 
to the workforce; these enterprises are generally un-unionised both before and after 
conversion, as such owners believe that unions are irrelevant if the 'us and them' conflict 
can be avoided. While conversions are rare they tend to be large and therefore have a major 
impact on union membership figures; when they are excluded, 41 % of co-op workers are 
union members. 
89 "IID," bt ruC,7I4. 
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Table 5.8 Trade union membership in co-ops 
5.8a: Co-ops with a union presence. 
% 
Britain 
London 
ex-London 
55 
80 
45 
5.8b: Union density 1: % of co-op workers who are union 
members) 
Britain 
London 
ex-London 
34 
50 
28 
41 
5.8c: Union density 2: membership levels in co-ops with some 
union members 
% 
unionised 
less than 25 
26-50 
50-75 
75-99 
100 
%01 
co-ops 
8 
16 
10 
42 
24 
5.8d: Reasons for union membership (% of unionised ccrops 
citing each reason'') 
• protecting workers' interests within the co-op: 38 
• general solidarity with the trade union movement: 87 
SaurcI: Co-op survey 
Further encouragement can be gained from a comparison of these results with union 
densities in small firms. In fact such comparisons are very difficult to make, because of the 
paucity of information concerning union membership in firms of different sizes. The major 
sources are the two surveys carried out jointly by the DoE/PSI/ESRC in 1980 and 1984, 
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covering workplace industrial relations90• Even these surveys are less reliable on very small 
firms, as enterprises with less than 25 workers were excluded, and in such firms union 
membership is "much lower". However, amongst the main results were: 
• union membership density was strongly positively related to firm size; that is, density 
increased with firm size. Small firms had relatively low union membership. 
• union density was also strongly correlated with type of ownership; it was higher in 
publicly owned than in privately owned firms of any size. 
• between 1980 and 1984, when the two surveys were carried out, union membership 
declined dramatically, after showing rapid growth in the 1970591 • 
Figures which are directly comparable to those above on co-operatives are difficult to obtain 
from these results, mostly because of the exclusion of very small firms. However, indicative 
figures are available. Union density in co-ops - 34% - does not compare well with the overall 
figure of 58% in 1980 (for all firms). This is not really an appropriate comparative figure, 
bearing in mind that 96% of co-ops have less than 20 workers. The WIRS 1984 survey found 
that the average density in private sector enterprises employing 25-99 workers was only 
20%, and that "given the positive and continuous relationship between density and 
organisation size, firms below our sample threshold of 25 employees could be expected to 
have very much lower union density on average than this" (emphasis added)92. Another 
claim has been made that only 10% of workers in small finns are unionised93. On the basis 
of these figures, therefore, it seems safe to say that union density in those co-ops for which 
data is available is at least double that in comparable private sector firms. 
Although co-ops are more highly unionised than small private sector firms, they are clearly 
less so than the public sector or indeed large private sector firms94• Therefore co-ops which 
operate in areas privatised from the public sector or fragmented by the private sector still 
represent a weakening of the trade union movement; but nevertheless, if fragmentation or 
90 ~,o{ EmplDymmt, Policy ShIIlia Instil"", Ectmomic II1fIl SociIIl Raam:II Council. Dcan;'1 & Mill.rd, 1983; 
MillflNml & Stnml1986. 
91 Dq8rtmmt 0{ EmplDymmt (DE) figtlTll sJunp tJuat tolld Ullion ",.",bmhip foil by 15" frrmt 13.3711 in 1979 to 11.3711 in 
1983, after ltaving';"" frrmt 11.5711 in 1973. (AMII4l Ahtr!lcl ofSf4tjstiq, 1986, Tllbk 6.23) 
92 Mill..." & Stnml1986, p. 61 
93li1bour Party 1985, p. 13 
H MillTl1fl1'tl & StnmI rqort a dDlsity of 60" in firm, wi'" aM' 50,000 workm (1986,,,.58-9). 
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privatisation processes are to take place anyway, co-ops are preferable to small firms for the 
trade union movement. 
Reasons for trade union membership 
The reasons given by co-operatives for union membership are shown in Table S.8d. This 
suggests that there is a strong ideological sympathy amongst co-op workers towards the 
trade union movement, and less concern with the internal role of unions. The large number 
of relatively new co-operatives, and the strong influence of ICOM, CDAs and local 
authorities on them, have strengthened the links with unions. One uncertainty is how 
sustainable the sympathy is. Preliminary evidence95 indicates that the initial enthusiasm 
may wear off after the first year; coupled with the now-weakened poSition of local 
authorities, present levels of membership and support may be wlnerable unless unions can 
make a greater impact on establishing a role within co-operatives. 
Wage. and working conditions 
Related to this is the second major issue, that of 'self-exploitation'; it is a crucial and difficult 
one for both the co-operative and trade union movements. Many co-operative workers 
work long hours for low wages, particularly in the early days, in order to establish a 
co-operative as a commercially viable entity. Of course this does not just apply to 
co-operatives; most workers in small firms experience lower pay and worse conditions than 
those in larger firms96. Small firms generally operate with low capital intensity, and can 
only compete on the basis of intensive exploitation of cheap labour; hence the resistance to 
unions' attempts to organise and improve wages and conditions within small firms97• The 
situation is likely to be worse in co-ops, whose specific characteristics provide even more 
downward pressure on wages. For instance, the typical situation of severe initial 
undercapitalisation means that the business must be built up through 'sweat equity'. 
Shortages of some necessary skills will also be more pressing in early days, before on-the-
job training begins to compensate. Thirdly, even when successfully established, the pursuit 
of specifically co-operative objectives is likely to conflict with commercial performance, and 
this may have an impact on wages and keep them lower than they might be otherwise. Thus 
in printing co-operatives, practicing job rotation will have a commercial cost and tend to 
95 Rqort by ,"'''y 1'IIt1mlly, GUB,I9B7. 
96IUi1I,.w, 1985"; .. MIO c1tq,., 3 
97 LH""" 1985".25 
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reduce wages below what they would be with conventional demarcation98• The tendency 
towards low wages in co-operatives will be offset by the workers' claim on any surplus, but 
in practice only a few co-ops manage to pay bonuses in addition to wages. 
The desire of co-operatives to unionise is likely to conflict with their poSition in the 
economy, particularly when trade unions are intent on maintaining wage levels. However 
there has been very little evidence on the actual wage levels achieved within co-operatives. 
The Cardiff University study of worker co-operatives in Wales found that over 70% of fuIl-
time workers received less than £75 for an average working week of 43 hours. 
My own survey found wages to be substantially higher than this, although this may be due 
in part to self-selection amongst co-ops providing information. The mean weekly wage was 
£116, with the median around £100. In comparison to the Cardiff study, 73% of workers 
received £150 a week or less. The full breakdown is given in Table 5.9 and illustrated in 
FigureS.B. 
Table 5.9 Wage levels in co-ops (1986) 
Wage 
level 
0-24 
25-49 
50-74 
75 -99 
100 -124 
125 -149 
150-174 
over 174 
Soura: Co-op survey 
98 SIC chlrpter6;MRarris, 1985. 
%0{ 
workers 
1.9 
11.2 
13.1 
14.1 
17.8 
153 
11.1 
15.5 
% 
cumulative 
1.9 
13.1 
26.2 
40.3 
5B.l 
73.4 
84.5 
100.0 
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Table 5.10 Hours worked by full-time workers 
Hours % of %of 
co-ops workers 
30-39 34 44 
40-49 49 43 
50-59 11 10 
60-79 5 2 
>80 1 1 
Soura: C(H)P survey 
Figure 5.8 Wage levels in co-ops, 1986 (£lweek) 
% of 
co-op 
workers 
(cumulative) 
a 50 75 100 125 
Weekly wage 
150 175 
Wages were higher in unionised co-operatives; where 50% or more of the workforce were 
members of trade unions, the mean wage was £133. In all other co-operatives the mean was 
£110. 
The average (mean) number of reported hours worked per week by full-time workers in 
responding co-ops is 41 (see Table 5.10). 56% of workers worked more than 40 hours per 
week, but only 13% worked more than 50 hours. 
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Wage differentials 
Further conflict between trade unions and co~peratives over pay issues has occurred over 
the payment of wage differentials. Pay equality is central to the policies of many 
co~peratives, on the grounds that differentials are incompatible with a non-hierarchical 
structure. Much union activity is of course directed towards maintaining differentials, and 
as with wage rates generally c~peratives may be perceived as undermining gains won by 
unions elsewhere. 
Even in co~peratives which most closely replicate capitalist structures pay differentials are 
narrower than the norm. Mondragon has a policy of maintaining a maximum differential of 
3:1, and at Scott Bader it is 7:1. This policy has come under attack from some quarters, on 
the grounds that it prevents ~peratives from attracting highly skilled management and 
technical personnel, and that this adversely affects performance. The more radical view is 
that the role of conventional management cannot be divorced from the power structure of 
capitalist firms, and that this is what c~peratives are in opposition to; therefore it is 
preferable to either attract sympathetic co-operative managers or train people from within, 
and that this can be done without substantial differentials. However this position is 
constantly under pressure, and at Mondragon, for example, there have been recent 
proposals to extend differentials to 6:1. 
Of the 231 co-operatives responding to the survey, 65% reported operating some form pay 
equality policy. This can be interpreted in various different ways: equal gross paYi equal 
take-home pay; equal hourly pay; equal pay for equal needs <e.g. so that workers with 
children receive more than those without). The remainder claimed to pay more for 
senior/more skilled/more experienced workers. Pay equality is a result of the generalised 
commitment to egalitarianism in co-ops, and is of course easier to maintain in small co-ops, 
before a skill-based hierarchy, and the problems of retaining specialised workers, can 
develop. It will be interesting to see how this commitment develops over time as co-ops 
grow; certainly the example of Mondragon suggests that it becomes threatened. 
Wages: companso", with capitalist firms 
It is difficult to make direct comparisons between this co-operative wages data and wage 
levels in comparable capitalist firms. Wages are depend strongly on the industry in 
question, and a meaningful comparison would require a sample of capitalist firms in the 
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same industries and of a similar size distribution to co-operatives. This has been done in 
later chapters on the clothing and printing sectors, and show that wages in co-operatives are 
lower; these results are summarised below in Table 5.11. 
Table 5.11 Average weekly wage in co-ops and capitalist industry, 1984 Ie 1986 (£) 
All All All Printing Clothing Food Distrib. 
inds. & mfg. non-mfg· w'sale retail 
services inds. inds. 
[SICM] 0-9 2-4 0,1,5-9 475 453 617 641 
1984 
Capitalist M 156.7 15S.9 148.1 201.1 114.0 138.S 129.3 
firms F 93.5 96.0 90.9 112.1 SO.l 88.4 S5.S 
Co-ops 112.6 57.5 112.0 5S.0 
1986 
Capitalist M 174.4 183.4 167.5 234.1 132.1 161.0 147.2 
firms F 107.5 111.6 103.1 134.6 92.6 99.1 101.1 
Co-ops 116.1 111.3 9S.3 116.5 70.7 
SIC.standarci Industrial Oaasiflcation (1980) 
Co-op ftguree for 1984 and 1986 are from different!lOUJ'C8S and are not directly oomparable. 
Sovrce: New Elmri"gs Surwy, 1984 &c 1986; own data. 
There are real problems associated with this situation: 
At a time when national bargaining agreements are under attack and the scope 
of wages councils being cut back and undermined, co-operatives which 
undercut in this way are a further threat to the wages and conditions of union 
members and particularly the low paid99• 
Co-ops struggling to establish themselves may be forced to attract business by undercutting 
prices charged by competitors, and hence undermining the wages and conditions of 
workers in those competing firms. The transfer of work from conventional, unionised 
businesses to undercutting enterprises, whether co-ops or not, is not a positive contribution 
by co-ops to the labour movement. 
Although many co-operatives do pay low wages and few can afford to pay union rates, 
there is some optimism. Evidence presented in following chapters shows that wages have 
99 ruc, "il, p. 7. 
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been increasing in C(H)PS, and, in certain circumstances at least, are comparable with or 
better than those in private sector firms. The necessary conditions for this to happen will be 
explored more fully in the conclusion. 
However there does need to be a reassessment within the ruc of attitudes towards the 
other benefits of working in co-operatives. The current attitude is quite clear: 
The ruc does not accept the view that democratic rights in the workplace can 
be seen as a trade-off against wageslOO. 
It does represent a narrow economistic approach towards workers' situation, reflecting the 
preoccupation amongst trade unions with issues of pay and working conditions. The fear 
that co-operatives paying low wages will undermine wage rates elsewhere can be 
overstated. There will only be a direct threat to other workers if c(H)peratives used low 
wages as a means to compete by undercutting prices charged by other firms. It is more 
usual for c(H)peratives to pay low wages despite charging comparable prices to their 
competitors. The low wages may be due to severe undercapitalisation, or the cost 
advantages enjoyed by co-operatives may be used to provide other benefits for workers. 
These can be direct costs, such as financing creche facilities to give single parents to work at 
the co-operative, or indirect costs such as the time taken up in meetings or the productivity 
losses associated with job rotation. 
The issue is not straightforward, and as Mellor &t Stirling comment: 
A trade union official is unlikely to be convinced that £SO a week plus job 
satisfaction is better than £80 a week plus [incentive] bonus101• 
However £SO plus job satisfaction and other gains in a c(H)perative is undoubtedly better 
than £SO plus alienation in a small firm. 
If unions could accept that c(H)peratives have legitimate objectives other than maximising 
wages, then lower wages in c(H)peratives need no undermine wage levels elsewhere. Lower 
wages in co-operatives cannot be taken in isolation but go together with other gains for 
workers. Given that the pursuit of co-operatives' social objectives costs money, unions 
could easily argue that workers in enterprises which do not meet social objectives should be 
able to extract greater pay than workers in those that do. It would no doubt be a difficult 
100 iii. 
lOt Mellor & Slmi"g, t984, fl. 10. 
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negotiating tactic, but would at the same time broaden the perspective of trade unions. 
After all, the gaining of skills which are usually denied to the mass of workers under 
capitalism must be a step forward for the labour movement Similarly with the appreciation 
that preoccupation with economistic or money-orientated objectives is specific to capitalism 
and not the basis of a human-orientated society.1OZ 
Opportunities for trade unions 
At present there appears to be a relatively positive approach towards trade unions amongst 
co-operatives, and this does provide the opportunity for a stronger relationship to be 
developed. McMonnies found that in co-operators on Merseyside had a more positive 
attitude towards trade unions than most trade unionists103. Despite some widely held (and 
anti-union) views, there is a role for trade unions within co-ops. Unions are necessary to 
represent the interests of individual workers when they conflict with demands imposed 
upon a co-op by the requirements of the market or plan. They are also a key source of 
information and training on key issues such as health and safety. Even at Mondragon, 
unofficial union membership is growing. In large co-operatives where there is a dear 
division between shop floor and management, unions can assist in representing workers' 
interests when management has decision-making power. Although there are those who 
hope that unions would wither away in an economy with widespread co-op production, 
this largely depends upon the political and economic environment within which co-ops 
develop. In Yugoslavia for instance, where self-management was introduced under the 
auspices of the Communist Party, trade unions have not been abolished but form a 
significant part of the socio-economic system., although their role has changed. Unions' role 
does have to be clearly worked out In Britain there is a danger that trade union officers 
could take on management roles in rescues co-ops, and compromise their position as 
workers' representatives; this appears to have been the case at !<MEUM. Essentially the same 
arguments apply to this situation as with worker directors on the boards of capitalist 
companies, as recommended by the Bullock Report: that acting as both management and 
workers' representatives is an ambiguous position, with management interpreting and 
responding to market forces and workers representatives protecting workers against those 
forces. This applies in a co-op as well as in a capitalist firm. 
10211{fmt, 1981. 
103 McMoMia, 1985. 
104 Eccla, 19B1iC1Mb, 1983. 
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Ooser co-operation between the two movements is certainly necessary if co-operatives are 
to become a major force for workers in Britain. It is highly unlikely that a significant 
co-operativesector could be developed without union support in an industrial country with 
a developed labour movement, as is illustrated by the role of the union movement in the 
much larger co-op sectors of France and Italy. 

6. Co-operatives and Finance Capital 
INTRODUCTION 
In setting out their strategy for assisting the development of worker co-operatives in 
London, the Greater London Enterprise Board (GLEB) considered that "the combination of 
problems faced by worker co-ops may be linked to lack of start-up capital"l. This view 
echoes the widely held opinion amongst both theorists and practitioners of co-op 
development, that co-ops tend to suffer from a shortage of finance2. It is considered that this 
problem constrains their ability to survive commercially and to achieve a restructuring of 
production under worker control, and ultimately the development of a large and successful 
co-op sector. Although there has been much debate on the financial needs of co-ops, there 
has been little detailed analysis of existing provision. In this chapter I examine the nature of 
the financing problem and of attempts to resolve it in Britain and Europe, and then look at 
the sources of finance used by British co-ops, including more detailed results on the three 
selected sectors. The analysis builds upon that of Part I, and considers co-ops' relationship 
with finance capital and the impact of intervention on behalf of co-ops in the financial 
markets. 
CO-OPS' FINANCING PROBLEM 
-I have noted in the previous chapter that co-ops tend to be concentrated in labour-intensive 
rather than capital-intensive sectors of the economy, and that one explanation for this is that 
they suffer from problems in raising finance. Certainly there have been any number of 
horror stories from individual co-ops concerning their efforts to raise finance from the 
banking community and other sources, although this applies equally to small firms and 
does not necessarily relate to any problem specific to co-ops3. Surveys have found a lack of 
finance to be the major problem inhibiting co-op development', but the same has been 
reported for small businessesS. The starting point in this analysis will a theoretical one; 
1 GLEB, ""(11), ".22. 
2 S. .z"."t 1liiy krt Dft ctH1p ~ m Brilllm; ,.g. SlDtt, 1985; T1romlcy, 1982; Com{orllt".I, 19B8. 
3 MIllor, HIIfIMII 81 Stirlmg, 19B7. 
4 CAG, 1984; NNLCDA, 19 •• It Moul4 ., f¥ pomllll out tIuIl ill 1M t1f1iniDrt of CDA ..".,., .",." of fi7umu it 
..".tiJna .. by t:IHIfII"lIII a:t:UII for ok fall,." (Stott 1985). 
5 SBRT,1987. 
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before I examine the actual position of co-ops I consider the strong a priori evidence that 
co-ops' capital structure is intrinsically weak because of their class background. 
The financing issue has concerned theorists of all persuasions; it provided the centrepiece of 
Vanek's neoclassical analysis, is integral to Oakeshott's 'social democratic' perspective, and 
on the left has been identified by Tomlinson as a major constraint on their success6• As a 
result there have been a plethora of both practical and theoretical solutions, the nature of 
which reflect the wide range of ideological positions held. In considering these it will 
become apparent that not only is the amount of finance crucial for co-ops, but also the form 
which financing takes, in its impact on the nature of co-op development. 
I have presented Vanek's analysis of the finandng issue in Part I, when considering the 
general problems of neoclassical analysis of co-ops. It need not be repeated here, save for 
the contrast between Vanek's main point - that co-ops' problems stem from incorrect 
dedsions taken internally within the co-op over the form of financing to adopt - and that of 
Stephen's critique?, which suggests that these problems are the result of a general shortage 
(for whatever reason) of funds to finance expansion. 
Like Vanek, Stephen writes from a neoclassical perspective, but concludes that the finance 
problem for co-ops stems from their relationship to the rest of the economy. But neoclassical 
theory offers no explanation as to why this should be the case; essentially it just offers a 
restatement of the problem: co-ops suffer from a lack of finance. For an explanation we must 
consider the specifically capitalist relations of production which co-ops face in western 
Europe, and the role which co-ops playas non-capitalist forms of enterprise within this 
structure. Thus the shortage of capital faced by co-ops must be explained with reference to 
their origins from outside of the capitalist classB. 
Co-ops within capitalism do have an intrinsically weak capital structure. In a capitalist 
economy, ownership of capital brings with it control of the production process and 
appropriation of the product of that process. Although this control is continually contested, 
its retention by capitalists as a class makes the economy capitalist. Worker co-ops represent 
an attempt to wrest control of production and the product from capital by labour; however, 
, v...t, 1m; 0rriIrIIIDft .. ll18; Toml ..... , 1982; __ PIIrl OM. 
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they do this within a capitalist economy and so require access to a portion of capital in order 
to undertake production. This leads co-ops into a peculiar relationship with capital; if 
following a socialist path, this implies opposition to the very existence of capital and 
capitalists as a class, but in order to survive they need to appropriate a part of that capital 
and become part of the circuit of capital. Given that labour as a class does not have capital of 
its own, and that capitalists will recognise the opposition of co-ops, this appropriation will 
lead to conflict with two consequences. Firstly, co-ops will have problems securing 
sufficient finance to undertake production on a competitive basis with capitalist firms 
without intensive exploitation of labour, and secondly, finance will be made available on 
terms which tend to undermine the socialist essence of co-ops and encourage degeneration. 
Moving from this very abstract level we can examine the form which this conflict takes in 
practice. In co-ops, formal control is on the basis of contribution through work rather than 
capital, and one fundamental co-op principle is that finance involved in co-ops will only be 
entitled to a limited return. Any surplus generated within a co-op belongs to the workforce 
and not to external capitalists. Consequently, co-ops perceive that finance capital is hired as 
an input to production in the same way as other physical inputs, and the owner of that 
input receives a price for its services. This position is embodied in the slogan 'labour hires 
capital, not capital hires labour' which the co-op movement often uses. The owners of 
capital will not be able to directly extract surplus value from workers in the form of profits 
as happens in capitalist enterprises. 
Therefore external equity capital is not available to co-ops. It would entail control (at least 
partially) passing from the hands of workers to capitalists, who would then benefit from 
exploitation of the workforce; clearly capitalists would not make equity available unless 
they secure these two conditions. Indeed this was the fate of many 19th century British 
co-ops which degenerated into joint stock companies as they issued shares to external 
capitalists in order to raise finance for expansion. 
Av AlLABILlTY OF FINANCE, AND COMMERCIAL PERFORMANCE 
The relationship between co-ops and finance capital is one aspect of co-ops' overall 
relationship with capital. The underlying contradiction in this relationship - between the 
social relations within co-ops and those in the economy - results in co-ops facing difficulties 
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obtaining sufficient finance through the banking system to compete with capitalist finns. 
This will be manifested in various concrete fonna: 
• a shortage of machinery and production equipment and of finance for stocks (fixed 
capital), and of flows of materials and energy (circulating capital); 
• in order to compete, a tendency towards more intensive exploitation of labour, with 
lower wages, longer hours and worse working conditions; 
• worse commercial performance than better-financed capitalist firms; 
• reliance on non-capitalist sources of finance - public sector, private (sympathetiC> 
sources, and members especially in early years; 
• an increasing proportion of commercial finance as co-ops become more profitable; 
• differences between sectors related to nature of accumulation within those sectors -
less profitable sectors will retain a relatively higher reliance on non-capitalist finance. 
Several of these relate primarily to commercial performance and will be dealt with in the 
next chapter. The two issues - availability of finance and commercial performance are of 
course closely telated. Under-finandng will tend to be self-perpetuating: unprofitable 
co-ops will be unable to accumulate, and will become progressively less competitive, less 
profitable, and thus face an intensification of the need to exploit labour if they are to 
survive. Therefore, from a given 'surplus' (i.e. surplus of revenue over material and 
overhead costs of production), there will be pressure to keep wages low and devote the 
remainder to accumulation - contributing to fixed or circulating capital. This will be dealt 
within more depth in the next chapter. Intervention in this process is required if co-ops are 
not to be permanently under-financed; hence the motivation for public sector funding for 
co-ops. 
Under-financing is not a problem exclusively fadngco-opsi the difficulties faced by some 
small fimIS in this area have been covered earlier. Storey et 1119 have investigated the impact 
on accumulation in relation to the survival of small £inns in the north-east. They found that, 
as would be expected, those which perfomked best tended to have higher proportions of 
retained profits, and those which coUapsed had lower gearing (ratio of internal funds to 
total capital employed). Thus the leu profitable firms (which eventually coUapsed) showed 
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an increasing proportion of total finance provided by loans, either from members or 
externally, as reserves are run down to meet losses. 
Financing problems for small firms 
Unavailability of share capital is a problem specific to co-ops, and is in addition to the 
difficulties which British capitalist firms generally face in raising finance. The issue is a 
sensitive one, as it concerns the relationship between finance capital (the aty) and 
industrial capital, and the extent to which their individual interests have exacerbated 
Britain's economic problems10• The main characteristics of British company financing in 
general are that: 
• bank lending to industry has generally been in the form of overdrafts, rather than 
longer term loans. Overdrafts can legally be recalled at any time and thus represent liquid 
assets for banks. This has enabled the aty to maintain flexibility towards and independence 
from industrial capital. Banks do lend medium to long term in some circumstances, and in 
practice overdraft facilities are routinely renewed, but the broad aim of finance capital 
remains the maintenance of independence and flexibility - whether from industrial capital, 
the state, or foreign loans. The low apparent risk involved in overdraft funding - because of 
its liquidity - has meant that banks do not have to intervene to protect their loans. 
• A VOiding direct intervention in the running of industry, banks have protected 
themselves by securing their poSition in the event of company failure, by the collateral 
required for loans. This contrasts with the approach of many American and European 
banks, who aim to secure their loans by agreeing conditions on the firms operations. The 
UK approach "pins the banks' concern on what happens when the firm collapses rather than 
how it operates when alive" and can be referred to as "negative management rules"l1. 
• the most important form of finance for new investment in industry has been internally 
generated funds (retained profits)12. 
• despite the above there is no evidence that firms have suffered a shortage of bank 
finance13j it is more likely that industry has simply generated too few worthwhile projects 
for financing. Firms have generally been able to secure as much finance as they need at the 
20 .. &g. Fine" H1mi129BS, duqIIm 2 "'; a.klq tm4 H""';'2983; 
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going interest rate. Rather, the passive nature of banks' funding and the availability of 
'flexible' overdraft finance has meant that industrial finns could secure even long-tenn 
finance without the need to undertake long-term planning; and yet the availability of funds 
has obviated the need for state intervention in such planning. It is this lack of intervention -
by either banks or the state - which has enabled British industry to continue largely without 
a framework of planned industrial development, and has contributed significantly to 
industry's weakness14. 
Although numerous surveys have found no evidence that banks have generally resbicted 
the availability of finance for industrial companies, for small firms the difficulty in obtaining 
finance is frequently dted as a barrier to growth1S• A 1987 survey of venture capital users 
,- found that 41% saw availability of capital as a major obstacle to growth16, and the same 
.!': result is found in regular surveys of small businesses11• The Wilson Committee found that 
small companies did have difficulty in obtaining finance, and as a result proposed the 
establishment of the small firms' Loan Guarantee Scheme. Under this, the risk to the banks 
of investing in small companies was partially taken over by the state, with the government 
guaranteeing 70% (80% until 1984) of a medium term loan at a premium of 25% over 
commerdal interest rates. The scheme was intended to be self-finandng - and thus was not 
intended to involve any subsidy to small firms - but has been plagued by a high failure rate 
of firms. 42% of loans have gone into default, compared to an antidpated 30%, and the 
,)" scheme ran up a deficit of £109m on total lending of nearly £6OOm by 198718. This 
performance suggests that the financial requirements of small companies were not for 
viable investments in industrial capital19. OTI investigations found that small finns suffered 
acutely from poor financial management and administration20• If so, then the banks can 
hardly be blamed for failing to advance credit to small firms. The CBI also "did not discover 
any serious weakness in the Oty's support for small firms, pointing out that more than 
£1 billion alone had been raised on the Unlisted Securities Market for small undertakings"21. 
If these points are correct, they suggest that if small finns have problems obtaining finance, 
24 Fbw (; HtmiI, 2N5, ,.242. 
25 JJrmg,lIB1".2. 
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it is because they are not very profitable and suffer from poor management. In fact there is 
some evidence that the availability of equity funds now exceeds the business opportunities 
to invest in, and many recent USM flotations have been oversubscribed. Other evidence 
suggests that there are adequate loans funds for small businesses, resulting in competition 
amongst lenders for 'quality' investments22. This is reinforced by Bums, who concludes that 
there is adequate finance for new businesses with real growth potential .... the 
problem would now seem to be that there are insufficient businesses with 
growth potential coming forward with well-prepared proposals. .... The 
availability of external finance would appear to be no longer a major barrier to 
small business growth in the United Kingdom.23 
However it is also true that the nature of the banking system tends to discourage loans to 
new companies. 'Quality' investment usually means businesses that have gone beyond the 
start-up phase and reached a size to demonstrate growth potential; it is much more difficult 
for new businesses to convince banks that they represent a viable investment. British banks 
are centralised and monopolistic; limited discretion is given to local branch managers, 
although their personal knowledge of the people in charge of firms is heavily relied upon; 
and there is an overriding concern with obtaining adequate security for loans. All of these 
factors make it very difficult for new finns without a track record to obtain funds. 
Co-operatives and banks 
The combination of co-ops' inability to raise external share capital and the characteristics of 
the British banking system suggest that co-ops will face severe problems in raising loan 
finance, even more severe than those faced by small firms in general. In the absence of 
external shareholding, co-ops will demonstrate a relatively greater reliance on loan finance 
(ignoring for the moment the possibility of raising share capital from workers). For a given 
total financial requirement, more of it will have to be financed from loans in a co-op than in 
a capitalist finn. The consequent high gearing ratio has several implications. 
Firstly, in the context of British banks' negative management rules, they are unwilling to 
lend when gearing is higher than some standard rule of thumb. Highly geared enterprises 
are thought to entail higher risks, because such a structure requires a greater proportion of 
earnings to be devoted to interest and loan repayments than if a greater part of finance 
comes from share capital. This adds to the burden of fixed overhead costs. 
22 Donm 81 Hoyk, 2986. 
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Secondly, British banks are concerned about the amount of security they have for their 
loans. Given the practice of securing loans against floating charges on firms' assets24, a 
highly geared firm effectively offers the bank less security than one with lower gearing, 
because loans fonn a higher proportion of total assets. This increases the risk perceived by 
banks. Whereas a small scale capitalist may be able to provide additional security e.g. a 
house), the class background of co-op workers suggests that they are much less likely to 
have access to personal assets of this kind. The particular structure of co-ops requires a 
different approach by banks; they sometimes interpret the lack of personal financial 
investment in the business by the members as a sign of lack of commitment, whereas in 
practice the commitment of workers in co-ops is likely to be greater, if not for ideological 
reasons then at least because their jobs and livelihoods are at stake as much as for any 
capitalist.25 
Thirdly, bank managers place great emphasis on the personal characteristics of those 
involved in small businesses, and co-op workers are likely to face difficulties in generating 
confidence amongst bankers. In addition banks may be cautious of dealing with a group of 
people rather than one or two individuals; they are also likely to be suspicious of co-ops as 
an unknown and unusual fonn of business, taking more convincing that a particular 
venture is viable than if presented by a capitalist. Finance problems faced by co-ops are 
likely to be more severe at start-up and in their early years; once established, co-ops can at 
;: least overcome one potential hurdle - the lack of a track record. 
Although the more established co-ops make greater use of commercial finance, they still 
face problems with· banks. One large, well established and profitable wholefood 
wholesaling co-op, for instance, can only obtain an overdraft to cover the equivalent of 2 
days turnover, leading to major cash flow problems. 
Despite widespread concern with the difficulties faced by co-ops in raising finance, there is 
little quantitative evidence regarding the sources used by them in practice. A survey of the 
banking fadJitief used by worker co-ops in London has been carried out by O\loe Munro of 
GLIB, and thiJ provides UIeful information on co-ops' relations with commercial banks26. 
Another lurvey, CIJ'I'led out by the National Network of Local COAs, investigated the 
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position of specialised co-op loan funds27. In addition my own research has investigated 
sources of finance used by co-ops in the printing, clothing and wholefood sectors. 
Munro's survey primarily investigated the banking facilities available to London co-ops. It 
found that relationships with banks were varied, and depended as much on the attitude of 
individual managers as on corporate policy. If any of the clearing banks were to be expected 
to have a particularly favourable poSition towards co-ops, the Coop Bank would be the 
most likely candidate. It is an integral part of the consumer, co-op movement, wholly owned 
by the Co-operative Wholesale Society, and banker to the movement as well as to many 
Labour local authorities. It has attempted to establish good relations with the worker co-op 
movement; partly through links with local CDAs, but also through its scheme to offer £ for £ 
loans, matching funds contributed by members - although many co-ops do not regard this 
as any more favourable than nonnal commercial terms. CDA workers are reported to have 
found the Co-op Bank well informed28 - e.g. through their involvement on the management 
committees of local loan funds - but this position does not translate into a good relationship 
with co-ops themselves. Munro reports that many co-ops are initially attracted to the Co-op 
Bank, but soon become disillusioned; in fact the Co-op lost more accounts than any other 
bank. She continues: 
The Co-op Bank of course attracts a great many worker co-operatives because 
it is felt to be the least unattractive bank on ideological grounds, and the belief 
may also prevail that it is likely to be more sympathetic than other banks ••.• 
but leavers [commented] in generally strong terms on the quality of service: 
"Hopeless", "Pathetic·, "Unhelpful", "Unbearably inefficient", and so on. It may 
be argued that the strong criticisms of the Co-op Bank are partly a reaction to 
unreasonably high expectations, but it is also striking that co-ops currently 
banking with the Co-op are generally less satisfied with their relationship with 
their bank than any of the others.29 
The Co-op Bank in fact claims to operate at least 50% of worker co-op accounts30; this seems 
unlikely to be true. Munro found that it gained an equal number of new co-op accounts 
(about 28%) as NatWest, but lost far more to finish in second place with 22%. Although the 
Coop Bank undoubtedly suffers because of its very limited branch network, this drawback 
would perhaps be acceptable if it offered preferential treatment to worker co-ops; the fact 
that it does not reflects both the rather cool relationship between the traditional consumer 
27 NNLCDA, 1986. 
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co-op movement and the new worker aH>PS, and the difficult relationships between 
commercial banks generally and co-ops. 
Both surveys reported that the most common fonn of bank lending was through an 
overdraft, in common with British industry generally. In London in 198658% of aH>pS had 
overdrafts, ranging from £200 to £60,000, with an average (median) of £2,000. The main 
constraint on overdraft facilities appears to be available security; although the majority of 
small Oess than £1,000) overdrafts were unsecured, larger ones required securities both in 
the form of a charge over assets and personal guarantees or tangible security. Munro found 
that 25% of London co-ops had applied for term loans from banks, although less than half 
had been successful. As expected, she found that tenn loans are less important than 
overdrafts in external commerdal financing, as did the NNLCDA. 
The problems faced by new co-ops in particular in raising commercial finance is illustrated 
by this being the least important source of finance (apart from accumulated reserves) for 
new clothing, printing and wholefood co-ops, contributing under 15% of total requirements 
(see Tables 63a-63d). It is relatively most important in printing co-ops, which have 
frequently been conversions from some other business fonn, and thus often start with some 
fonn of track record upon which to approach banks; they are also aided by the relative 
profitability of firms in the printing industry. The importance of a track record is illustrated 
··f by the increasing importance of commerdal funds as co-ops get older; by year 6 it is the 
.'«, second most important source of finance, after accumulated reserves, providing 25% of the 
total. 
Although there are difficulties faced by co-ops in raising finance from banks, it appears 
unlikely that this is based on discrimination towards them by banks. Whilst there is 
certainly ignorance towards co-ops in banking circles, there is little evidence that banks 
apply different criteria to co-ops and capitalist finns when assessing applications for 
finance. The standard criteria of projected viability and business prospects, perceived risk, 
gearing and avaUable security, and capability of management would be applied in the same 
way in both cases, but u a result of their origins, avaDable resources and orientation, co-ops 
are much leu Hkely to meet banIca' requirements than me capitalist firms. This problem 
would of course be exacerbated by any tendency for co-ops to be estabUshed in declining 
industries, and is IDustrated by dothing co-ops having the smallest initial proportion of 
commercial finance of the three aec:tol'l studied. 
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A1TEMPTS TO DEAL WITH CO-OPERATIVES' FINANCING PROBLEM 
It has been established that co-ops have an intrinsically weak financing structure. Different 
measures have been adopted to deal with this, varying between countries and over time. 
However, the measures can be broadly divided into three groups: 
• weakening co-op principles by permitting external shareholdings. 
• raising capital from members, either in the fonn of shares or loans, or building up 
reserves; 
• establishing sources of finance which are wholly or partially independent of finance 
capital, including private/sympathetic sources and public loan funds. 
Shares in co-operatives (1) CPF co-parmerships 
The IPS Acts which first gave distinct legal status to co-ops in the mid-19th century did 
permit the issuing of shares by co-ops. These are issued to members (who need not be 
workers), are refundable on demand, carry a fixed and limited rate of interest, and are 
presently limited to £5,000 per member. At that time there were few opportunities for 
co-ops to raise finance on favourable tenns, and as a result most co-ops encouraged 
members to contribute the maximum in loans and shares. CPF co-ops also welcomed 
members from outside, such as local retail (consumer) co-op societies and trade unions. For 
instance, Equity Shoes, fonned in 1886, had 304 members within two years, including 145 
retail co-ops and 3 trade unions; the rest were workers and individuals31. In most co-ops 
non-worker members soon formed a majority (and still do), especially as many retired 
workers retain their membership. Obviously such enterprises are not workers co-ops in 
today's understanding of the word, as they are not controlled by their workers, and they are 
sometimes referred to as co-partnerships32. Workers' control in the enterprise sense is 
clearly vulnerable to the actions of non-worker members, but in the class sense workers 
control remains as long as the non-worker members do not represent the interests of capital. 
The position of these non-worker members may act H a constraint on the actions and 
decisions of workers in the co-op, but in practice this may be less of a constraint than those 
imposed by the need to compete in the market, especially if the quid pro quo for, say, 
allowing membership by retail societies is the provision of an Hsured market which may 
Sl Plum., (2937), I(IIDta bt77lomlq,19B1. 
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lessen the constraints which would otherwise be faced by co-op workers. Furthermore, 
shareholders cannot extract surplus value from the workforce, as return on capital is limited 
under the IPS Acts. 
A major problem with this structure is that when the asset value and nominal value of a 
co-ops' shares move apart, there is an incentive for members to wind up such a co-op in 
order to realise the value of the capital assets. This is more likely if there are many non-
worker members who do not thereby stand to lose their jobs; it proved to be the downfall of 
many CPF co-ops which closed in the period 1925-1975 on being wound up by members. 
Sharu in co-operative, (2) Equity participation CD-tip. 
A more recent attempt to bring in external share capital is the National COA's Equity 
;. Participation Co-operative (EPa, a hybrid structure which attempts to make co-ops 
attractive to private sector finance. It involves a complicated two-tier structure, consisting of 
a trading company, which is a normal share company, and a workers co-op. Some of the 
shares in the trading company are owned by the co-op, which is itself controlled by the 
workers in the trading company. Thus the workers have some collective control over the 
trading company, and the control is enhanced by giving the co-op shares ten times the 
voting power of non-co-op shares. 
The idea behind EPCs is that the structure will appeal to potential external shareholders, 
who could invest in the share company with a view to accumulating capital. Oearly they 
are not co-ops in the accepted sense, in that there is only modified worker control, and 
furthermore ~e potential for accumulation of capital is not limited. EPCs are justified on the 
basis that they provide a means of overcoming the shortage of finance which co-ops face, 
and that they will enable gradual conversion to a full co-op structure over time33. There is 
potential for great flexibility in the distribution of voting rights, dividends and the 
appointment of directors, but they do not avoid the tension between control by workers and 
external shareholders - the more the powers of external shares are restricted, the less 
attractive an investment they will be to finance capital. It had originally been intended that 
the !PC structure would enable the raising of finance through the Business Expansion 
~ (BES); however, if the shares held by the co-op (i.e. the EPC) carry sufficient weight 
.uCDA,rrL 
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in voting rights to ensure effective worker control, the company is rendered ineligible for 
theBES. 
How they will work out in practice remains to be seen; by the end of 1986 only four EPCs 
had been formed, and none of these tapped conventional finance capital - two involved 
local authorities, one involved trade unions, and another raised 'community' money (from 
sympathisers). Indeed it may tum out that EPCs are most effective at providing a means of 
securing such broadly sympathetic finance, and that eventual conversion to a co-op will 
result. However the CDA is also keen on promoting them as employee share schemes, and 
in this guise they have more in common with conventional employee participation schemes 
or ESOPs34. Munro concludes that 
it is now generally accepted that the EPC does not provide a workable solution 
to the problem of access to capital. There is therefore little justification for the 
entailed departure from established co-op principles.35 
Whilst I would agree that there is little likelihood of the EPC structure attracting commercial 
equity finance into co-ops, their potential for attracting municipal or trade union 
involvement cannot be dismissed in the same way, because these latter sources do not 
necessarily represent the same class interests as finance capital. Their involvement will tend 
to be based upon linking co-ops to wider policies and objectives, rather than the 
accumulation of capital, which would be the objective of conventional finance. Oearly EPCs 
weaken worker control in its orthodox sense, but this rests upon an individualistic 
conception of what worker control is; within a capitalist economy there will always be a 
conflict between control exerted by workers as individuals within an enterprise, and control 
exerted by workers as a class. If EPC's can strengthen the links between co-ops and the 
labour movement then they can potentially strengthen worker control on a class level. The 
form in which conventional co-ops operate is not defined by their legal structure as worker 
controlled enterprises - many replicate small business practices - and similarly EPC's could 
in practice operate in line with radical co-op objectives. 
Conclusion. - extem41 equity 
The experience of raising finance for co-ops through external equity within the British legal 
framework is not encouraging as a means of strengthening the co-op sector; where this 
34 ~.; u:r, 1986-
35 MIm"" 1911; p. 42. 
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occurs in Europe it is associated with much stronger legal restrictions on co-ops being 
wound up for the personal profit of members36. Where external equity finance has been 
raised by British C(K)PS - and this took place extensively in the 19th century - there has been 
a very strong tendency for degeneration through control by external capital. Indeed this 
fann of degeneration was one of the main concerns of the Webbs in their work on C(K)ps37. 
Continuing proposals - such as the recommendation that C(K)PS need new sources of capital 
including the possibility of outside equity "from such sources as the local community, trade 
. unions, major suppliers, and so on''38 - are made without taking into account historical 
experience and the need for intervention at the state level to provide - as a minimum - a 
very different legal framework to prevent degeneration. Although the structure of ICOM 
co-ops has been developed so as to inhibit this form of degeneration, there is still no legal 
provision to prevent or discourage it, in contrast to European experience. 
There is no reason to believe that C(K)pS raising external equity from commercial sources 
(e.g. ven~ capital funds) would avoid the degeneration which has resulted from such 
initiatives in the past. Co-ops' problems are likely to intensify as venture capital becomes 
increasingly important in the finanCing of small businesses, not because C(K)PS are 
discriminated against, but because they do not meet capitalist investment criteria for an 
acceptable rate of return on such investment. Greater London Enterprises (the restructured 
successor to GLEB) have been attempting to generate venture capital financing for co-ops, 
but admit that it would involve dilution or removal of key aspects of C(K)P structure. GLE 
have stated39 explicitly that for co-ops to secure venture capital financing, they would need 
to: 
• dilute worker control by allowing capital a direct involvement in the running of the 
enterprise, for instance through the appointment of management. 
• remove limitations on pennissible retum on capital. Oearly, the need for venture 
capitalists to maximise return on capital conflicts with co-ops' desire to retain gains for 
workers. 
NM,I •• 
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• allow capital a 'profitable exit strategy'. Venture capitalists typically have a short time 
horizon, and would seek to withdraw finance within five years, and take advantage of 
capital gain. This cannot be effectively achieved in co-ops without pennitting share capital. 
Various compromise suggestions - such as EPCs and non-voting shares - have been made 
which fall between the requirements of capital at one extreme and of co-ops at the other. 
These all involve restrictions on the ability of capital to secure maximum profit, and as such 
appear unlikely to appeal to investors who in any case complain of a lack of profitable 
investment projects. The ceding of partial control to outsiders would have implications for 
the types of strategies co-ops could pursue, especially if these conflicted with profitability, 
and attempts to raise capital in this way blur further any distinction between co-ops and 
small companies. 
Raising finance from members 
The IPS Acts envisaged that co-ops would raise finance from members, who could either 
purchase shares or make loans to the co-op for whom they worked, and this fadlity was 
used extensively by the CPF co-partnerships. However the idea of individual shareholding 
was rejected by ICOM, who have been heavily involved with new British co-ops. ICOM 
drew up model co-op constitutions on the basis of Common Ownership of the means of 
production, whereby all of a co-op's assets would be held collectively. Members of ICOM 
co-ops contribute the legal minimum - a nominal £1 - of share capital40, although larger 
amounts are pennitted by the legislation. The rationale behind this is that workers should 
not be required to 'buy' their jobs; that is, if it is a condition of membership that more than a 
nominal number of shares must be purchased, people with limited resources would 
effectively be excluded. This would tend to exclude the poor and unemployed, and in these 
drcumstances entry to the co-op would effectively require a capital as well as a labour 
contribution; this is certainly incompatible with any notion of co-ops as socialist enterprises. 
Any members' contribution in ICOM co-ops must be on the basis of members' loans. 
Typically these are interest free, unsecured with no fixed repayment terms, and relatively 
small. Occasional large loans are made on more commerdal terms. Limitations on the 
resources available to most co-op workers restrict the importance of members loans as a 
source of finance, although even these limited amounts may be imp>rtant in early days. 
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ICOM encourages members to contribute equally to loans, as it is felt that an unequal 
sharing of the financial burden amongst members might put the co-op under strain41. For 
the same reason ICOM rules do not pennit outside members, in case they have a financial 
interest in the enterprise which would conflict with worker interests. 
The third fonn of members' capital is reserves, or retained surpluses. In the early ICOM 
conversions, many stipulated that a high proportion of surpluses should be retained 
collectively rather than distributed as bonuses to individual workers; for instance, at Scott 
Bader at least 60% of any surplus is compulsorily allocated to collective reserves, with the 
balance available for social objectives or allocation as bonuses. The principle of a high 
proportion of collectively retained earnings also applies in the many new co-ops fonned 
under ICOM rules. The use of accumulated reserves as a source of finance is a difficult issue 
for many co-ops; poor commercial performance combined with a desire to pay adequate 
wages limits the ability to accumulate and tends to keep the reinvestible surplus down, but 
difficulties in obtaining extemal finance mean that reserves are necessarily an important 
source of finance. 
The ICOM fonnat is unusual by European standards. In France, Italy and the Spanish 
Mondragon co-ops, a requirement that workers buy shares is typical, and members' 
shareholdings (and loans) are important sources of finance for co-ops42. Co-ops in these 
countries tend to have a more individualist ethic, contrasting the collective approach of 
ICOM co-ops. At Mondragon, all workers must on joining a co-op pay an 'entry fee', which 
"forms the basis for self-financing the costs involved in one's job"43. In 1977 the entry fee 
was equivalent to about 6 months earnings (although the exact amount varies according to a 
complex formula), which can largely be paid from wages in instalments after joining. Most 
of the fee is credited to the individual's capital account with the co-op, while a small portion 
goes into collective reserves. If the co-op makes a surplus, this is allocated between 
individual accounts, collective reserve and social fund; the same appUes if a loss is incurred. 
Members cannot withdraw their individual accounts until retirement, There is clearly the 
potential for quite unequal accumulation by workers in co-ops with different levels of 
42 ICOF,Jt87. 
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perfonnance, although Thomas &: Logan report that the spread of wealth in Mondragon is 
narrower than inequalities deriving from incomes". 
In French co-ops, members are encouraged to purchase shares and to make loans to their 
co-op, and a minimum financial contribution is a condition of membership. This is both for 
reasons of increasing available finance, and to generate materialist worker-commitment to 
the co-op. Similarly, in Italian co-ops members are encouraged to purchase shares and make 
loans. 
The issue of members' capital contributions is a contentious one. For ICOM, minimal and 
equal contributions are crucial in establishing an environment of equality between co-op 
workers. Oakeshott takes a diametrically opposed position: members should be encouraged 
to contribute sufficient capital to 'buy' their jobs, and individual shares provide a self-
interested incentive for workers' commitment to the enterprise. 
The ICOM model has been criticised for adversely affecting co-op perfonnance, on the basis 
that it has reduced the ability of co-ops to raise finance, and through its impact on 
individual workers' incentives. Oakeshott takes the latter position, and encourages co-ops to 
use individual workers shares and capital accounts. For him, a crucial aspect of co-ops is 
that they overcome traditional divisions between management and workforce, and 
engender a commitment by the workers to the objectives and success of the enterprise. Such 
identification with the enterprise by the workforce is considered to be crucial in achieving 
high productivity and overcoming conflict within industry. It is argued that collective or 
common ownership of a co-op, and retention of any surplus as a collectively held reserve, 
will give the workforce little incentive to contribute towards better productivity and 
enterprise performance: 
Workforce members will have little incentive to maximise profits which are 
reinvested or retained on collective account because, apart from extra job 
security, they will individually derive no material benefit when that happens. 
Collective ownership of this kind could, therefore, become a major disincentive 
to profit maximisation - and could well be self-defeating in that its main 
objective is to increase the company's financial strength (I say nothing about 
the moral and social objectives of collective ownership).45 
"Mp.259. 
45 CWaIIDIt, 2971".84. 
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This approach elevates the business and productivity aspects of co-ops above all others. 
Oakeshott justifies it by referring to the nature of human activity in a capitalist world, seen 
as driven fundamentally by individual self-interest. The analysis can only be sustained by 
treating the economic as distinct from the moral and social (as he himself admits); as we 
have seen in Part I, this is integral to the neoclassical and sociaI democratic perspectives. It 
contrasts with lCOM's approach, which aims to develop a collective and socially orientated 
alternative co-op movement, changing the world rather than reflecting - and therefore 
reinforcing - the status quo. And indeed it is difficult to see how the promotion of an 
economy based fundamentally on self-interest is compatible with the ideals of co-operation. 
Oakeshott has established an organisation to promote co-ops in this favoured form, whose 
philosophy is encompassed in its name - Job Ownership Ltd. JOL has broadly adopted the 
Mondragon structure, whereby workers must contribute an entry fee on joining the co-op. 
Because surpluses (or deficits) are largely credited to the individual accounts, co-op 
members share in the growth of the co-op's asset value and withdraw this on retirement. 
Although these individual 'shares' are not marketable, Oakeshott considers that the 
prospect of individual's capital growth is an incentive which is a major component of 
Mondragon's success. 
The value of the stake will rise or fall depending on the fortunes of the 
enterprise. This is the condition which, by creating a direct link between the 
interests of the members and the enterprise, ensures genuinely responsible 
behaviour and a positive attitude to productivity .•••• the commitment of the 
workforce needs to be secured by the requirement of a meaningful capital 
stake.46 
OakeshoWs objection to the collective ownership of capital and profits is that it hinders 
commercial performance, and ultimately reduces the chances of co-op survival (or at least of 
growth and expansion) and hence the impact which co-ops can make - although this does 
raise the question of whether successful JOL co-ops would be any different to small 
businenes. This will be discussed further in Part m; at this point it is sufficient to bear in 
mind that Oakeshott's concern is with reforming, not transforming capitalism. 
Others also mnsider that the ICOM pOSition has adversely affected co-op performance, 
although for different reasons. In particular there is concern is not with incentives and 
employee motivation, but with an overall shortage of finance and the impact this has on 
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co-ops ability to survive and grow. In their investigation of the feasibility of establishing a 
co-op sector in Wales along similar lines to Mondragon, Logan and Gregory consider that 
the ICOM structure 
has imposed a major constraint on the ability of common ownerships to raise 
capital, since the ICOM rules have been based on an elitist and purist view of 
the principles of co-operativism rather than any pragmatic acceptance of 
business reality47. 
That is, restrictions on members share contributions and loans will lead to problems of 
under-financing, which will in tum cause poor performance. ICOM's stance on share issues 
is also criticised by the Co-op Union and the national COA, as well as commercial banks. To 
a certain extent the criticism is well founded; ICOM itself grew from Scott Bader48, and its 
early co-ops were all conversions from established private firms in which finance was not a 
problem and where social objectives could receive priority; this contrasted with the CPF c0-
partnerships, whose rules emerged out of necessity in harsh circumstances49• Logan and 
Gregory consider that the appropriate way to counter the intrinsic weakness of co-op's 
capital structure is to tap members' contributions. 
It is plain that a major debate is called for on the question of how capital is to 
be raised for co-ops. The Italians, the French and the Basques have all adapted 
in more or less pragmatic ways to the need to face 'market forces', while at the 
same time denigrating their effects upon society. This may well explain why 
their structures have enabled the co-op enterprises to playa more significant 
role, in terms of both output and employment, than has been the case in 
Britain. In Italy there is no restraint on interest payments on loans, in 
Mondragon the individual member participates in the growth of assets while 
maintaining liquidity and avoiding decapitalisation through restraint upon the 
distribution of surpluses throughout his working life.50 
However this fails to address the point that in Britain many members of today's co-ops are 
poor, formerly unemployed or active in marginal and highly exploited areas of the labour 
market. It is unlikely that they would have access to financial resources on any significant 
scaleSt ; Munro comments that, in London, "personal funds provide a very limited source of 
capital"52. Certainly this would restrict further the relevance of co-ops, to those who are 
already comfortably off (the 'middle class') and who could afford this contribution. 
47 Logrm iii Gregory, 1981". 94. 
48 See.,ter 5. 
49 '11Itmt1q,19B2". 43. 
50 Logrm iii Gregory,l9n, ,. 95. 
52 SID", 2985, ,. 23. 
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Furthermore, an increasing proportion of CXH>ps registering in Britain do so under the 
Companies Acts, which do not restrict the interest paid on loans (although individual co-op 
constitutions may do). Even with limits on interest payments, it seems unlikely that 
members are deterred from making loans to their co-op by this factor, as interest paid can 
compare well with returns available elsewhere. The constraints are likely to be concern with 
the very high risk associated with investing in CXH>ps, and an absolute lack of funds on the 
part of members, rather than a decision to invest money elsewhere because of interest rate 
considerations. In fact a high proportion of new co-ops (ICOM and others) do make use of 
members' loans in early years; but the amounts tend to be small, evidence supporting the 
view that workers simply do not have funds available. Members funds (loans and reserves) 
have in fact been the largest single source of finance for British co-ops, despite the 
discouragement of loans and shareholding. It is far more plausible that it has been a lack of 
external funds which has constrained CXH>p growth. 
Whilst I would endorse the call for a debate on the financing issue, there are other 
conclusions that can be drawn from the experience of European co-ops, relating to the 
impact of intervention in financial markets. I will examine these later, but firstly tum to a 
more detailed analysis of finance contributed by members. 
IntenuJl & extern," /i1Ul1lCe - gearing 
Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 show the total finance used (on average) by co-ops in each sector 
and overall, by age of co-op. Total finance used in year 1 covers expenditure on machinery 
and equipment, stocks, plus trading profit (or offset by a loss) in the first year53• 
Co-ops in the two . production secton require substantially more finance than those in 
wholefoods, the latter requiring finance largely for stocks rather than machinery and 
equipment, although in all cases financial requirement depends on both capital-intensity 
and size of co-ops. Thus clothing co-ops, although relatively labour intensive, have tended 
to be large often established as rescue co-ops, and hence have the highest initial financial 
requirement. In all secton total finance used increases initially. It falls for clothing co-ops 
after year 2, due to mounting losses; in printing it falls after year 5, although this is largely 
due to the impact of a very large investment in one co-op which does not appear in years 6 
53 '1'111 /fprw ..... ."",,.,. /It "" end of _1Ntlin, ,.ar, 1IJ,.ar 2'. fipra ... /It fill ""' of tm6 yW' tnulm" 
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and 7; whilst in wholefoods finance used rises steadily throughout as co-ops accumulate 
and expand. 
Table 6.1 Co-op finance: total, and members' funds (£'000) 
Printing Wholefoods Clothing 3 sectors 
fa] fb] fa] fb] fa] fb] fa] fb] 
1 9.1 30 5.1 58 12.3 -7 7.6 27 
2 12.9 30 8.3 50 20.0 29 11.6 38 
3 15.6 45 10.8 55 10.5 20 12.1 47 
4 47.4 70 15.3 62 13.2 14 24.7 64 
5 54.1 42 21.6 58 5.8 3 30.6 48 
6 27.3 45 21.5 68 22.4 58 
7 24.9 29 25.6 70 25.4 58 
{a] atle1'age total {iruma per co-op, £'000 
[b] % of total proT1ided by members (loans and 1tSDWS) 
Soura: own data, drawn from London ICOM (1987); Companies House, Registry of Friendly Societies. 
Figure. 6.1 Average finance used by co-ops, by sector and age (£'000) 
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Table 6.1 also shows the proportion of total finance which is provided by members, whether 
in the fonn of loans or retained surpluses. It shows that co-ops in the three sectors started 
off with an average of just under 30% of total finance provided by members, increasing 
steadily to to just under 60% in years 6 and 7. 
There is substantial variation in the proportions of internal funds used in each sector: 
• printing co-ops use a similar proportion of members' funds as the overall figure for the 
three sectors, except for the older co-ops (years 5,6,7) where printing has a lower proportion; 
• wholefood co-ops have a consistently high proportion of members funds (varying 
between 50% and 70%). 
• clothing co-ops have a consistently lower proportion (varying between -7% and 29%, 
with a steadily falling proportion of internal funds over time. 
It is difficult to make direct comparisons between the financial structure of co-ops and 
capitalist finns. An initial attempt can be made by considering the proportion of total funds 
derived from external funds as analogous to the gearing ratio of capitalist finns. On this 
basis the co-op results can be compared with those obtained by Storey for small finns in the 
north-eastS4• He found that firms which failed carried a higher proportion of external funds, 
and also that this proportion increased dramatically in the years prior to collapse. 
Continuing £inns had an average (mean) gearing of 15%, which did not vary a great deal 
over time. Thus co-ops in all of the sectors studied had higher gearing than Storey's small 
finns. 
It would be unwise to extend this finding to conclude that co-ops are more likely to fail as a 
result of this; there are limitations on the general comparability of co-ops and small firms, 
especiaUygiven their different relationships to finance capital, and these samples are not in 
any way matched. If co-ops do have problems in obtaining external funding, then they will 
tend to have a lower gearing, but this would be offset by their lack of equity finance. 
Comparability is limited; small firms' external funds are almost exclusively commercial 
Iunds from banks and finance houses, yet for co-ops, as later examination will show, public 
sector 10ana and private (concessionary) sources are crucial elements in the make up of 
external funds. 
54 SIlftJ" II, J'87. 
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Although Storey's results are interesting it is important to remember that a correlation 
between high gearing and a tendency to fail does not mean that one causes the other; in fact 
gearing reflects other aspects of a firm's operation - such as low profitability - and it is these 
that cause collapse. Thus we should examine whether co-ops' high gearing is caused by the 
same factors as in capitalist firms, and then ask what are the implications for commercial 
survival of both. 
The different proportions of members' funds used by co-ops in the three sectors will have a 
variety of explanatory factors and depend upon the availability of finance from a number of 
sources; it does not necessarily reflect a conscious choice by members, rather the working 
out of constraints and limitations operating in a number of areas. However, in terms of 
Storey's findings, it is interesting to note that the clothing sector had by far the highest 
gearing ratio of the three, increasing steadily over time, as well as the highest failure rateSS. 
The comparison does not hold with printing and wholefood co-ops, however, as they show 
substantially different gearing but very similar survival rates. Further analysis in this and 
the next chapter will show that the high reliance on external funds by clothing co-ops does 
reflect intense commercial weakness. 
Internal Funds 
Evidence from printing, clothing and wholefood co-ops shows that members' funds - from 
loans and accumulated surpluses - form crucial sources of finance. The two sources have 
varying importance at different stages of a co-op's development. If co-ops are short of 
financing then members' loans are of crucial importance in a co-op's early stages. Retained 
earnings would be more important for established co-ops; obviously they cannot be used 
until a co-op has reached a certain stage of viability, and even then there is a constant 
tension between wages and additions to reserves. 
Further breakdown of members' funds is shown in Tables 6.2a-6.2d. These show the 
unsurprising result that accumulated surpluses become increasingly important in both 
relative and absolute terms, as co-ops grow older. At the same time, loans from members 
become less important in relative terms, but the absolute amount remains fairly steady over 
the first five years. 
55 .. ."., 5,""'5.7. 
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51 % of co-ops in the three sectors made use of members' loans in their first year (Table 
6.2d), with relatively more printing and wholefood co-ops using them than clothing co-ops 
(Tables 6.2a,b,c). The average size of members' loans per co-op is also shown in these tables. 
They start off at just under £4,000 and remain fairly steady until after year 5. Initially they 
are highest in the clothing sector (£5,000), and yet provide the smallest proportion of total 
finance of the three sectors (15%), reflecting the high initial finance used by clothing co-ops 
(see Table 6.1). 
In the three sectors overall, members' loans fonn 25% of total finance in year 1, declining 
steadDy to 4% in year 7 as total finance increases (Table 6.2d). They are much more 
important in the wholefood sector (41% in year 1 - where they are the largest single source 
of finance) than in printing and clothing (providing 19% and 15% respectively). These 
results generally support the proposition that members loans will be more important in 
co-ops' early years. In printing and clothing co-ops the proportion of members' loans 
declines over time, whereas clothing is marked by instability; this feature becomes more 
apparent in the next chapter on commercial performance. 
Retained surpluses become steadily more important as a source of funds. Obviously they 
are virtually insignificant at the end of the first year (2% of total finance) and increase to 
over 50% of total finance by year 7. The increase is most dramatic in wholefoods (17% to 
66%), but less dramatic in printing (13% to 36% in year 6). 
To summarise, the overall picture regarding internal funds is as follows: 
• internal funds provide between 30% and 60% of co-ops' initial financial requirements, 
tending towards the upper figure in wholefoods and the lower one in printing; 
• there is a tendency for this proportion to increase as co-ops get older. This finding is 
particularly important as it suggests that external funds (from whatever source) are not 
being made available in suflident quantity even as co-ops become established; 
• membeI'I' loans of are important in establishing co-ops, with an average contribution 
of £1,900 per co-op in year 1; this relates to average total finance of F:1 ,600 in the same year; 
• within internal funda, members loans become steadily less important over time as 
eaminp are retained within the co-op; retained profits become both absolutely and 
relatively more important as the overall finandaI requirement ~ 
Tables 6.2a - 6.2d Intemal finance 
Table 6.2a Printing co-ops 
Member loans Retained earnings 
Age % of total % ofco-ops average average % of total 
finance using amount (£'000) amount (£'000) finance 
1 18 57 2.9 0.9 12 
2 15 64 3.0 1.9 15 
3 17 65 4.0 4.6 28 
4 5 63 4.0 30.6 65 
5 5 50 5.0 20.2 37 
6 6 54 2.9 10.7 39 
7 3 43 1.5 6.1 24 
Table 6.2b Clothing co-ops 
Member loans Retained earnings 
Age % o/total % o/co-ops average average % of total 
finance using amount (£'000) amount (£'000) finance 
1 18 37 5.0 -2.7 -22 
2 15 36 5.1 3.9 19 
3 17 44 3.3 0.7 6 
4 5 43 1.9 1.0 8 
5 5 50 1.4 0.6 -10 
Table 6.2c Wholefood co-ops 
Member loans Retained earnings 
Age % of toW % ofco-ops llTJerage llOerage % o/total 
finance using amount (£'000) amount (£'000) finance 
1 18 53 3.9 0.9 17 
2 15 57 4.1 1.8 22 
3 17 54 4.0 3.8 35 
4 5 54 3.7 75 49 
5 5 35 3.2 4.4 53 
6 6 38 2.9 13.5 63 
7 3 39 2.7 16.9 66 
Table 6.2d 3 sectors 
Member loans Retained earnings 
Age % o/total % ofco-ops llTJerage llOerage % o/total 
finance using amount (£'000) amount (£'000) finance 
1 18 51 3.8 0.1 2 
2 15 55 3.9 2.2 19 
3 17 56 3.9 3.6 29 
4 5 56 3.6 13.7 56 
5 5 39 3.7 13.2 43 
6 6 44 2.8 11.7 52 
7 3 40 2.3 13.7 54 
Stn.Irt¥: al lot Table 6.1 
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INTEKVENTION IN FINANCE MARKETS 
Logan & Gregory's argument is that restrictions on members' contributions cause an overall 
shortage of finance; the major problem with is their failure to consider the extent of 
intervention in the finance market on behalf of co-ops in the European countries where 
sizeable co-op sectors exist It is this intervention which explains the strength of co-ops, 
rather than access to members' funds. Such intervention is also the basis of much local 
authority assistance for co-ops in Britain. 
The source of this error lies in the overwhelming reliance on and belief in the merits of 
market processes, and the conviction that co-ops have succeeded because of an acceptance 
of the 'reality' of market forces. Sometimes the market is explicitly accepted as a set of 
external forces providing essential discipline and efficiency (as with neoclassical writings 
and Oakeshott), but even on the left the view is widespread that co-ops in Britain have 
failed because they have not come to terms with the market and the need to survive in it. 
This view is clear in the writings of Thomley, and Logan &z: Gregory amongst others. 
Obviously the market does exist and affects every aspect of the activities of co-ops; indeed it 
was argued in Part I that the market is the main source of degenerative pressures on co-ops. 
This holds the key to an alternative explanation of relative performance of co-ops between 
countries - that the larger co-op sectors of France, Spain and Italy (compared to Britain) have 
come about because there has been a much greater degree of intervention in the market 
which has worked to the benefit of co-ops. This applies in product markets, but also in the 
finance capital markets, where co-ops have access to specialised sources of finance. This 
factor was a major influence on GLEB in developing their support strategy for London 
co-ops, as they pointed out that 
Co-ops in France, Italy and Spain appear to have far greater access to external 
capital than do co-operatives in Britain, though capital raised from members 
and the re-investment of profits remain important sources in all cases.56 
56 GLEB,1I4(4). 
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Europe_ cperience 
France 
In some ways French co-ops followed a similar path to those in Britain through the 
nineteenth century, responding to aises in the economy as ideologically inspired initiatives 
. to maintain jobs and skills. In 1938 the government set up the Caisse Centrale de Credit 
ClH1pI!Tatif (eCCe), giving financial support, as a bank to provide a more substantial source 
of external capital for of all kinds of new or expanding non-agricultural co-ops. It is 
constituted as a union of co-ops, although the state does playa role in its administration, 
and provides finance only to co-ops. 
The formation of the ecce drastically changed the situation regarding the availability of 
funds for French co-ops. Until that time, share capital was a vital source of finance, as for 
the CPF co-ops in Britain, and external shareholders were welcomed - the disadvantages 
were considered to be outweighed by the need for finance. French co-ops are still 
encouraged to raise loans and share capital from members - as it provides a basis for 
borrowing and helps with gearing - but only a few large co-ops have a sufficiently strong 
capital base to borrow from the conventional commercial banks. For the majority of co-ops 
the only source of external finance is the eeee57. Loans are basically assessed on 
commercial terms, although the ecce does intervene and advise co-ops how to organise 
,'i}. . their capital structure so as to present a case successfully. In addition it takes a broad 
perspective on the prospects for a co-op when assessing risk; besides considering financial 
factors it examines co-ops' methods of operation, commercial position, management, and 
industrial relations. Although these are factors which any bank should take into 
consideration when considering making finance available to a company, the familiarity of 
the ecce with co-ops means that these factors can be accurately assessed in the co-op 
context. Despite (or because of) this, lending to workers co-ops is considered to be a high 
risk activity, and forms only a small part (1-2%) of the bank's funds; the rest goes to other 
forms of co-ops. Nevertheless, the ecce does receive some state subsidy and interest rates 
are Jow compared to commercial banks; the majority of co-ops do have loans from the 
ecce. Ita activitie& have been very important in promoting worker co-ops in France, and 
57 III' ill IIIhi4iIItJ "., ..... ErpplM 4« Crr4It '"""" 
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although it operates on a commercial basis, government intervention was essential in its 
establishment and successful operation. And as Thomley points out: 
without the Caisse Centrale .... co-operatives would still exist ... but these well 
co-ordinated and centralised sources of funds have increased the size of the 
movement and strengthened sections of industry where co-operatives are 
important58• 
And although new co-ops in France do face financial problems, these are less severe than in 
Britain. Finally, for co-ops with a very weak capital structure, small loans are available from 
the movement's central organisation SCOP59. 
Italy 
Unlike France, there has been no generally available specialist source of finance for co-ops 
in Italy, and as a result lack of finance has probably been their greatest single constraint60. 
Despite this the sector in Italy is much bigger than in France and Britain, due to the 
protection which co-ops have enjoyed in the product markets rather than finance market61. 
The state has offered contracts to co-ops on favourable terms, primarily in public works. 
There has also been strong political and labour movement support of co-ops, and the 
collective planned organisation of the wider co-op and labour movements has brought them 
together in a network which offers protection from a hostile environment. 
The situation is exacerbated by a poor relationship between the co-op sector and 
commercial banks. The reluctance of the banks to make finance available has led the state to 
make some loans on favourable terms to co-ops, but only for certain limited purposes and 
not as a general principle. Finally, the Lega has established its own financial ann, Fincooper, 
which negotiates on behalf of co-ops with commercial banks and with the government; it 
uses its assets to underwrite loans raised elsewhere and can offer slightly more favourable 
rates. Fincooper has also established and administers a revolving loan fund, raised entirely 
from within the movement, from which co-ops can borrow at a rate of 1.75% below the 
prevailing bank rate62. In most Italian co-ops members' investment in shares and loans is 
considered to be critical to success, and in many cases these are the only sources of finance. 
This reflects more than anything else the unavailability of funds from elsewhere. There is no 
58 H., ,.245. 
51 SqdFtII C'pjp 0Hprimf lie PmrIydicm. 
60 'l'IIImdIy, 2982, ,. 2S7. 
62_ .",.22. 
Q BldfIy,29B&. 
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bank specialising in funding for co-ops, and the co-op federations have complained of too 
little help from the stateS. 
Spain 
The much-praised success of the Spanish Mondragon co-ops cannot be dissociated with 
from the highly interventionist role of the group's bank, the CIlja Laboral Popular (CLP)64, 
and the extent to which the CLP itself was the product of the interventionist Spanish state. 
Although much Spanish economic policy throughout the Franco era was highly favourable 
to Mondragon - particularly the protection of newly developing industries from foreign 
competition - the role of the CLP cannot be overemphasised. In a detailed and closely 
argued analysis of the Mondragon phenomenon, Fairclough points out that the CLP: 
represents an intervention in the co-operatives' favour, primarily in the 
markets for financilll capital rather than the product marketing provided by 
allied retail co-operatives. The CLP has given the Mondragon producer 
co-operatives the most crucial fonn of market protection because it has 
avoided the otherwise ubiquitous problem of raising capital which producer 
co-operatives face ..... the Mondragon group's expansion has been facilitated, 
perhaps above all other internal factors, by possessing an exclusive capital 
market in the fonn of a secondary savings bank whose main profitable 
investment has been restricted, by law, to the associated co-operatives. From 
the 19608, the (.'(H)peratives had more capital in their own (.'(H)perative bank 
than was required for investment by the member co-operatives in the group. 
This provided the engine of rapid capital accumulation in the group during the 
1960s. The scope for the existence of such an institution was, in tum, a product 
of the state's intervention in the functioning of financial capital markets and 
financial institutions during the period of Spain's rapid industrialisation. 
(emphasis in original). 
Fairclough analyses in some detail how the combination of fascist efforts to contain the 
threat of independent working class opposition and democracy, and to transfonn Spain 
from a rural, agricultural economy to an industrialised one, provided a legal, political and 
economic environment which was highly favourable to the growth of the Mondragon 
co-ops. For a fuller understanding of this success, it is necessary to examine how the CLP 
operated and the nature of its relationship to the individual co-ops. 
6! ."."".,., I'll. 
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The conventional banking aspect of the CLPs role is to ensure that new or expanding co-ops 
have sufficient finance available. After securing some finance from members' 'entry fees', 
co-ops can obtain some assistance for new investments from the central government, which 
can make available low interest loans or grants through the National Labour Protection 
Fund. However the CLP almost always provides the bulk of finance required - usually 
around 70% - in the form of medium term loans. 
The distinctive aspect of the CLPs role is not just the mobilisation of community savings for 
exclusive lending to co-ops, but the interventionist position it takes once it is financially 
involved with a co-op. The relationship is formalised in a legally-binding Contract of 
Association between the co-op and the CLP. Under this contract, a co-op is eligible to 
borrow from the CLP, and to participate in the CLP's General Assembly67, and in return 
must supply the CLP with its annual audited accounts and plans, and monthly performance 
reports. The CLP maintains a sizeable Management Services Division (the Empresarial)68, 
which provides managerial and technical expertise to associated co-ops, particularly for 
those in difficulty. More important are the services which it provides to the Mondragon 
group as a whole in terms of co-ordination and strategic planning. 
The banking division of the CLP works closely with the Management Services division. 
Complex planning is required to achieve the successful banking operations that fulfill legal 
requirements and satisfy the group's soci<H!COnomic aims, meet the needs of individual 
co-ops and also bring sufficient financial returns to meet long-term liabilities. All these 
depend upon the health of the group as a whole; here the Empresarial plays a key role by 
providing expertise in all aspects of planning and development both for individual co-ops 
and for the group. 
The role of the CLP is therefore highly interventionist; not only does it insulate associated 
co-ops from the conventional problems associated with lack of finance, but also from the 
degenerative influences of the capital market. On the contrary, the provision of finance is 
associated with positive influences; the result of this system is to extend to the modest sized 
individual enterprise a range of intelligence and management and technical expertise, a8 
well as capital, that is usually available only in Iarge firms. It is also significant that 
66 l.IIJIDIlI Gnpy, 1982".41. 
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Mondragon co-ops are not ooncentrated in the typical labour-intensive industries, but are 
distributed throughout manufacturing industry, as a result of the availability of finance. 
Furthennore, the bank plays a crucial role in planning Mondragon's co-operative economy, 
undertaking the broad management role which has been lacking from British banks with 
such serious implications for the performance of British industry. There have been 
complaints that the interventionist role of the CLP infringes individual co-ops' autonomy. 
However this needs to be accompanied by an appreciation that this role has contributed to 
the great strength of the Mondragon co-ops. Although co-ops surrender some of their 
independence to the CLP, the advantages of the CLP's financial and management services 
expertise are substantial. There is no reason to believe that operating without the CLP in the 
market would give co-ops any more autonomy - their subsequent weakness would most 
likely result in even greater problems. 
Britain 
The experience of European co-ops and their relationships to capital - as part of a broad 
process of intervention in markets to protect co-ops - has important lessons for the 
development of the co-op sector in Britain. Later in this chapter I will examine the position 
of British co-ops with regard to sources of finance; at this stage I will review developments 
in the availability of finance over the past ten years. 
Industrial Common Ownership Finance 
The first attempt to establish a loan fund specifically for co-ops came in 1973 with the 
formation of Industrial Common Ownership Finance OCOF) as a subsidiary of ICOM in 
1973. Initially ICOF was established to channel funds from Scott Bader and other 
sympatbieers into loans for co-ops. It received a major boost when given a grant of £250,000 
under the 1976 Industrial Common Ownership oeO) Act, to establish a revolving loan fund 
for bona fide common ownership co-ops. This principle was extended in 1983 when the West 
Midlands County Council established a fund of £500,000 to be administered by ICOF for 
lending to co-opt in the West Mldlands area, and in 1987 two smaller regional funds have 
been established .. £100,000 for West Glamorgan and £20,000 for Northampton. ICOF's 
OriginallOUl'Ce of fund. - deposits from sympathisers and co-ops - was cut off in 1979 by the 
Barudng Ad; becauee hi lending policies are not oonsidered to be strictly commercial and 
prudent, it does not quaUlyfor a deposit-taking Ucence from the Bank of England. In order 
, . 
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to compensate for this and to raise sufficient funds to continue and expand operations, 
leOF has recently Oate 1987) undertaken a successful share offer of £500,000, raising money 
from individual, co-op and institutional sympathisers. The issue involved selling 10-year, 
non-voting, redeemable preference shares in a subsidiary of leOF established to raise 
money for lending to co-operatives. 
This marks a change in leOF's operation. In the past the bulk of its funds have come from 
public sources - either from central government under the leo Act, or from local 
authorities. The share issue moves back towards the original intention of raising finance 
from within the co-op movement and those sympathetic to it. No funds will have been lent 
from this source before 1988, but in future, it may be more appropriate to consider leOF as 
part of private, non-commercial funding for co-ops. 
Over the past decade leOF has become one of the main sources of short to medium term 
finance for British co-ops. Between 1973 and 1986 it lent over £1m to over 100 co-ops, with 
an average loan of £7,000 and terms from 6 months to 6 years. Although leOF assesses loan 
applications according to broadly commercial criteria - in that co-ops must show good 
prospects of being able to repay any loans - its familiarity with co-ops enables commercial 
risk to be evaluated in a more constructive way than conventional banks, as with the French 
Caisse Centrale. The terms of its loans are also more favourable than those afforded by 
commercial banks: security is required in the form of fixed and floating charges over co-op 
assets, but where sufficient security is not available leOF can take a 'flexible' view, and has 
on occasions waived this requirement if it considers the project to have other features which 
make a contribution to the co-op sector69. Perhaps more importantly, leOF does not require 
personal security from a co-op's members; the importance of this principle is illustrated by 
lCOF's refusal to abandon it in order to gain a deposit-taking license from the Bank of 
England70. Interest rates are related to money market rates and to leOF's costs, and are 
generally marginally below those charged by commercial banks on business loans. 
The terms of leOF funds are therefore relatively favourable for co-ops, but can only provide 
a limited source of finance in relation to total needs. At the end of 1986 the General Fund 
(i.e. not reserved for particular areas) stood at just £160,000; compare this with the £200,000 
required by the London printing co-op Uthosphefe for its expansion programme in 1984. As 
69 'l'IIt1m1q, 19B1, ". 12-
70 ICOF, 1917, p. 7. 
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a result leOF can only make small loans, although even loans of under £10,000 can be of 
crucial importance to co-ops when starting up. The West Midlands Fund stood at £380,000 
at the same date. 
leOF is proud of its track record in granting loans: 
In the five year period 1982-1986, the leOF General Fund experienced an 
annual write-off rate of 10% of loans. This compares favourably with the bad 
debt rate amongst small businesses experienced by the commercial banks.71 
But despite this success, even a 10% annual write off will deplete the fund within 10 years 
unless topped up by subsidies or operating surpluses. Problems in this area are illustrated 
by both funds being well below their original levels, and in none of the last five years was 
interest receivable sufficient to cover operating expenses and write-offs. This is partly due to 
the relatively high cost of administering such small 10ans72 coupled with favourable terms 
to borrowers, and partly to the lack of profitable and low-risk large loans to compensate as 
is the case with commercial banks. It also reflects ICOPs progressive policy of funding new 
co-ops and strengthening existing ones; if it assessed co-ops in the same way as banks 
assessed small firms it would primarily be funding well-established enterprises. Oearly 
leOF requires an effective subsidy if it is to continue with its work. 
leOF operates under much less favourable circumstances than Mondragon's CLP. The latter 
has much greater resources and flexibility to take deposits from the public, and also enjoys 
~. . significant tax concessions which effectively reduce the cost of its funds. It also benefits 
from a much greater spread of lending, including the profitable large low-risk loans to 
established co-ops which leOF lacks. 
l«IIl authorlty/CDA loan funds 
The establishment and success of lCOF was largely the result of an initiative from within 
the co-op movement (through lCOM) and a 8uccessfullobbying effort which resulted in the 
passing of the favourable ICO Act13, Since 1980 it has been the activities of local 
government, mostly Iabouf.a)ntroUed authorities, which have continued intervention in the 
finance market on behalf of co-ops. 
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The most substantial initiative was launched in London by the GLC, following the Labour 
victory in 1981, while the metropolitan counties generally followed suit, as did some city 
and borough councils. Financial support for co-ops was part of a more general strategy of 
intervention in the local economy, aimed at countering the problems of restructuring and 
unemployment74. In London GLEB was established to put the GLC's policies in this area 
into effect, with funding of 02m for the year 1983-4, and its operation included making 
loans to co-ops. A Co-op Unit was established within GLEB to develop its strategy towards 
co-ops, and subsequently in 1984 the London Co-op Enterprise Board (LCEB) was 
established as a spin-off from GLEB to deal with smaller co-op projects. LCEB deals with 
relatively small loans, the intention being that sums over £25,000 would be dealt with 
directly by GLEB. In addition GLEB made small sums (up to £20,000) available to local 
CDAs in London for disbursement to co-op initiatives. 
The activities of GLEB made a substantial impact on co-ops in London, and by April 1986 
the board had directly or indirectly loaned O.5m to 215 different co-ops in London. In 
addition £1.7m was spent on other co-op initiatives, particularly training programmes for 
co-op and CDA workers. It is estimated that 59% of all co-ops trading in London over the 
period 1983-1986 received financial support from GLEB or one of its delegated programmes. 
Such finance was by far the most important source of external funds for co-ops7S. 
An important aspect of the GLEB/LCEB initiative is the linkage between the financing of 
co-ops and the GLC's wider objectives76. The GLC supported co-ops because they could 
playa role in the council's policy of 'restructuring for labour', part of which involved 
democratisation of ownership and production, and the provision of opportunities for 
workers marginalised in the labour market. As a result, criteria for assessing applications 
for loan finance were broader than simply profit and loss considerations". 
74 TlliI.tratqy wa ftmde4 using 1M 1'f'Od1lCt of. 2, ",te IDIIIcr S.U7 of the 7972 lJJCII1 GoIlmImmt Act. 
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Although GLEB and LCEB survived the GLC's abolition in 1986, the conditions under 
which they operated were drastically altered. GLEB in particular was changed from an 
organisation promoting progressive restructuring in London's economy to a conventional 
venture capital organisation; the Co-ops Unit was effectively disbanded, loans are now 
made only on strictly commercial criteria, and at least one C(H)P has been converted back 
into a capitalist enterprise, whilst another Iarge co-op has ben encouraged to change from a 
collective to hierarchical structure18. 
By early 1988 LCEB had approved loans totalling £1.Sm during its 4 years of operation. 
Despite its success in assisting London's co-ops, LCEB suffered similar problems to those of 
leOF, its portfolio consisting of small loans which are expensive to administer. LeEB's 
policy of targeting marginal and disadvantaged workers also means that loans suffer a high 
rate of failure; of the £884,000 outstanding as loans to worker CCH>ps in February 1987, fully 
£450,000 had been provided for as doubtful debts'9. This may reflect cautious accounting 
polides, but by February 1988, of £1.37m actua1ly disbursed as loans over the 4 years, some 
£258,000 had actually been written off, in addition to the bad debt provision. LeEB's 
activities have been dependent upon GLEB for both lending resources and meeting running 
costs; income from interest charged on loans (at 10%) is insufficient to cover overheads 
(£200,000 in 1986/7) and bad debts. The major changes taking place in local government 
since 1986 have also constrained LCEb's ability to aid London's co-ops; grants received fell 
from £623,000 in 1985/6 to £234,000 in 1986/7 . 
. Other metropolitan counties folIowed the GLC's example, most notably West Midlands 
County Coundl. Besides the fund administered by leOF, the council established West 
Midlands Co-operative Finance Ltd., with a block grant of £700,000 for the first year. This 
company provides loans and other assistance to co-ops, and was administered through the 
Economic Development Unit of the coundl; its lending policies are more conservative than 
those of the original GLEB. 
Most local authorities do not have the financial resources to set up substantial loan funds of 
this kind, and 80 some authOrities have gone into partnership with the Co-operative Bank to 
provide a loan guarantee sc:heme8O. Under this arrangement the authority guarantees a loan 
217 Co-ops & Finance Capital 
made by the bank to a co-op at a lower interest rate than nonnallyavailable, and the scheme 
has been adopted by Sheffield, Merseyside, and the London boroughs of Haringey, 
Southwark and Waltham Forest. 
Other authorities have financed the establishment of loan funds for co-ops, usually 
administered by the relevant local CDA. In 1986 there were 12 such funds in operationSl, 
although all were small in comparison to the West Midlands and London funds; collectively 
they had access to a total of approximately £900,000, an average of £75,000 per fund. These 
funds were all established in the first half of the 1980s, a period when Labour-controlled 
local authorities were most active in local economic intervention82; all funds relied 
exclusively on local authority financing83, generally through S.137. By the end of 1986, it 
was reported that 8 of the 32 London boroughs had funds available for co-ops, either as 
specific loan funds or direct allocation of council funds. 
Because of the small size of these funds, they can only advance small loans to co-ops; there 
is generally a £10,000 upper limit. Loans are short to medium term - six months to six years, 
as with ICOF. Terms are almost always preferential to those which would be advanced by 
commercial banks, even if co-ops could get loans from this source: interest rates in all cases 
are lower than those charged by banks, varying from 0% to 12% in mid-1986; in addition 
about half of the funds offer interest and/or capital repayment holidays in the first year. 
This concession can have an important benefidal effect on a co-op's finances in the crucial 
start-up period. The attitude towards security varies considerably: in general some form of 
security is required, but in one third of cases no security was taken; this has the advantage 
that a co-op's assets can be used to secure additional borrowing elsewhere. 
The NNLCDA survey investigated the nature and use of local authority loan funds, and 
found a very high usage of these funds and specialist sources, especially by new co-ops. The 
impact of specialist funds is unsurprisingly greater when more money is available: therefore 
50% of all co-ops in the West Midlands have received loans from the WM-lCOF fund. 
Individual funds reported that they had assisted between 10% and 80% of co-ops in their 
area, with an average of around 50%. Altogether such funds (including ICOF and 
GLEB/LCEB) had made loans totalling f3.1m to 360 co-ops by mid-1986; relating this to the 
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figures in chapter 5, this means that probably 4~ of all co-ops have received finance in this 
way. 
Most of the funds are too new for an accurate picture of the write-off rate for loans to have 
emerged, although there is no reason to expect it would be any less than the 10% p.a. 
achieved by leOF. Given the relatively low interest rates charged, this suggests that most 
funds will experience problems within a few years as the total available for lending falls. 
There are ways to counter this problem. Firstly, the costs of administering the funds is 
generally met either from the general costs of running the COA, or directly by local 
authorities, which reduces or eliminates the burden of overhead costs on the funds. 
Secondly, local authorities can top up the funds as they are diminished, and in some 
instances there is a formal arrangement that this will be done. 
Public-.ector finance - prospect. 
The availabiUty of publicly-provided finance for co-ops, through local authorities and 
COAs, transfonned the financial resources available to co-ops in the early 19808. For the 
co-ops considered in the current research, the public sector (including ICOF) was the largest 
single source of funds - providing 42% - in co-ops' first year. However, the particular 
circumstances of the early 1980& when these funds were established no longer apply, and it 
is likely that local authorities will be less Ukely to commit funds in the future. The NNLCDA 
survey reported pessimism amongst some of the older funds about receiving further local 
authority support. The reasons for this are: 
• Since 1985 the metropolitan authorities have been abolished, and many remaining 
Labour authorities have been rate-capped, limiting their resources available for economic 
development; 
• there is severe competition for the limited funds available, with COAs competing with 
a variety of small business development agencies; 
• the initial enthusiasm for worker co-ops is Ukely to be dtminished as a more realistic 
assessment of their job creation and socio-economic potential is made in the light of 
experience; 
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• with the entrenchment of Conservative domination of central government, the impetus 
behind co-op development will be further oriented along smaIl business lines, and support 
for co-ops from public funds is likely to be reduced84. 
Although some loan funds have recently been boosted by local authority attempts to 
establish external projects in advance of major restrictions on expenditure imposed by the 
Conservative government, over the longer tenn they are unlikely to receive continued 
funding without a more sympathetic central government. H co-ops have access to public 
sector funding, this is increasingly on the same basis as smaIl capitalist enterprises rather 
than specialist sources for co-ops. 
Sympathetic finance 
A second form of protection for co-ops from competition in capital markets results from the 
availability of private sources of finance from sympathisers and supporters - sources which 
do not operate solely on commercial criteria and which are willing to sacrifice some 
financial gain in the pursuit of other objectives. This was used extensively by wholefood 
co-ops, many of which were formed early in the co-ops boom when there were few 
alternatives, and they drew upon and already-existing network of supporters and 
sympathetic customers willing to contribute. It can include loans from one co-op to another 
- the wholefood co-op Suma has in the past assisted the establishment of new retail 
wholefood co-ops - but more typically includes sympathetic individual, friends, customers, 
support groups trusts and charities. 
The use of such funds has some analogy to the use of community savings to finance co-ops 
by Mondragon's CLP. There is nothing developed on this scale in Britain, but recently there 
have been attempts to formalise the use of sympathetic finance for co-ops. The largest of 
these has been lCOP's successful 500,000 issue of co-operative shares in 1987. The shares 
offered a maximum dividend of 6% and an insignificant prospect of capital gain, and yet the 
offer was over-subscribed, and suggested that there existed a substantial reservoir of 
potential finance which would be allocated at least partially on non-commerciaI criteria. 
This parallels the boom in 'ethical investment' unit trusts and similar funds which avoided 
investing in 'sociaIIy harmful' practices such armaments, alcohol and tobacco production. 
B4 _ Pm Dl. 
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Individual co-ops have begun to raise finance in similar ways. The feminist printers 
Amazon Press, or the gay First Out coffee shop raised money from supporters by the issue 
of debentures. Paper-recyclers Paperback raised 50,000 from supporters early in 1988 by a 
loan stock issue, again over-subsaibed. 
Funding from such sources has been on a variety of terms ranging from interest-free to 
near-commerdal rates, on terms which are generally better than those offered by banks. 
Perhaps more important is the fact that such funds are not obtained by competing in 
commercial finance markets but from sympathetic sources, in some way committed to the 
non-commerdal achievements of co-ops. With the decline in public sector financing, such 
funding is likely to become co-ops' most important single source of external finance. 
Source. of funding - ."",,,,11.1'11 
Details of the proportions of finance raised from these three external sources - commercial, 
public sector, and private - are included in Tables 6.3a-6.3d, and illustrated in Figures 6.2, 
63 It 6.4. The main findings and trends are as follows:-
Private sources: important initially, providing 16% of funds in year 1, declining to to 3% in 
year 7. Ai total funding increases, the average amount of private funding remains roughly 
constant - at £1-2,000 per co-op overall, and £3,500-£4,000 per co-op using finance from this 
source. The initial importance of private finance is illustrated by it being the most 
commonly used external source in co-ops' first year - used by 30% of co-ops in the three 
sectors. However, it is the least common over the longer term (see Table 6.6) 
PubUc aector fundi: initially the most important source by value, providing 43% of total 
finance in year 1 and used by 24% of co-ops. There is an eventual decline to 9% of total 
finance, but over time, 55% of all co-ops considered make use of public sector funds at some 
point. 
Commercial fundi: increasing over time, starting at 14% in year rising to 31" in year 7. This 
source is used by {ewer co-ops in their first year (18%) than any other source, but by more 
co-opt overall (57%). 
Table 6.3 Total finance by source 
Table 6.3a Printing co-ops 
Age Co-ops Commercilll Private Public External Retained Member Internal 
(no.) funds funds funds finance earnings loans finance 
(total) (total) 
% % % % % % % 
1 21 17.7 27.4 26.1 71.2 10.6 18.2 28.8 
2 22 27.3 19.0 23.5 69.8 15.1 15.2 30.3 
3 20 19.0 18.0 16.5 53.5 29.8 16.7 46.5 
4 19 20.1 4.6 5.5 30.2 64.6 5.3 69.9 
5 16 23.3 3.6 31.1 58.0 37.4 4.6 42.0 
6 13 35.0 7.4 12.5 54.9 39.4 5.8 45.2 
7 7 59.5 2.4 11.1 73.0 24.4 2.6 27.0 
Table 6.3b Clothing co-ops 
Age Co-ops Commercilll Private Public External Retained Member Internal 
(no.) funds funds funds finance earnings loans finance 
(total) (total) 
% % % % % % % 
1 19 12.5 0.4 94.0 106.9 -22.0 15.1 -6.9 
2 14 19.9 2.8 48.8 71.5 19.4 9.2 28.6 
3 9 31.8 0.0 47.9 79.7 6.2 14.0 20.2 
4 7 46.3 0.0 40.0 86.3 7.5 6.2 13.7 
5 4 36.3 0.0 61.0 97.3 9.7 12.4 22.1 
Table 6.3c Wholefood co-ops 
Age Co-ops Commercial Private Public External Retained Member Internal 
(no.) funds funds funds finance earnings loans finance 
(total) (total) 
% % % % % % % 
1 47 13.5 22.2 6.1 41.8 17.1 41.1 58.2 
2 44 19.0 11.3 19.6 49.9 22.0 28.0 SO.O 
3 41 15.2 11.8 18.1 45.1 35.1 19.8 54.9 
4 37 7.9 14.6 15.4 37.9 49.2 12.9 62.1 
5 31 16.4 16.6 8.8 41.8 52.9 5.3 58.2 
6 26 18.2 6.3 7.8 32.3 62.6 5.1 67.7 
7 18 20.5 2.6 6.8 29.9 66.0 4.1 70.1 
Table 6.3d 3 sectors 
Age Co-ops Commercial Private Public External Retained Member Internal 
(no.) funds funds funds finance earnings loans finance 
(total) (total) 
% % % % % % % 
1 87 14.4 16.1 42.8 73.3 1.5 25.3 26.8 
2 80 21.8 11.1 29.6 62.5 19.1 18.4 37.5 
3 70 18.5 12.8 20.8 52.1 29.9 18.0 47.9 
4 63 17.2 8.0 11.1 36.3 55.6 8.1 63.7 
5 51 20.5 9.1 22.0 51.6 43.3 5.0 48.3 
6 41 24.8 6.7 10.7 42.2 52.4 5.5 57.9 
7 25 31.0 2.6 8.6 42.2 54.1 3.7 57.8 
Stn6c6: as for Table 6.1 
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Figure. 6.2 Amounts of total finance from various sources, by age of co-op (£) 
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Table 6.4 Co-ops making use of external finance sources (%) 
Printing Clothing Wholefoods All 
Commercial [a] 27 21 13 18 
Funds [b) 82 53 47 57 
PubUc ra] 27 58 9 24 
Funds [b] 77 74 36 55 
Private [a] 36 11 34 30 
Funds [b] 55 16 45 41 
Hog: 
[a] '" of co-opt Ulling thlIlIOUI'Ce In lint year 
[b] '" 01 co-ops Ulling thlIlOI.U'CIe at any time 
Smmw: .. for Table 6.1 
'Jbe contrut between sources of finance for co-ops in the three sectors combined is shown in 
Tables 6.4 ft 6.5 andPigures 6.3 It 6.4. 'Jbe proportions of finance provided by the different 
sources change over time; the crucial role of public funds in the establishment of co-ops is 
clear, providing over 40% of initial finance. In the first year, members' loans and public 
funds together provide 68.1 % of total finance; by year 7, 85% is provided by reserves and 
commercial funds. 
~~ 
:it Table 6.5 S~ of flnance in order of impon.nce, years 1 & 6 (3 sectors 
~. combined) 
Yea,l Yea, 6 
Source 
" 
Source % 
1 Public sources 43 Reserves 52 
2 Member loans 25 Commercial 25 
3 Private IoanI 16 Public 11 
4 Coumaerdal80Ul'Ce8 14 Private 7 
5 Jteierves 2 Member loans 4 
........ torTab.6.1 
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Figure. 6.4 Sources of finance, years 1 & 6 
These overall results conceal significant differences between sectors. Wholefood co-ops are 
by far the most reliant upon private funding sources, and only lout of 47 wholefood co-ops 
relied solely upon commercial funds for external finance. There are several reasons for this: 
(i) they were amongst the first co-ops to become established in the co-op boom, before 
public sector finance became available for co-ops; (ii) they attracted support from the 
alternative movement, and (iii) initial capital requirements were relatively low and co-ops 
could therefore be established with small amounts of finance -from members and a few 
sympathetic sources; and finally (iv) stemming from the alternative movement, with its 
rejection of dependence upon either the state or private capital, some wholefood co-ops 
rejected altogether commercial borrowing in principle, fearing that this would jeopardise 
workers' control over the co-op85. Thus nearly two-thirds (63%) of initial finance was 
provided by private or members' loans. Perhaps most signifkantly; some 45% of wholefood 
co-ops were totally reliant on internal (members) funds in the first year. Although the 
importance of commercial funds increases moderately, the relative commercial prosperity 
85 Although of course this approach fails to acknowledge dependence on the (product) market tom if more formal dependence 
upon the state or finance capital is lWOided 
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of wholefood co-ops (see next chapter) leads to reserves becoming most important and the 
financing of expansion from internal sources. 
Printing co-ops use the highest proportion of commercial funds initially, but are primarily 
dependent upon private sources and public funds (together 53%). Five out of 22 printing 
co-ops made no use at all of commercial funds over the period; all except 2 made some use 
of public sector or private funds, and only 1 relied solely upon commercial finance as their 
source of external funds. As accumulation takes place, reserves and commercial funds 
become the major sources, with the former relatively more important. Several printing 
co-ops were' converted' from some other form of operation (see chapter 8) and thus had a 
.. record against which they could more easily secure bank loans. 
Oothing co-ops are to start with almost totally dependent upon public funds, which 
provide 94% of total finance required in the first year. The poor commercial performance of 
clothing co-ops is reflected in their inability to accumulate, and although reserves provide 
some finance the proportion is much lower than in the other two sectors. Surprisingly, 
commercial funds provide a high proportion of finance; this reflects the high failure rate of 
clothing co-ops and difficulties in surviving more than 2 or 3 years; those which do remain 
become well-established and can attract commercial finance. Coupled with this, only 2 
clothing co-ops had made no use of public sector funds at some point, and no clothing 
co-ops were solely dependent upon commercial finance for external funding. 
CONCLUDING REMAIUCS 
There are two major findings from this analysis of co-op financing. Firstly, public funds 
have played a crucial role in the recent growth of the co-op sector, and secondly, co-ops are 
primarily dependent upon internally generated funds for growth and accumulation. 
Typically co-ops are formed as relatively small and severely underfinanced enterprises, 
which in the past have had to rely disproportionately on workers' own funds contributed 
through loans. This situation has been transformed by the availability of public funds in 
recent years, which have become the largest single source of finance for new co-ops; the 
establishment of specialist financial sources has been one of the most significant 
developments in the expansion of the sector in the 1980s. Although some initial finance is 
provided by banks,.the second D'IOIt important source is loans from members themselves. 
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This casts doubt on Logan &: Gregory's claim that changes to co-op structures would 
generate greater amounts of finance from members, as it is equally arguable that co-op 
members are providing as much as they can afford. 
Despite the important role for public sector finance in the establishment of co-ops, the 
commitment is not sustained once co-ops are operating86, and public funds are much less 
helpful for expanding co-ops than for newly-established ones. One problem is that only 
relatively small amounts are available from public sources, and that as co-ops require 
increasingly large sums they are forced to tum elsewhere, primarily to banks and finance 
houses. The only exceptions are the major loan funds established through the GLEB and 
WMEB, which can potentially lend large amounts. However, both of the councils involved 
in the establishment of these funds have been abolished; coupled with tighter restrictions on 
local authority spending it is unlikely that the situation will improve. Any general cutbacks 
in public sector funding for co-ops will inevitably contribute to a slowdown in the rate of 
growth of the sector. 
Even with the provision of finance from public sources, co-ops in Britain are far from 
having the sort of support enjoyed by Mondragon co-ops. Intervention by local authorities 
can certain1y ease the constraints felt by co-ops as a result of under-financing, but it has not 
been accompanied by any overall strategic planning and management provision for the 
co-op sector. This element has been crucial to the success of Mondragon co-ops, and the 
absence of strategic intervention by banks or government has been a major element in the 
poor performance of British industry. Once established, British co-ops are left at the mercy 
of commercial sources of finance and the general anarchy of market forces. 
There are subsidiary debates concerning the provision of local authority and other public 
sector finance, in particular regarding the development of new forms of financiaI 
instruments which would maximise the beneficial effect of such funding. This covers, for 
instance, enabling local authorities to provide finance to co-ops in forms other than loans, as 
these impose severe burdens on co-ops in their vulnerable early stages, and do nothing to 
overcome the banks' reluctance to lend to highly geared enterprises. As a result a need is 
perceived for an equity-like form of financing which does not allow those providing 
86 T1tiI refl#ts 1M tqJ11I'OIIC1t .",,. by lDcIIl CDAI, ." mailmDft effort ;, cperulMl 011 atilbllMiIIg CD-DpI ,.tJWr tIum 
IJIbMf1llllf support. 
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external capital to gain control or appropriate surplus value- These have been discussed 
elsewhere81 and I will not go into the debates any further here. 
The second major finding relates to the increasingly important role played by internally 
generated finance in co-op growth. By the third year of trading, accumulated reserves form 
the largest single source of finance. Commercial finance increases in importance over time, 
but remains in second place. By this time the financial structure of co-ops resembles more 
closely that of conventional finns, who also obtain the majority of finance from internal 
sources; the 25% of total finance obtained by co-ops from commercial sources is probably 
not untypical. 
The ability of co-ops to grow is largely dependent upon the rate at which they can 
accumulate directly from earnings. This is dependent upon many factors, some of which are 
examined in more detail in the next chapter on co-ops' commercial performance. Evidence 
presented there shows that accumulation, particularly in early years, is typically at the 
expense of low wages. It does indicate that co-ops are unable to escape from pressures to 
increase explOitation in order to compete and survive, in the same way as capitalist firms, 
even though formal class divisions have been abolished within the enterprise. 
Although these results cover co-ops which are still relatively new, they do offer some 
pointers to the future which can be related to the European experience. Eventually co-ops 
can accumulate sufficiently to overcome problems of underfinancing, and can finance 
necessary increases in capital equipment. It has been suggested that co-ops 
will reach some maximum size in terms of employment, and then stop 
growing altogether ••.• older co-operatives become capital-rich, and unwilling 
to use their funds in either internal growth, which could threaten the 
cohesivenen of the collective, or in diversification .... they key problems are .... 
the over-a(.'CUl1\ulation of col1ectively-owned assets and the under-utilisation of 
external debt.88 
This is .upported by the experience of the British CPF co-ops, which operated in sectors 
where technical change wa. relatively slow and through accumulation became cash-rich. 
However, newer co-opt operate in • wider variety of industries, and even in the more 
established 0 .. tueh u printing, ~ca1 change and hence finandal demands are now 
much pater; u • result it is too early to predict whether the same will happen to them. 
11 LCT, I'''. 
" BlIrht Ii Jorta, JI'" 
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Moreover, few British or French co-ops operate in capital-intensive industries, and there is 
little evidence to suggest that co-ops reliant upon their own resources for accumulation are 
able to become established and survive in such areas. The movement of Mondragon co-ops 
into such industries has been accomplished in the context of a highly interventionist and 
protected capital market. 
If older co-ops do become cash rich, whilst newer co-ops are starved of finance, then one 
possible solution might be the establishment of an inter-cooperative capital market. The 
collective assets of ageing co-ops could be used to finance the creation of new co-ops, and 
elements of leOF s operation represent this in an embryonic form. One interesting side 
effect of this could be that this co-op capital market might demonstrate international capital 
flows in opposition to those in the capitalist market; that is, the election of a socialist 
government would normally lead to a capital outflow from the country in question, but 
funds in the co-op market would be likely to flow into the country in anticipation of a more 
favourable environment for co-ops89. 
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Note, on Fim"u:ing TRble. 
1. Full details of data sources etc. are given in Appendix 2. See also appendix 4 on financial 
structure of co-ops. 
2. The numbers of co-ops included from each sector in each trading year is as follows: 
Table 6.6 No. of co-ops included 
Year of Trading 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Printing 21 22 20 19 16 13 7 
Wholefoods 47 44 41 37 31 26 18 
Oothing 19 14 9 7 4 
AU co-ops 87 80 70 63 51 39 25 
Stnm:e: al for Table 6.1 
3. The tables in this and the following chapter are based upon all co-ops in the relevant . 
sectors for which adequate financial data is available. Therefore the range of co-ops 
included is different in each year, diminishing as co-ops depart through being too young or 
through failure. Table 6.7 below is the equivalent to Table 6.3d, but based on the experience 
only of those co-ops which survived for 6 years or more. 
Table 6.1 Total finance by source - 3 sectors (B) 
Age Co-ops CommerciRl Prif1llte Public External Retained Member Internal 
(no.) funlls funlls funds finance earnings loans finance 
(total) (total) 
CJ, 
" 
CJ, CJ, % % CJ, 
1 40 14.1 18.0 27.9 60.0 6.1 33.9 40.0 
2 41 24.1 11.6 23.6 59.3 19.4 21.3 40.7 
3 41 20.8 12.3 16.2 49.3 35.7 15.0 SO.7 
4 41 11.5 10.4 8.5 30.4 63.7 5.9 69.6 
5 41 23.9 14.7 8.3 46.9 47.4 5.8 53.2 
6 41 24.7 6.6 8.9 40.2 54.2 5.5 59.7 
7 25 30.8 2.7 7.7 41.2 55.2 3.7 58.9 
ScIurr»: .. for Table 6.1 
The main·contraltl are that the kmpr luting ~ have used: 
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• lower total finance 
• less public sector finance 
• greater use of internal funds 
which largely reflects the fact that those longer-lasting co-ops were first fonned in the 1970s 
when there was very little public sector finance available for co-ops. 
4. The tables in this chapter are presented according to trading year rather than calendar 
year; therefore anyone trading year will include figures from different calendar years, and 
hence of different real values. Table 6.8 below is a recalculation of Table 6.3d, adjusted to 
. take account of this, with all values adjusted to 1975 prices. It shows very little difference, 
indicating that using current figures does not introduce any bias. 
Table 6.8 Total finance by source - 3 sedors (C) 
Age Co-ops Commercial Private Public External Retained Member Internal 
(no.) funds funds funds finance earnings loans finance 
(total) (total) 
% % % % % % % 
1 86 13.5 16.6 43.5 73.6 0.1 26.2 26.3 
2 80 21.0 11.4 28.8 61.2 19.9 18.9 38.8 
3 70 18.2 12.9 20.9 52.0 30.5 17.5 48.0 
4 63 16.7 8.6 11.3 36.6 55.3 8.0 63.3 
5 51 20.4 9.6 21.4 51.4 43.5 5.0 48.5 
6 41 24.4 6.4 10.8 41.6 52.8 5.5 58.3 
7 25 30.9 2.6 8.5 42.0 54.3 3.6 57.9 
Source: as for Table 6.1 
7.Commercial Performance of Co-ops 
INTRODUcnON 
The aim of this chapter is to examine in detail, for the first time, the commercial 
performance of a broad range of the new worker c<H>peratives. In the past, knowledge of 
commercial performance has been restricted to the old CPF C<H>pS, which are covered by 
the only established dataset on British C<H>ps, and the few of these that remain have been 
analysed to death. One central aim of the research for this thesis has been to collect 
accounting data on some of the large number of new C<H>ps, and establish a dataset 
covering their performance which can subsequently be used by other researchers. 
Accounting data has been collected to give as complete a coverage as possible of C<H>PS in 
the printing, clothing and wholefood sectors1. It is used in this chapter to analyse the 
comparative performance of co-ops in the different sectors, and also of co-ops and capitalist 
firms within each sector. 
The analysis of Part I suggests that the commercial performance of C<H>PS will be poorer 
than that of capitalist firms, for two main reasons. Firstly, because C<H>PS tend to pursue 
objectives which aim to enhance the position of the workforce and labour generally, rather 
than intensifying their exploitation by capital. Such measures conflict with the process of 
accumulation which characterises capitalist industry; given that commercial activity is first 
and foremost about increasing profit, C<H>PS can be expected to fare less well. Much of this 
chapter will be devoted to an examination of whether or not this is in fact the case. 
Secondly, co-ops will tend to start off in a disadvantaged poSition compared to capitalist 
firms, given their shortages of skills and finance. 
The measurement of C<H>PS' commercial performance is not straightforward. Conventional 
approaches are centered on capitalist conceptions of the objectives of commercial activity -
that is, making a profit. This reflects the role of the capitalist finn in the accumulation 
process, which is different to that of a C<H>perative. The first part of the chapter explores 
some of the conceptual issues involved in the use of accounting measures in quantifying the 
1_Appmli%2 
I 
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commercial performance of worker co-operatives, while the actual experience of co-ops in 
the three sectors is dealt within the second part. 
ISSUES IN THE CHOICE OF PERFORMANCE MEASUllES 
Co-operative Performa,," 
Attempts to measure the performance of co-ops reflect their contradictory position in a 
capitalist economy, and are fraught with difficulty. Firstly, co-ops are distinctly different to 
capitalist enterprises and, potentially at least, exist to advance the interests of workers rather 
than capital; secondly, they operate as 'commercial' enterprises - i.e. engaged in commodity 
production - in which case they are judged on capitalism's terms. This raises the question of 
whether they should be assessed in terms of their own objectives or in terms of how the 
economy judges them. Measurement of 'efficiency' for co-ops brings us face to face with 
major problems in that the concept of efficiency is related tp the objectives of an enterprise, 
and to the objectives of economic activity; "the necessity of judging efficiency in relation to 
purpose"2. 
Most research has acknowledged that co-operatives do have a range of objectives. 
According to Thomas and Logan:3 
Self-managed enterprises .... have a multi-purpose objective function rather 
than a simple maximising income-per-worker objective. Various objectives 
have been explored, particularly in the context of researching the behaviour of 
Yugoslav enterprises: maximising income for the collective of workers; 
maximising the income per embodied unit of labour; maximising a range of 
objectives which include collective consumption and social objectives; or the 
combination of maximising pure surplus ('profif] and a target increase of 
wages, are some of the objectives of a variety of theoretical models4• . 
Performance measures based upon commercial perfonnance face a fundamental problem in 
that many elements of co-op perfonnance are not quantifiable in monetary terms. Although 
'social' objectives can theoreticaDy be included, this is limited to certain ones which can be 
quantified; it is difficult to see how a restructuring of the labour process can be quantified 
for inclusion. Even if the various objectives could be quantified there remains the problem 
2 NtIrJI, 21", ". n. 
S 'l'IIrmuI t; UpI, 2112, p. 17. 
4",.w1y ",., of HorrMt, 2167,1- VMIk, 2m, VIDUk, 2175,,,,. 20-SS 
Commercial Performance 233 
that different co-ops will have different objectives, and no overall' objective function' for the 
co-op sector could be identified. 
Any fonn of quantification arbitrarily elevates certain aspects of performance, those which 
can easily be quantified, over those that cannot. In a capitalist economy quantification 
essentially takes place on the basis of monetary valuations, and thus aspects of (say) 
production which have either actual or potential conunodity status (they can be bought and 
sold) are elevated over social or non-commodity aspects. 
In focusing on commerdal performance, the approach adopted here accepts that the 
commodity aspects of co-op production will receive most attention. It can be argued that 
this merely reflects the overriding need to survive in a capitalist economy which dominates 
co-ops' activities. However, the objective is to analyse this performance in terms of all 
aspects of co-operative production, in later chapters. While this chapter primarily 
concentrates on one aspect of the outcome of co-op activity, later chapters examine the 
process by which this outcome is achieved. 
Furthermore, there is very little information on the commercial performance of co-ops, 
indeed very little quantitative information of any kind exists on new British co-ops. The 
distinctive aim of this piece of research is to gather - for the first time - extensive data on the 
commerdal performance of new British co-ops and interpret this in relation to a marxist 
theoretical analysis and available qualitative data, rather than accept commercial 
performance as the final objective. 
The primary areas of analysis of commercial performance will be: 
• the record of aggregate growth performance in tenns of output; value added and 
invesbnent; 
• the generation of a surplus (value added) by co-ops 
• distribution of the surplus to wages and accumulation 
Firstly I examine the relevance to co-ops of conventional accounting frameworb for the 
measurement of commercial performance, leading to the development of a more suitable 
alternative. 
...... 
... 
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AN ACCOUNTING PERSPECI'IVE FOR CO-OPERATIVES 
The role of profit 
Any capitalist firm, like a co-operative, is engaged in a range of different activities. Amongst 
these it produces things, employs workers, pays wages, fires workers, buys and sells 
commodities, rents or owns buildings, and accumulates capital. But in measuring the 
performance of a capitalist firm all except one of these are ignored; a firm is not judged 
fundamentally by the number of workers it employs, or the level of wages it pays, but by its 
ability to make a profit; conventionally performance is assessed on the basis of profitability 
(return on capital) and related measures. This is not just a matter of arbitrary choice, but 
reflects the fact that the primary and overriding function of the capitalist firm is to make 
profits and accumulate capital. Profit is the life-blood of capitalism and it is through the 
accumulation of capital that the class structure and the essential nature of capitalism are 
preserved. 
Measures of performance based on profit cannot provide an 'objective' assessment of 
performance, because they operate on the basis of criteria which are rooted in the 
maintenance of the existing economic and social structure. One of the functions of such 
measures is to legitimate the pursuit of profit as an activity, presenting it as a desirable, 
necessary activity upon which society's continued existence, growth and welfare depend. 
Profit maximisation is therefore seen as a commendable activity, socially responsible and 
necessary for everyone's benefit. In this way it reinforces, and is part of, capitalist ideology. 
How is profit is presented in this way, being to everybody's benefit, rather than as a 
measure of the degree of exploitation of one class by another? It is achieved by a misleading 
representation of profit as an economic category. There are various different conceptions of 
profit within orthodox economic theory, but what they have in common is a false portrayal 
of the source of the value of commodities. Profit may be presented as a reward for 
entrepreneurship, as the price of capital or as the reward for abstinence (consumption 
forgone)5. AU of these contribute to the conception of the role of profit in the economy as 
something 'owing' to capital, and therefore denying any rightful claim by labour to all or 
part of this lurplus. They all conceal the fact that the source of profit is not capital at all; the 
source is the surplue value which is appropriated from labour by capital. Profit is not the 
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result of a situation of equality between capital and labour, but the result of the 
"appropriation of the surplus product by one class through its monopolisation of the means 
of production and the system of wage exploitation"6. Thus there is a contrast between the 
neoclassical view, in which "profit is indicative not only of the firm's market viability but 
also its social efficiency in utilising society's resources", and the alternative perspective in 
which "the magnitude of [profit] is indicative of social, institutional and monopolistic power 
rather than social efficiency"7. 
The same applies to the whole set of accounting measures based around profit and the 
accounting discipline in general; they are not neutral, purely technical tools. "The 
accountancy profession is not free of value judgments; accounts are not just technical ways 
of measuring performance: they do represent certain ideologies"8. Tinker et al9 identify 
accounting practices as deriving from marginalist economics, with an emphasis on 
'individuals' (whether persons or corporations) and the 'objectivity' of market prices. 
Accountancy reflects the environment in which it exists, but it also forms part of that 
environment; it therefore helps to determine the nature of social formations, and to 
determine perspectives within those social formations. The role of profit in the capitalist 
economy determines that the presentation and use of accounts is centered on an enterprise's 
profitability, but the resulting form which accounts take helps to reinforce the role of profit 
and to influence the perspective within which profit is seen. Accounting forms and 
procedures represent the dominant capitalist ideology; in view of the role of co-ops, the 
existing accounting framework is not necessarily suitable, and the use of it may restrict the 
ability of co-ops to break out of a capitalist perspective. 
Alternatives to profit for co-operatives 
The use of profit-based measures of performance by co-ops is problematic, for three 
reasons. Firstly, the absence of the capital-labour relationship - at least at the enterprise 
leve110 - means that profit itself does not exist in a co-op. Secondly, profit-based measures of 
performance are specific to the capitalist economic structure, to which co-ops are opposed. 
6 Fbte,19n. 
7 Tbabr, 1980, ,.147. 
B Hirtl, 1983".41. 
9 Till_ I1IL 1982, ,. 188. 
10 Takl", ,.",.,. .1t1Iffft1IIIII ibtd.tit: vinP tMt ctHIfIS tID IIDt """."." iIIIo. das at ~ ",.",.,., .. 
Wour -.",.jar COfIcm& t1{ 1M w.w. - atFairdDrlBIt (7986) (_ ~ 1). AlIItouglt t1dI ". ~",.au. 
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Thirdly, on a practical level, such measures are not particularly useful in assessing co-op 
performance, either to co-ops themselves, researchers, banks or support agencies. This is 
partly because the reported profit figure in a co-op depends on whatever decision co-op 
members make on the distribution of the 'surplus' between wages, bonuses and 
accumulation. Given that the whole of the surplus accrues to the membership, rather than 
just the wages payments made by capitalists, the division into 'profit' and wages/bonuses 
loses some of the economic significance and crucial role which it has in capitalist firms, and 
instead becomes an allocational decision between wages and investment in the means of 
production, although this is not to ignore the pressures to reinvest a certain amount, 
determined elsewhere by the process of accumulation and competition. 
These points suggest that co-ops should avoid viewing profit from the standpoint of capital, 
and be wary of using capitalist constructions. The question arises of whether it is possible to 
develop alternatives to profit-based measures of performance which can be used by co-ops. 
In developing an alternative we must relate it to the actual position of co-ops in a capitalist 
economy; they reject the basis of capitalist production, but are continually compromised by 
their role as commodity-producing enterprises within such an economy. Therefore, co-op 
oriented measures of performance reject profitability but are also comprOmised by co-ops' 
present form of existence. The broad form of such measures can be derived from the 
contrast between the actual operation of a co-op and a capitalist firm; the latter is engaged in 
providing a return to capital, whilst the former attempts to provide a return to labourn . It 
would have several objectives: 
• to provide a measure of performance which is more suited to the nature of co-ops than 
capitalist profit-based measures, and which win provide a more acceptable and useful 
method of measuring co-ops' commercial performance; 
• to assist in moving co-ops and those associated with the co-op sector away from 
capitalist conceptions of perfonnance, and provide co-ops themselves with a method of 
assessing performance which derived from their own starting point and which relates to 
co-ops' own class interests; 
What would the development of such measures achieve? There are several arguments 
against it. FIrstly, although the capital-labour relationship is aboUshed at the level of the 
II AI",.,.",. .. """ 1",." .. t1dI It not",.,."". Z!fCZDIf£r NtImIi ~ tid. _tiorI " ~ witll • mt1PIdIJ1y 
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enterprise, it remains at the level of the economy. Co-ops cannot wish this away and it 
remains a fundamental determinant of their activities, constantly pressurising them to act in 
a certain manner. More importantly, it is ultimately the judgment of the capitalist economy 
as to whether a co-op survives or collapses, and this judgment is based upon co-ops' ability 
to generate a surplus - which looks very much like profit. The surplus remaining after 
wages have been paid provides the source of capital for accumulation, and this both reflects 
and influences co-ops' competitive position. Therefore if the economy judges co-ops in 
terms of their ability to generate a 'profit', then perhaps commercial performance should be 
assessed in this light. 
In practice co-ops do have some flexibility in terms of the level of surplus which they 
generate; the intensity of competitive market pressures does vary and will allow some 
co-ops to generate a higher than 'normal' or average surplus. For others, achieving a low 
surplus, survival can be achieved - for a time at least - by the acceptance of low wages or 
poorer conditions of work. The scope for such variations and the way in which these will be 
manifested in co-ops is sufficient to justify the use of performance measures specific to 
co-ops. The impact of the capitalist economy on co-ops is as much on the way in which they 
operate as on the outcome; it is the process of co-operative production which is pushed in a 
capitalist direction, but the outcome of the conflict between this and co-op objectives is 
something specific to co-ops. 
Secondly, it is argued by Cutler, Hindess, Hirst and Hussain (CHlffi)12 that changes in the 
method of calculation - i.e. the particular ways in which the British accountancy profession 
and Companies Acts (company law) derive profits - would have a major impact on the 
nature of British capitalism. Could this be extended to suggest that a coop-specific method 
of calculation would actually change the relationship of co-ops to the economy? 
The problem with the CHHH argument in the case of capitalist firms is that it does not 
address the economic basis of production, nor capital-labour relations, looking only at the 
superstructure. Changing the method of calculation does not change the fundamental 
nature of British capitalism; rather, it reflects changing material conditions13• Although 
there is a two-way relationship between accounting and capitalist structure, causality flows 
22 CHIiH,297B. 
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primarily from the latter to the former. However, co-ops represent a limited change in the 
economic base, and thus a change in the superstructure can follow. 
Ultimately the usefulness of alternative perspectives on performance depends on the extent 
to which co-ops are removed from the capitalist economy. Alternative measures of 
performance can follow economic changes but cannot bring them about. Intervention by 
local authorities has to a limited extent brought about some economic change, and co-ops 
are - in some cases - being promoted for reasons other than capital-oriented restructuring. 
To the extent that an economic environment has been created where co-ops have the 
flexibility to pursue other, non-capitalist objectives, then some other form of performance 
measurement is appropriate - some form of measuring 'social returns' rather than profit 
returns. 
V,due added 
Measuring the commercial performance of co-ops from the perspective of labour must 
encompass three requirements: 
• Labour, not capital, is the source of value 
• In a co-op labour owns the means of production and the surplus accrues to labour 
• To a capitalist labour appears as a cost, even though it is the source of value. In a 
t, 
co-op, capital appears as a cost, even though this is a result of capital's remaining hold over 
the means of production, through finance capital. 
Value added, suitably defined, will fulfil this role; essentially this appears as the surplus or 
residuallelt after materials and overhead costs have been paid from co-ops' revenues. It 
does not depend upon the distribution between profits and wages. 
There may appear to be a danger in the use of value added accounting. When, in the 19705 it 
became fllhionable for companies to present value added accounts to their employees, this 
was widely criticised as a means by which management further manipulates the 
workforce1•• Value added presents a "picture of a unity of interests in the financial 
performance of a given business organisation, whereas in fact there exists a basic conflict of 
interests"l!. However, co-ops are an attempt to break away.from the relationship between 
24 HW, 29B5; LtI1Iour...."., 2178. 
25 ".",.,,; CIuWI.ullopldtJol, 2., ,. 27. 
Commercial Performance 239 
labour and capital which gives rise to this conflict (although other, different, conflicts may 
arise in the process). To the extent that co-ops do represent a co-operative effort by the 
workforce then perhaps value added can provide a suitable representation of performance. 
Williams &: Has1am16 advocate the use of value added criteria in assessing investments in 
industry. This is claimed to be a better measure of wealth creation, from the perspective of 
labour; they consider that labour has the major interest in modern manufacturing industry. 
The limitation of this approach, however, is that it is essentially concerned only with 
distribution (i.e. distribution of the surplus between capital and labour) and cannot address 
the question of class relations in industry. 
In a co-operative, value added records a meaningful quantity, that is, the surplus which 
remains from revenue once costs have been deducted17. H finance is treated as an input like 
any other, then its cost (interest) can be treated in the same way. Thus value added is the 
quantity which accrues to labour; labour then takes the decision as to the distribution of this 
surplus between current payments such as wages, bonuses etc., and retained earnings for 
investment. The important role of value added for co-operatives has been noted by 
Marris18, who states that "Value added is the true contribution of the business to its worker 
members". Value added does appear to have more relevance to co-operatives than profit, 
and is additionally useful because the same measure can be derived for the performance of 
conventional companies, although with a different meaning. 
Any measure based upon value added will be playing a very different role to one based on 
profit. For conventional enterprises performance can be encompassed by the one measure 
because of the role which profit plays in a capitalist economy - i.e. the rate of profit is a 
means by which capital increases the rate of accumulation through the allocation of means 
of production to more productive functions. Profitability can be used as the firm's judgment 
of perfonnance because it is the economy's judgment of performance. A firm has other 
activities in addition to making a profit - it produces output and employs workers - but 
these are irrelevant in capital market, except insofar as they contribute to profit. They are 
not important aspects of performance in their own right. 
16 Willilmu, HIUlIun " 1985. 
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The rate of profit cannot be replaced with any single value-added based measure for 
co-operative performance, for two reasons. Firstly, value added does not have the particular 
role of profit in the economy at large. Secondly, there are a variety of objectives which 
characterise the conflict between co-ops and capitalism, which vary between co-operatives 
and between members, and so a variety of different measures would be used to assess 
different aspects of co-operative performance. 
Ratio meatnlrel blUed on value tultIed 
In order to make comparisons between co-operatives, some form of rate of retum is 
required. Customary accounting measures are centered on retum on capital (the ratio of 
profit to net assets), with a variety of other ratios contributing to this. Analysis of 
contributory ratios can assist in a diagnosis of reasons for good and bad performance of a 
firm, and furthermore are useful for making comparisons between different firms19 
It may be possible to develop a similar set of measures for co-operatives. Suitable diagnostic 
tests would enable the early identification of co-operatives likely to run into difficulties. 
Support and financing agencies - such as COA's, ICOF and even a hypothetical investment 
bank for co-operatives20 - could pick up on these early warning signals (as of course could 
the co-operative members themselves). 
~. MOving from a diagnostic to an explanatory perspective, it should be possible to identify 
some of the factors which contribute to a successful co-operative. For instance, the 
effectiveness of particular support strategies could be assessed, such as offering evidence as 
to whether co-operatives assisted by grants or wage subsidies are more or less likely to 
succeed than those receiving 'soft' loans. 
Such a set of measures of performance for co-operatives cannot necessarily be derived from 
conventional measures simply by substituting value added for profit wherever it occurs. For 
a capitalist company the ratio profit:net assets makes sense, as it measures the rate at which 
capital appropriates a return for itself. In the case of co-operatives the situation is different. 
While a ratio wlUl a4iltd:net lISSets can be calculated it is meaningless once labour has been 
identified as the source of value. 
·2' .. ".""", (tJ'11) "".. typbd "".,.11 of~ ,.,. 011 NtIIm to cqItIII. 
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Problems with meauring return to lilbour 
The key problem faced is therefore one of deriving a measure of the rate of return to labour, 
rather than capital, with the return defined as value added rather than profit. But on what 
basis is the labour input to be calculated? The immediate question raised is whether it is 
labour or labour power referred to here. Ideally, co-op workers would be concerned with 
measuring the efficiency of their labour, but all available data relates to labour power. 
The simplest approach is to use value added per worker, a measure which is easy to 
calculate but which suffers certain drawbacks. Firstly, labour input varies according to the 
length of the working week or year (although account of this could be taken if sufficient 
data were available). More importantly, it neglects differences in the skill composition of the 
workforce, and in the level of technology employed. Value added per head will be higher if 
a given output is produced by a small number of skilled workers rather than a large number 
of unskilled workers, without implying any difference in 'efficiency'. A co-operative which 
'undervalues' its skilled workers will demonstrate an artificially high value added per head 
in the same way that a firm with undervalued assets will demonstrate a high rate of profit. 
Similarly, a co-operative with more capital intensive technology will have higher value 
added per head even if there is a less capital intensive option with similar levels of skills 
and profitability. 
These points will certainly be less important in making comparisons between co-ops in 
similar activities, where skills and technology may not vary a great deal between co-ops. 
However, effective and useful comparisons across co-ops in different sectors and with 
different technologies requires some alternative method of measurement of labour. 
The problem of taking account of skill differences is one of measuring non-homogeneous 
labour in a way that will enable aggregation. An analogous problem, that of measuring the 
rate of profit on physically different types of capital, is solved - in practice if not in theory -
by the monetary valuation of different capitals (even if such valuations are arguably 
inaccurate particularly during periods of inflation). For labour of different skills there is no 
simple equivalent. 
One possible solution is to measure labour by wages/salaries paid. On the (somewhat 
tenuous) assumption that wage differentials reflect relative skills, the total wage bill would 
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therefore reflect the total skills which the co-operative has. This leads to a ratio such as value 
added:total wages. A major difficulty with this measure is the relationship between skills and 
wages. It could be argued that in the economy in general wage differentials reflect skill 
structures, but this is unlikely to be true in co-operatives. Many adopt a policy of narrow or 
no wage differentials21, whatever the workers' skills. Co-operatives are frequently forced to 
pay low wages as a result of their peripheral position in the economy, in common with 
some other small businesses. But the extent to which low wages are necessary varies from 
co-op to co-op, and so the wage structure in an individual co-op cannot necessarily be said 
to reflect the skills of its workers. Furthermore, if the ratio value added:total wages were 
adopted as a measure of productivity, a co-op would apparently improve its performance 
by reducing wages, which from the perspective of labour is clearly incorrect and illogical. 
~-' An alternative method of using wages to measure skill differences would be to use an 
external scale of differentials - e.g. union rates or national wage levels for the relevant skills. 
However, this would require data on the physical skill structure of each co-operative and on 
external wage rates. There is a clear trade-off here between simplicity and theoretical rigour. 
Generation of value adtled 
follOwing the above, I have adopted value added per worker as the primary indicator of the 
commercial or commodity productivity of workers co-ops; the higher the figure the more 
productive co-ops are at generating a monetary surplus from production, and over which 
they have control. The distribution of this surplus will be examined in the next section; in 
this section I examine which aspects of production contribute to changes in the surplus. 
Value added per worker can be Increased by any of the following changes, or a combination 
of them: 
• Workers produce more output with the same stock of means of production; this could 
be because the pace of work is increased; the working day lengthened (analogous to 
increases in absolute surpluS value in aipitalist finns); workers may become more skilled 
(espedally if there Is an element of 1eaming by doing' in co-ops which start off with skill 
shortages); or the general conflict between capitalist and co-operative methods of 
21 .. .".,5. 
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production may be increasingly resolved in the direction of capitalist organisation - for 
instance if a more detailed or hierarchical division of labour is adopted. 
• The intensity, skill content and organisation of work can remain constant, but the stock 
of means of production available to each worker may be increased. 
• Relative price changes affecting a co-op's inputs or outputs. 
In the first case accounting data will reveal that the ratio of value added to means of production 
(V A/MP) will increase, because value added rises with a fixed stock of means of 
production. One way of measuring this stock is by the balance sheet value of fixed assets; 
although this is not entirely satisfactory, it is the best method available. In the second case 
the ratio means of production per worker (MP /H) will increase. By examining the course which 
these ratios have taken in practice for co-ops we should therefore be able to isolate the 
source of changes in value added. 
Measurement of the stock of means of production presents problems for a variety of 
reasons. Firstly, a monetary valuation is not necessarily an accurate representation of the 
physical stock of means of production in use. Secondly, even if monetary valuations are 
used, none of the quantities fixed assets, total assets, or net assets represent the appropriate 
quantity of buildings, plant and equipment, and stocks in use. I have adopted fixed assets as 
a proxy for means of production, although these qualifications apply and any results must 
be interpreted in this light. 
Generation of value added 
~ wagesas%of 
value added 
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The contribution of the two ratios can be represented as in the figure above. They go some 
way towards solving the problems mentioned above with value added per head, that of 
taking account of different levels of technology. Examining the ratio MP /H in addition to 
VA/H gives some indication of the different intensities of means of production used by 
co-ops. 
Distribution of value added 
A second set of ratios can assist in analysing the distribution of co-ops' surplus; essentially 
this can be divided between wages (including bonuses); accumulation for investment in 
means of production; or allocation to social uses outside of the co-op22 (capital's claims 
through interest and rent have already been taken account of in reaching net value added). 
In practice British co-ops rarely allocate their surplus to anything other than wages or 
reserves, and so there are two crucial aspects of surplus distribution: 
• the level of wages paid; are these lower than wages in comparable capitalist firms or 
union rates, and what is their absolute level; 
• the distribution between wages and accumulation, as the extent of the latter is crucial 
for co-ops ability to invest in means of production. 
These are revealed by the two ratios wages per worker (W /H) and value added:wages (V A/W). 
As in the previous section, the contribution of the two ratios can be illustrated as follows: 
Distribution of value added 
~ means of production 
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In practice it is easier to invert the second ratio, to become W IV A, as it makes more sense to 
think of 'wages as a percentage of value added' rather than the reverse. However this does 
not affect the principle of the ratios. This ratio also fulfills a direct function, as a measure of 
the distribution of surplus between immediate renumeration and reinvestment or other 
non-wage objectives. If the ratio is greater than one over a prolonged period a need is 
indicated for some form of external subsidy if the co-operative is to continue in operation. It 
also indicates the extent to which co-ops are accumulating, and thus links with the 
generation of surplus (through increasing quantities of means of production) and with the 
previous chapter's findings regarding the provision of finance through internal reserves. 
Pyramid of accounting ratios for co-operatifJes 
Combining the two sets of ratios developed above, we now have a simple pyramid of ratios 
based around a return to labour (albeit through monetary valuations in the market) rather 
than return on capital. 
Accounting pyramid for co-operatives 
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These measures taken together can provide a broad picture of commercial perfonnance, and 
will be used later in the chapter in an analysis of the actual performance of co-ops to date. 
MondrRgon - Index of "RI"e Rdded 
Attempts have also been made to develop an accounting framework specifically for co-ops 
at Mondragon. The financial and planning aspects of co~peration are administered by the 
Caja Laboral Popular (CLP), whose research department has developed measures of 
co-operative perfonnance23. The most interesting of these is an Index of Value Added 
(IV A), which aims to record overall changes in productivity levels. It is defined as follows: 
IVA = eVA I (H + CJW) 
(GVA=gross value added; H=no. of workers; C=annual 
cost of capital; W=annual wage bill) 
The denominator is therefore a composite number comprising the annual cost of capital 
divided by the average wage and the number of workers. The contribution of capital is thus 
measured in terms of equivalent 'labour units', and the ratio computes the return to capital 
and labour combined. In this it is something of a halfway house between a return to capital 
and a return to labour. This measure does treat both capital and labour as factors of 
production, but turns the conventional approach around by measuring capital (average 
annual cost) in terms of labour units. 
The IV A does take account of different capital resources in different co-operatives, but it 
still fails to allow for differences in workers' skills. This aids comparability between co~ps 
with different levels of technology. In making comparisons between co-ops and capitalist 
firms in the UK the problem of low wages in co-operatives reduces the usefulness of 
comparability. However, Thomas and Logan24 report that the problem identified above, of 
wages not reflecting skills because of reduced differentials or low wages all round, does not 
apply. In Mondragon the level of earnings is linked to that of similar branches of economic 
activity, and so there is no downward bias as a result of using co-operative earnings. The 
same 8Uthol"l report, however, that the Mondragon co-operatives tend to invest heavily in 
education and training and so their workforces tend to be more highly skilled than those in 
2S nr-. .l.Gpft, 1m, ,.101. 
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comparable firms. Thus co-operative perfonnance would tend to be overestimated by this 
measure, because of the undervaluing of the skilled labour input into the co-operatives. 
COMMERCIAL PERFORMANCE OF BRITISH CO-OPS 
Now that a specific framework for analysing the commercial performance of worker co-ops 
has been established, it is possible to examine the experience of British co-ops in the three 
chosen sectors since the mid-1970s, when their recent expansion commenced. The general 
issues addressed relate to the overall performance of co-operatives as competitive, 
commodity producing enterprises, compared to that of capitalist firms, changes in this 
performance over time; and the extent to which co-ops appear to be involved in the same 
accumulation process as capitalist firms. 
More specifically the analysis examines: 
• the overall growth in output of the three co-op sectors studied, and of individual 
co-ops; 
• the level of productivity (in terms of commodity production) in co-ops; 
• those aspects of co-op production generating changes in productivity, and 
• distribution of the product generated, and resolution of the tension between wages 
and accumulation. 
• the relationship between co-ops absolute and comparative position to capitalist firms, 
and their ability to accumulate. 
These results can be analysed in the context of the theory developed earlier to evaluate 
further the role of co-ops in the process of economic restructuring. A large element of this 
section will be descriptive, concentrating on the outcome of co-ops' commercial 
perfonnance; the bulk of analysis and explanation takes place in the subsequent chapters on 
the individual co-op sectors. 
The rapid expansion of the British worker co-op sector has been highlighted in chapter 5, 
where the increase in the formation rate and the number of co-ops in operation was 
analysed in some detail. One of the conclusions of that chapter was that economic 
conditions since the late 19705, and particularly during the early 19805, had been 
;"{. 
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particularly favourable to the form/ltion of new co-ops, but that the same conditions were not 
necessarily suited to the surviml of those co-ops; the wide variation in survival rates 
between different co-op sectors suggested that more analysis of the role of co-ops in 
particular economic sectors was needed to evaluate the role of specific co-ops beyond their 
general position in an economy undergoing major restructuring. This analysis is done in 
chapters 8,9 & 10. In this section I consider how co-ops commercial performance has 
developed in the light of their relationship with capitalist firms in these sectors. 
Growth in output 
The first aspect of commercial performance considered is the overall output of co-ops. This 
has been growing, both from new co-ops continuously being formed, and the expansion of 
existing ones. 
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Figure. 7.1 Total real co-op output by sector 
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The increasing level of overall activity in co-ops in the three sectors is shown in Table 7.1 
and illustrated in Figure 7.1. This shows that the wholefoods sector has by far the highest 
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output, and has reached this point by steady growth over a relatively long period2S• The 
growth in printing, and especially clothing, has been more recent; it remains to be seen 
whether the growth in these two sectors can be maintained over a prolonged period, or is 
just due to their more recent establishment. 
Table 7.1 Co-op output (£'000, 1985 prices) 
Average 
Total sector output output per co-op 
Year C P W C P W 
1977 40.6 713.5 20.1 117.8 
1978 58.0 158.4 2240.4 57.5 39.2 158.5 
1979 88.3 312.9 4180.6 87.4 62.0 172.6 
1980 131.4 683.7 5457.2 32.6 67.7 168.9 
1981 388.3 1181.0 7313.9 64.1 78.0 185.8 
1982 583.8 1693.9 9889.9 72.3 88.3 233.3 
1983 1017.0 2370.9 11570.7 100.7 117.4 266.6 
1984 621.9 2893.9 11235.9 88.0 150.9 383.9 
Note: C=c:lothing; P=printing; W=wholefoods 
Souru: own data based on research at Companies House and the Registry of Friendly 
Societies 
Oearly a large part of this growth is due to the rapid increase in the number of 
co-operatives over the decade; chapter 5 showed that the number of co-ops overall 
increased from 30 in 1975 to around 750 by 1985, and similar growth applied in these three 
sectors. However, individual co-ops have also demonstrated a remarkable capacity for 
growth26; Table 7.1 and Figure 7.2a show growth in average co-op output. 
Although the wholefood sector has by far the highest number of co-ops of all the sectors 
studied, it also has the highest average output, while average output in printing is 
marginally higher than that in clothing (see Figure 7.2a). A striking result is that the rate of 
growth in average real output has been very similar in wholefoods and printing; Figure 7.2b 
shows growth in average output expressed as an index (1980=100) and illustrates the almost 
identical movement of the two sectors over the period. Although the clothing co-op growth 
25 All"""...,,,..,.tiIia are __ ill 1&""", ill 1915 """,etetpl for .... 1PIIid& are ill,."".".., {c:umnI"aJ 
temrs.1WI..r_ are I.'" bulbJIDr If"" ",., If.:tifllly lJy CIHIfII,. ",. eflell of"."."'" arel%dauW 
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rate has been higher over the period 1980-84, the usefulness of this result is qualified by the 
small number of ro-ops for which data 1$ available, and the extreme sensitivity of the result 
to the time period chosen27• The significance of the printing/wholefood result is that, for 
output at least, it suggests that similar processes may have been at work in both co-op 
sectors in tenns of their relationship to the economy and the co-op sector as a whole. 
Although these results are impressive, the time period is too short and co-ops too young for 
a comparison to be made with the growth of capitalist finns in the respective sectors; it is to 
be expected that newly-formed enterprises would demonstrate faster growth than longer-
established ones. Despite this rapid growth, prospects for continued co-op growth are 
uncertain; the declining formation rate of new co-ops indicates that at least this aspect of 
growth is diminishing. 
Commodify pt'oductivity28 
Moving from the absolute amount of output produced by co-ops, we can begin to analyse 
how that output is produced; this also enables some comparisons to be made with the 
performance of capitalist firms. Earlier analysis suggested that co-ops will tend to produce 
less commodity output than capitalist finns; firstly because many objectives will conflict 
with commercial productivity, and secondly because they suffer from a shortage of finance 
which restricts access to the means of production. 
In this section I use ratio analysis to investigate the commodity productivity of co-ops, 
based on the accounting ratios developed earlier in this chapter. Moving from overall 
output, we can examine the output per worker produced by co-ops. This enables 
comparisons to be made relatively easily between co-ops and capitalist finns. Data on gross 
output per worker (GO/H) is presented in Table 7.2 below and illustrated in Figure 7.3a. In 
general the pattern follows fairly closely that for average co-op output. 
HoWever the "absolute levels of output per worker in each co-op sector are not especially 
interesting; they reflect the . characteristics of the industry more than anything else (although 
later we wiD see that it is useful for individual co-ops). Of more interest is the change over 
27 'l'ItiI...,.,.,...,.". *' "" ........,fWIIl"~ till,.",,., tltHlfllIICIor. 
211"...., till,.",.'......" ~..."., IItM Jtu' ~fD ."""..u..,,,,. ~ion of 
eormntNIitfa " ht CIfII..,., ., ..,.,., • ..." ... 111M ,,""'ltlMJllil ""'" .,In,."",., in ",. ,~ht of "'It, 
7.2a Average co-op output (£million, 1985 prices) 
7.2b Index of average co-op output (1980=100) 
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time, and the position relative to the industry average29 - i.e. how co-ops are perfonning 
relative to capitalist firms. 
The data shows that output per head has increased over the period, as co-ops have 
expanded - with this expansion more than compensating for the small size of new co-ops 
being formed. There are differences between the sectors: the increase has been most 
dramatic in wholefoods (which later investigation will show mostly to be in the wholesale 
sub-sector rather than retail), steady in printing, but slow and erratic in clothing. This last 
result reflects the instability of the clothing sector in general, and the small number of 
co-ops for which data is available (in part reflecting the short life of many clothing firms and 
co-ops), and is found throughout this analysis. 
Relating these figures to those for comparable capitalist firms shows that on average co-ops 
are much smaller, although in printing the relative size and output per worker of co-ops is 
increaSing. In 1980, the turnover per head of printing co-ops was 45% of that for comparable 
capitalist firms and in clothing 38%; in 1984 the respective figures were 58% and 25%. 
Figure 7.3b shows GO/H in co-ops by sector as a proportion of the capitalist figure. 
Table 7.2 Output per worker in co-ops (£'000, 1985 prices) 
Output per worker 
Year C P W 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
3.5 
5.6 
4.8 
5.4 
6.9 
4.0 
4.4 
Sorlrce: as for Table 7.1 
8.6 
10.4 
11.9 
12.0 
13.2 
16.8 
18.7 
17.2 
17.2 
25.2 
23.3 
23.0 
26.7 
32.4 
33.9 
43.1 
as % of industry tlVeTage 
C P W 
41.8 
38.0 45.2 
33.8 44.2 
36.0 46.5 
43.9 58.6 
253 57.9 
24.7 49.3 
29 WIImwr,..,. iruIJImy fip1a ,.,. to ...n firmI (leu ,- 1.00 UJri.m). Set, Mf&titbu of""""" ire "",.ui% • 
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Valuea4de4 
One of the main limitations with using infonnation on gross output is that it varies 
considerably according to the nature of different industrial sectors; for instance it is high in 
the wholefood sector, but this is mostly accounted for by the nature of the industry -
purchases of goods for resale rather than transfonnation of the goods. By contrast, clothing 
and printing represent manufacturing processes rather than distribution, and embody a 
different relationship between material inputs, labour, and output. In CMT clothing 
manufacture, there is little or no expenditure on direct inputs, only overheads, and so 
output per worker comprises largely labour expended. Thus the variation in output per 
worker may merely be reflecting the nature of these different industries. 
Of more interest and importance is the prpportion of output over which co-op workers have 
some control. Value added is a measure of this surplus, given the prevailing market prices 
(see above). Value added per worker is the most important single measure of commercial 
performance for co-operatives, and varies much less than output per worker; in fact the 
relationship between output and value added per worker is a useful way of distinguishing 
different productive activities. Results are shown in Table 7.3 and Figures 7.4a &r 7.4b. 
Table 7 .3 Value added per worker (£'000, 1985 prices) 
Net value added per Gross VA per worker (co-ops) 
worker (co-ops) as % of industry average 
Year C P W C P W 
1977 3064 
1978 2858 2910 
1979 2954 3621 3037 33.1 
1980 3561 3614 3233 63.8 32.5 
1981 2140 4143 3297 395 34.8 
1982 2822 4515 3926 50.3 38.4 
1983 3533 6268 3747 57.2 51.8 
1984 2868 7087 4507 44.1 52.8 
1985 3519 5853 50.6 42.0 
Not6: ... Appendix 1 for distinction between net and src- value added) 
Sotftr. u for table 1.1 
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In printing, average real net value added per worker (NY APH) has been steadily increasing, 
from £3,500 in 1979 to £6,900 in 1984. Gross value added per worker in the printing industry 
rose over the same period, from £12,800 to £15,800 (at 1985 prices). The relative position of 
printing co-ops has improved steadily, from 33% of the industry average in 1979 to 53% by 
198430. Despite this improvement, value added in co-ops remains much lower than in the 
industry as a whole. The low figure has two related components: a low output per worker 
(see above) and costs taking up a higher proportion of output. The latter has been around 
57-64%, decreasing over 1979-1985, but compares with a steady proportion of around 50% 
in the industry. The two elements are related because overheads (fixed costs) are likely to 
make up a greater proportion of a lower output. 
In clothing, value added per worker has increased marginally over the period, but has 
varied from year to year rather than showing a steady trend. As with printing, co-ops 
generate about half of the industry average GV APH, also on a much lower level of output. 
Although the two co-op sectors have similar levels relative to the appropriate industry 
figures, in absolute terms value added per worker in clothing is about half that in printing 
by the mid-l98Os. 
In the wholefood distribution sector the overall level of real value added per worker has 
been increasing steadily, from £3,000 in 1979 to £4,400 in 1984 (Table 73). However there are 
substantial differences between the two sub-sectors, wholesaling and retailing. Thus in the 
wholesale sub-sector GVAPH increased from £6,000 in 1'979 to £7,400 in 1984 (in 1985 
prices); the respective figures for retailing were £2,400 and £3,700. 
An interesting observation from Figure 7.4a is that in the late 19705 VA/H in all 3 sectors 
was around the same level, but since then has varied widely. Oothing has varied erratically 
around the original figure of £2,900; printing has risen rapidly to become by far the highest 
in real terms; and wholefoods has risen slowly. In the next section the source of these 
differences will be located in the different mechanisms for increasing value added in co-ops. 
It is also useful to look at Niue added as " proportion of output; while this basically 
characterises the sector under consideration changes over time within sectors are revealing, 
as is a comparison with that achieved by capitalist firms (see Table 7.4). Since 1980, this has 
so OJmpIrlDu ...... t:IlHIfIIlIIfIl WUI"Y fipra 1m .IM IraiI of GrDII Val.., ~, ,."." ",." Nd V_ AIlIW (_ 
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been rising in printing co-ops, falling in wholefood co-ops, and moving erratically in 
clothing co-ops. In printing, output per worker is closer to the industry average than is 
value added per workeri thus printing co-ops generated a lower proportion of output as 
value added than capitalist firms. This suggests that overheads make up a higher 
proportion of costs and output in co-ops - which is not surprising as overheads (fixed costs) 
by definition do not vary much with output; thus co-ops probably bear similar overheads 
but on a lower output. Oothing co-ops show the opposite, with value added representing a 
higher proportion of output than the industry, reflecting the concentration of clothing 
co-ops in CMT. 
Table 7.4 Value added as % of outptut 
Year C P W C P W 
1978 37 18 
1979 85 38 12 48 
1980 67 36 14 40 50 
1981 47 39 15 40 50 
1982 56 38 14 40 46 
1983 53 41 13 41 47 
1984 73 45 12 42 49 
1985 81 41 12 40 47 
Source: a. for Table 7.1 
Generation of value added 
In this section I apply the ratios developed above - to analyse the generation of co-ops' 
surplus - to the three co-op sectors. The source of changes in the main commodity 
productivity measure - value added per worker (V APH) - is analysed by means of the 
contributory measures value added/means of production (V A/MP) and means of production per 
worker (MP IH>; these trace changes in the level of value added generated with a given stock 
of means of production, as opposed to changes in the level of MP. Movements in these are 
given in Figure 7.5 and Table 7.5. 
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Table 7'.5 Means of production (fixed assets) 
Fixed assets per worker Value added/fixed assets 
Year C P W C P W 
1977 1182 
1978 1608 600 1.78 4.85 
1979 208 2568 597 5.64 1.41 5.09 
1980 410 2348 1165 3.45 1.54 2.78 
1981 210 2299 1797 4.05 1.80 1.84 
1982 201 2414 1895 5.56 1.87 2.07 
1983 137 4561 2444 10.20 137 1.53 
1984 133 5093 3124 8.53 1.38 1.44 
1985 125 3698 1069 11.14 1.58 1.67 
Sotl1u: IS for Table 7.1 
Figure 7.5a shows changes in the stock of (means of production) fixed assets per worker, 
and clearly there have been different trends at work within each sector. In clothing the stock 
of MP /H has been declining steadily since 1980, whilst at the same time the productivity of 
workers with these machines has been increasing. The clothing industry (at least in CMU is 
characterised by a relatively unchanging technology and labour intensive operation (see 
chapter 9). This is supported by the data for clothing co-ops; the stock of MP /H is very low 
(in 1984 it was £360 at 1985 prices), much lower than the other sectors; surprisingly even 
lower than the distribution (as opposed to production) sector, wholefoods. The steadily 
declining level of MP measured indicates that assets are being depreciated but there is little 
reinvesbnent. However, clothing machinery tends to have a long life and with adequate 
repair and maintenance can last much longer than the usual 10 year depreciation period; 
nominally depreciated fixed assets in the balance sheet does not necessarily mean that the 
physical stock of fixed assets is diminishing. Although MP /H in monetary terms is 
decreasing, it may not be so in physical terms, and so the monetary trend may be 
misleading. It seems unlikely that there is actually decapitalisation in physical terms in the 
clothing co-op sector. 
In printing, the stock of MP per worker appears to have increased dramatically, particularly 
in 1982/3. This is almost certainly an accurate reflection of events, u it is known that in 
particular some of the larger London printing co-ops undertook major investment and 
expansion programmes over this period, using both public sector and private sector finance 
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(see chapters 6 and 8). Wholefood co-ops have shown a steady rise in the stock of means of 
production, although it has not been as fast in printing - but given the labour-intensive 
nature of production in the sector the increase is Significant. 
The ratio of V A/MP is also shown in Table 7.5 and Figure 5.5b, and gives an indication of 
how efficiently co-ops are using their stock of fixed assets. This shows a striking contrast 
between clothing and the other two sectors; it appears to show dramatic increases, but this 
partly reflects the artificially reducing level of fixed assets. There is probably some increase 
in productive efficiency, but it is unlikely to be as dramatic as the figures suggest. In 
printing and wholefoods the level of VA/MP has been constant since 1980, and at the same 
level in each sector. The constancy of this figure is very surprising; it would be expected that 
efficiency would increase as co-op workers became more experienced through on-the-job 
training, especially if there is an initial lack of skills, but which could be acquired over time. 
Thus increasing value added per worker appears to follow investment in more advanced 
machinery etc., rather than greater efficiency. This is strong supporting evidence for the 
problem of initial underfinancing explored in the previous chapter, and shows the pressures 
on co-ops to accumulate from their limited capacity to generate a surplus. 
Distribution of vldue added 
One of the widely perceived characteristics of co-ops is that workers tend to end up 
working for low wages, frequently referred to as 'seif-exploitation'. This is a central reason 
for opposition to co-ops within the trade union movement; they are seen as undermining 
the hard-won gains of workers elsewhere, providing unfair competition to established firms 
on the basis of low wages. While there is evidence that wages for co-op workers are lower 
than those in comparable capitalist firms, there is no reason to believe that this by choice; 
indeed it appears that co-ops in general pay as high a level of wages as can be afforded - if 
not mar, than can be afforded. 
Average wages paid in co-ops in the three sectors are shown in Table 7.6a31. Amongst 
capitalist firms in these sectors, both mens' and womens' wages are highest in printing, 
followed by whoJesaJe food distribution, retan food disbibution, and· finally clothing 
manufadure (see Table 5.11, chapter 5). Pay in clothing and retaillood distribution is 
relatively low; only in printing aN men'. wages higher than the average for all indusbies. 
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time, and there may not be enough data to draw strong conclusions, but the indications for 
co-ops are favourable. 
Among wholefood co-ops overall average wages have risen from £1,511 in 1978 to £4,002 in 
1984. However, these figures for the wholefood sector reflect a major divergence between 
wages in the wholesale and retail sub-sectors: in retail wages have risen from £1,460 to 
£3,016 over the same period, in wholesale from £2,231 to £5,825; that is, in 1984 wages in 
wholesale wholefood co-ops were 90% more than those in retail, and were around the same 
level as those in printing co-ops. Comparative data on earnings in food distribution33 do 
reveal a differential between wholesale and retail, but this is consistently less than 10%. This 
suggests that there are other major distinctions between wholesale and retail wholefood 
co-ops which are not simply reflections of general sectoral differences. 
The position of wholesale and retail co-ops relative to the sector varies. In 1984 co-op wages 
were 80% of male wages in wholesale food distribution, and 126% of female wages34; the 
equivalent figures for retail were 45% of male rates and 68% of female rates. Comparisons 
between wages in clothing and printing co-ops (as well as wholefoods) and pay levels 
reported in the New Earnings Survey in 1984 are given in Table 5.11, and show that wages in 
wholefood wholesaling were by far the highest, relative to wages in comparable capitalist 
firms, out of any co-op sector. 
Thus wholefoods reflects a position of contrasts: in the wholesale sub-sector, wages are the 
highest relative to the industry average of any of the sectors studied, and equal highest in 
absolute terms, and yet in wholefood retailing wages are the lowest relative to the industry 
average and the equal lowest in absolute terms. 
The finding that wages in co-ops are lower than those in capitalist firms is supported by 
'virtually the only [other] comparative data', which found that 'in a sample of 100 small US 
co-ops .... pay is typically much lower than the average for the industry'3S. 
SS F?DIfI ",. NnP £.1m..,. Surwyi film " ,., "".m.zml to ",. CmtvI of ProtbIclitm far IIIi1_tor. 
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Relationship of wages to value added 
Further insight can be gained by comparing wage levels to the level of surplus, or value 
added, generated in a co-op. This reveals whether the level of wages paid is sustainable 
over the longer term. There is also a crucial connection with the generation of co-ops' 
surplus; given the problems faced by co-ops in raising finance due to the lack of equity 
(share) finance which can be used as gearing for raising loans, the ability of co-ops to retain 
some surplus as reserves is the main source of gearing, and hence is crucial for their ability 
to secure loan finance. As we have seen above, increases in the stock of means of production 
per worker have primarily enabled printing co-ops to enjoy such a rapid increase in their 
overall productivity and surplus generation. A high proportion of value added retained for 
investment is therefore essential if co-ops are to expand, but this must be combined with 
evidence of the level of wages paid to see if reinvestment is at the expense of low wages. 
In the clothing industry as a whole the proportion of value added devoted to wages has 
fluctuated between 63 and 69% over the period 1980-1985 for small firms, after profit and 
depreciation taking 31-37%. The low level of finance required for clothing manufacture 
suggests that profits are high in the industry. 
Table 7.7 Wages as % net value added 
Year C P W 
1977 94.5 
1978 100.7 85.7 
1979 132.1 85.4 89.1 
1980 137.7 98.5 90.8 
1981 89.8 98.6 95.6 
1982 113.9 89.1 83.1 
1983 99.5 75.9 95.0 
1984 107.6 85.8 91.6 
1985 105.1 103.1 
Stnm:e: u for Table 7.1 
Oothing co-ops face a different situation. Although relative to industry levels, wages are 
high compared to other co-op sectors, this is achieved by paying out a very high proportion 
of value added in wages (see Table 7.7 and Figure 7.6c). This proportion has only been 
below 1()()f1 in one year out of the period 1980-85; apart from'the 90% achieved in 1983, it 
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has varied from 100% to 138%. That is, wages have generally been higher than the surplus 
generated, leading to accounting losses and paying wages from reserves. This is not 
sustainable in the long term without further injections of finance - either subsidies, grants or 
further loans to meet these deficits. Some clothing co-ops have achieved this; clothing 
co-ops have had the highest level of subsidy (per co-op) of the three sectors. Nevertheless, 
even when this source of income is taken into account, clothing co-ops are still devoting 
virtually all of their surplus to wages. 
Printing co-ops show wages at lower levels of value added than clothing; over 1979-84 they 
varied from 76% to 99%, although the incomplete figures for 1985 show this rising to 103%, 
indicating that problems may be arising. Co-ops devote a higher proportion of value added 
to wages than do capitalist firms, but the differential in printing has been declining over 
time. 
Wholefood co-ops overall devote a similar proportion of value added to wages as printing 
co-ops, and somewhat less than clothing co-ops. Between 1977 and 1984, 78% to 89% of 
value added went in wages. Again there are differences· between the sub-sectors; in 
wholesaling the range is 60-86% over 1979-84, whilst in retailing it was 85% to 104% over 
1977-1984. Thus the former, besides achieving impressive levels of wages, has done so 
whilst retaining a higher proportion of surplus for reinvestment than any of the other 
sectors examined. Retail wholefood co-op-ops have some surplus left for reinvestment but 
as we have seen earlier, this is at the expense of very low wages. 
Intle% of vldue added 
Table 7.8 shows the Index of Value Added (developed in Mondragon) for co-ops in the 
selected sectors. This 'index of productivity' gives different results from other measures. It 
shows increases in all co-op sectors, and is highest in clothing and wholefood retaiJing. Both 
of these sectors are labour-intensive, and it is likely that this result reflects above all the very 
low costs of capital faced by these co-ops. Unfortunately the measure is easily distorted - for 
instance by renting rather than owning premises - and as a result is difficult to interpret 
reliably and consistently. 
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Table 7.8 Index of value added 
Year C P W 
1977 414 
1978 55 607 
1979 468 89 676 
1980 146 127 785 
1981 250 165 676 
1982 354 296 808 
1983 668 396 768 
1984 714 312 613 
1985 790 192 
Source: as for Table 7.1 
CONCLUDING REMAJU(S 
In the above sections I have concentrated upon a detailed but descriptive analysis of the 
commercial perfonnance of co-ops in the three sectors over the period 1976-1985. Inevitably 
such an exercise tends to be somewhat dry, but nevertheless presents information which is 
essential for an understanding of the role of co-ops in the British economy in the early 1980s. 
In this summary, and the next three chapters, I attempt to interpret and explain the 
performance record of these co-ops, in the context of wider economic and industrial changes 
and the experiences of some individual co-ops. 
The most striking result is that co-ops appear to have been less productive, in commercial 
terms than capitalist firms, as measured by average output and value added per worker36• 
Several consequences stem from this. Firstly, it is from the surplus generated in co-ops and 
capitalist firms that wages are paid, profits are distributed (in capitalist firms) or devoted to 
accumulation. Accumulation is the basis upon which future competitive ability and 
commercial perfonnance depend. Given that co-ops tend to be under-financed initially, and 
that relief offered by public-sector funding tends to be concentrated on new co-ops, then 
accumulation from this surplus is the main means by which co-ops can gain the additional 
finance needed to increase the stock of means of production and secure their future 
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commerdal survival. This is demonstrated in the actual experience of co-ops revealed in the 
last chapter. 
In a capitalist economy, where finance and means of production are allocated through the 
market mechanism, there will be a tension in the distribution of a firm's surplus between 
workers' wages and the demands of capitalists for personal consumption and accumulation 
to strengthen their future position. This conflict over distribution is one element of the 
wider class conflict between workers and capitalists. Unless co-ops are somehow protected 
from the need to compete with capitalist firms they too will face the same tension; although 
the contradiction between capital and labour has been abolished within the enterprise, it 
remains on a social scale. Therefore co-ops must match the accumulation carried out by 
capitalist firms if they are not to become progresSively weaker, unless there is intervention 
in finance or product markets to protect them. 
The lower surplus generated by co-ops means that the tension between accumulation and 
wages will be particularly intense. It has been revealed that the proportion of value added 
devoted to wages in co-ops is higher than in comparable capitalist firms, and this in a 
situation where internal accumulation provides the main source of finance for established 
co-ops38. In addition, wages are also lower in co-ops, a result which supports some of the 
suspidon held by trade unions towards them. It is a widely held view that many co-ops 
only survive by paying low wages; the overall results show that despite paying low wages, 
British co-ops have still to match their capitalist rivals in commercial terms. 
Co-ops studied are reliant upon their own reserves for strengthening their position. 
Although public sector finance is important in aiding the formation of co-ops, it has yet to 
secure their establishment on a basis where they can compete effectively on capitalist terms. 
The crucial role of accumulation based upon internal resources is essentially the same as 
saying that co-ops use 'sweat equity' as a substitute for external equity - they have to 
generate 'gearing' from their own resources. The previous chapter revealed was that 
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crlIicIIm Df .,.114 ID""'" /I""" dIdI pi ID 1IImaI1I"1riInI1itm 10 oamm ,.",., IIum imIa""".,. HOfMIn', IIw 
"",.",1Im ..., 10 ... 1ft t»OJII#I 10 tmldlIIW"" ilia 1ft ,."".,.t"",., ".., ,.,.14rtiwg into eanmI tlh1i4mtlI,If 
#I llItMr ".., CHJII "" "",.., "" ".,. ,.".", /fmt.I. . 
Commercial Performance 263 
external commercial finance which can theoretically be raised on the basis of this gearing is 
not increasing at the same rate. 
The failure of external finance to provide sufficient resources for co-ops' growth and 
accumulation means that the need for 'sweat equity is not just limited to new co-ops but 
applies to established co-ops as well - therefore co-op workers face the same downward 
pressure on wages as capitalist firms, a position resulting from the need for both capitalist 
firms and co-ops to accumulate to survive. 
It would appear that wages in co-ops are a high as they can be, commensurate with 
continued accumulation - higher wages would jeopardise the future existence of co-ops. The 
problem is not low wages or accumulation per se but a low surplus - the key question is 
why do co-ops generate on average a much lower surplus per worker that their capitalist 
competitors? 
To a degree the problem is a circular one - co-ops perform badly because they are under-
financed, but are under-financed because they do not perform well enough to accumulate. 
The problem is of course worse for co-ops than capitalist firms because of their tendency to 
secure less external finance and be even more reliant upon internal resources. 
The importance of availability of finance is reinforced by evidence that improved 
performance has largely resulted from increases in the stock of means of production, for 
which internally accumulated resources are required. Thus overall performance of co-ops 
could be improved by greater availability of external finance, to increase the stock of means 
of production faster than can be achieved through internal accumulation. 
One important factor relating to co-ops' underperformance is their relatively recent 
establishment - it is to be expected that 'new' co-ops would perform less well than 
established capitalist firms. This is supported by changes in the relative position over time; 
where evidence is available, comparisons suggest that the relative disadvantage of co-ops is 
diminishing, at least in the printing and wholefood sectors. Examining the dynamic of 
co-ops overall also reveals the different experiences of co-ops in the three sectors~ It 
immediately appears that the 'vicious circle' of low accumulation and poor perfonnance is 
more intense in some sectors than others; also some individual co-ops have succeeded in 
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breaking out; what are the characteristics of co-ops and of co-op sectors which explain these 
changes? 
8. Printing Co-operatives 
INTRODUCTION 
The printing industry is one where workers' co-operatives have traditionally been strong. 
Printing co-operatives flourished in the 19th and early 20th centuries, and several of them 
survive to this day. In the resurgence of worker co-operative activity in the 19705 and 19805, 
printing co-ops have again been important; in 1986, of the 880 known worker co-operatives, 
some 60, or 7%, were classified as being in printing, with 89 in the broader printing and 
publishing sector. The overall structure of the printing industry is one of a few large firms 
and many small and medium sized firms in competition, but with few direct trading links. 
It therefore appears to meet the conditions for inclusion as an example of Schutt &: 
Whittington's 'independent and competitive' category of small firmsl. 
There are several reasons why the printing co-op sector is interesting. Firstly, many of the 
problems facing workers in general during during recent years are particularly manifested 
in the printing industry - notably the loss of jobs, the impact of rapid technological change 
and attempts to destroy the relatively high degree of control and organisation which 
workers and unions have historically gained in the industry. In the context of these changes, 
can co-ops potentially contribute to the protection of the position of labour in the industry? 
Secondly, the printing industry was selected by the GLC/GLEB for a sector strategy aimed 
at countering destructive effect of these changes, and the promotion of co-ops formed an 
integral part of this strategy2. While this may appear to be unreasonably London-centered (a 
criticism which probably has some truth in it), it is partIy because London has traditionally 
been (and still is) a centre for Britain's printing industry, but also because the policies and 
environment created by the GLC in London may have important examples for the rest of 
the country. 
71_.,.,. 
2 GLe, 1985; GLEB, u(l). 
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THE PlUNTlNG INDUSTRY 
Labour process and technological change 
The print industry has been undergoing major restructuring over the past decade, centered 
on three main issues. Firstly, there is a crisis of profitability which has developed since the 
early 1970s and was intensified by the recession of the early 1980s. As a result, printing 
firms are threatened by bankruptcy and are adopting measures to overcome the crisis. This 
leads to the second characteristic, which is that printing firms have introduced major 
changes in production, partly to increase labour productivity and partly to break up the 
existing labour organisation and influence within the industry. New technology leads to 
T both job losses and radical changes in the existing skill structure of the industry, the latter 
,'J:: enabling employers to abandon the traditional system of recruitment and training over 
which the trade unions had a relatively high degree of control. The third issue is that the 
boundary between the printing industry and other sectors - particularly information and 
communications - is becoming increasingly blurred. In this context, industrial disputes in 
the industry have been widespread, most prominently in newspaper production where 
workers have been strongest, and where all of the above elements are present. As the 
potential gains for capital of undermining or destrOying this strength have increased, so 
have their actions become more aggressive, as the owners of The Times (both under 
Thompson with the 1978/79 lockout, and under Murdoch with the move to Wapping), the 
t· 
Mirror Group (Maxwell) and numerous regional papers have demonstrated. Two of these 
,Tt 
disputes led directly to the establishment of workers' co-operatives, at the Scottish Daily 
News and Nottingham News. 
The use of technology to break the power of the print unions and reassert capital's control 
over production has been particularly obvious in recent years. By the nature of the product, 
the conflict is highly public, but it is also the case that Fleet Street has traditionally set the 
terms on which workers and capitalists operate throughout the industry3. At the same time 
the applicability of conditions in Fleet Street to the rest of the industry can be overstated4; 
worken in small printing firms are not generally in as strong a position as their 
counterparts in Fleet Street. Before examining the current state of the industry and the 
S MMWuIll, 2983, p. 28 • 
• Rahat", 29 •• 
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position of co-operatives within it, I will firstly examine the industry's historical 
development. 
Historical development 
The printing industry was first established in Europe in the 15th century. In many ways it 
remained unchanged for nearly four centuries, with few major alterations to the essential 
organisation of work, ownership and the nature of production. The industry was dominated 
by skilled workers employed in small printing shops, using labour intensive production 
methods. 
From the earliest days of printing, workers have undertaken strong mutual organisation in 
order to protect their skills and position. In common with many other industries, workers 
became organised into craft guilds; these had three main functions: (i) maintaining 
standards of craftmanship; (ii) promoting fraternity and solidarity between workers, which 
lessened the animosities inseparable from commercial competition, and (iii) regulation of 
working conditions, wages and the allocation of workS. 
Much printing work was undertaken by casual labour, and unemployed printing workers 
would be supported by their trade society in order to prevent them from undermining wage 
rates at a time of labour SUtpluSi similarly the society's 'call house' would attempt to 
distribute available work amongst recognised printing workers, who would often have to 
move from town to town in search of employment6. This 'tramping system' was 
widespread amongst craft workers in pre-capitalist days, but remained longer in printing 
and in a modified form still operates today, with much labour recruitment still controlled by 
trade unions. Despite this collective organisation, however, the early printers' societies 
remained largely conservative in their outlook. 
Industrialisation came late to the industry; it remained initially unchanged during the 
industrial revolution in the late 17th and early 18th centuries. Although machinery and 
steam power played a crucial role in the development of other industries they had little 
impact on prfnting7. However, the existing structure could not be maintained as the 
industry came under capitalist control. Previously, masters were craftsmen themselves, but 
5 QU, 1967. 
6 MtmIwll, 19B5, ".16-
7 DrIly bt 1M cue D/.D« 71ma, w#IJdI fur IlIIcmg IMIl ~ ta:Im.". to J"DIlIII* COftIerWtiw MDs, ... t1ten. 
tymIJol of 1M """ eM -.".", tlrimt",.. (CIrD4, 1967, JI. 47). . 
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as larger joint stock finns grew increasingly important, the division between workers and 
employers increased. Capitalists continually aimed for lower labour costs and more 
productive labour processes, using the two main weapons of mobilisation of cheap labour 
and introduction of machinery. Mechanisation and the division of labour increased, 
although without dramatic technical change, whilst skilled journeymen continued to restrict 
labour supply by collective action and limitations on apprenticeships. 
Craft unions emerged from the old printing societies, and their struggles centered around 
the same issues of wages and conditions, and the apprenticeship system upon which their 
negotiating strength and job security was based. Despite rapid increases in productivity and 
continual attempts by employers to increase the number of apprentices, solidarity was 
largely maintained; where it was not, working conditions were particularly atrocious. 
Printing involves three main stages of production: the pre-press stage (typesetting, 
composing and the making of the printing surface); the press stage; and finishing (collating, 
folding and binding). The pre-press stage produces a bespoke product, while the press and 
finishing stages are carried out on a small batch to mass production basis. All three stages 
have traditionally involved skilled labour, although as mechanisation has proceeded much 
greater use of unskilled labour has resulted.S 
Increasing demand for newspapers, periodicals and books in the 19th century helped 
labour's position even as technological developments took place. The radical press 
flourished, thriving on and supporting working class agitation; ironically this was because 
the Stamp Acts levied taxes on newspapers (in an attempt to keep the price high and so 
prevent the working class from reading newspapers) and served to inhibit circulation and 
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profitability of the capitalist press, so restricting accumulation. While stamp duties were in 
force they inhibited the incentive for technological change and allowed the radical press (on 
a technical level at least) to compete with the establishment on the same terms. Once duties 
were repealed in the 1860s the situation changed and "for the British press this was the 
beginning of a new era in which economic control replaced legal and political control as the 
driving force behind newspapers"9. 
From the 1850s printing became rapidly more capital intensive and more mechanised, but 
the basic structure of production remained little changed until the end of the century. The 
press stage became largely mechanised during the second half of the 19th century, with the 
major event being the invention of the high speed rotary press in the 1880s. At the end of 
the century the pre-press stage was also mechanised, with the introduction of linotype and 
monotype machines. Mechanisation involved the replacement of skilled by semi-skilled 
tasks, although some skilled jobs did remain or were newly created; nevertheless the high 
degree of organisation of skilled workers and favourable demand conditions did enable 
them to retain much control over the introduction of new machinery. The main 
technological revolution took place between 1890 and 1914, with profound and general 
change in both the processes of production and the methods of organisation. Nevertheless 
the displacement of skilled workers was buffered by the general expansion of demand on 
the basis of mass education, advertising and commerce. 
Printing in the 20th century - conflict and change 
Since the turn of the century three main types of printing process have continued to be used 
-letterpress, litho, and gravure. In the 20th century major technological changes have taken 
place which have eroded the classic structure of the industry and its craft organisation. The 
main ones have been: 
• the introduction of and radical improvements in offset litho printing, especially the 
development of web offset machines (using a continuous roll of paper rather than sheets); 
• the development of simpler typesetting methods, based on phototypesetting, suited to 
litho printing and much simpler than for letterpress printing; 
9 MlJrsIrtIll, 2Uft,,,. 21. 
270 Performance of Co-operatives 
• the development of other reprographic methods (particularly photostating), with 
greatly widened commercial applications; 
• the application of computer technology: firstly to typesetting, leading to the 
replacement of photosetting with digital setting, and secondly the associated development 
of computer-controlled laser printing. Although not yet extensively developed in the 
industry, laser printing represents the first time in the history of printing that the press stage 
has moved away from printing from a relief surface. 
The invention of offset litho printing in 1904 has had a major impact on the industry 
throughout the 20th century, for two reasons. Firstly, it requires different skills from the 
older letterpress process, particularly when combined with phototypesetting; the latter is 
much more akin to traditional 'secretarial' work than to the tasks of the printing hand-
compositor. Secondly, the machinery was relatively cheap to purchase and easy to use, at 
least for low to medium quality products. For high quality, high quantity and multi-colour 
work, capital equipment is very expensive and requires large scale operation, but much 
printing work is in relatively short runs and with basic quality requirements. These two 
factors have enabled new capital to enter the industry, particularly in small scale 
production, and avoid traditional areas of control by labour, as workers from outside of the 
industry could be recruited into positions requiring new skills. 
In larger scale printing the introduction of computer technology has deskilled other parts of 
the production process, such as machine minding and adjusbnent, as they have become 
increasingly automated. Most recent developments have accentuated changes at the pre-
press stage, with the link between word-processing in offices and typesetting in printing 
£inns becoming less distinct. The changes are not necessarily because the new technology is 
itself deskilling (although it often is), but also result from the way in which technology is 
used. For instance, computer typesetting is much more complex and intellectually 
demanding than using the old linotype and monotype machines, but the change is being 
used by employers to break up tasks into simplified and easily quantified sections, over 
which capital can more easily maintain control. By placing the emphasis on volume 
production, and using technology to introduce mass production methods into composition, 
the effect is to increase productivity and reduce union power, instead of using technology to 
enhance workers' skills and control over production. Thus it is the process of introduction 
of new technology which is as important as the technology itself. 
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Gender divisions 
In the past craft workers have managed to retain a relatively high degree of control over 
working conditions, although at times this has led to inertia and a slow response to 
technical change. Another result is that wages and earnings in the printing industry, even 
excluding newspapers, are considerably above the average for manufacturing; hours 
worked are marginally shorter, as shown below in Table 8.1. It has led to a level of male 
dominance which has been largely unchanged since pre-capitalist daystO. This is illustrated 
in the massive gulf between male and female earnings in the industry, and it is clear that the 
differential between men's and women's wages in the printing industry is greater than in 
manufacturing industry in general (1.8:1 compared to 1.6:1). The strength of labour has 
essentially been used to protect the position of skilled males, rather than workers as a 
whole. This is due to job demarcation and the preservation of 'skilled' well paid work for 
men, rather than paying women less than men for the same work. 
Table 8.1 Wages and hours worked in the printing industry 
All All All General 
inds mfg. P&P P&P 
(SIC 0-9) (SIC 2-4) (SIC 475) (SIC 4754) 
(mean) M 152.7 158.9 201.1 179.7 
weekly F 93.5 96.0 112.1 
wage M 143.3 149.7 181.3 158.3 
(median) F 88.6 92.1 100.0 
weekly M 44.3 44.4 42.2 
hours F 39.4 39.9 39.2 
(mean, inc. overtime) 
N0t4: P&P = printing Ie publishing 
Source: New Ellmings SUrTJq; Co-ops Survey. 
Print 
Co-ops 
109.1 
43.2 
Printing capital has attempted to use female labour to undermine craft workers' poSition 
and organisation, especially in composing and binding. For capitalists in the 19th century, 
female workers were a step forward: they worked for around half men's wages (with 
10 Cockburn,I9IS, 1985a. 
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virtually the same situation today) and had little of no union protection; as a result working 
conditions were often appalling: 
conditions in the workshops, espedally of some large Bible contracton, were 
shocking. Arbitrary discipline, inadequate ventilation, lack of sanitation and 
miserable wages frequently prevailed where the unfortunate women toiled to 
produce the Word of Godn. 
Skilled male workers generally (but not always) saw women as a threat, as indeed they 
were when Used by capitalists in this way. A few small print shops were started by 
philanthropic feminists after 1859; although they were never widespread, it did show that 
women were capable of carrying out tasks involved in print work. 
In the present era, as a result of male domination, the increasing role for women in the 
word-processing/composing/typesetting stage of production is treated by the unions as a 
threat rather than an opportunity to act to improve the status of women in the industry as 
slcilled workers. I will return to this point later when discussing the role of co-operatives in 
the industry. 
Output and employment 
Uke virtually the whole of British industry, printing was hit by the recession of the late 
19705 and early 1980s. Output and employment trends in the industry are shown below in 
Table 8.2 and Figure 8.1. Although output has steadily increased in value terms, this 
conceals fluctuations in the volume of output. In common with British industry as a whole, 
output fell in real terms during the depths of the recession in 1979-1983, although the 
decline in printing came later than in production as a whole. Since then output has been 
steadily increasing. The output volume index for the general printing and publishing 
subsector (SIC 4754, 1980.1(0) fell from 103.4 in 1979 to 93.6 in 1983, and has since climbed 
to 121.4 in 1986, a rise in output of 30% in 3 yean, significantly more than in the economy as 
a whole. 
11 HOfIJI III Chiltl1951, ,.161 
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Table 8.2 Output and employment in printing 
SIC 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Output 475 7,321 7,951 8,317 9,794 10,979 11,760 
(fm) 4754 2,549 2,732 2,944 3,501 3,906 4,425 
Output 4754 103.6 100.0 95.5 95.2 93.6 102.6 110.4 121.4 
volume 1-5 106.9 100.0 95.6 97.4 100.9 102.5 107.0 
Employment 475 339.3 322.1 309.4 302.1 299.4 301.9 
('000) 4754 136.1 127.6 120.5 115.7 118.1 118.1 
Notes: 
SIC 475 - All printing &: publishing SIC 4754 - General printing &: publishing 
SIC 1-5 - All production industries Volume index based on 1980 = 100. 
Source: Business Monitors PA475, PQ4754 
Figure 8.1 Output and employment in printing (Index, 1980=100) 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
• Printing 
output 
Year 
lEI Production 
industries 
Printing 
employment 
The initial fall in output was associated with a greater fall in employment; the number of 
workers in the subs ector fell by 15% from 136,100 in 1980 to 115,700 in 1983, as output fell 
by 6.7%. The same trend applies to the printing and publishing industry as a whole. Rising 
output since 1983 has been accomplished with an approximately steady level of 
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employment, representing an increase in the volume of output per worker of around 16% in 
the two years 1983-1985, and 27% over 1980-85. This tells a story which is typical of that of 
British industry: the 1979-83 recession was used as a means to bring about widespread 
redundancies and a lower level of employment, and the subsequent increase in demand has 
not been reflected in increased job opportunities, rather in increased profits, and higher 
wages for those who remain in the industry. The total wage bill as a proportion of gross 
value added and of output (see Table 83) fell during 1980-2, indicating that the effect of job 
losses was to increase profits, rather than productivity increases being shared with the 
remaining workers, although since then workers have recovered some ground since then. 
Table 83 Printing: share of wages in output and value added (%) 
Wages/Output 
Wages/GVA 
1980 
29.5 
59.0 
Sawra: Census of Production, PA475. 
Ownership and product structure 
1982 1984 
24.8 27.4 
54.0 56.0 
Printing is one of Britain's longest established industries, but unlike many others is not in 
long-term decline, for several reasons. F'lJ'Stly, it is not subject to a very high level of import 
penetration, although large publishers are increasingly placing book printing orders in 
lOu~t Asia, and there is European competition in gravure printing. The localised and 
bespoke nature of the industry's product, and fast turnaround time required, makes imports 
~, ~y in general, printing. Secondly, there is not a falling level of domestic 
demand; although output volume fell during the recession, by 1986 it was 17% higher than 
it had been in 1979. Employment in printing did not fall as fast as in manufacturing industry 
... whole over 1~ (8.8% compared to 175%). Finally, some commentators have 
heraldecl the rapkldevelopmentof electronic communications as spelling the death of the 
printing industry ,in its present fann. However, this is not • realistic position; rather than 
being in decline, 'ptlntiftl is' undergOing extensive restructuring, of which its partial 
~tion into tntOrmlittOn and communications industry is a part. These overall 
changeI do of, COUl'le eonc:eaI diffefelitial impacts; for iftstaJ\ce, London as the traditional 
," ) 
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centre of the industry has been particularly hard hit. It is the changing nature of the 
industry's product, skill requirements, labour process and ownership structure which gives 
it its present characteristics, rather than any process of absolute decline. 
The major trend in the ownership structure of the printing industry has been increasing 
centralisation of capital. In the 19608 many printing firms were absorbed into industrial 
groups with newspaper, book and magazine publishing, and leisure ('IV and radio) 
interests. During the 19708 and 1980s this process has continued, with trends towards 
integration into more diversified leisure and communications industries, which are in turn 
dominated by multinationals for whom printing is likely to be only one of many interests. 
The largest firms operate in book, gravure (magazine/periodical) and security printing, in 
part because of the very substantial cost of setting up in these areas, but also because of the 
direct links between printing and publishing. This trend can only be accelerated as the 
nature of print changes from a physical product to an electronic digitised image, and feeds 
directly into information and communications channels on a global scale. The strategy 
epitomised by Maxwell's Pergamon/BPCC group was extreme but typical12, involving 
acquisitions and rationalisation of medium to large finns which would be incorporated into 
the larger structure, usually with many redundancies and little consultation. 
At the same time as this process of centralisation has been taking place, there has been a 
new role developing for small printing firms. Originally this was made possible by offset 
litho technology. Indeed offset litho was first used and developed outside of the traditional 
printing industry, and was quickly adopted by printing departments of larger companies 
and institutions engaged in other forms of business; such 'in-house' printing was largely 
outside of the traditional areas of influence of the printing unions, and yet took business 
away from conventional printing firms. A second factor which enabled this new sector to 
grow was that the new and different skills involved could be recruited from outside of the 
traditional union control of the skilled labour market. The availability of cheap offset litho 
machines ensured that small jobbing printers covered a substantial part of the print market. 
More recently the declining cost of computer typesetting has also opened up further areas of 
print to small finns. 
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For many years this non-union growth was restricted to printing departments of primarily 
non-printing organisations, and to a minor part of the small jobbing printer sector known as 
the 'rat trade', where wages and conditions of employment were particularly badll. Existing 
union strength was sufficient to ensure that most printing firms retained traditional 
methods of recruitment and control of work organisation and allocation, through the threat 
of boycotting work which originated in non-union ('dosed') shops. This was particularly 
the case once the unions had realised the full impact of offset litho technology, which they 
had originally dismissed as not 'real' printing. 
A more recent development which has posed a potentially more serious threat to the 
position of labour is the emergence of high-street 'instant-print' shops. These have grown 
rapidly over the last 10 years, and have taken a great deal of work away from the traditional 
small jobbing printer, espedally the uncomplicated work with relatively high profit 
margins. Most instant print shops are franchised. This involves large capitals in a low-risk 
accumulation strategy, leaving individual franchisees - subject to market discipline - to deal 
with demand risk and control over labour at a time of restructuring and conflict. It is a 
classic case of Schutt lit Whittingtons 'devolvement' fragmentation strategy14. Most 
franchisees are deliberately selected from outside of the printing industry, to avoid 
'contamination' by established printing industry attitudes1S, ensuring a separation between 
franchised printing and the traditional (organised) printing industry. Franchised businesses 
are almost all non-union, with very poor wages and conditions by printing industry 
standards, and represent an area in which the unions find great difficulty in becoming 
established16. 
Despite this restructuring the traditional role of small printing firms has remained. Small 
jobbing printers are vulnerable to the new competition from non-union instant print shops, 
but are relatively strong in competition with large firms. This results from the nature of 
small firms' relationship with their market, and the same process makes it unlikely that 
small firms will be taken over by large firms as centralisation of capital continues: 
the bespoke nature of the product limits the technical advantage obtained from 
large scale prodUction, and there is often a strong marketing advantage arising 
23 Goa, 2981, p. '0-2. 
24 Sdtlllt & WJaitlm,IDII,1981. 
25 GoN,2981, p. 82. 
26 CUB, "" (I); Goa, 1987. 
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from local knowledge of customers and from geographical contiguity between 
printer and customer.17 
In most areas of traditional printing the only source of economies of scale is the length of the 
print run; thus large printing firms tend to be found in book and periodical printing where 
these conditions apply. Most general printing work involves only relatively short runs and 
thus small firms are not at a competitive disadvantage; in fact they may have an advantage 
through lower overheads, and sometimes through lower wage costs. 
By the early 19705 the print industry in Britain consisted of a very large number of small 
businesses operating in local markets and a small number of large printers operating in 
national and international markets; in between are 'intermediate' printers, competing in 
both markets and becoming increasingly squeezed from both sides18• Strong competition 
between small and intermediate printers has generally worked in favour of the former. 
In 1985 nearly 80% of all printing firms had less than 10 workers, whilst 98% had less than 
100; these produced 41% of the industry's total output. Small firms are much more 
important in printing than in manufacturing industry as a whole, where firms with less than 
10 workers make up only 69% of the total; those with less than 100 workers make up 94% 
and produce only 32% of output. Furthermore the role of small firms has been increasing in 
importance over time. The importance of production in small enterprises is even more 
marked in the general printing and publishing subsector (SIC 4754), compared to printing 
and publishing as a whole (SIC 475). In 1984 the average (mean) size in the former was 11.7 
workers, and 18.8 in the latter. 
Small printers are typically general jobbing printers, producing work with relatively 
unsophisticated technical requirements, although there are some highly Specialised firms 
providing a specific service to other firms in the industry. Printing co-operatives fall into the 
first category, thus the relationship to large firms is one of competition rather than one of 
dependence. Intermediate printers can often only compete by producing work of a higher 
quality than general jobbing printers, but the cost of equipment required to enter this field -
particularly colour work - is high, and furthermore faces competition from the high quality 
high volume large printing companies. Given this structure the role of small firms in the 
27 BPIF,2979. 
II ICC, 2916, -p. %. 
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For many years this non-union growth was restricted to printing departments of primarily 
non-printing organisations, and to a minor part of the small jobbing printer sector known as 
the 'rat trade', where wages and conditions of employment were particularly bad13. Existing 
union strength was suffident to ensure that most printing firms retained traditional 
methods of recruitment and control of work organisation and allocation, through the threat 
of boycotting work which originated in non-union ('closed') shops. This was particularly 
the case once the unions had realised the full impact of offset litho technology, which they 
had originally dismissed as not 'real' printing. 
A more recent development which has posed a potentially more serious threat to the 
position of labour is the emergence of high-street 'instant-print' shops. These have grown 
rapidly over the last 10 years, and have taken a great deal of work away from the traditional 
small jobbing printer, espedally the uncomplicated work with relatively high profit 
margins. Most instant print shops are franchised. This involves large capitals in a low-risk 
accumulation strategy, leaving individual franchisees - subject to market discipline - to deal 
with demand risk and control over labour at a time of restructuring and conflict. It is a 
classic case of Schutt It Whittingtons 'devolvement' fragmentation strategy14. Most 
franchisees are deliberately selected from outside of the printing industry, to avoid 
'contamination' by established printing industry attitudes1S, ensuring a separation between 
franchised printing and the traditional (organised) printing industry. Franchised businesses 
are almost all non-union, with very poor wages and conditions by printing industry 
standards, and represent an area in which the unions find great difficulty in becoming 
established16. 
Despite this restructuring the traditional role of small printing firms has remained. Small 
jobbing printers are vulnerable to the new competition from non-union instant print shops, 
but are relatively strong in competition with large firms. This results from the nature of 
small firms' relationship with their market, and the same process makes it unlikely that 
small firms will be taken over by large firms as centralisation of capital continues: 
the 'bespoke nature of the product limits the technical advantage obtained from 
large scale production, and there is often a strong marketing advantage arising 
23 Coa, %987, ,. So.%. 
14 Sell"", 81 WIIiumgfoll,1911. 
15 Coa, 19B1, p. B2. 
16 CLEB, 1fII (I); Coa, 1911. 
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from local knowledge of customers and from geographical contiguity between 
printer and customer.17 
In most areas of traditional printing the only source of economies of scale is the length of the 
print run; thus large printing £inns tend to be found in book and periodical printing where 
these conditions apply. Most general printing work involves only relatively short runs and 
thus small £inns are not at a competitive disadvantage; in fact they may have an advantage 
through lower overheads, and sometimes through lower wage costs. 
By the early 19705 the print industry in Britain consisted of a very large number of small 
businesses operating in local markets and a small number of large printers operating in 
national and international markets; in between are 'intermediate' printers, competing in 
both markets and becoming increasingly squeezed from both sides18• Strong competition 
between small and intermediate printers has generally worked in favour of the fonner. 
In 1985 nearly 80% of all printing firms had less than 10 workers, whilst 98% had less than 
100; these produced 41% of the industry's total output. Small firms are much more 
important in printing than in manufacturing industry as a whole, where firms with less than 
10 workers make up only 69% of the total; those with less than 100 workers make up 94% 
and produce only 32% of output. Furthermore the role of small firms has been increasing in 
importance over time. The importance of production in small enterprises is even more 
marked in the general printing and publishing subsector (SIC 4754), compared to printing 
and publishing as a whole (SIC 475). In 1984 the average (mean) size in the former was 11.7 
workers, and 18.8 in the latter. 
Small printers are typically general jobbing printers, producing work with relatively 
unsophisticated technical requirements, although there are some highly specialised firms 
providing a specific service to other firms in the industry. Printing co-operatives fall into the 
first category, thus the relationship to large firms is one of competition rather than one of 
dependence. Intermediate printers can often only compete by producing work of a higher 
quality than general jobbing printers, but the cost of equipment required to enter this field. 
particularly colour work· is high, and furthermore faces competition from the high quality 
high volume large printing companies. Given this structure the role of small firms in the 
17 BPIF,I979. 
IB ICC, I9B6, 'P. le. 
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printing industry can be primarily characterised as falling into Schutt and Whittington'sl9 
'independent and competitive' category; most printing firms do not have direct trading 
links with large finns. As always however such categorisation is not perfect, and some finns 
operate in the'dependent' category, subcontracting and supplying large firms. 
Besides a division into a few large and many small firms, the printing sector is also 
differentiated by product, although in practice product and ownership divisions are closely 
linked. 'Printing' as an industrial sector generally includes publishing, because of the 
frequent dual role of finns as printer/publishers and close links between the two activities. 
However the dual role of firms is typical of only part of the industry - specifically 
newspapers but also some book and magazine publishers - although it is becoming more 
important as the incorporation of printing into conglomerates takes place. Furthermore the 
nature of work and production in printing is very different to that in publishing, and 
restructuring has a different impact on each; whilst one effect of current restructuring is to 
bring printing and publishing closer together, it is useful to keep a conceptual distinction 
between the two as far as possible. The general printing sector exists in addition to the three 
subsectOI'l (newspapers, books and periodicals); it includes some specialist printers (e.g. 
security and dty printers) but also the bulk of jobbing general printers, which is where most 
co-operatives operate. 
This relates to a further characteristic of the printing industry which is of particular 
importance when considering co-operatives: the special relationship between printing finn 
and customer. Printing is mostly engaged in produdng a bespoke product, to a particular 
customer's specifications, frequently leading to a close relationship between producer and 
COI\IUmer, and encouraging market specialisation by particular firms. This characteristic has 
specifically worked in favour of printing co-operatives. 
The first half the 19801 has seen the restructuring process in the printing industry moving 
ahead very rapidly, as historic processes within the industry coindde with massive changes 
taking place elsewhere in the economy; the impact of this within the industry is illustrated 
by both the changes in output, employment and productivity detaUed earUer, and by the 
battles between print unions and employers. 
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The growth of the co-operative sector also stemmed from the particular economic and 
political circumstances of the later 19705 and early 1980s. The combination of all of these 
factors - resulting in the growth of print co-operatives - will be examined shortly, but first I 
will briefly mention the GLC's intervention initiative as a response to the state of the 
printing industry in the early 19805. 
GLCIGLEB sector strategy 
The intervention followed the general principles set out in the GLC's London Industrial 
Strategy; that the restructuring taking place would not be ignored but an attempt would be 
made to change its terms - restructuring for labour rather than restructuring for capital. The 
'sector strategy' was important in printing for two reasons: firstly, the industry plays a 
major role in the London economy - the combined paper, printing and publishing sector is 
now the largest manufacturing industry in London. Secondly, one aspect of restructuring is 
employers' use of technological change, and consequent new sldll and labour requirements, 
to move out of London and away from the strong labour organisation there. Such a move 
was facilitated by the ease of separating out functions within an organisation as electronic 
communication and data transmission improved, and as print material becomes more 
computer-based. 
The aims of this strategy were deliberately limited, recognising the restricted resources at 
the council's disposal; the main ones were:20 
• to improve and increase the jobs available to women and and black workers, who are 
restricted to poor opportunities and inferior jobs in the industry; 
• to ensure that new technologies are not introduced in ways that lead to unemployment 
and desldlling, using them to produce better rather than worse jobs; 
• to extend and strengthen the role of workers and their organisations in the running of 
finns. 
In practice this intervention meant working with a few firms in the hope of providing 
examples which others might follow and which would strengthen the experience of printing 
unions in dealing with technical change and capitalists' strategies of implementing such 
change. But rather than investing simply in order to increase competitiveness GLEB aimed 
20 GLBB, 114(.); GLC 1985. 
~. 
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to provide investment in accordance with the above principles. Printing co-ops were seen as 
potentially playing an important role in the achievement of these aims, given the right 
support, and thus they played a central role in the sector strategy. Certainly printing co-ops 
had historically been amongst the most progressive employers in the industry. One key 
result was that the GLC/GLEB was prepared to intervene in order to support printing 
co-operatives, both through prOvision of finance and purchasing power. 
The strategy was ultimately limited by the restriction of funds available to GLEB and the 
abolition of the GLC in April 1986, but the role of co-operatives within the sector strategy 
was maintained by the activities of the LCEB and LCP A2l (both GLEB initiatives) which 
retained elements of the original GLC approach. 
Altmuative print 
A further significant effect of the widespread availability of cheap offset litho technology, 
with very different implications for the role of labour and trade unions both within the 
industry and generally was the emergence of the alternative press in the late 1960s. Many 
underground and alternative publications were established (International Times and Oz 
being amongst the best known), often fuelled by anarchist and anti-establishment motives. 
More significant was the impetus this gave to community printshops, which developed in 
parallel "with the alternative press. They were intent on opening up a new field of publishing 
outside of the establishment or mainstream, but were more interested in radical and 
community politics rather than the utopianism of the alternative movement. Although the 
underground press was vigorous for a decade o~ so, those parts of it which had not become 
politidsed either fade;ct away or became commerdalised. The initiative then passed to the 
much more politically-oriented community presses and publishers all over the country; this 
movement too felt commercial pressures but also had a related clearly defined role as 
IeI'Vfce agents to- Community, political and campaigning organisations. It was this 
development which fousled the basis for the emergence of printing co-operatives in the 
19701 and 198Ot. 
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CO-OPERATIVES IN PlUNTlNG 
The printing industry is one where co-operatives have traditionally been active. They were 
prominent in the co-operative movement in the nineteenth century, and although these 
older co-operatives have been subject to general decline in the twentieth century, three of 
the seven CPF co-ops reDlairung in 1986 were in printing. When the resurgence of workers 
co-operatives began in the 1970s, printing co-operatives were present from the beginning. 
The growth in their numbers is shown below in Table 8.4. The combined printing and 
publishing sector is now the largest area of co-op activity in production in Britain. 
Table 8.4 Formations of printing co-op. 
Year No. % of aU 
formations 
pre-1977 5 
1977 5 16 
1978 5 7 
1979 6 13 
1980 6 9 
1981 5 7 
1982 5 4 
1983 6 3 
1984 15 7 
1985 13 6 
1986 11 5 
Total 82 6 
Sorace: UCOM (1981); own figures 
These new co-operatives frequently had an overtly political orientation, often growing from 
the alternative press of the 1960s and 1970s. Some were directly linked to alternative 
publications (e.g. Leeds Alternative Press, Rochdale Alternative Press),or more generally to 
the initiative to establish a free and open pres., from which they derived their names as well 
as their orientation (Manchester Free Press, Tyneside Free Press, Cambridge Free Press). 
Many of these printing co-ops were, and still are, specifically oriented to working for 
community groups, campaigning organisations, political groups, charities, and later, local 
authority work. 
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This overt political orientation of printing co-operatives is not new. One of the early CPF 
co-operatives was Leicester Printers, founded in 1887. It was established as a joint initiative 
between local trades unions and consumer co-operatives - who supplied the bulk of starting 
capital and orders in the early.stages - with one objective being to draw the trade union and 
co-operative movements closer together22• It was still operating in 1987 with 50 workers and 
a turnover of over £1 million a year23 (making it relatively large by printing industry 
standards)24. Another printing co-op, Blackfriars Press, was established in 1916 with close 
links to the Independent Labour Party; indeed, only ILP members were eligible to join the 
co-op25. 
The Webbs found similar examples in France. They commented that the majority of French 
co-operatives "had become favourites of .... the more conservative-minded economists and 
political thinkers .... their members hold aloof from, and to a large extent are avowedly 
hostile to, the French Socialist Party .... [and] have apparently little connection with French 
Trade Unionism"26. But this was less often the case in printing; there was "L'Emancipation, a 
strictly communist printing society .... its members are all trade unionists ... they divide 
among themselves, over and above their wages at the trade union rate, none of the profits, 
which .... go either to the reserve fund or to collective objects of a social1cind." They also 
noted another successful printing co-operative "L'Union Typographique de ViUeneuve St. 
Georges, founded in 1906 out of the movement for the nine hours day by five compositors"27. 
tJ' Co-ops emerged during a period of major change in the industry towards the end of the 
19th century, as the extension of capitalist control over the industry in the 19th century 
intensified class conflict. This conflict was most severe over attempts by capital to wrest 
control of production from male craft workers and deskill their positions. 
UnHb tnide union in' many industries in the early 20th century, those in printing did not 
can for NltionaUAtiOft or IOdaUsation of the Industry. Unemp~t in printing wu much 
lower than in t'rther industria in the inter-war period, and Oilld considers that there was a 
tacit agreement between unions and capitaliltl that private ownership would continue28. 
22 c::w.MoIt, 7..78; KlriItImt,7..n. 
25 ~ ,.,.".." RIfU"",IIfPrWly SoddiII 
24 AI".,.",.U _ f'*IJr .... .,., .,. t:llpllltliII' firm bt 7.988. 
25 BlM:lfrltm ",." ,.."..,., ."., 0{ FrItfuIJy Socidia. 
2f NIWI S. I, 7.17.4, ,. 7. 
21M/p·7 . 
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This had not always been the case. In the late 19th centwy there had been attempts by local 
branches to swing the unions behind support for the establishment of producer 
co-operatives: 
Sooner or later we shall have all trades becoming co-operative producers. 
There will come a day .... when we shall do without the capitalist altogether, 
and we shall reap the just reward of our labour.29 
Child continues: 
But in 1890 there were only four producers' co-operatives in the industry, at 
Manchester, Leicester, Edinburgh and London. By far the most important was 
the Manchester Society, established in 1869. Its workshops were models of 
hygiene, safety and comfort for the worken, and trade union negotiators 
frequently referred to them as models for other employers to emulate. The 
Society encouraged its members to join the appropriate union, always paid 
union rates, observed union conditions and pioneered shorter houn. About 
1900 it introduced the forty-eight hour week. During the long negotiations for 
shorter houn in the printing industry in the early twentieth centwy, the 
example of the Manchester Co-operative Society was often dted approvingly 
by the unions ..... [However,] the unions generally gave little encouragement to 
the co-operative producers' movement. They feared that the co-operative 
'workers' would develop an 'employer' outlook, and lose their interest in 
unionism. The T.A. went so far as investing several thousand pounds in loan 
or share capital of some half dozen printing co-operatives, but none of the 
others gave even this much support30• 
Nevertheless printing co-ops fonned an important element of the producer co-op sector in 
the early 20th century. In 1920 there were nineteen in printing, out of seventy-two for the 
whole of industry. The affinity between co-operatives and the printing industry is 
unswprising. Printing is predominantly a trade of craft workers (although this is now 
changing) with a strong tradition of collective organisation, centered on the union 'chapel' 
(or branch) within the workplace. The allocation of craft work to unemployed worken in 
the industry has been controlled by trade societies and trade unions through the 'call-list' 
since the earliest days. Harris points out that certain features of TU chapels in the printing 
industry mirror the organisation of co-operatives. In particular these are: 
• autonomy and self-administration; 
• the importance of voting and democratic dedsion-maJdng; 
2J TypofrrapIIiad Alladldan, Rqart tJf DdIJ* M.I.", 2U'". 5. CfIII*I ill Qiltl.2H7". 2.17). 
3D CIrIIi, 2H7". 23B. . 
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• the original function of the chapel as the focus of worker~rganised job design and 
work allocation, the prerogative of workers rather than management; 
• the role of the chapel in legitimating new recruitment and training of apprentices31• 
A second important factor is the predominance of small £inns in the printing industry, 
particularly in general printing. The figures quoted in the previous section on the industry 
as a whole show this quite clearly, and co-operatives are not particularly small by industry 
standards. The average size of a NGA chapel in London is six member&32, and the median 
size of a printing finn is certainly below nine workers. The result of this is that the tendency 
of ~peratives to be small is not a competitive disadvantage in the printing industry 
(although of courae other factors - such as underfinancing - may be). 
I have noted arUer that the predominance of small finns and relative ease of entry for 
co-operatives have been aided by technical change - in particular the development of offset 
litho and computer typesetting - which have served to make it easier and cheaper for small 
firms (and co-operatives) to be set up. While in many cases this has been used by capital to 
undermine the power of labour (particularly through in-house and instant printing), the 
same changes are widening access to print, and they fadlitated the emergence of the 
altemative pretI. Marshall points out that in commercial terms there are now widespread 
opportunities for IINlI to medium-sized printers and publishers; the problems arise when 
trying to break into distribution monopolies. He continues 
It fa this double-edged nature of new communications technology which 
makes it VfII'Y diffic:ult to limply say that new technology is bad technology. 
1be posstbllities for increasing media access and democracy are enonnous, 
nationally and intematfcmally. But such possibilities exitt against a background 
of inc:reulna capital amcentration and market control of print and other media 
by transnational companies whose polides of profit and power militate 
directly apinltany beneftdal·application&of the technologies. It is not enough 
to .. "What will the new. system do?" More important is "Who will control 
it?"31 . 
This is of direct relevance to co-operatives. Not only do they have the potential for 
democratic organisation. ~thin the workplace, but in printing (and associated publishing) 
theN II the additioftll· potential for contributing to working class expression and 
organisation through open media acc:eu. Marshall'. qualification is of crucial importance, 
.U Af.IWrII,I_. 
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however. Are the restrictions of operating in the market such that printing co-operatives 
will be forced into the same mode of operation as other small printing firms - particularly 
when faced with competition from burgeoning high street instant print operations and all of 
the undermining of working conditions which they embody? 
The changing nature of worker co-operatives in the 'new wave' has provided even more 
reason for co-operatives to be set up in printing. In contrast to the older co-ops - who 
adopted conventional forms of management and division of labour - the newer 
co-operatives have emphasised collective management and job organisation, often aiming to 
rotate tasks and skills. Craft workers in printing have traditionally been able to exert some 
measure of control over working conditions, and this has given printing co-operatives some 
flexibility in reorganising work on a more egalitarian basis. One consequence of labour's 
strong position and high degree of control has been relatively high wages for craft workers. 
These high wage levels have provided workers in printing co-operatives with flexibility 
which other co-op workers do not have. If they wish to develop alternative fonns of 
production and the division of labour - which may result in reduced efficiency in 
commercial terms - printing co-op members are at least in a strong poSition compared to, 
say, workers in clothing co-ops, whose wages are so low that reductions in commercial 
efficiency may not be sustainable. However there are two important, related forces acting on 
printing co-operatives which tend to constrain attempts to reorganise and restructure 
production. The first is that the strength of craft workers is based upon control over 
recruitment, and co-operatives' attempts to sustain 'open' membership policies and to 
demystify skills and technOlogy may undermine craft status; this can sour relations with the 
print unions, in an industry where (in many sectors at least) union influence over the 
allocation of work is very strong. Secondly, there is the general point that the trade union 
movement does not acknowledge the legitimacy of wage levels in co-operatives 
undermining established union rates, even if associated with other gains (see chapter 5). 
Printing co-operative. - commercial performance 
While the number of printing co-operatives has been growing steadily, the increase in 
output has been even more impressive. Total output has grown from £O.52m in 1980 (with 
:'1'<. 
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10 co-ops) to £3.2m in 1984 (with 24 co-ops) and an estimated £6.3m in 1986 (26 co-ops)34. 
This growth has resulted from the rapid expansion of existing co-ops as well as the 
establishment of new ones, and has undoubtedly been aided by the expansion of the co-op 
sector in general and the rapid growth of the printing industry in 1983-6; these co-ops 
entered the industry without having to go through the restructuring process which 
dominated the industry earlier, and were well placed to take advantage of demand growth 
following 1983. Although growth has been impressive, however, the total output of printing 
co-ops remains miniscule in relation to the printing industry. Even when compared to the 
general printing subsector, co-ops produce perhaps 0.1% of total output, and with total 
output of £6m and employment of ISO, are collectively the equivalent of only one large 
printing finn. 
Comparative results for the printing co-op sector are reported in chapter 7. Two factors are 
immediately obvious from these. Firstly, the commercial perfonnance of printing 
co-operatives is significantly worse than that of small capitalist printing firms3S. That is, 
wages are lower, gross output and value added per worker are lower; value added makes 
up a lower proportion of output, and, despite wages being lower they take up a higher 
proportion of gross output. The low level of wages, output and value added per worker 
reflects the insecure commercial poSition which co-operatives hold in a capitalist economy. 
The high proportion of wages paid out in value added indicates that low wages are not paid 
out of 'choice' .. indeed co-ops are probably paying as much (or even more than) they can 
afford in wages commensurate with the retention of a surplus sufficient to meet payments 
due to capital (interest), the claimJ of the state (tax), and the maintenance of a sufficient 
stock of the means of production to enable the co-ops continued operation (depredation and 
capital expenditure). This consistently high claim of wages is due to the relatively poor 
commerdal performance of CX)o()perativesi this poor performance itself could have several 
explanatlons:underfinandng, some Inherent 'inefficiency' of co-operatives, or the pursuit of 
objectives which run counter to commercial ones. 'These have been explored earlier. At this 
point It II Important to note" that if co-ops are underfinanced, low surplus retained will 
exaeerbate tbiI situation and any consequent poor performance, thU8 reinforcing a vicious 
u .,...",.,..",., 10 .. far'" _1dII4 of fIMrcW MIll" ""',l1li4", 11M """""oft»-Opl ".., JUJt.". 
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circle unless it can be somehow broken; underfinandng certainly is a potential cause of the 
low labour productivity exhibited in low output and value added per worker. 
Secondly, the relative performance of co-operatives has improved consistently over time. 
This suggests that the position of co-ops is, in part at least, due to their relative youth 
compared to capitalist firms36. Initial problems of underfinandng may have been alleviated 
over time. The consistent improvement in the position of co-operatives suggests that, if 
continued, within 5 years or so it could equal the performance of comparable capitalist 
printing firms. 
In absolute terms, however, the performance of printing co-operatives has been superior to 
the clothing and retail wholefood sectors, despite being poor relative to printing industry 
levels. Thus, although wages in printing co-ops are in general below industry levels, they 
are high in co-op terms - and improving. In order to explain and understand this, we can 
first look at print co-ops' market relationships. 
Printing co-operatives and markets 
Pressures towards degeneration for co-operatives are transmitted through market 
relationships, and the particular nature of market relationships for printing co-ops is an 
essential factor in explaining their success in co-op terms. For many, the link to a Specific 
market is aucial. Often print co-ops grew out of the 'alternative print' movement and retain 
links to community publishers. The provision of prilllting services to political and 
community groups, trade unions, charities and local authorities provides a major element of 
printing co-op work. Others are closely associated with alternative newspapers, which 
provides a stable base market for the co-op.37 Given the ideological position of printing 
co-operatives they frequently prefer to deal with these customers rather than 
straightforward commercial customers; some co-ops will also refuse to handle sexist or 
radst material, and this is less likely to be supplied to them by these broadly 'political' 
customers. In addition many such customers prefer to deal with a co-operative rather than a 
capitalist printing firm, and there is an amount of market segmentation at this community 
and political end of the printing industry, from which co-ops benefit. 
36 Thil.".,,,,,,,t CIUI 1M DDmIllWl. Dclll ",.,.,. in tM chqIIr 5 ."ggat. thIIl prolHIbIy 1/3 of IIll aH1pI /J1IIl ,rrUUl fi"". 
4isqpaIr fDithi713 Y"" of [rmrwilm, both slstnUtl 1M ctmIiMml to he '",.tu,.,' (i ... 7'O't .fIIrt-", .tag,) by tM 118' of 3 or 4. 
37 ,.g.lMtlI Altmrlltiw P,."./lArb OthD Paper; RDchdIW Altmrlltiw Pm./RIJcJu1JIU', Altmrlltiw Pqer. 
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2B8 Perftmnance of Co-operatives 
Printing co-ops are sheltered from the full force of direct competition with capitalist firms, 
as their market does not operate solely on commercial criteria. However, this market is 
limited and in danger of becoming saturated by the rapid growth of the printing co-op 
sector. The situation was eased by the emergence of radical local authorities and 'munidpal 
sodalism' in the early 1980si co-ops benefited when these authorities used criteria derived 
from their sodal wider polides in addition to commerdal criteria when allocating 
contracts38. Similarly the expansion of the wider co-operative sector itself generated work 
for printing co-ops. Although the extent of inter-trading is limited, there have been 
numerous examples of co-operatives and support organisations specifically giving work to 
printing co-operatives. More generally, the expansion of local level political and cultural 
activity through the early 1980s <often by groups receiving local authority funding) 
provided a further boost. 
With the abolition of the metropolitan counties and the GLC in 1986, and legal restrictions 
on contract compliance and the use of non-commercial criteria in awarding contracts, local 
authorities will be a less important source of business for co-operatives. This is unfortunate, 
as the partial shielding from competitive forces has been important in enabling printing 
co-operatives to expand their operations so rapidly over the first half of the 1980s. The loss 
of this trade will exacerbate problems caused by saturation of the community print market. 
For instance, when Lithosphere wanted to expand in 1983/4 it did so away from its 
~'!, traditional customer base (which it had carried with it since days as the printing department 
~}t of War on Want) and entered the market for colour video sleeves. The move away from the 
political market into a strictly competitive market reflected both a strong commercial as 
opposed to ideologJcal strand in Lithosphere's operations39, and the limits of the political 
print market. 
A further attempt at intervening in the market and protecting co-ops from the adverse 
effects of competition has been the formation of the London Co-operative Printers 
. . , ' 
Association (LCPA). This was formed in 1983 and initially comprised of London's four 
largest print co-operatives (Litholphere, Spider Web, Calverts and Blaclaose Press) and was 
initiated with Iundfng and assistance from GLEB as part of its printing Sector Strategy40. Its 
51.., ..... GttB ,."..,.",.,. }oIIIf OU/GLBB ,.".,., 1'fIiIt:t, it .... ron4itiDn tf 0.."."." ",., 0.""."", 
'lllrik.".,,,.,., .... '.,,. 
!, 11'1'/1"'. ' 
'4ItatBl,.IJ. 
Printing Co-operatives 289 
aim was to replace (at least partially) competition between London's printing co-operatives 
with planned co-ordination, so that co-operatives 
could plan their investments to compete against each other as little as possible 
... [and] ... share common marketing fadlities, so that jointly they could offer a 
whole range of printing fadlities in the same way that medium sized 
commerdal print firms d041. 
Since its establishment the LCP A has expanded; at one time it had 11 members, but by 1987 
this had been reduced to 6. This was due partly to internal disagreements between the 
co-operatives over strategy, and these difficulties were increased by the abolition of the 
GLC and effective abolition of GLEB in its original form; the LCP A is now primarily a 
vehicle for the joint purchasing of inputs; co-ordination of marketing and output had been 
relegated as an objective. 
We can therefore identify the following factors which have contributed to the strong growth 
of printing co-operatives, in the general context of the growth of the co-operative sector. 
• the relatively low cost of establishing a printing operation, especially for basic work 
(i.e. not high quality, high volume multi-colour work); 
• a long tradition of collective organisation by skilled workers, and a high degree of 
control over the production process; 
• continual contesting of the control of the labour process between employers and 
workers in the industry, with the former using technological developments to undermine 
workers' craft status and strong organisation; 
• the historical importance of printing co-operatives within the co-operative movement; 
• the opportunity for a more radical approach to the restructuring of production, in 
keeping with the aims of the new co-operative movement; , 
• the close direct links between producer and consumer, due to the bespoke nature of 
the printing product, enable printing co-operatives to operate in a partially segmented 
product market where there is some protection from competition' and market forces are 
mediated; 
47 GLC 7985, p. 30. 
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• favourable market conditions, with the expansion of the alternative print sector 
through the late 19708 and early 19808, on top of a general increase in demand for printed 
materiaL 
As a consequence, printing co-operatives are in a relatively strong commercial position and 
hence have some protection against tendencies to degenerate. 
Objectif1e, of printing co-operatit1a 
The politidsation of printing co-operatives is demonstrated in the following list of their 
stated objectives: 
t. e+) Ihuing and developing a broad range of IldDs 
2. e-) providIn,a produd or M'Ylce felt to be particularly Important 
3. (-) giving members a grea_ opportunity to have a say in managing the enterprise 
4. (=) increalb!8 employment in the c:o-operatlve 
5. e.) r..arpnJslng in a c:Ufferent manner to that which might be expected in a typical company 
6- e+) maxlmJaillg the level oIwapt and baa_ 
7. e-) maxbllising job aecurity for existing workers 
8. e+) maxbllisin, pofitabWty and effidency 
9. e+) provldblga eervice to a particular special group within the community 
10. C+) rotatins workerl between a variety of job8 
11. C+) partldpating in the wider labour movement 
12- e-) other 
(13. e-) irlcreallng the irlVolvement with the wider e»-operatlve movement)-
• no repJiea aupporIing thiI objective. 
(+), e-), e.) denoteI the relatlvelmpcrtance 01 each reply irI the printing co-operatlve HCtor compared to 
eo-operatlvea .. a whoIe; .. J. e+) m_ that JftCII1I prlntin, co-operatlv. pve thiI amwer than the average. 
There are four conclusions to be drawn from these results. firstly, great importance is 
attached to extencUns printing sldJls beyond the normal restrictions of a white male craft; 
eombined with further objectives of partidpation in nmning the business, job rotation and 
reorganising work aIcmg non-apltalist linea, it appears that print oo-ops are particularly 
concemed with deveIopina the labour procell in the industry along alternative Jines to that 
in capltaUat ftrmI. Secondly, productivity and effidency objectives rate fairly low, although 
they appear to be more important than in the co-op sector u a whole. Thirdly, links to 
particular marketi are important; thiI can be either through the spedflc nature of the 
market, luch u .w:tng a particular group, or the nature of the product provided to that 
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market. Finally, although external non-business links are limited and of generally a low 
priority for all co-ops, in printing co-ops links to the labour movement are of relatively 
greater importance than those to the co-operative movement; in fact no print co-ops rated 
links with the co-operative movement as an important objective. This finding supports the 
view that workers in printing co-operatives are more politidsed than co-op workers 
generally, and reflects the nature of class organisation within the industry. 
Relationship with trade unions 
This politicisation both reflects and is reflected in a high level of unionisation within 
printing co-operatives. Of 20 print co-ops responding to the questionnaire, only one had no 
union members. The NGA was represented in 13 of the co-ops and SOGAT '82 in 7.42 These 
18 co-operatives had between them over 100 members of the two print unions. Harris found 
similar results in London, where 3 out of 14 print co-ops examined were non-unionised; one 
of these was very new and one other was a quasi - co-op, a co-op partnership which has 
more in common with the 'instant print' trade than the rest of the printing co-operative 
sector. Certainly printing co-ops have a much higher level of unionisation than the British 
worker co-operative sector as a whole43. 
There are several reasons for unionisation. First there is the general political commitment of 
print co-ops to the trade union movement. Second, the strong position of print unions and 
their ability to boycott work from non-union shops means that in many parts of the industry 
union membership, and the consequent obligation to meet union rates and conditions of 
work, is essential for firms to secure work. Third, some co-ops aim to change the more 
reactionary elements of trades union policy from within. Finally, it has often been a 
condition of local authority funding (notably with GLEB) that a co-op is unionised. For 
these reasons, the concern of trade unions earlier this century that workers in printing 
co-ops would lose interest in unionism has not been borne out in practice. 
The relationship between co-ops and trade unions has been varied, with many aspects 
different to it. As noted earlier, there are elements which both co-operatives and print trade 
union chapels have in common, but there are also strains on the relationship. Many print 
co-operatives see it as a major objective to not only bring women and/or black workers into 
42 Som. C»-OJI' IuJd membm of both lDIicmI. 
43 .. cJuqIIItr 5, TIIb,. 5.8. 
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skilled trades, but into the white male dominated trades unions as well. Co-ops which have 
policies of giving priority to employment of women and black workers have run into 
opposition from the unions, as this clashes with the latters' control of labour recruitment in 
the industry. Conventionally, print unions allocate workers into vacancies from the 
'callbook', or list of its unemployed members; if a vacancy arises in a unionised finn the 
union allocates the job in rotation to the next appropriate member on the callbook. Given 
that the unions, and hence the callbook, are dominated by white males, this practice 
conflicts with some co-ops' policies of positively recruiting women and black workers into 
the trade. Furthennore, commitment by co-operatives to rotate workers between skills and 
demystifying the trade could undermine the status of craft status and differentials. As a 
result such co-ops see changing the print unions from within - perhaps inducing them to 
make exceptions to recruitment policy in the case of progressive enterprises such as 
c:o-operatives -, as an essential aspect of their trade union membership. The difficulties of 
this task should not'be underestimated. Print co-operatives are tiny in industry terms and 
do not yet have significant weight within unions. Secondly, the unions have fought bitterly 
in the past to exclude women from craft poSitions, and associated aijitudes are 
entrenched". 
As second point of conflict is the wages issue. 1bere is general concern in the trade union 
movement that co-ops will undermine estabUshed wage rates, and this is perhaps even 
stronger in the printing industry. Many co-ops - especially in the early days - pay low wages 
in an attempt to bec~me viable, typified by those with 'undercapitalised' start ups. Print 
unions in particular are opposed to low wage labour entering the market, as it undermines 
their ability to 'fine tune' wages through the control of labour supply from unemployed 
members via the call-book. Certainly the low level of wages in some print co-ops offers 
grounds for concern. Even in co-ops which pay at or around the union rate, there stiD exists 
the potential for underminins pay rates by unregulated hours of work. The working of 
hours in excesI of the basic working week'S by co-op workers (often unpaid) is widespread. 
The, reucma for uniontsation in printing co-operatives are varied; those given include the 
followfnS: 
44 MIrIIItII, 2m; 0dII"'" 2111. 
U .,.,NGA ...... J7.1 ...... 
• protecting workers' interests within the co-operative 
• in order to obtain work / closed shop 
• general solidarity with the trade union movement 
(total = 19 co-operatives) 
Source: Co-op survey 
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The strongly politicised nature of the co-operatives is manifested in the desire to change 
some union practices and to build general links and solidarity. Only 1 out of 19 unionised 
printing co-operatives did not state general solidarity as an objective. Although 6 of the 19 
stated that part of their reason for unionisation was its necessity in obtaining work, only 1 of 
these did not also support solidarity. 
The low importance given to the role of unions within co-operatives is surprising, and 
suggests an idealised conception of co-operatives' internal organisation. Harris46 has given 
this issue some attention in printing co-operatives. He suggests that the union chapel 
provides an important alternative source of decision making within the co-operative, and 
also that the workers implicitly agree to use the union as 'an external arbiter and reference 
point', on issues such as wages and hours of work. 
The chapel appears to form a structural link with the larger union body and an 
alternative source of authority not only on wages, but also because it can call 
upon external arbitration in time of dispute. As a form of workplace 
representation, the chapel forms an alternative system of decision-making 
which is democratic and participative in nature and which could be seen as 
forming an appendage to the main decision-making system of voting in the 
co-operative47• 
The is an apparent contrast between my results and those of Harris: he finds the issue of 
workplace representation to be much more important. There are two possible explanations 
for this. Firstly, Harris considered only fully-unionised co-operatives, whereas the 
questionnaire results include all co-ops with a union presence. Secondly, it is likely that the 
use of the union as an external reference point is actually considered as solidarity -
maintaining union rates etc - rather than as protecting workers' interests. The latter is more 
likely to be narrowly interpreted as the union's role during a dispute, and while expansion 
has been so rapid there have been very few instances where co-operatives have attempted 
46 HJmV, 19B5. 
47 i1ziIf., ". 34-5. 
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to make workers redundant; in addition, the small size of most printing co-ops has meant 
that other disputes could generally be solved within co-operative meetings rather than 
needing external arbitration. 
Printing co-operative. in haru:e 
A comparative exercise has been carried out for co-operatives and capitalist firms in the 
printing sector in France by Defoumy48. The French co-operative sector is both larger and 
longer established than that in Britain, but like here there is a concentration of co-operatives 
is in printing. Defoumy's results contrast with those above, although they may reflect the 
likely state of British printing co-operatives in perhaps ten years' time. His main findings 
were as follows: 
• Gross output per hetId: significantly lower in co-ops than capitalist firms, with the 
relative position poorer in smaller co-operatives, worsening from 1971 to 1979. 
• Gross rxllue tuldtd per hetId: lower in small co-operatives than small capitalist firms, but 
with a smaIJer differential than for gross output; generally higher in large co-ops than large 
firms, but as with the above, the relative position of co-ops deteriorating over time. 
The combination of the two results above means that 
• Gross t1tIlue added/gross output: consistently and significantly higher in co-operatives, 
indicating that co-ops are more productive. 
• W"I'S per hetI4: slightly lower In small co-ops than small firms, slightly higher in large 
co-ops, but no major difference overall. 
• WillIS/gross wlue .dlll: marginally higher in co-ops. 
Together these results8Uggest that French printing co-operatives have a much lower level of 
ou~t or tumover per worker than comparable capitalist firms, but that co-op workers are 
more productive in their use of material Inputs and capital equipment than their 
counterparts in capitaHat firms; tbia contrats with the situation in British printing co-opt, 
where both tumover aftc:I value acided are lower than in comparable capitalist firms. 
Defoumy aIIo presentI cia. on the capitallntenslty of co-ops and capltaHat firms. He finds 
that co-opt are relatively undercapita1ised, but use their limited capital assets more 
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productively than do capitalist finns. Beyond this his conclusions were different for co-ops 
of small (1-9 workers) and intermediate (10-99) sizes. For small co-ops, he finds that they are 
undercapitalised and more labour intensive than their capitalist counterparts, and that this 
leads to lower value added with the effect felt in low wages. The high proportion of value 
added paid out in wages restricts the surplus available for reinvestment, and they appear 
unable to break out of the low wage/low value added/low investment circle. That is, small 
co-ops appear unable to accumulate. He notes that in printing a much higher level of 
investment is required to keep up with technical change compared to building and 
construction, the other sector examined. 
Once co-ops reach the intermediate category - particularly for those with 25-40 workers, he 
claims that they pass a crucial threshold of economic performance and follow a different 
pattern. Although undercapitalised and labour intensive, they are very productive in their 
use of means of prodUction, with lower overheads, and as a result achieve both a higher 
level of gross value added and wages per worker than capitalist firms while retaining a 
sufficient surplus for investment. He concludes that around this size the improved 
economic efficiency of collective ownership and a partidpativeorganisation fits best with 
the demands of a competitive economy. Unfortunately Defourny does not examine how 
small co-ops grow into medium-sized ones., nor does he interpret the commercial 
performance of French co-operatives in terms of their other achievements or the historical 
development of the French co-op sector. 
In view of Defoumy's findings on the relative undercapitalisation of French printing 
co-operatives, a similar analysis is needed for those in Britain. Unfortunately comparative 
figures for the capital intensity of printing firms in Britain are not provided in the Census of 
Production (which presents only 'flow' and not 'stock' variables). However there is an 
alternative source which provides indicative (but not strictly comparable) figures for 
printing firms49• For these 'intermediate' printers, the level of fixed assets per head ranged 
from £1000 to £75000 in 1984, with a median of £6700. The ratio of gross output to fixed 
assets varies from 0.8 to 32.1, with a median of 3.8. 
The results in chapter 7 showed that the level of fixed assets per worker had been increasing 
in printing co-ops, although it is still much lower that the figure for capitalist firms above. 
49 ICC, 1986. This pn1f1itla atmIiw ratio /UIIJlysis of tN bulin. .. pnfomunu:.e of 100 CDmJ1G1IIa in 1M 'intmrrd"',.' 
cWsi/ic#tilm (tll1'Pll1W1' £700,000 to £6m). 
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Table 8.5 (at the end of this chapter) gives results for both individual printing co-ops and the 
whole sector; in 1984 the median level was £2130. The ratio of value added to fixed assets, 
by contrast, had not shown any increase, never rising above 2, and with a 1984 median of 
1.18. This is much lower than in French co-ops, where it is generally around 5.0. British 
co-operatives therefore appear to malce less productive use of assets than capitalist printing 
firms and much less than French co-operatives. 
The French situation therefore contrasts significantly with that of Britain. Defoumy reports 
that French printing co-operatives are more productive in this area than capitalist firms, 
while British ones are much less so. 
This finding is echoed by Thornley, who notes that there are sufficient printing co-ops in 
Prance (about 75) to have formed their own federation, one of whose aucial roles is to 
negotiate with banks on behalf of co-opsSO. like Britain, many print co-ops survive on work 
from the sympathetic labour movement; they have also been concemed with internal 
organisation and tend to promote managen from the shopfloor and have avoided 
hierarchical practices brought in from outside (although this is in the context of the general 
acceptance of a conventional managerial role in French co-ops, unlike in Britain where this 
is still vf!!lY much a live issue). Also, wage differentials are generally low, but unlike British 
co-ops they pay better wages than in the industry as a whole. 
Both French and British printing co-operatives appear to be undercapitalised. In France this 
is associated with a higher level of technical efficiency than in capitalist finns, which 
compensates for undercapitalisation. As a result wages in French printing co-operatives are 
comparable with those ruling in capitalist finns, particularly in larger co-ops. 
In Britain· COoOperatlvet are faced with underaapitalisation flU lower levels of technical 
efftdenc:y, and 10 overall have not yet managed to bring wages up to industry levels. In his 
article Detoumy MJgeItI that some French printing co-operatives have broken out of the 
low accumulation vidouI drcle afflicting ,mall co-operatives, and that the position of 
medium-tized co-operatives II relatively easy to ,uatain. This raises the question 01 whether 
British co-operatives are likely to follow the same path; is the French situation limply the 
reault of co-Opt be1na lonpr estab1tshed than in Britain? Certainly some British co-ops are 
now movlna Into the rnedfum-IIzed cateaorY (more than 10 worken), but only one is in 
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Defoumy's most productive size category of 25-40 workers. By analysing the results for 
individual co-operatives we can see the paths taken by these growing co-operatives and use 
this to contribute to an explanation for the different experiences. 
THE EXPERIENCE OF INDMDUAL CO-OPERATIVES 
So far attention has largely been concentrated upon the experiences of individual co-op 
sectors and the average performance of co-ops within those sectors. I now tum to individual 
co-operatives, and examine some of their contrasting experiences. These cover a wide 
spectrum, and are influenced both by the material drcumstances in which co-ops operate 
and dedsions taken by co-op workers on dealing with the contradictions facing them. 
Material circumstances cover a range of factors, including the nature of market relationships 
and production relationships, the degree of financing available, and the type of origin (new 
start, rescue, or conversion). These factors affect both the commerdal performance of co-ops 
and the ability to secure other gains for workers. 
Within an individual industry, such as printing, market relationships and the nature of 
production within the sector will tend to be similar across co-ops. Other factors will vary, as 
will the way in which co-op workers deal with contradictions. In addition, co-op 
development is a dynamic process, and crudal issues will vary over time, with the size of 
co-ops, and the external economic and political environment which they face. 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to an examination of the contrasting experiences of 
individual printing co-ops, fadng different start-up conditions and with a variety of 
attempts to deal with the problems of survival. 
Feminist printing co-op. 
Part of the motivation in the establishment of many printing co-ops has been opposition to 
the male domination of the 'skilled' printing trades. At the same time, new co-ops generally 
have frequently been opposed to sexism in employment and society. Combining these two 
strands have been a number of printing co-ops with a strong feminist stance, such as 
Sheffield Women's Printing Co-op, and Amazon Press. They have a commitment to political 
rather than commerdal aims: opening up printing skills to women in a male-dominated 
profesSion; job rotation and a demystification of printing skills; and contributing to wider 
'i! 
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struggles through support of feminist groups and advising customers (particularly 
womens' groups) on their printing needs. 
Most of these co-ops have been characterised by relatively poor commercial performance, 
and indeed they are representative of a wider group of radical and commerdally marginal 
co-ops (such as Cambridge Free Press). Turnover and value added per head are low, and 
the relatively high burden of fixed costs means that the surplus generated is small in both 
absolute terms and as a proportion of output. Wages are low, and despite this the total wage 
bill in many cases is larger than the surplus generated, leading to an operating deficit. As a 
result these co-ops have remained in a static poSition, with low accumulation and growthSl• 
This is not surprising. Many objectives conflict with the need to survive commerdally, and 
this is exacerbated by initial weakness due to lack of access to sldUs and finance. Such a 
starting point generates a need for 'sweat equity' (or alternatively 'collective exploitation') 
in order to accumulate and ensure long-term commerdal survival. However the strong 
commitment to nonooeommerdal objectives makes this difficult, and the outcome is 
manifested in low or even negative accumulation. 
Such co-ops clearly cannot hope to survive unaided for any length of time in a competitive 
capitalist environment. 'They may need ongoing subsidy or grants to meet trading deficits, 
and almost certainly would be unable to raise finance commerdally for investment in the 
means of production in order to expand their operations; this may reinforce a reluctance on 
~ the part of workers to approach banks, fearing a loss of independence. Even paying low 
wages, their capacity to expand through 'sweat equity' is limited. 
Given that commerdal sources of finance are not readily available, such co-ops have three 
main avenues for railing finance - members, sympathiseJs and local authorities. The first 
tends to be very limited; very few co-operative members have extensive resources either to 
lend direc:t1y or to use as aec:urlty for external loans. Many feminist co-ops have raised funds 
from aympathilers, usuaDy lnthe form of donations, although there are other ways; 
Amazon Prest for instance raJaed £1500 through the issue of debentures to sympathisen. In 
pnera1 theta 'aympathetlc' sourcet of fundi are Umited, and support of this kind is 
Probably more iJnportant In . termI 01 providing a seml-protectecl market for the co-
operatlvel products. Ultimately· these m-operativet become reliant on local authority 
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funding for their survival. Most of the printing co-ops in this category have received local 
authority funding (directly, or indirectly through CDAs) at some time. Often this is revenue 
support, meeting trading defidts, but this does little more than keep the co-operative going 
at the same level. Without this support most such co-ops would collapse, as was the fate of 
Rye Express. In the mid-1980s the situation fadng these co-ops changed as sympathetic local 
authorities were prepared to make finance available on the basis of non-commercial criteria, 
supporting them specifically as womens' initiatives. Several womens' printing co-ops 
received local authority funding (loans and/or grants) which enabled them to purchase new 
equipment, cover past defidts and expand output. A dty council loan of £10,000 assisted 
Sheffield Womens Printing Co-operative to expand output from £20,000 in 1982 to £46,000 
in 1985, whilst a GLC loan of £8,000 assisted Women in Print to expand from £9,000 in 1982 
to £30,000 in 1985. Obtaining such support is the key to escaping from the problems of low 
wages and shortage of capital eqUipment, whilst still maintaining other objectives. 
Because of the relatively high political profile of print co-operatives such support is easier to 
obtain in the industry than would perhaps be the case elsewhere. The highly political nature 
of the product - bespoke to customers' requirements and reflect the nature of those 
customers - means that feminist print co-ops can . maintain a high political profile both 
through their attack on the male domination of the trade and on the offensive nature of 
much printed material. 
Although these co-operatives face difficulties in achieving high levels of commercial 
performance, their small size does have advantages in attempts to reorganise the labour 
process. There are two aspects to this. The first is the recruitment of women and black 
workers into conventionally white male positions. The second is actually changing the 
division of labour; attempting to break down the conventional division of jobs into 
skilled/unskilled, manual/intellectual work. Small print co-ops in particular have placed 
great importance on the commitment to skills exchange and have had some success at 
implementing this, with high degrees of job rotation. Because of this, some co-ops have 
taken a positive decision not to expand past a point where these objectives can be 
maintained. 
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'SWeI&t equity' CO-OP' 
The problems of underfinandng are not restricted to feminist printing co-ops, but affect the 
majority of new starts. Frequently these would also be considered 'alternative' co-ops, with 
political or non-commercia1 objectives. However, they tend to be more committed to growth 
and also face a need to achieve this on the basis of internal accumulation. They have been 
referred to as 'shoestring' co-ops52. 
In tenns of commercial performance they start off at low levels of output and value added 
per head, but demonstrate gradual increases over time. Increasing productivity pennits 
slow accumulation and expansion, with low but increasing wages. Although these co-ops 
grow from small starts, they mostly remain with less than 10 workers. There is initial 
dependence upon private sources and memben' funds, and where public sources are 
available this am reduce the extent of 'sweat equity' required for successful establishment 
as independent enterprises. Later they do stand some chance of securing commercial funds, 
although this may not be welcomed. As in feminist co-ops, survival is achieved on the basis 
of high levels of worker commitment. 
The process and results of growth can affect the achievement of political objectives in such 
co-ops, raising different problems to those faced by smaller co-ops. In medium sized co-ops 
the objective of restructuring the labour process is less easy to implement, and in any case 
attitudes to job rotation and sldJl sharing vary with the political orientations of 
co-operatives. Where sldll sharing is adopted it is likely to detract from commercial 
perfoml8l\ce if pursued extensively. This is illustrated by the example of F1ypress, a 
unionised London print co-operative with 9 workers, who 
display~ a high leve10f commitment to partic:ipation. PJypress operates a 
Jceyworker system in which task areas corresponding to the various parts of 
tM poductkm proc!IU are delegated to pain of fully trained 'keyworken'. 
TatkI are rotated in auc:h a way that at least one keyworker remains in the task 
area while • worker from another task area is able to leave his or her own task 
area in Older, to Jearn new IIdIJs. 1'htt .)'Item of Job. rotation refIeds the 
commitment to sldJls IharinS at Plypress, and in theory the system could 
extend . to even the' mott spedaUsed tasks. In a . co-operative of this size 
however, the extent of Job rotation is Iilcely to affec:t productivity levels and the 
relatively low [wage] rate whichPlypresl pays may reflect this.53 
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This attitude is not universal. The original LCP A co-operatives tend to place emphasis on 
management accountability rather than direct participation in management as such. Thus in 
Calverts, an original LCP A co-operative with 13 workers, there was no policy of job rotation 
and traditional lines of demarcation were retained. Harris concludes that 
extensive job rotation of the sort practised by Flypress becomes untenable in 
co-operatives with more than about ten members. Direct participation by 
means of job rotation gives way to a hardening of job boundaries, especially 
the division between administration and production. What the evidence from 
Flypress (and the comparison with Calverts) suggests is that these boundaries 
will harden with growth whether this is seen as a political issue or not.54 
Calverts' reasoning was related to the highly skilled nature of much printing work: they felt 
that extensive job rotation was incompatible with developing these skills (or at least was 
incompatible with developing these skills and surviving commercially). Late in 1985 
Flypress obtained a loan from LCEB for new machinery and expansion, and this contribu ted 
to a change in policy, if not objectives. The technological complexity of the new machinery, 
and the need to develop expertise in areas such as marketing led to a decline in job rotation 
and increasing specialisation. this has enabled an increase in wages to union rates. 
Managing the division of labour: the price of success? 
Some printing co-ops have far fewer problems with initial financing, and demonstrate 
commerdal performance which improves rapidly and soon compares well with that 
achieved generally in the industry; examples are Lithosphere, Blackrose Press, and Spider 
Web. Several such co-ops are conversions from already-existing operations: Spider Web was 
a conversion from a share company, and Lithosphere originated as the print department of 
the radical charity War on Want. This contrasts with the new-start origins of most other 
printing co-ops. These co-ops have used commercial finance extensively, although with 
some additional public sector financing. 
Large co-ops generally face different problems as a result of both absolute size and the 
commercial orientation necessary to achieve growth. On the division of labour issue,' the 
existence of a separate management function tends to be seen as a fact of Ufe rather than as a 
contentious issue in large printing co-operatives. Associated with this is a limited or non-
existent commitment to skill transfer, and ultimately the introduction of a fonn of 
representative participation and indirect management accountability. The problematic 
54 i1li4., p. 40 
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relationship between growth, mmmercial success and co-operative ideals is manifested in 
the experience of Lithosphere, the largest of the new printing co-operatives in Britain. 
Lithosphere was originally the printing department of War on Want By the late 1970& 
outside work accounted for 55% of its turnover and it was judged to be a mmmercial 
enterprise by the charity mnunissioners, who ordered it to be separated from the charity. In 
1980 the printing operation· including machinery, orderbook and goodwill· was sold to the 
employees, who established it as a workers co-operative. The price of £38,000 was met by a 
loan from War on Want and the workers redundancy money. 
Since 1980 Lithosphere has grown rapidly, expanding turnover from £131,000 in 1981 to 
£535,000 in 1984 and £900,000 in 1981. Over the same period the workforce expanded from 8 
to 28. By commerdal criteria it is by far the most successful of printing co-operatives, and is 
also successful in industry terms (see Table 8.5). Productivity and wages are close to 
industry averagesi a printing industry mnsultant reported in 1985 that "the co-operative's 
present performance is good by industry standards, but the recent investments have not yet 
realised their potential and muld be used more effectively."SS 
Lithosphere maintained its political customer base inherited from its days at War on Want, 
but recent expansion has been into the arts and media market. Integral to its expansion was 
the purchase of a four mlour press (the first printing co-operative to do so), made possible 
by. £200,000 loan from GLBB in 198456. The co.operative was also a founder member of the 
LCP A. Expansion and success have brought problems however, partly due to the 
. difficultiet ulOCiated with maintaining democratic participation in a co-operative with 
more than 20 people, but also due to cla.hes between mmmerdal and political objectives. 
Lithosphere is mmmitted to growth, and muld continue to expand in the way that it has 
until now. However, • comparable capitalist firm would be in a position to expand through 
taJdna over other ftrm8. It II through this process - centralisation of capital· that capitalist 
finns acx:umuJate most rapldly; tht. iI not just because of the rapid increasea in the size of 
individual fInN involved, but because such takeovers would pnerally involve a 
restructurJna of one or both of the el\terprise8 involved to enable greater profitability and 
acc:wnuJation. Uthotpbere are now attempting to expand in this way, and recently made an 
II"",.,. PItt..., ........... ,... ...... , • ......",.""". '" In, 1111".". 
"AIIItaIfP ..... -..,......, "'.",... ..... ,."..IJIfIU ....... ,..,." COiiIItWICWly IIrDul4 WI ... 
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abortive attempt to take over an ailing CPF co-operative, Leicester Printers (LP). There were 
several attractions for the Uthosphere. Firstly, LP had recently purchased modem 
equipment; secondly, it is a long established operation with a substantial customer base, 
and with a larger workforce and turnover than Uthosphere itself. In the end, agreement 
could not be reached between Uthosphere and the unions at LP, and LP was taken over by 
a local capitalist. Although both co-ops agreed that redundancies would be required in the 
merged operation, they could not reach agreement on the way in which these would be 
imposed. This episode reinforces shows again the consequences of a commercially oriented 
strategy, and that even co-ops cannot avoid the economic imperatives of operating in a 
capitalist market. 
The issue of participation, and the role and nature of management authority, has been of 
fundamental importance to the co-operative while expanding. Although there has not been 
a formal policy of job rotation, there has been an openness towards the sharing of skills and 
a tendency not to formalise roles, particularly in management and administration. In the 
larger co-operative this led to problems with achieving the efficiency required to meet 
commercial objectives, and the chosen response was to formalise management roles. At the 
same time it was decided to replace direct participation in decision making with delegated 
responSibility, subject to a monthly meeting of all workers. The new Structure involved 
organising the co-operative into six departments, each with a departmental head who 
would meet weekly and who had the capacity to take substantive decisions without referral 
to the monthly meeting. 
Any co-operative (or indeed any collective organisation) has a hierarchy which is covert if 
not formalisedS7• In Uthosphere these changes reinforced the existing hierarchy in three 
ways. Firstly, the older and more experienced members (including some founder members), 
who were all white males, tended to be in management and administrative jobs, which 
reinforced their already dominant poSition through access to and control of information. 
Secondly, the introduction of departmental heads rather than representatives added an extra 
layer to the hierarchy and in particular made collective organisation within departments 
much more difficult. Finally, the co-operative took part in the lcom Pilot Project (IPP) 
training programme, which was specifically oriented towards finding an organisational and 
management structure(s) for large co-ops which did not entail abandoning co-operative 
57l.tnuby" 19'5. 
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principles. This was particularly suitable for Uthosphere given the changes it was going 
through,. but in practice involvement and interest was restricted to the senior members. The 
problem was recognised by the IPP organisers: 
The focus of the programme was on training for the senior workers who 
needed to strengthen their business management and technical sJdlls and take 
the lead both in developing an organisational structure appropriate to the m-
op's new needs and in clarifying the long term objectives. This did not help to 
improve communications' between the senior and some of the non-senior and 
non-member staff and the IPP had relatively little direct effect on these 
workers due to their lack of involvement58. 
Although the IPP programme did have some beneficial effects lor Uthosphere, it did 
reinforce existing divisions and produced little to assist taclcling them. 
The difficulties caUJed by these changes were most exbenae in the relationship between the 
typesetting department and the rest of the co-operative. This department was established 
four years after the co-operative itself, and was staffed solely by women. Many of them had 
come from smaller, more radical printing co-operatives, and when Uthosphere was 
reorganised the typesetters took an alternative approach, preferring to run their department 
collectively without an identified senior worker. This position was unpopular with the other 
departments, who lacked an identifiable person to make contact with at the weekly 
meetings of senior workers. 
This cluh was acCentuated by the lack of integration of the typesetting department into the 
co-operative. The women had aU joined when the entire typesetting department was being 
reetaffed, and there was no continuity of personnel in the department to faciHtate this 
process. furthermore, Uthosphere has a year-long probationary period before workers are 
eligible for membenhip, and this meant that the women felt unable to fully partidpate in 
dedsion-making. In addition 
The ~ct ~tthey were the only women in Uthosphere working directly in a 
printing-re1ated job in a predominantly male profeIIion alIo added to their 
feelinp of isolation. LtthoIphere'. aenlor memhen liked to tee them8elves as 
pragmatic, democratic eplitarians, but the typesellerl saw them as a bution of 
white male power, reaultlng in a [continuing] duh of ldeology.59 
The male senior members had alwaY' been commerdaIIy rather than ideologicaUy inclined. 
TbIa led to further peniltent clashes - feminist coUectivity versus a more traditional 
1111'1',1111". a. 
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management structure and feminist political ideals versus commercialism - which 
accentuated the very real problems faced by women working in a profession dominated by 
men. The general experience of Lithosphere is disappointing in its failure to tackle this 
problem, in particular the failure of the senior men to recognise that their own sexism and 
the sexism of the industry is a problem. 
CONCLUSION 
The experience of printing co-operatives holds many lessons for the wider co~perative 
movement. The sector has expanded rapidly, both through the formation of new co-
operatives and the growth of existing ones. On the one hand there has been reasonable 
commercial success; although in overall terms printing co-operatives still perform less well 
commercially than the general printing subsector, the dramatic improvements in their 
average performance over the period 198(H985 suggests, that they could eventually match 
the performance of printing firms in general. This is reinforced by the experience of the 
larger printing co~peratives, which, despite being small by manufacturing industry 
standards, are larger than most printing firms. These co-operatives have achieved above 
average levels of productivity and wages, and appear to have the potential to improve this 
position further. 
Such success is dependent on many factors. Firstly the origin of the co~perative; 
conversions from already existing enterprises have a great advantage, and many of the 
largest printing co~peratives have this origin. The advantage is that they find it much 
easier borrow sufficient money to purchase the machinery necessary to compete in the 
market. New start co~peratives face much greater difficulties in this area, and, for many, 
finance is not available from commercial sources; in general they can only build up 
suffident resources if workers are prepared to work long hours for low wages in the early 
years. This process can be eased if finance is made available from local authorities or other 
sources who are prepared to take a broader look at co~peratives than that implied by 
strictly commercial criteria. 
The experience of printing co-ops is in many ways a record of success. Whilst there is a 
conflict between the adoption of a commercial growth~riented strategy and the pursuit of a 
radical restructuring of the labour process within ~ps, most of the larger ones have 
nevertheless achieved some form of collective self-management, and control over their own 
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decisions. They exist as independent enterprises paying reasonable wages as well as maldng 
achievements in tenns of worker control; even where printing co-operatives have not 
achieved a restructuring of production, workers do have more responsibility and autonomy 
than in capitalist firms. This still applies at Uthosphere, which despite its problems and the 
adoption of a hierarchical structure, remains a genuine attempt to find a wor1cable solution 
to the problems of democratic management in a large co-op in a capitalist economy; it is 
closer to equal opportunities than the vast majority of printing firms. Oearly the nature of 
choices available remains dictated by the needs of market competition, and has perhaps 
been eased by the rapid expansion of the printing industry during the early 19805. 
Nevertheless the choices and conflicts facing printing co-ops are to a large extent those 
resulting from success, and the high degree of politicisation means that there is an 
appreciation of the nature of these conflicts. Certainly there are problems, of which sexism 
and gender divisions, and the emergence of different classes of worker remain the most 
serious. Any downturn in the economic prospects of the industry will exacerbate conflicts, 
and in the case of co-ops this is intensified by the abolition of the GLC and metropolitan 
counties, and other restrictions on local authority expenditure. 
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Table 8.5 Individual data for selected co-ops 
Year Age Output Net value Average Wages as Net VA/ Fixed 
added per wage % of V A fixed assets assets per 
wurker worker 
(£) (£) (£) (%) (£) (£) 
ALL PRINTING CO-OPS (summary) 
1979 212.5 2459 2100 85.4 1.09 1744 
1980 520.1 2751 2709 98.5 1.40 1786 
1981 974.5 3418 3371 98.6 1.55 1897 
1982 1507.2 4019 3582 89.1 1.48 2148 
1983 2176.4 5754 4390 76.3 1.27 4187 
1984 2805.6 6791 5859 86.3 1.39 4936 
AMAZON PREss 
1982 6 11076 -38 380 -993.46 -0.09 434.8 
1984 8 26932 208 2038 981.93 0.10 2113.5 
1986 10 42399 2280 5076 222.56 0.59 3874.5 
BLACI<ROSE PREss 
1980 2 130725 5391 3714 68.88 1.31 4128.0 
1982 4 190657 6781 4606 67.93 1.36 5000.0 
1984 6 297919 50268 35018 69.66 0.87 57566 
CAL VERTS PRESS 
1978 1 40669 2230 2432 109.05 1.80 1237.4 
1980 3 81115 3066 4109 134.01 2.17 1411.8 
1982 5 105867 4661 5270 113.07 2.16 2157.2 
1984 7 235571 9663 7398 76.56 2.95 3280.2 
CAMBRIDGE FREE PREss 
1982 2 18424 1674 1728 103.27 1.08 1547.8 
1984 4 25874 1007 849 84.34 1.98 508.4 
PI. YPRPSS AND BAIX:ER 
1980 2 33367 2637 1883 71.39 1.59 1658.3 
1982 4 54009 2583 2364 91.54 2.17 1188.4 
1984 6 84604 3114 3122 100.26 5.03 619.1 
LEEos ALTERNATIVE PUBUCAllONS 
1982 5 49471 3174 4049 127.55 0.62 5109.8 
1984 7 67692 3698 3286 88.87 1.15 3207.2 
LlTHosPHERE 
1980 1 90286 5308 4123 77.67 1.77 3003.4 
1982 3 250345 10101 8201 81.19 3.67 2752.1 
1984 5 53.5364 11053 9107 82.39 1.13 9816.1 
MANCHBSTER FREE PREss 
1980 1 16248 1006 1808 179.70 0.64 1566.7 
1982 3 134048 2381 894 37.54 0.86 2754.1 
1984 5 243766 4042 3446 85.26 1.25 3243.1 
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Table 8.5 continued 
Year Age Output Net value 
addedpet' 
worker 
(£) (£) 
PARADOS GRAPHICS 
1981 2 16430 1818 
1983 4 101649 6379 
1985 6 157528 8611 
SPIDERWEB 
1983 3 314058 9517 
1984 4 413976 10131 
SHEFPIELD WOMENS PlUNTING CO-OP 
1982 1 20250 1910 
1983 2 29122 3935 
1984 3 27853 2460 
TROJAN PRESS 
1981 2 16559 549 
1983 4 45569 3165 
Average Wages as Net VA/ Fixed 
wage % of VA fixed assets assets per 
worker 
(£) (%) (£) (£) 
3063 168.51 0.31 5841.2 
6816 106.86 3.19 1997.3 
8221 95.46 5.18 1661.4 
7882 82.82 2.40 39655 
8282 81.75 1.21 8403.3 
2032 106.39 6.40 298.2 
3748 95.24 2.50 1574.0 
3334 135.49 0.72 3428.0 
955 173.86 1.73 317.6 
1814 57.32 6.30 502.4 
9. Clothing Co-operatives 
INTRODUcnON 
The second industry chosen for study is clothing manufacture. Like the other two sectors 
studied, it has always been an important sector of co-operative activity, and a relatively 
high number of co-ops have been fonned. It also has a large proportion of small firms, 
which broadly fit into the 'dependent' category as identified by Schutt & Whittington, 
contrasting with the printing and wholefood sectors. It also differs from those sectors, in 
that clothing manufacture has been in decline in Britain for many years; this decline has 
intensified the problems of low wages, poor working conditions and insecure employment 
which have long characterised the sector1• The majority of workers are women, who are not 
in a strong position to challenge their intense exploitation. Oothing co-operatives are faced 
with perhaps a greater challenge than elsewhere, in countering the vulnerability of workers 
in the industry, but at the same time are in a weaker position to mount such a challenge. 
This chapter analyses the strength of clothing co-ops and the extent to which they have been 
able to bring about any changes. 
THE CLOnlING INDUSTRY 
The role of women in clothing manufacture 
The clothing industry is characterised by the important position occupied by small firms, 
and the large number of female workers, who make up around 80% of the workforce. It is a 
Wages Council industry, wage levels tend to be low, and it is technologically backward. All 
of these characteristics need to be understood in the context of the particular relationships 
between small producer firms and large retailers and wholesalers2. But first of aU, it is 
necessary to examine the impact which the role of female labour has had on the 
development of the industry and the nature of the labour process. 
The origins of women's employment in the industry lie with the role of garment-making as 
part of women's domestic tasks. With the extension of capitalist control during the 19th 
1 7'1tm,., .... fIIIftY .tu4 .. 1dg"',,"1lng tile ,..ftftm of eltJIIIbw ."..,.; _ far,."". W"",1'71. 
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centwy, developments in clothing paralleled those in many other industries, as workers and 
production were gathered together in factories. In clothing, this did not generally involve 
changes technology or the division of labourj rather, the intention was to increase 
supervision and control over production, particularly over the length of the working day 
and the pace of work. At the same time, a dual system of control was (and still is) 
maintained throughout much of the industry by the parallel use of homeworkersj for them, 
and for some factory workers, control and exploitation is maintained indirectly through 
payment by piece rates. 
Since the adoption of the modem sewing machine in the latter half of the 19th centwy, the 
major technological characteristics of clothing manufacture have remained unchanged . 
. r:. . Because much of the work is carried out by women, capital has had little incentive to 
~f . develop new production techniques, and hence the technology has remained largely 
unchanged. Rather than invest in research and development so as to increase profitability 
through new production equipment and methods, capital has relied upon the characteristics 
of female labour to maintain and increase profits through low wages and poor working 
conditions. It has been possible to keep wages down for three reasons. Firstly, there is 
always a large reserve army of female labour from from which new workers can be 
recruited, which does not apply to the same degree to male 'skills'. Secondly, the social 
obligation on women to· reproduce labour-power through child-rearing and the support of 
men means that they have a lower attachment to the labour force, which in turn makes 
collective organisation more difficult for womenj hence their reputation for being less 
militant as workef53. Despite their superior collective organisation, men have a poor record 
in defending the righ .. of :women workers. Thirdly, low wages are justified on the basis that 
sewing is not 'skilled' wOI;'k; in reality, machining is skilled, but the sldlls can be underrated 
because they are often partly learnt and used within the home. This also saves employers 
the costs of training their ~ed workers, in addition to paying 'unskilled' wages. 
Although women dominate manufacturing work in the industry, there is a sharp division of 
labour alona gender lines. 1'here are several distinct stages in the process of clothing 
produdion and distribution. 
s S. """,2118, ftw.1IMW "."".11 ....... ' ""'". 111M ....... ". doIIIbr& ~ ". 1M""'" .',_ 1M 
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In the manufacturing stage (cutting, machining .and trimming), machining is the most 
important element; it is labour intensive, and accounts for as much as 80% of the labour 
needed to produce a garment4. This almost exclusively female work, whilst virtually all 
cutting is carried by men; the latter is considered to be a much more highly skilled job than 
machining5• 
Ownership .tructure 
The relatively small incentive to innovate technologically has had an impact on the 
ownership structure of the industry. Although there are economies of scale to be gained in 
some areas, production remained on a small batch rather than mass production basis. 
Processes of centralisation and concentration of capital continued, but compared to many 
other industries there were few competitive advantages to be gained from large scale 
production; where these did exist, they were in long production runs of relatively 
standardised garments for mass consumption. To counter the increased organisation of 
clothing workers in larger factories, major producers also began to move out of London 
during the inter-war years to areas where cheap labour was plentiful. This included both 
4 GLC, 29B5". W. 
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peripheral regions of Britain (such as the north-east) and production in the third world. 
However, the lack of major scale economies, and problems of worker resistance in large, 
unionised factories, meant that much production remained small scale. 
Following 1945, the emergence of large retail combines added an extra element to this 
structure. Concentration and centralisation proceeded much further and faster in 
distribution than in manufacturing; the continuing dependence of the latter on cheap labour 
made British manufacturers highly vulnerable to imports, and capital remained weak and 
unable to accumulate significantly. 
The emergence of large firms in distribution added a new element to the role of small firms 
in the clothing industry, and the continued existence of low technology, highly labour 
intensive small clothing firms can only be understood in terms of the development of the 
industry as a whole. The trend has been towards 
an ecology of firms engaged in a complex hierarchy of subcontracting. 
'Manufacturers' break up orders from the leading retailers in an increasingly 
concentrated industry to subcontracton who may divide up their share in turn 
to sma.11er firms. At the bottom of the hierarchy are the homeworkers6. 
In order to keep the cost of making clothes down to a minimum, it has been in the interests 
of these wholesalers and retailers to maintain a large number of manufacturing firms in· the 
industry, and to make entry easy for new producers. Thus they frequently supply the 
material used, keeping down working capital requirements; the consequences are to make 
margiN in manufacturing small, and to increase the relative baigaining position of retailers 
and wholesalers relative to the makers of clothes. At the same time, it increases the ease 
with which new entrants may Join the industry as manufac:turen, as others are forced out. 
Small firms are therefore encouraged at the manufacturing stage of the industry, in Cut 
Make and Trim (CMn. The necessary s~ are possessed by many women, so workers are 
easy to find, and the fixed capital requirements - for inexpensive sewing machines - are 
small. MOst of the plannIn" design and marketing sJdlla are handled elsewhere, and so the 
requirement for '~. slcills fl minimal. These firms are effectively Jabour-only 
IUbc:ontrlCton, locked Into partic:u1ar dependent relatfanthips with larger distributors and 
monopoly retaDera, are hip1y vulnerable, and have Uttle control over the price they receive 
for their work. 
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The dominant force in the British clothing industry, Marks &: Spencer, makes full use of this 
system, and indeed its success is built upon it. M&:S - or 'Balcer Street' as it is known in the 
trade - takes around 20% of the entire output of the UK clothing industry, and yet 
undertakes no production directly. It obtains its supplies from a vast network of suppliers, 
including many smaIl-medium firms as well as large multinational manufacturers such as 
Tootal. M&:S exercise direct control over the production and output of many suppliers, there 
is also an element sub-contracting, with suppliers contracting out work to smaller 
manufacturers and homeworkers. For its suppliers, M&:S contracts offer the prospect of 
high volumes and long production runs, but which allow very low profit margins and have 
extremely tight quality control requirements. Many producers become highly dependent, 
relying on M&:S for up to 90% of their work. However, being locked into "the Western 
World's most tightly controlled factory-to-shop system"7 can be a double-edged sword. "To 
make profits out of Marks and Spencer requires fast, highly accurate work"8; failure to meet 
quality requirements frequently results in ruthless removal from the approved suppliers 
list, and there is constant vulnerability to changes in buying policy and to fluctuations in 
M&:S' own level of business. For M&:S the problems of their suppliers are unimportant, as 
all that matters is the survival of a large number of smaIl suppliers, rather than any 
particular supplier. When in 1979 M&:S held its first unscheduled sale for 20 years, suppliers 
were forced to bear half the burden of price cuts9. In 1988, following a period when M&:S 
sales were below expectations, suppliers were forced to bear the brunt and impose closures 
and redundancies10• 
Although this structure has benefited the large retailers and wholesalers, it is not favourable 
for either capital or workers in clothing manufacture. It has led to a failure to innovate, and 
a lack of a coherent design and marketing strategy; "show us what you want and we'll make 
it for you" remains a common attitude amongst manufacturerstl. Many of them are content 
to remain at the bottom end of the mass market where prodUction runs may be relatively 
long, but competition from low cost imports is most intense and where profit margins are 
1 Stm4t.r Timp 21.6.83. 
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lowest. Price competitiveness is often seen as paramount, and can often be achieved only 
through low wages. 
Working conditiOnl 
Whilst M&tS is renowned for its products, prices and profits, less well known is its 
dependence upon the conditions of work endured by many clothing workers in Britain. The 
clothing industry is renowned for its sweatshops and poor conditions, and the success of 
firms such as M&s, far from transfonning the poor position of clothing workers, has been 
built upon it. M&S itself has succeeded in developing a reputation as a good employer, 
offering better wages and conditions than is typical in the retail trade; it can only achieve 
.<J.. this by keeping at arms length the workers who produce most of the goods sold in their 
'/'.' stores. 
lO'lf 
.~ 
The clothing industry is notorious for its low level of wages and poor working conditions. 
Table 9.1 shows wages in 1984, with bOth male and female wages in clothing significantly 
, below average wages in all industries and in manufacturing; in fact clothing has lower 
wages than any other manufacturing industry12. 
Table 9.1 Clothing industry: waaes and hours worked, 1984 
All AU Clothing Clothing 
In4s. Mfg. Ind. Co-ops 
(sICO~9) (SIC 2-4) (SIC 453) 
(",.,,) M 152.3 158.9 114.0 57.5-
Average F 93.5 96.0 SO.1 
weekly 
wage M 143.3 149.7 112.1 
(m •• n) F 88.6 92.1 76.4 
" Weekly M 44.3 44.4 42.4 
hours F 39.4 39.9 39.2 
(mt.tm, inc. orJerlime) 
- maJe/lemaJe worbn combinecl.v .... 
ScIun.Y: NftI ~ Swwy; own calculatioN. 
12 .. NaP ....... "".. 
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The small firms which carry out much CMT work are dependent upon cheap labour; 
typically female and/or black and immigrant workers, suffering from racism and insecurity 
over their official status, which further undermines their employment status and strength. 
The vulnerability of these finns to the tenns offered by the large distributors means that 
there is constant downward pressure on wages and working conditions, and conditions in 
the industry are highly influenced by the degree of dependency on large firms. In the 
majority of clothing firms, "wages are low, conditions poor, work insecure and many 
working practices illegal", and wages are low even by comparison with other industries 
employing predominantly women 13. The current Wages Council minimum rate for clothing 
workers is around £2 per hour, but many workers are not registered and receive less than 
this, nor are they subject to health and safety regulations. The worst off of all are 
homeworkers, who are paid by piece rates which work out at £1 per hour or less, and have 
even less legal rights. This is despite the fact that many of them are ultimately working for 
'respectable' retailers such as Marks & Spencer, Tesco, Debenhams and the Co-op1". 
Workers are poorly organised, and the main union in the industry, the NUTGW, is [white] 
male dominated and weak. Many finns operate on the fringes of legality, where "a very 
frequent practice is for a firm to close without warning to avoid creditors and then open 
again soon after with the same management and often in the same premlses"1S. This is not 
because the clothing industry necessarily attracts employers who are inherently devious or 
evil people (although it may well do); they simply have no choice if they are to stay in 
business. The experience 01 work for the majority of workers is unpleasant and badly paid, 
but they too have little choice in what they do; that is why the industry is dependent upon 
the weakest and most exploited sections 01 the labour force. For· workers, the reality of 
conditions contrasts sharply with the idealised vision of 'small is beautfful'16, and in the 
clothing industry it is those in the large factories who enjoy superior working conditions. 
The low profitability of clothing finns makes any long term investment virtually impossible, 
and so the industry remains ineffident, with low productivity,· continually dependent upon 
sweated labour. The situation is particularly bad in London, where manufacturers are 
lS GLe, 2985, ",. 229-220. 
24 TIM OfwrwrU.B8. 
25 GLe, 2985, 'P' 222. 
26 RIdrm., 21B5&. 
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highly dependent upon the fashion trade, which exacerbates their vulnerability to 
fluctuations in the level of demand. 
Recent clump. 
The last decade has seen perhaps the most far reaching changes in the nature of production 
and accumulation in clothing for a century, with extensive restructuring of production 
resulting as several different historical processes came together. 
In production, British clothing manufacture1s had experienced a long period of decline 
resulting from 
-Mi< • a marginal economic poSition, with low accumulation and a lack of reinvestment in 
~"Ii new productive capital; 
• competition from developing-country imports; 
• an inabiUty to compete with imports; with labour intensive production, labour costs 
could not be significantly reduced in what was already a low wage industry, and there had 
been insufficient investment in machinery which could increase productivity. 
This long term decline accelerated sharply during the 1970&, and was exacerbated by the 
recession of 1919-81. The number ofliquidations in the sector increased to almost double the 
rate for aU manufacturing industries during the 1970&, and by the mid-1980s they accounted 
for 27% of compulsory and 85% of voluntary liquidations1'. With many firms closing, both 
. output and employment feU by 26% during 1979-82 (see Table 9.2 and Figure 9.1). Since the 
recession, the industry has seen a rise in output, but this has taken place without any 
significant increase in employment. As in many other industries, the recovery has 
essentiaUy been a recovery for profits, and the share of output and value added devoted to 
wages has faUen (see Table 9.3). 
The second c:hanae had been a gradual decline in the importance of standardised garments 
for.ma~s mar~, In favour of specialised fashion ~ts. Oothing is one mar1cet where 
consumers'tastes have undergone such a change18, and this gave an additional importance 
17"..,.,.", • 7'oI1ftIII, 1'., ,. SI. 
I. NoIIIII. 0'",.",.", 1117. ~ ."..,1Mtitm If""', • .,... to".. CItIItIIIIfIJ'I,,,., ,.". .... fly ",.", 
,.""...,. ... "" '"... ""'iMlIDrt' .... , hI 1MrI" ma.......,.",. __ ...."",tiDft"."". ... ,.". 
........ tI.J.,...",,,.,,,,.....,. ""--,. .... ,..,.,..,.,. 
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to the role of design, and of flexibility in production and distribution; that is, firms which 
could produce designs which anticipated or created market trends, and which could alter 
production quickly, would have a competitive advantage. 
Table 9.2 Clothing industry: output and employment 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Output (£m) 3,105 3,018 2,898 3,025 3,170 3,671 
Output volume 115.2 100.0 88.5 85.7 87.0 95.4 
(1980=100) 
Employment 321.9 296.1 255.9 237.1 228.8 228.2 
('000) 
Source: Census of Production (P A453) 
Figure 9.1 Output and employment in clothing (Index, 1980=100) 
120 
• Production 
industries 
Year 
rm Clothing output Clothing 
employment 
1985 
4,187 
105.5 
236.8 
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Table 9.3 Clothing industry: share of wagel in output and value added (%) 
1980 
Wages/net VA 66.6 
Wages/output 27.7 
~: CmsuI ofProtlllCtitm PA453 
1981 
66.5 
27.9 
1982 
65.2 
27.4 
1983 
64.1 
26.9 
1984 
62.9 
26.9 
1985 
61.1 
25.7 
Thirdly, the development of computer-based 'flexible manufacturing' systems has been 
applied to small-batch clothing production. Already computer aided graphics and 
numerically controlled machine tools have had a considerable impact on pattern grading, 
marking and cutting. Size and design changes are easily accommodated, and there have 
been considerable increases in the speed and accuracy of the pre-sewing stage of 
production19• Although there have not yet been any really major breakthroughs in 
automating garment assembly, prototypes have been designed which enable computer-
controlled machining, and it is only a matter of time before this is widely available, together 
with computer-based innovations in inspection, finishing and production control20• 
In the absence of full automation of clothing production, the pattern of present development 
is accentuating the unequal relationship between the large distributors and small 
manufacturers. Machining of garments continuel to be subcontracted to small, labour-
intensive, low techno1ogy firms, which remain controDed by a design/ distribution/ retailing 
operation making full use of mtcro-eJectronic technology to gather and process information, 
and to automate stade control and warehousing21. Benelton il the most sophisticated 
. example of thla structure, bUt other firms are following suit (e.g. Burton and Next in 
Britain) •. SuCcess is based upon a combination 01 control and flexibility: control over 
(centraUsed) distribution, retaning and design, and flexibility in (decentra1ised) production. 
These developments benefit the design/distribution companies, but offer Httle for clothing 
worlcen who remain employed in ImaB sweatshops. The prospect is for a deteriorating 
'balance between 'primary sector' or 'core' Jobs (those which offer a reasonable wage, some 
stability of employment,and a fun range of rights and welfare benefits) and 'secondary 
11 S-, M;,. II 
2D".",.,., JIll. 
221t111t1r, 1115; Zlddfll, 1115. 
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sector' or 'peripheral' jobs (those which offer low wages, little stability, few rights and 
welfare benefits). 
In the longer term, larger manufacturers may benefit from the adoption of increasingly 
mechanised clothing production, as will a minority of workers in skill-intensive jobs22. The 
past few years have seen the start of some adoption of these new technologies in the 
clothing industry. However, most of the capital equipment is very expensive, and the 
history of poor management and accumulation does not augur well. There are doubts 
concerning the capability of the industry to restructure effectively even in capital's 
interests23; the prospect is of European finns benefiting most. There seems little doubt that 
effective public intervention is necessary to ensure such restructuring in Britain; in London, 
the GLC aimed to use such intervention to restructure along lines which would benefit 
workers in the industry, although little of this programme was implemented before the 
coundl's abolition. 
Without such restructuring, the prospects for the industry in Britain are bleak. With 
advances in productivity taking place elsewhere in Europe, the British industry faces 
intensified pressures to reduce labour costs, with implications for deteriorating wages and 
working conditions experienced by the some of the most vulnerable workers. 
CLOTHINC CO-OPEKATIVES 
Introduction 
As we have seen the clothing industry is characterised by particularly poor working 
conditions and low wages, especially for women workers. If co-ops are not to simply 
replicate the situation found in typical clothing firms, they are faced with the following 
challenges at the level of the enterprise, in addition to providing work for unemployed 
clothing workers: 
22 Allltough 1M ~ of 0. _ted Imo. inti.",,, ""'Y lie 1'Ilntmt; .DIMP' 1M ,.., 20,.., 1M BrlIiM tmik iNluJlry 
,..,,,.,, """.""". from.""" "'tatiw 1tuIvmy, II1iI1I low .,., '0. aqdIId "".,.., 1M."""."", low .... 
(QwrmcI f HR, 1.6.88). 
2J RIIMJdI., MImdIa,. Ptzlyl«Jmlc IIIfIGII ",., "BrllIM doUd", ~ tqIfJIItar lGdibly to ,. ...,.,.,. of 
..., "",.",.".UIa ". 0. .",.., ,.,.,.".",.,. .111 ,.,."" .. ..., "..,." "" ItlwyJ .,.1fIWII...,.", ,."",. ", 
",....,,.,,,,,,.,,., dilrrmlNl1l p.(p eortqIIIilorl"_ 1M ~,.., .. ,., ", BEC~. «jarftia 
JUJ.87) . 
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• securing a greater degree of control by workers over their own jobs and work 
environment; 
• providing more stable employment, higher pay and better working conditions for 
clothing workers; 
• improving women's access to 'skilled' work in the industry. 
The problems faced by co-ops in achieving these objectives are immense. The poor 
conditions experienced by most clothing workers result from the nature of the accumulation 
. process in the industry, and the impact which this has had on the structure of the industry 
and the nature of the labour process. It is not due to a conscious strategy by capitalists 
owning small clo~g manufacturing firms; if these clothing firms are to survive they have 
very little flexibility open to them in terms of working conditions. Given that co-ops must 
survive in the same market and must operate in the same relationship to the large 
distribution companies, what potential is there for clothing co-ops to operate differently and 
meet the cha11enges outlined above? In this chapter I will first of all consider the nature of 
the clothing co-op sector, and then consider the experience of some individual co-ops. 
Fo,."udio" of cloth;"g co-op. 
. ' 
19th century co-operatives 
Oothing co-operatives figured prominently in the second major wave of co-op formations 
in the nineteenth century, and many were formed during the 1880s. Oothing, along with 
the related boot and shoemaldng co-ops, and printing accounted for the major part of these 
CPP co-ops. All of these industries were late in transfening to factory production, and in 
them small scale manufacturing predominated24; Oakeshott notes that these three 
industries "never seem to have accounted for less than 60% of the enterprises in existence at 
any one time"25. Of the three industries, however, clothing was the smallest. Eight CPP 
clothing CX)-()ps survived until the late 19501, when several of them were very large by 
industry standards: 
24.".",." tift". 2f. 
26 a.r.fIoII, 211.".5 •• 
Co-op 
Alcester Productive 
Ideal Oothiers 
Kaycee Oothing 
Kirkby-in-Ashfield Manufrs 
Macclesfield Silk Manufrs 
Queen Eleanor 
Sunray Textiles 
Wigston Hosiers 
Source: Co-operative Union, 1960. 
Workers 
27 
831 
364 
49 
71 
153 
165 
64 
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The fortunes of these co-ops were largely tied to their trading relationship with retail 
societies; clothing co-ops, along with footwear co-ops, had very close links with the retail 
co-ops which provided their main market. It was this assured market which enabled the 
producer co-ops to survive and grow. By the mid-1960s however, retail co-ops were facing 
increased competition from supermarkets, and the response was to become more like their 
capitalist competitors and convert retail co-ops into a homogeneous chain. This change 
involved a more dominant role for the CWS. Previously, retail stores had more autonomy 
and a free choice as to suppliers, and many chose to purchase from CPF producer co-ops, 
and each offered a different range of goods. In 1963 the "Co-operative Wholesale Marketing 
Scheme" was introduced, under which retail societies were encouraged to amalgamate and 
to make all their purchases directly from the CWS26. The aim was to have a similar range of 
goods available in all co-op stores, and to enable lower prices through bulk purchasing by 
the CWS and scale economies in distribution. 
The Marketing Scheme had a major effect on many CPF clothing and footwear co-ops, as 
they lost their main market. Several reported substantial reductions in co-op trade in the late 
1960s; for instance in 1967 Kaycee Oothing stated that: 
CWS Marketing Schemes now control virtually . all 80% of all trade in 
menswear in our major outlets. This is having a serious effect on our trading 
potential. The future depends on our ability to find new markets27 
Similar sentiments were expressed in 1970, and the co-op eventually folded in 1974. Many 
footwear co-ops suffered the same fate. Even for Ideal Oothiers, which was fortunate 
21 SorM mIIil,.. ... IIGWlIy,... tIM'., *Cws. 
211"-1 CIofIIim AfuaMi Rqort 2167, If1II*II "...".", 2914. 
'S 
.. 
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enough to be selected as a supplier to CWS Mar1ceting Schemes, the changed market 
relationship had a serious impact: 
a steadily increasing part of our trade with the CRS is covered by Marketing 
Schemes which are not profitable28. 
Despite the pressure exerted on suppliers by the CWS, this continued trade provided a 
cushion from the worst effects of the Marketing Schemes on producers, and Ideal Oothiers 
did find some new markets. However, the co-op finally collapsed in 1983, and by 1987 only 
one CPF clothing co-op (Queen Eleanor) and two footwear co-ops (NPS Shoes &: Equity 
Shoes) survived. The impact of links between producer and retail co-ops is of course in line 
with the analysis of the Webbs detailed in chapter 2. 
Recent ftmnations 
In chapter 5 the size of the clothing co-op sector was shown relative to the overall sectoral 
distribution of co-ops. Table 5.7 shows the prominence of clothing co-ops amongst 
production co-ops, and within the co-op sector as a whole. The information is summarised 
in Table 9.4. 
Table 9.4 Formation of clothing co-ops 
1·' 
SIC Co-ops Co-ops Survival 
formed sUTTJiuing rtlie(%) 
All co-ops 0-9 1330 880 66 
Production 1-4 361 243 67 
Oothing 453 75 40 53 
Soun¥: t..oadan 100M (1987); own caIcu1atioruL 
'!but 5% of aD CXHJPI, and 17«1 of production co-ops, fanned in the period 1975-1985 were 
in clothing manUfacture. Only printing, arts &: medi., buDding and wholefood retailing had 
mOre formations in the period. 
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Reasons for emergence of co-ops in clothing 
There are a range of important factors and characteristics of the industry which are behind 
the emergence of clothing aK>ps and their prominent position in recent co-operative 
growth: 
• the industry is labour intensive; 
• production is generally small scale. 
• start up costs - in terms of fixed and working capital - are low 
• the clothing industry has been in decline, leading to redundandes. 
• the industry is characterised by poor wages and working conditions, and a lack of 
opportunities for advancement for women. 
• the structure of the industry is such that production is divided up into stages between 
firms; those in CMT can survive with few skills other than cutting and sewing. 
To the extent that widespread unemployment and poor working conditions in the industry 
provide an incentive for workers to attempt production under their own control - with more 
secure and better quality jobs - then there are fewer constraints on the formation of 
aK>peratives in clothing than in many other industrial sectors. This accounts for the 
relatively high level of clothing aK>p starts. Most importantly, the limited initial financial 
and skill requirements mean that the problems typically faced by co-operatives in securing 
adequate finance are less likely to be constraint, particularly in CMT, where most clothing 
aK>ps are to be found. 
However the conditions for emergence are very different to the conditions for survival, and 
do not necessarily contribute to the achievement of those objectives. Indeed, the very 
conditions which malce it easy for clothing co-ops to start may detract from performance. 
For instance, the ability to start production in CMT with few sldlls offers little opportunity 
to secure a higher degree of control over work, due to dependency on other firms. 
The importance of sman firms in the clothing sector is a character:iatic shared with printing, 
but overeD there are more contrasts than similarities. Skilled printing work is male 
dominated, well paid, and highly unionised; none of these factors apply in clothing. 
Furthermore, relationships to large firms are very dilfereDt whUe clothing co-ops are highly 
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dependent upon direct trading links, printing co-ops have a much greater degree of 
independence. 
SurDi'Dal III growth of clothing CO-OP' 
The distinction between ronditions for fonnation and emergence of co-ops and those for 
survival are illustrated in the high formation rate and the subsequent high failure rate. 
Although many clothing co-ops were fonned over the period, their ability to survive was 
poor. Table 9.4 shows that 75 clothing and footwear co-ops were established in Britain from 
1975 to 1986, and by the end of 1986 only 40 of these were still trading, a survival rate of 
53%. Refening to Table 3.8, the clothing sector has the lowest survival rate of all co-op 
~;_ sectors apart from buDding •. 
The instability and insecurity of clothing .co-ops reflects the industry in which they operate 
rather than anything particuJarly to do with the co-op form; it is a characteristic of small 
clothing enterprises in general. It is difficult to make direct romparisons between the 
survival rates of co-ops and capitalist firms, as data on the industry is of poor quality, but 
clearly there is a high turnover of small firms in the clothing industry. 
Ectmomicpolition 
The low survival rate of clothing co-ops is of course a consequence of their vulnerable and 
insecure economic position. Their commerdal performance has been dealt with in chapter 7, 
in comparison with the performance of co-ops in the other two sectors. Some of the 
important findings are worth noting at this stage in the context of the analysis of the sector 
and key results are presented in Table 95 at the end of the chapter. 
The clothing· co-op sector is the smallest of the three co-op sectors studied, in terms of the 
number of co-ops included, and the output of the sector. It is also the least consistent over a 
period of time; the instability derives from the high failure rate and short Ufespan of many 
clothing co-opt, leading to a rapid turnover of operational co-ops. In addition, operating 
co-ops are themselves relatively unstab1e29. Although this instability means that trends in 
performance are ctifftcu1t to detect, it is ibelf an iDdication of economic vulnerability and 
.' 1ftIIIJIDaUty. 
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The clothing C<H>p sector is characterised by poorer performance in all areas than the other 
two sectors studied. Both net value added per worker and wages are lower; and although 
they are closer to industry averages than are the equivalent figures for printing co-ops, this 
reflects the generally poorer performance of the clothing industry as a whole. 
The most disturbing aspect of clothing co-ops performance is that virtually all of the surplus 
generated is devoted to wages. Although wages in clothing co-ops are only marginally 
lower than those the industry as a whole, these wages are low in absolute terms. 
Nevertheless, there is no surplus remaining to contribute to accumulation; in every year 
except one from 1980 to 1985, 100% or more of net surplus was devoted to wages. So, in 
terms of the performance indicators discussed in chapter 7, clothing co-ops perform badly _ 
low surplus per worker, low wages, and low contributions to reserves. For the main 
indicator, value added per head, clothing co-ops have only achieved 50% of the level in 
printing co-ops. Co-ops are also less productive than capitalist clothing firms, as Table 9.5 
shows. Output per head is only one third or one quarter of the industry average, and value 
added per head is lower, and inevitably a much greater proportion of the surplus must be 
devoted to wages, thus restricting accumulation. 
Turning now to the generation of value added, clothing is also distinguished from the other 
two sectors. The inability to accumulate means that productive capital does not get 
replaced, and as a result the value of fixed assets per head has continuously fallen. This is 
more a financial phenomenon than a real one, and physical capital in clothing can endure 
for a long period with adequate maintenance, certainly much longer than the usual ten year 
depredation period.However, it does indicate that very little new physical capital can be 
afforded. It also appears that value added is increasing relative to the diminiShing book 
value of assets, unlike the other sectors where it is roughly constant. 
Particularly disturbing, and unlike the other two sectors, is the evidence that there has been 
no improvement over time; in printing at least, performance started off badly but has 
shown a steady improvement. With wages being higher than the surplus generated, trading 
losses are being run up, and no reinvestment is taking place, making it even more difficult 
to improve performance. The problem is partly a result of initial financial problems; 
although clothing co-ops benefit from a relatively high proportion 01 public sector loans and 
grants, these appear to be primarily to subsidize trading losses rather than to invest and 
restructure. There is Utt1e initial finandaI input from members, because most clothing co-op 
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workers are poor, and little sympathetic private funding, perhaps because clothing does not 
have the political significance of wholefoods or alternative print. Oearly, with such poor 
performance, clothing co-ops overall have substantial problems in raising commercial 
finance, although this does not apply to all individual co-ops. 
The experience of clothing CO-OP' 
The origins of most clothing co-ops result from the long-standing economic problems of the 
clothing industry. Many are closely associated with closure or redundancies at capitalist 
firms, and represent efforts by workers to preserve their jobs. There have been fewer new 
starts than in the co-op sector generally, and more 'rescues' or 'phoenix' co-ops. 
FIl1renham Enterprises 
Such origins, and the consequent difficulties, were illustrated by one of the first co-ops 
fonned in recent years, Fakenham Enterprises30. Although the co-op originally worked in 
footwear manufacture, its problems were identical to many in CMT clothing manufacture. 
The factory at Fakenham, Norfolk, was originally part of a medium-sized footwear firm 
based in Norwich - Sexton, Son and Everard - which went into liquidation in 1972. As part 
of a larger concern, it carried out a particular part of the shoe manufacturing process, and 
employed around 50 workers, of whom all except one were women. When it became 
apparent that the Receiver's plans were unlikely to preserve any of the Fakenham plant's 
jobs, the women occupied the factory. A core of around 12 women maintained the 
occupation for 1S·weeks, and eventually succeeded in establishing a co-op. Their aim was 
not just to save jobs, but specifically to secure a greater degree of control over their own 
work and improve coruntio~. A co-op was specifically chosen because of the women's 
experiences of capitaUat employers32: 
the women did not want .... -somebody to make a takeover bid for us and two 
yean from now decide that the thins isn't a profitable concern and throw us 
out on the road again. We've had it so often. - Because of their previous 
employment,experience, the women were IUSpidOUI that a new owner would 
have no scruples about introdudng further redundancies. They wanted to be 
able instead to offer jobs to the women who had been forced to leave the 
!O l.ot:bU,JI7I; ~, J, .... 
n NlJc-, J_,,,. 5J-2., 
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factory, both because they could not afford to work without pay and because 
of pressure from disapproving husbands33 
Problems began immediately. As part of the larger concern, the Fakenham factory had 
carried out only part of the shoe manufacturing process. Skills and equipment were geared 
exclusively to 'closing' shoe uppers, and the factory was dependent on the main company 
for supply of raw material, for management skills and marketing. Fakenham therefore had 
no independent manufacturing capability. 
The co-op was faced with an immediate need to secure new business. One option was to 
undertake shoe closing work under contract, similar to that camed out in the past. 
However, sub-contract work in a declining market promised insecurity, absorbing 
fluctuations in other firms' workloads, and consequently the sort of employment flexibility _ 
hiring and firing - used by conventional firms, but which would be incompatible with being 
a co-op. 
An alternative was for the co-op to move into making and marketing its own products. This 
involved additional requirements: 
• skills in product design 
• production skills for all stages of manufacture 
• management and administrative skills, especially marketing, costing and organisation 
• appropriate production equipment 
• working capital for raw materials, wages, stocks, creditors etc. 
Because of its previous role and position within the larger firm, the co-op was lacking all of 
these, and could not move into this area immediately. It was initially forced to take some 
shoe contracts, and also other sub-contract work, making bags, dresses and leather clothes, 
usually on a CMT basis. However, the situation on these other lines was if anything worse 
than that for shoes, as the co-op workers laclced appropriate skills and machinery, and could 
only compete at the bottom end of the sub-contract market. This effectively meant 
competing with outworkers - individuals working at home - and as a result the prices 
offered provided very low rates of pay and little contribution to factory overheads. 
l5 w.jc:ma, J"", ,. 5J. 
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The combination of these types of work led the co-op into a vidous circle, illustrated below. 
Sub-contract work offered low profitability, and hence no surplus which could be retained 
for training, product development and new machinery. Undercapitalisation meant 
continued dependence on work with low capital and skill requirements, and acceptance of 
such work continued the cycle of low profitability and undercapitalisation. The overall 
result was stagnation, insecurity and recurrent financial crises. Although this situation 
applies to many firms in CMT, for the co-op it was worse due to the particular 
circumstances of formation and the greater than usual shortage of finance, skills and 
equipment. 
J, 
acceptance of low skill, labour intensive contracts 
J, 
work offers low revenue and value added; low skill level 
J, 
low surplus and accumulation 
J, 
lack of capital for product developnent, training and new machinery 
J, 
little training or invesbnent in new machinery 
J, 
need for work with low capital and low skill requirements 
J, 
A necessary condition for breaking out of this situation was an injection of finance enabling 
invesbnent in machinery and training, with the aim of thus securing work with a greater 
skill requirement. Such work would pay higher rates, enabling the accumulation of a 
surplus for continued training and investment, or the payment of better wages, and 
eventually the possibility of developing their own products. The consequent reduced need 
for subo-contract work would reinforce the. beneficial aspects of the process, and enable a 
greater degree of security and independence, and escape from recurrent finandal crises. 
~ 
This situation is not peculiar to a co-op, but would apply to virtually any small firm in the 
clothina or footwear industry with sbnilar origins. In fact the situation facing a co-op is 
moN cHi:ftcutt even 'than thia, as the achievement of a greater degree of collective control 
over work and the introduction of alternative wor1cfngpractices is an additional factor 
which makes vIablUty more diIftcuIt to achieve. This conflid wu mustrated through the 
involvement of &ott Bader, which will be disc:ussed below. 
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Like many co-ops, Fakenham Enterprises was in a weak position to secure external finance 
from commercial sources. This was due to: 
• the co-op's poor commercial performance record; 
• the lack of management and financial sJdlls; 
• potential discrimination against an all-women enterprise, in addition to discrimination 
against co-operatives; 
• the inability of co-op workers to contribute any significant finance of their own; 
• the lack of security which could be offered by the co-op or individual workers against 
any loan; 
Although there was little chance of obtaining commercial finance - and the co-op never even 
attempted to secure it - there were offers of funds at the very beginning from two 
sympathetic sources. The first was from ASTMS, the union representing some of the 
original workers at Sextons, and which had been sympathetic to the womens' struggle from 
the beginning. The second offer was from Scott Bader (58), which was keen to encourage 
new co-ops, particularly those emerging from bankrupt companies rather than conversions 
as most had been up to that time. There was conflict between the ASTMS and S8 
approaches, and the women accepted the involvement of S8, largely because they were 
offering the more substantial finance. 
S8's aim was to bring the co-op to financial viability as quickly as possible. It contributed 
funds to cover worldng capital and operating losses in the early days, although its initial 
contribution of £2,500 was nowhere near the estimated requirement of £20,000. S8 insisted 
on bringing in its own manager, who would have complete control over the co-op (I) until 
viability had been achieved. This approach gave the workers very little, if any, say over how 
the co-op was to be run. S8's approach was as follows: 
achieve profitability quite single-mindedly without confusing this with the 
ideals of common ownership. As soon as the conc:em is able to pay its way 
without financial assistance from US we naturally earnestly hope that it can 
become a common-ownership concern but no-one should be under any 
illusion concerning the immediate priorities34 
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Despite this aim, SB never really supported attempts to move away from Iabour-only su~ 
contract work, and under their influence the co-op remained hopelessly vulnerable to 
fluctuations in the state of the footwear industry. Furthennore, SB's approach conflicted 
with the changes which the women had introduced during their occupation, and which for 
many of them were the most significant achievement of their struggle. 
It is typical in the clothing and footwear industries for production to be organised on a 
piecework basis. This is capital's method of securing control over the intensity of work, 
particularly in sukontract work where supervision is indirect. Piece rates are thus used to 
maintain the speed of the machinists; it encourages competition between workers, tends to 
result in a tense atmosphere, with workers tied to their machines throughout the working 
day. 
From the beginning of the occupation, the women at Fakenham worked collectively. This 
meant that they participated equally in decision-making, and there was completely open 
access to information. Collective organisation extended to the production process itself. 
Instead of a detailed division of labour, with different workers carrying out small parts of 
the overall process repetitively, the aim was to enable each worker to carry out the entire 
process and produce a finished article. In practice some specialisation was necessary given 
the low pricel offered by sub-contract work, but for the first time workers were sharing 
their skills and knowledge rather than competing. Integral to this was the introduction of a 
flat-rate weekly wage in place of piece rates. Although this meant that experienced workers 
eamedless than under the conventional system, it encouraged collective rather than 
individual effort, and contributed to the relaxed atmosphere at the factory. There was also 
flexibility over hours worked - women with responsibility for children could work hours 
which suited them; under the previous owners it was management which dictated hours 
worked. During school holidays women could bring children into the factory, or work at 
home. Management decisions were made collectively at weekly meetings of the workforce. 
Given the .~ ftnandaJ state of the co-op however, this reorganisation of working 
, . 
pract:lcet w. under severe pressure from early on. Despite SBs position u a pioneer of 
industrial democracy, they. dearly saw eo-operative working as entirely subordinate to 
commerdal vtablJity, and It was their Imposition of a manager that undermined the changeI 
whleh the women had introd1lC*f. Instead of attentpting to find a sympathetic manager 
who wouIdbaftc:l upon their achIevementt and be nspcmsiw to their needs at the same 
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time as passing on the required administrative skills - admittedly a difficult task - SB 
selected an individual with no interest either in co-operatives or in training the Fakenham 
workers, and with a very conventional view of hierarchical organisation and control. 
Ultimately SB did not succeed in establishing the co-op as commerdally viable, nor did they 
equip the women with necessary managerial sldlls or financial security to break out of their 
dependent economic position. SBs legacy was to leave the co-op in a position where it could 
not survive and was eventually absorbed by outside capital. 
After two years the workers decided to end their relationship with SB, following continual 
bad experiences with SB-appointed managers. They remained dependent on sub-contracts, 
firstly shoe upper closing, which provided stable work but led to increasing direct 
involvement by the company providing the contract in the organisation of work at 
Fakenham. This involvement eventually culminated in a takeover bid, which was rejected 
because it was 
a terrifying prospect that having worked so hard for so long, having given up 
our weekends and evenings to meet delivery dates without pay, even taking 
severe wage cuts, it should all be for nothing more than to take the retrograde 
step of becoming again a satellite of a shoe company3S 
A downturn in the shoe industry early in 1975 meant that shoe contracts became 
increasingly difficult to obtain, and the major one was lost. This forced the co-<>p into 
accepting smaIl unprofitable contracts which did little beyond keep the workforce intact in 
the short term. 
The co-op then obtained a major contract machining dresses for another Norfolk clothing 
firm, but were essentially competing with outworkers and working for very low rates. It 
involved the installation of appropriate machines at Fakenham by the contracting firm, and 
provision of cut material for machining. Although this contract endured for some time, as It 
progressed it involved increasingly direct control by the capitalist firm. This started with 
deciding the layout of that part of the factory doing the dress machining, then control over 
the work carried out by the dress machinists, and finally paying the wages of these workers 
directly rather than through the co-op structure. This involved a change from flat-rate 
wages to piece rates. The rest of the co-op was becoming increasingly marginalised; the 
dress contract gave little contribution to overheads, and although it provided steady work it 
did not provide IUfficient surplus to enable the development of the co-op'. own products. 
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Over a period of a year, dependence on this contract marked a takeover of the co-op by 
capital and direct employment of the majority of co-op workers as wage labour. Because of 
the weak economic position of the co-op there was very little that could be done to resist 
this, and by early 1976 the Fakenham Enterprises co-op existed in name only, with no work 
other than the dress mntract 
The story of the Falcenham CCH)P is one of failure to break out of an adverse economic 
poSition, with this situation dominating all other aspects of the co-op's operation. The 
problems were exacerbated by a lack of some necessary skills and of finance; but 
maintenance of the co-op was dependent on changing the co-ops economic relationships -
moving into new products and mar1cets. This in tum required external assistance, but the 
most substantial - that provided by Scott Bader - was never really orientated towards 
changing these economic relationships, only to making the co-op more competitive in its 
existing, highly dependent relationships. 
The importance of Falcenham's market position and its impact on the co-op's development 
was antidpated in Part I and ties in with the findings from printing co-ops. One of the most 
significant aspects of Fakenham is the extent to which the women did succeed in changing 
their immediate working environment and gaining limited control over the labour process 
. despite adverse economic conditions. The achievement of this by women almost unaided in 
an economy and society dominated by men is also striking, and although there are some 
important and enmuraging lessons for women in the clothing industry, the hopelessness of 
their economic situation illustrated the constraints on any long-term success in these areas .• 
Recent clothing co-ops 
The expertence of Palcenham provides an extreme example of the difficulties involved in 
establishing a co-op out of a factory closure in a declining industry. More recent co-ops have 
had a mixed record, but reflect attempts have faced similar problems, but reflect many 
elements of the Pa1cenham experience, both in terms of origins and wlnerability. One which 
has had some success f. a shoe manufacturing co-op established in Minehead when Oarks 
doled a fadory there. n.e co-op was estabUshed by a few of the redundant workers, 
desper.te1y thortof finance and s1dDa, but with support from the local mmmunity, and 
eapftal equipment Ieued from the former owners 01\ tennt which, in the circumstances, 
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were reasonable. The co-op eventually received some state funding, (through CoSIRA36), 
but provided jobs for only 20 of the origina1200 workers. It provides a classic example of a 
dependent small firm, reliant upon the fonner owners for the majority of work, and 
although the co-op has survived it has always been commercially marginal: 
Oarks were quick to utilise the flexibility and reduction in overheads, 
commitments and labour costs resulting from putting out .... by imposing 
stringent conditions on the type of shoes that the co-operative could produce, 
Oarks contributed to the situation whereby the co-operative, unable to 
develop its own markets, was desperate for contract work37. 
However the Minehead Shoe C(H)P continues to operate and has avoided the fate of some 
similar ventures. In 1978 a number of women workers were made redundant from a large 
clothing firm in Ayrshire; 12 of them formed the Doon Vlllley co-operative at the suggestion 
of their former employer, who offered them cut, make and trim sub-contract work. Living in 
a rural area the women had little alternative opportunities for work, but the co--op lacked 
both finance and management skills - like Fakenham - and hence had little hope of survival 
or development in the vulnerable CMT market. Although some assistance was obtained 
from the local authOrity, the co-op eventually collapsed. The case of Doon Valley represents 
a particularly extreme example of capital making use of co-operatives in its own interests 
during restructuring. 
Another example of the difficulties of establishing a co-op in CMT work is that of Dowlais 
Knitwetlr38• In 1976 Courtaulds closed down a hosiery factory in Myrthyr Tydfil, making 
several hundred workers redundant. An attempt was launched by a group of workers to 
preserve some jobs; rather than remain in hosiery production - which was a depressed 
industry and relatively capital intensive - they decided to form a C(H)P in the associated 
area of CMT clothing manufacture. The co-op was not launched immediately but some time 
was spent making a successful application for MSC funds to cover wage costs in the start-
up period, and it was eventually established in 1978 with 12 women workers. Despite the 
MSC funding the co-op soon faced difficulties; although CMT is relatively simple, the skills 
required are different to those in hosiery manufacture, and the highly competitive nature of 
CMT and consequent low prices meant that the co-op operated at a lou. There were also 
endless problems - like Fakenham - in recruiting a manager who wuboth competent and 
S6 Cotnu:il for SNll In4w"" ". RII"" ANU. 
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committed to working in a co-op. It was appreciated that CMT did not offer the co-op long 
tenn stability, but the MSC was not geared to financing the move into own-<iesign 
production and this remained elusive. Caught in the trap of low value CMT contracts, low 
wages and lack of investment, the co-op contracted sharply after the end of MSC funding 
and eventually collapsed. 
In 1980 the co-op Louise Argyle was formed on Tyneside when a capitalist clothing finn went 
bankrupt. FollOwing a lO-day sit-in, a co-op was formed by 24 of the workers, with 
assistance from Tyne &: Wear County Council (now abolished), who provided grants, loans 
and funds for a feasibility study. The original intention of the women - like those at 
Fakenham - was to move into 'own label' production, but they very quickly found 
themselves locked into the CMT subcontracting work typical of small clothing firms. Their 
subsequent existence has been marked by a continuing shortage of skills, finance and 
equipment, and consequent low productivity, problems which make success in CMT 
difficult and a switch into higher value products virtually impossible. 
Despite the usual economic problems and vulnerability of CMT co~ps, Louise Argyle has 
survived for seven years and had a turnover of over £200,000 in 1986, providing work for 24 
women. Their survival to date has been dependent upon continued local authority funding, 
but this has been orientated towards meeting trading losses and preserving jobs rather than 
restructuring to ensure long tenn viability. Within this difficult economic existence, there 
have been achievements in the nature of the labour process. At a basic level, workers are on 
wages rather than piece rates, which eases some of the direct experience of oppression. 
Despite the major problems and insecurity which have been faced, most of the workers 
have reacted positively to working in a co-op rather than in a capitalist finn. They have 
developed a high degree of self-confidence, both as workers against management and as 
'Women againstmen39, which began to lead to increased awareness of wider political and 
aodal illuel. 
A further example of a marginal CMT ~p was that of Happy HAnds, formed in West 
GJamorpn in 1980. Although some of the initial workers had been made redundant from 
\-' "', " . . 
other dothina fac:toriel, the co-op did not emerge directly from a closure; as a dothing co-op 
it is unusual in being a 'new start'. A lengthy period of planning and preparation was 
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undertaken, and a £5,000 loan obtained from ICOF. This was audal in avoiding typical 
problems of under-capitalisationi the co-op subsequently expanded from 6 to 28 workers, all 
women. The co-op survived on the basis of adequate capitalisation and efficiency, but 
remained in sub-contract work with all the associated vulnerability and uncertainty. 
Furthermore, it was restricted to machining, the least skilled part of manufacturing, lacking 
the skills and resources to undertake cutting, trimming and finishing, which reduced value 
added even further. The co-op did attempt to move into own-<iesign work, linking up with 
a designer and starting to exhibit, but even with some funding assistance from the Welsh 
Development Agency this move was beyond the co--op's resourcesi it eventually collapsed 
in 1986. 
Wages were low, in what is anyway a badly paid industry, and being vulnerable to 
customer defaults, in some weeks no wages were paid at all. Nevertheless, the co-op did 
illustrate some achievements which were possible in the clothing industry. The women 
secured some control over their work in basic but important matters: reorganising the 
layout of the factory so that machines faced each other and conversation was made easier, 
doing away with piece work and supervision, and rotating some of the administrative tasks. 
Perhaps most important achievement was flexible working hours, to cope with the needs of 
those caring for children. 
Happy Hands was one of several clothing co-ops in Wales, where clothing is now the most 
important sector of co-op activityi at the end of 1986 there were 9 clothing co-ops employing 
some 160 workers. However, the sector faces problems typical of small clothing firms and 
clothing co--ops. They are concentrated in CMT work, and lead a precarious existence, with 
a high turnover of businesses. During 1986, for instance, there was a sharp downturn in 
orders, and 4 clothing co--ops collapsed while the others faced major difficulties. In the same 
year 3 new clothing co--ops were created, including one formed by workers made redundant 
when their factory was closed by the multinational BTR. 
As would be expected, the CMT co-ops lack the skills and ftnancial resources to move out of 
subcontracting into producing their own ranges, and on their own are unJilceIy ever to be in 
a position to do so. In an attempt to overcome these problems, the Wales Co-op Centre is 
developing a strategy to aid clothing co-ops40. This would include spedaIist financial 
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assistance, access to mmputer-aided design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM) facilities, and 
the provision of design, management and marketing skills. Whilst this is an ambitious 
project, it muld, if established, provide the crucial intervention and support which clothing 
co-ops have been lacking. 
The rea>rd of a>-ops in CMT subcontracting is mixed but generally poor: a high failure rate, 
ongoing commercial problems and mnstant vulnerability to changes in the level of activity 
in the clothing sedor. Their poor performance in commercial terms is shown in Table 9.5. 
Although wages remain low, some have however managed to improve their working 
environment in an industry where poor mnditions are the nonn; reorganisation of factory 
layout is easy given the unsophisticated technology used, and because mnventionallayouts 
were developed as much to facilitate SUpervision as efficiency. Although there are examples 
of job rotation, the largely monotonous job content remains mostly unchanged. Workers do 
have a say in how the businesses is run and some small CMT a>-ops do tend to operate 
democratically, but for much of the time the range of decisions which they have to make is 
effectively very limited by their marginal economic position. 
At the other extreme are co-ops established in order to produce to own designs, mmpeting 
in the fashion market. Although potentially more rewarding, there are perhaps even greater 
problems to faced than in CMT. The range of skills required is even greater - including 
design, marketing and distribution as well as manufacturing - and the market is volatile. 
Most 'new starr clothing a>-ops have been in this area, usually very small (2-4 workers) and 
unstable. One of the more successful was Ragged Robin, a fashion a>-op in Wales established 
in 1980, also with a loan from ICOP.lt traded successfully for several years - exploiting the 
,potential of direct sales through newspaper advertising - but folded in 1986. The greatest 
potential for, fashion clothing, co-ops is probably for those in Scotland and Wales which 
verge on 'craft' production, and for whom the market is relatively stable. 
An intermediate position is occupied by perhaps the most successful clothing a>-operatives, 
, , .' . 
. in c:olnmeldal terms at least. These co-ops produce clothing to their own designs, marketing 
gooda themselves, but operate in market aegmenta which are relatively unchanging and not 
, .', < ,; 
subject to the vlg8J'iel of fashion, and can sustain long production runs. 
The example of the Scottish co-op Rmulolpll Llilurer.Df!tlr is typical. It was fonned by the 
workers at a factory in Buckbaven, Fife, making high quality ou~wear, which was 
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closed by its owners aares Carlton in 1981. Convinced that there was still a market for their 
product, 19 workers succeeded in forming a co-op with the assistance of SCDC. Funding 
was obtained in the form of loans and grants from the SDA and local authorities, and 
although this was sufficient to cover the purchase of new machinery and materials, staff had 
to work for the first three months without pay - a classic case of 'sweat equity' required in 
an underfinanced co-op. By 1986 the co-op had expanded to 34 full-time and 22 part-time 
workers, again relatively large by clothing industry standards. Although there are weekly 
co-op meetings, it has a conventional capitalist management structure (in keeping with the 
trend where SCDC has been involved with supporting co-ops) and workers are obliged to 
contribute to individual capital stakes by deductions from wages. Randolph has benefited 
from the stability of a relatively unchanging market and major public sector purchasing (e.g. 
£70,000 pa sales to Severn Trent Water Authority> and now has an annual turnover of over 
£350,000 , although wages are relatively low. 
Wilshaw RainwetlT in Bradford operates in a similar market, also designing, manufacturing 
and marketing outdoor wear. The co-op obtained loan funding from the now-abolished 
West Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council on its formation in 1981. Uke Randolph it has 
grown steadily and now has 40 workers and a turnover of around £200,000, and is exports 
its products directly. 
Another Scottish clothing co-op, Fife Fashions, has benefited from similar conditions albeit in 
a different market sector. Following the closure of a clothing factory in Kircaldy several of 
the redundant workers approached SCDC for assistance in setting up a co-op making skirts 
and kilts; it was established with the aid of grants and loans from the SDA and local 
authorities. It has expanded steadily and in 1986 had 13 workers and a turnover of £125,000, 
and paid high wages. 
Even with favourable market conditions success is not assured. FollOwing the success of Fife 
Fashions and high demand for its products, an attempt was made to form a further co-op to 
in Fife when another clothing factory in Buclchaven closed down. However the Fifo Sewing 
Co-op was badly organised and was never properly estabUshed, only lasting a short time 
before closing down in 1986. 
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WOJU(JNC CONDmONS IN CO-OPS 
·One of the key issues concerning clothing co-ops is their impact on working conditions; 
under what conditions can they improve upon the poor conditions which prevail in many 
areas of the clothing industry? This thesis has primarily concentrated upon the experience 
of co-ops as commercial enterprises, and internal aspects of co-ops have been given less 
prominence. However, the issue of conditions for co-op workers has been raised wherever 
possible; co-ops potentially offer an improved quality of work, but have emerged during a 
period of restructuring which has stimulated small firms as part of an attack on working 
conditions in large-scale unionised industries. The abiUty of co-ops to make achievements in 
this area is not assured. The issue is particularly relevant to clothing co-ops, in view of the 
generally poor conditions of work which prevail in many areas of the clothing industry; can 
they offer improved conditions for workers, or is this precluded by their precarious 
economic position? I wt1l firstly make some general points on the issue before returning 
specifically to clothing co-ops. 
Many studies on this subject have concluded that co-ops can indeed offer improved 
conditions for the workers immediately involved, compared to their likely altematives. A 
more egaUtarian division of labour, less oppressive working environment, and the 
opportunity to participate in decisions concerning their work are frequent benefits, although 
countered by lower wages than could probably be expected elsewhere. There is also likely 
. to be added. flexibiUty in co-op working. This point can particularly apply to those raising 
chtldren - mostly women in our present society - who are more able to organise their work 
around the rest of their Uves, rather than vice versa. 
AI co-ops become larger these improved working conditions are likely to change their fonn, 
~ested.in ld,gher wages and shorter hours, with the benefits of participation reduced, 
, and . the labour process coming to resemble more and more that which characterises 
capitaUst .flrms41. Whether ~r not this makes working in a co-op more satisfying is 
uncertain; it Is reported from Scott Bader, Britain's largest co-op that 
the evidence is [not] clear cut .... some people appear to find the experience of 
co-operative working a satisfying one, IIOD'le perceive it to be virtually 
indistlnpisbable from working in a traditional business, others become 
c:ynIcal and di&t11uaioned42. 
1% - ..,.HM.IttIt (I"" ftJr .. " .... ",,,."~ 
42 0IIwr.2117. 
Clothing CD-Operlltives 339 
Even on the level of democratic worker control - in which co-ops should be able to easily 
offer greater achievements - success is not assured. Fairclough has charted the democratic 
degeneration of the Triumph Meriden co-operative , and recounts the following complaint 
by a co-op worker: 
As I see it there is no co-operative operating at Meriden and no consultation 
with any of the workforce. There is more consultation in any other factory in 
Coventry than there is here at Meriden. 
Fairclough proceeds to note the link between this and the commercial weakness of the co-
op: 
even some of the worker leaders realised that they were powerless in affecting 
the outcomes of the commercial negotiations which were conducted from a 
position of economic weakness and which seemed to throw the character of the 
co-operative around like chaff in the wind44. 
Similar complaints regarding the failure to develop any democratic input by workers were 
echoed at the Taunton Shirt Co-op after its eventual collapse. 
Certainly some clothing co-ops have made achievements in terms of flexibility of working 
conditions and the organisation of production on workers' terms. These may seem small 
and insignificant - such as reorganising the layout of the factory and improving the work 
'atmosphere' - but where working conditions are generally so poor, then any improvements 
should be valued. A more important change is the' ending of piece rates, but this is 
vulnerable to economic pressures. At the same time there can also be much greater stress in 
co-ops. Where co-ops are commercially weak, and survival is dependent upon sweated 
labour - long hours, low wages, unpaid overtime and poor working conditions - then 
workers can spend much of their time worrying about the Survival of their co-op and their 
livelihoods. Examples of the benefits of co-op working are countered by opposite 
experiences and on balance there is no reason to believe that working in a co-operative is 
necessarily an uplifting experience. What is certain though is that economic insecurity will 
exacerbate the difficulties workers face. At Fakenham, for instance, where the whole of the 
co-op's existence wu marked by a struggle for survival: 
the co-op's ultimate demise left the women embittered and pessimistic about 
the possibilities for change. Whatever the potential for political radicalisation 
4S F...",., llBA. 
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in a worker controlled enterprise, a failed attempt of this kind may actually 
increase workers' sense of powerlessness.4S 
And after several years spent studying the Minehead Shoe Co-op, Carter concluded that 
alternatives to capitalist organisation were possible but that "it also distressed me to see the 
trade-off in hard work and insecurity that these remarkable people had to endure"46. And in 
the context of Fakenham womens' experiences, Wajcman goes on to ask: 
Why, then, should working class people want to take on the responsibility for 
the viability of the enterprises in which they work by setting up co-operatives? 
That the question is rarely asked is in itself significant - being symptomatic of a 
number of middle-class assumptions of the nature of work. In particular, 
implicit in leftist discussions about workers' co-operatives is the assumption 
that having responsibility at work is desirable in itself •••.. Acquiring greater 
control over the workplace would indeed advance the struggle for job security, 
decent wages and work conditions but ownership fs not a necessary 
conCOmitant, nor even the best means of achieving it. In general workers do 
not have the confidence, the skills or the financial resources to want to take on 
the risks consequent on ownership of their workplaces41• 
In view of these types of problems, women involved in another struggle for jobs in the 
clothing industry decided not to pursue the idea of forming a co-operative: 
the workers at Lee Jeans ••.• occupied their factory in Greenock, Scotland, for 
seven months to protest against closure. Although the formation of a 
co-operatfve was suggested to the women, they were extremely reluctant to 
,take on the responsibility. involved. In the event a new private owner came 
forward, which was the best outcome so far as the workforce was concerned. 
They wanted an end to their struggle, not a continuation of it48. 
There can be no doubt that the negative aspects of working in a co-op will be exacerbated by 
unsupported competition in a market environment most difficulties result from the strain 
of trying to keep a co-op afloat in the face of commercial wealcness and recurring financial 
problems, with concern over whether or not wages can be paid or jobs are secure. It is no 
coincidence that many reports on the negative aspects of co-op working come from clothing 
co-ops, which are amongst the weakest. 
45 ~J..""Ja. 
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CONCLUDING REMAlUCS 
The experience of clothing co-ops is primarily indicative of conditions facing the majority of 
small firms in the clothing industry. Entry to the industry is relatively easy, with low capital 
and skill requirements, and furthennore long term decline and unemployment means that 
there are many workers who may consider the option of setting up a co-op. However, for 
both small firms and co-ops there is a high turnover of businesses, and their existence is 
often short and brutal. They face the prospect of chronic instability, with poor commercial 
performance, vulnerability to fluctuations in trade, a low potential to accumulate, low 
wages and a high degree of dependence upon larger firms. 
The structure of the industry means that most small clothing firms are locked into CMT, 
and the pressures on small enterprises are even more intense for co-ops. They tend to lack 
finance and skills, and as a result are often restricted to machining, the least rewarding and 
skilled part of the manufacturing process. The co-ops tend to be less productive than other 
firms, and although wages are only slightly lower than the average, this is achieved at the 
expense of accumulation, and therefore the position is not sustainable in the longer term. 
For most, the preoccupation is with survival, and there is little or no prospect of breaking 
out of this existence on their own; to date there have been no examples of this happening. 
Despite this rather bleak scenario, clothing co-ops have made some achievements. In some, 
women have exploited the limited potential for reorganisation of work to meet their own 
needs, and have undoubtedly made improvements in the generally appalling conditions of 
work typical of the clothing industry, even if co-ops remain economically weak. These 
achievements should not be underestimated, in an industry where other opportunities for 
women are few and the exploitation of workers is severe. Oothing co-ops are clearly not 
going to transform the industry alone, but they can offer benefits for the workers 
immediately involved. 
The survival of any form of enterprise in a capitalist economy is dependent upon the ability 
to accumulate. Oothing co-ops in CMT are failing to do so, and thus have not secured the 
conditions for an independent existence. As a result their relationships with the public 
sector are crucial. Until now, support has come in the form of initial financial provision, 
which has been crucial to their establishment and survival, given that co-op workers have 
no access to equity capital, cannot provide signiftamt quantities on their own, and are 
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unlikely to be able to raise commercial finance. Beyond mere survival, the sector is 
dependent upon the public sector for more progressive restructuring. In the longer tenn, 
competitive pressures on small underfinanced clothing firms will increase, as larger firms 
employ more advanced manufacturing systems and increase productivity, and this will 
reduce wages and working conditions in labour-intensive enterprises even further. Without 
a national level strategy for the industry, clothing co-ops must still look to the public sector 
for the only chance to escape sinking further into the marginal and highly oppressive 
sweated sector. 
Those clothing co-ops which have been more successful in commercial terms have been 
those which are not in highly dependent relationships with large firms. They have 
succeeded in carving out some fonn of monopolistic market position where competition is 
not so intense, which gives them more colnmercial flexibility and independence, although 
they do have higher skill requirements. They do tend to be highly dependent upon public 
sector support at the beginning, often arising from closures, but are likely to be more stable 
in the longer tenn. 
Clothing co-operatives 343 
Table 9.5 Individual clothing co-ops 
Year Age Output Net value Average Wages as Net VA/ Fixed 
added per WQge % of V A fixed assets assets per 
worker worker 
(£) (£) (£) (%) (£) (£) 
ALL CLOTHING CO-OPS 
1978 1 35.21 2.807 
1979 1 59.94 2006 2650 132.1 5.642 356 
1980 4 100.05 2711 3732 137.7 6.042 786 
1981 6 320.43 1766 1586 89.8 3.568 436 
1982 8 519.56 2512 2862 113.9 5.005 452 
1983 10 933.61 3244 3227 99.5 10.200 318 
1984 7 603.00 2780 2992 107.6 8.526 326 
BARGOED BLOUSB 
1982 2 71418 2682 2625 97.88 21.50 124.8 
1984 4 99685 2587 2799 108.19 82.81 31.2 
1986 6 138278 2887 3096 107.25 43.80 65.9 
F'IFB FASHIONS 
1984 1 69832 3967 3263 82.24 2.48 1600.5 
1985 2 92535 4566 5523 120.96 3.39 1347.7 
G~E~p~s~ 
1979 2 59944 2006 2650 132.08 5.64 355.6 
1980 3 57720 3497 4334 123.94 6.01 581.6 
1982 5 12384 1003 1038 103.49 1.14 876.7 
HAPPY HANDs 
1981 2 0 0 0 .. .. 0.0 
1982 3 15531 187.94 3.92 
1983 4 31790 1692 2211 112.66 11.94 164.4 
LoUISB ARGYLE 
1982 2 43893 159.39 2.55 
1984 4 98743 4162 4385 105.34 10.79 385.8 
1986 6 199101 7362 7265 98.68 11.40 646.0 
MINBHBAD SHOE CO-OP 
1983 1 89694 3829 3528 92.12 15.22 251.6 
1984 2 96339 3601 3983 110.61 16.93 212.6 
RAGGED ROBIN 
1981 2 24927 1606 1600 99.61 6.15 261.0 
1983 4 42398 2953 2978 100.85 5.11 577.5 
continued .... 
344 Performance of co-operatives 
Table 9.5 continued 
Y821' Age Output NetVtllue Average Wages as Net VAl Fixed 
added per wage % of VA fixed assets assets per 
worker worker 
(£) (£) (£) (%) (£) (£) 
RANDoLPH l.EJSURBWEAR 
1981 1 134712 1879 1563 83.22 2.51 748.4 
1982 2 198162 1862 2828 151.91 295 631.2 
1983 3 346736 3358 2955 88.00 5.68 591.4 
WIlSHAwRAINWEAR 
1981 1 55712 1684 1605 95.30 10.21 165.0 
1983 3 135163 2809 3062 108.99 13.05 2153 
1985 5 173778 3336 3450 103.43 23.56 141.6 
SourcI:own data 
10. Wholefood Co-operatives 
INTRODUCTION 
The third industry of co-op activity selected is the wholefood distribution sector, comprising 
co-ops in both the wholesale and retail trades1. There are a number of reasons why this 
sector is of interest. Firstly, it appears to provide an example of the third type of activity in 
Schutt &t Whittington's classification - independent small firms operating in a peripheral 
area ignored by larger firms. Secondly, it is the largest single area of worker co-op activity, 
and was developed relatively early in the current period of co-op growth. Thirdly, it is a 
new industry, and is firmly associated with the 'altemative' movement, which has had a 
strong overall influence on new co-ops. This provides a contrast to the established printing 
and clothing industries, and their long-standing association with worker co-op activity. The 
chapter begins with a brief review of the wholefood distribution industry and its 
relationship to the food industry in general, before examining the experience of wholefood 
co-ops in more detail. 
nm FOOD INDUSTRY 
The postwar period has seen a transformation of the food industry in Britain. Once a net 
food importer, Britain now produces a surplus to contribute to European food mountains. 
While food poliey can be viewed as a quantitative success, there have been major changes 
not only in the amount of food we produce, but the type of food that we eat as well. 
Increased processing of food has accompanied inaeased prodUction, and the food 
industry's failure has been the impact of these trends on peoples' health despite ostensible 
improvements in food production. The negative qualitative aspect of food production and 
consumption is being exacerbated by an increasingly unequal distribution of income, and 
the poor nutritional quality of the diets of those on low incomes; it appears that things have 
deteriorated since Orwell commented in the 1930s that capitalism was attempting to poison 
the working class with processed foods. 
1 'l'IraI.,," C'IHIpf .,. "lalbu:l {rrmI tM oIMr m.il MIll ~ COMUIICr C'IHIpf, IUdJ • tM eM, CRS """ otMr 
~1if1I_ielia, rddd, 1m ulliNt.Iy ctml10lW by tMi, ctlltomm tmIllrarr IfIIfJIloyea. Our CDftCmI la fI1iIJr ."., 
C'IHIpf "".,. i" 'II1ItoIaM or retllil «IifIity. 
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Food production, processing and distribution is increasingly concentrated in the hands of 
large national and multinational companies. Although the need to maintain and increase 
profitability in the industry has led to takeovers and centralisation, there is very little scope 
for increasing profits through sales growth; in Britain the volume of food consumed is 
relatively unaffected by changes in disposable income. Major retailers have concentrated on 
increasing their efficiency, aided by the development of computerised systems of stock 
control, and the domination of increasingly large multiple retailers. On the production side 
changes have been concentrated on increasing the scope of food processing. This increases 
value added but also extends shelf-life, and also results in standardised, mass-produced 
items which are suitable for promotion in extensive and expensive advertising campaigns. 
In the process food products have been transformed. Extending the scope of food 
processing has been associated with the increasing use of additives - preservatives, 
flavouring, colouring and much more - both to replace the natural goodness processed out 
of food and to extend shelf life. At the same time the food industry has used advertising and 
elaborate packaging to change tastes and eating habits in order to make these products 
acceptable to consumers. Besides changes in the type of food, there has also been a change 
in the location of its consumption. Eating out of the home is higher than ever before, with 
particularly rapid growth at the convenience/fast food end of the marketl . 
Food mad hetdth 
The long postwar boom in the industrialised countries, with its rising living standards and 
relative affluence, led to the widespread belief that food and nutrition were no longer a 
political issue. The rarity of queues and mass outbreaks of food poisoning fostered the belief 
that the impact of food consumption on public health was minima13. But as with many other 
supposedly 'consensus' issues, the perception of food and nutrition has changed markedly 
over the past 5-10 years. There is a growing understanding of the links between food, fitness 
and health, which are increasingly becoming items of mass concern. In 1977 a committee of 
the U.s. senate, chaired by George McGovern, reported on the links between diet and 
health. The McGovern Report highlighted the role of excess consumption of fat, sugar and 
salt in causing heart disease, cancer, obesity and stroke - all killer diseases. Between 1968 
and 1978 twenty expert committee reports on health and dietry goals had been published in 
2 Wigpu II SItIIl,lf86; CAC,lf86. 
S WalkIr II Out,.".,lfB$, ,.1. 
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the west, all with a similar message. In Britain the National Advisory Committee on 
Nutrition Education (NACNE) was established by the DHSS in 1979, to provide 'simple and 
accurate information on nutrition'4. The first draft of the NACNE report was presented in 
1981, recommending that the British diet was too high in sugars, salt and fats, and too low 
in fibre. It caused uproar, generating enormous opposition from the British food industry 
(particularly from the industry-funded British Nutrition Foundation), and was effectively 
suppressed by the DHSS. Its message could not be concealed, however, receiving extensive 
coverage in the Sunday Times. Combined with the effects of the American experience, where 
dietry recommendations had been talcen more seriously with positive effects on health, 
public interest and awareness had been aroused. The F-PlRn Diet sold over a million copies 
in the UK and familiarised a mass audience with the importance of a low-fat, high fibre diet 
Concern has also been focused on the health problems resulting from food additives, 
ranging from sugar to colourings, flavourings and preservatives. Many have been identified 
as positively harmful- e.g. as carcinogens or allergy-inducers - and there is a growing body 
of opinion that views such additives as largely unnecessary (even when not actively 
harmful), and being primarily in the interests of producers rather than consumers. At the 
same time widespread concern about factory fanning, environmental pollution from 
pestiddes, herbiddes and artificial fertilisers, combined with the trends desaibed above 
have contributed to recent growth in vegetarianism and demand for organic foodaS. 
Whole/ooth 
Wholefoods can be defined as: "Pure, unadulterated foods, most of which are unprocessed. 
Those that are processed have undergone minimal change and contain no additives or 
preservatives. The few that have undergone considerable transformation (e.g. the soy 
products) are based entirely on natural ingredients. "6. Recent interest in wholefoods began 
with the 'altemative' culture of the 1960& and 19708, where concern with diet was part of the 
rejection of the material and moral values of western society. Many of those involved 
became vegetarians and relied upon an essentially wholefood diet. Although consumption 
of wholefoods did continue to increase the interest was by and large confined to a fringe 
culture, and it was not until the diet/health links received greater attention that interest 
began to spread to the wider population. 
4~".%fI. 
5 CAe, 2986, ,.13. 
6~ 
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This movement is difficult to quantify. Accurate figures for the consumption of wholefoods 
are difficult to come by. Standard sources (e.g. Business Monitor) do not distinguish 
wholefoods from other foods, and CAG report that 'the health and wholefood business is 
the least researched part of the UK food business'7. However, CAG do report that turnover 
in all healthfood and wholefood items increased from £3Om in 1973 to £22Om in 1983, 
indicating very rapid growth8• A few wholefood items (such as wholemeal bread and 
yoghurt) do enter into market surveys, and the trends in sales of such items are steadily 
upward. 
The industry fight. back - health/oods 
For many years the conventional food industry regarded wholefoods as an eccentric and 
marginal niche, unworthy of significant attention, except perhaps for companies such as 
Whitworths with interests in dried fruit and pulses. Over the last few years the situation has 
changed somewhat and in view of the steadily rising trend in consumption of wholefoods, 
coupled with with decreasing consumption of fatty and processed foods, the industry has 
come to regard wholefoods as both a threat and an opportunity. 
In fact the rising consumption of wholefoods is a change probably without precedent in the 
history of capitalist food production. Previous developments have all involved an extension 
of the processing of food, enabling further standardisation and advertising, with nutritional 
needs frequently sacrificed. Wholefoods represent a reversal of this process, in that they 
involve less processing and packaging rather than more. 
As such they represent a challenge to the conventional food industry. Major companies are 
not well placed to take advantage of changing trends in consumption of wholefoods, 
however. With production strategies based on mass-produced, processed and (artificially) 
preserved foods, they are not well placed to take advantage of demand for food where 
'freshness' and lack of processing and additives are paramount. The lack of product 
differentiation in unprocessed food also undermines the industry's ability to influence 
consumer tastes through advertising. 
7 iIzitl., ".3. 
S TIdI ,.".."." • grtnIItII ,." of 22" ", """"" hi IfDIrIiul ,."",. TIll fa«l ",u:. btMz Ita bu:JIaal from 67.4 to 232.6 
(1975-%00) a.rllw.."., ""',ghIiftg.'" ... fIpN of £44.5 ... for 2973_ £95.0... for 2983,.' 2975 JIrluI, ... 
...,. ,., """ .. p1fI1l11 ,." of "'. 
Who1efood co~titJes 349 
Of course there are exceptions; in particular Britain's two major bakers, RHM and 
Associated Bakers, have been able to move rapidly into the production of wholemeal bread. 
Others have aimed at those parts of the wholefood market where some processing is carried 
out wholefood snack bars, and soya-based products in particular. Retailers have taken 
advantage of changing tastes in developing new promotional strategies (leading to the 
somewhat ridiculous situation where the British Sugar Corporation is promoting white 
sugar on the basis of it being 'additive free'!). An alternative strategy is to manipulate 
consumer tastes towards products which can be exploited by major companies. One area 
where this is taking place is in 'healthfoods'; although they have some similarities with 
wholefoods, they are often adulterated (e.g. with added sugar) or more highly processed 
and refined. Healthfoods also include vitamin and dietry supplements. 
The production and sale of healthfoods contributes to higher rate of profit for the food 
processing companies; it is itself a form of food processing and lends itself to product 
differentiation through fancy packaging, advertising and promotional exercises. This is in 
contrast to the transportation, simple repaclcaging and distribution involved with the 
majority of wholefoods. Of major importance in this area is the activity of the UK 
multinational Booker McConnell, who own both the Holland Ie Barrett chain of shops and 
major distributor Brewhurst. Booker's move into wholefoods and healthfoods coincided 
with steady decline in their major sugar interests and they have been at the forefront of 
attempts to merge the wholefood and healthfood markets. In April 1986 the trade joumal 
Natural Food Trader (until recently owned by Booker McConnell) noted that the distinction 
between wholefoods and healthfoods was becoming blurred. Traditionally, advocates of the 
former have argued that a diet of fresh and unprocessed foods was sufficient for nutrition 
without resort to dietry supplements. 
The wholefood and healthfood industry has undergone a rapid transformation over past 
decade, changing from a marginal, spedalist market to a mass market; this has been 
accompanied by a similar major change in the structure of capitaUst competition. Until the 
mid-1980s Booker was the major company in wholesale, retail and manufacturing. On the 
retail side Booker McConnell owns the nationwide chain of 227 Holland Ie Barrett shops. It 
has also established Realfare, a marketing and supply 'membership group' which it 
supplies through its Brewhurst subsidiary. Membership in 1983 wu 680 shops, representing 
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47% of health and wholefood shops9. Booker's wholesale operation, Brewhurst, is the 
country's largest distributor of health and wholefood products10. 
Besides Booker, there are a variety of independent finns of varying sizes, in both 
wholesaling and retailing. Many of these started off small, and benefited from the rapid 
growth of the market in the late 19705 and early 19805. 
As the market has continued to grow steadily, it has been transformed by the entry of major 
supennarket retailers. In food retailing generally, the rise of multiples and larger stores has 
been the dominant characteristic of the past decade: "in 1975, 9,000 multiples accounted for 
44% of the grocery market; by 1985 4,000 multiple outlets accounted for 68%"11, controlled 
by just 42 buying points12. While the multiples have been increasing their share of the retail 
grocery market, wholesalers have also been squeezed as over 70% of retail grocery turnover 
is supplied direct from manufacturers. No specific figures are available for the increase in 
wholefood sales in multiples, but it seems safe to assume that their share has increased 
substantially. This has squeezed the independent wholesalers and retailers, who are largely 
unable to compete with multiples in price terms; the latter also benefit further from offering 
extra convenience and comprehensive ranges. The pressure on wholefood wholesalers is 
illustrated by Booker's recent decision to reduce emphasis on distribution of wholefoods 
because of reduced profitability following increased competition from multiples13, and their 
decision to concentrate upon high-margin healthfood products. 
WHOLEPOOD CO-OPEllATIVES 
EIII'Iy 44Y. in tM 'new' co-op mO'Dement 
The origins of the wholefood co-op sector lie in the 19708. At that time, some members of 
the 'alternative movement' were seeking an appropriate structure for emerging commercial 
activities, which included bookshops, publishing and printing, besides the selling of 
wholefoods. Initially many of these enterprises were organised as unincorporated 
collectives, but later the co-op structure proved suitable when formal incorporation was 
9 CAC,29., ,.3. 
2Dfij.,,.. 
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required. This was assisted by the development of model rules by ICOM in the mid-1970s. 
The importance of such alternative co-ops was noted in 1981 by Thomley, pointing out that 
"more than half of the 300 or so co-operatives existing are engaged in some aspect of the 
alternative movement. 
The alternative movement emerged as a reaction to the exploitation of western capitalism, 
seeking an alternative to a lifestyle that was perceived to be alienating, destructive and 
materialistic; it was essentially a product of affluence and those involved predominantly 
had bourgeois, middle class roots. As a result, rejection and protest was not initially 
directed into support for the labour movement and class politics, but into anarchism and 
single issue campaigns around ecology, peace and anti-nuclear issues, and to a lesser extent 
the womens movement. 
Support for and promotion of wholefoods was prominent in the alternative movement, both 
for reasons of diet and health and the wish of vegetarians and vegans to avoid exploiting 
animals. But it was part of a total lifestyle, which rejected hierarchies in favour of collective 
living and working. This had implications for the operations of the emerging co-ops; they 
were committed to "small scale production and distribution, collective practice,and an 
extension of the function of 'shop' in an industrial society to being part of the community"14. 
Although alternative co-ops were concerned with commercial activity, the products 
involved were largely 'political', and furthermore, collective working was central to the 
operation of these businesses. Thus typical objectives of the early wholefood co-ops 
included the establishment of alternatives to conventional employment in hierarchically 
structured organisations and businesses, organising work in a collective egalitarian manner. 
Their aim was to promote an alternative lifestyle rather than defend jobs per se, but it was 
also hoped that such activity would provide a catalyst for more co-ops, providing non-
alienating work for increasing numbers of people. Objectives also included the promotion of 
desirable social changes in the community, and this extended to the nature of products sold. 
The co-ops aimed to 'promote the wholefood revolution', with the initial objective often 
being to meet a perceived sodal need, rather than pursue commerdal aims. In line with this 
'service' objective, many co-ops aimed to keep prices down so as to maIce wholefoods 
available cheaply to as many people as possible, especially poorer members of the 
14 All,.. Wll)wtl, co-{rMuIIr rf SUMA, IfIIDIU IN '1'Iu1mlIy, 19Bt, ,.10.5. 
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community. Subsidiary aims included encouraging local fanners to produce wholefoods 
and organic produce, the promotion of 'ecologically friendly' products, and to avoid buying 
from parts of the third world where exploitation of labour was seen as particularly severe1S• 
In some ways wholefood co-operatives follow on from a long tradition in the wider 
co-operative movement, in that many consumer co-operatives were originally established to 
make available cheap unadulterated foods to the working class. 
Collective lICti'Uity ,u,d mutu,d ."""ort 
In the mid-seventies the worker co-operative movement lacked infrastructure. The small 
remnant of the industrial co-operative movement from the nineteenth century was largely 
inactive and in any case not considered relevant by the new co-operative movement - which 
had little in common with the industrial working class base of the former. Local authority 
support was virtually non-existent, and local CSO's had not yet been formed in any great 
number. ICOM was in existence, however, as a membership organisation and provided the 
model rules under which most worker co-operatives were incorporated, as Industrial and 
Provident Societies. 
Collective activity was extended from within co-ops to become an important principle of 
relationships between co-ops. "Wanting to increase their influence in society, they are loath 
to see any co-operative isolated in an environment hostile to co-operative principles and to 
the sector's capital growth. The wholefood movement has defended itself against 
competition by forming federations and by trying to set up co-operatives at every stage in 
the food business from farming through to sales"16. 
One of the early efforts in this direction came in the mid-1970s when several wholefood 
shops in the north of England formed the Federation of Northern Wholefood Co-operatives. 
The aim of this federation was to strengthen individual members· who had common needs 
and therefore could benefit from common initiatives - through the sharing of knowledge 
and experience, and in some cases the provision of financial support. As part of this process 
the FNWC made a decision to establish co-operatively run wholesale warehouses, which 
would in tum offer the shops a wide range of goods based on bulk buying and efficient 
15 N»lIIaM,29IM. 
26 'l'IImdty,2'1l, pJ4S. 
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distribution17• The first of these wholesale co-operatives, Suma, was established in Leeds in 
1975, with a second, Green City, established in Glasgow in 1978. More recently, Suma, 
Green City and other wholefood wholesale co-operatives established the Federation of 
Wholefood Wholesale Co-ops. This is an attempt to formalise current arrangements 
between the wholesalers, who by and large do not compete geographically and who 
undertake some inter-trading 18. 
FomJl,ticm and ",rvival 
FOf'11Ultion 
Of all co-op formations recorded from 1970 to the end of 1980, some 18% were in 
wholefoods. This compares to a figure of 6% of total formations in wholefoods by the end of 
1986, illustrating their prominence in the early days of recent co-op formations. By 1986 
there were 68 wholefood co-ops; if a further 40 in catering are included, this is currently the 
largest single sector of worker co-op activity. 
The prominence of wholefoods partly reflects the particular ideology of those involved in 
the industry, and their commitment to collective organisation, which meant that a high 
proportion of all businesses involved in wholefood distribution took the form of co-ops, 
particularly until the early 19808. The formation of co-Ops was also relatively easy from a 
financial point of view. Initial capital requirements were minimal: trade could commence 
with little fixed capital beyond suitable premises and a moderate level of stock, while 
working capital requirements were low given the typical willingness to work for low wages, 
and could be built up through the generation and retention of surpluses. 
Sources of Fi7Ulnce 
Nevertheless, even with low initial requirements, financing was potentially a proble~ as 
many wholefood co-ops were formed prior to the establishment of CSOs and specialist loan 
funds. In addition, some 'altemative co-operators' were reluctant to approach banks for 
funding, and in any case, at that time banks would have shown even more suspicion 
towards co-ops than they do now. However, there was compensation in the availability of 
'sympathetic' finance raised from private sources, from friends, supporters, or other co-ops. 
27 HowrtJt & HIIIIIhIIootl, 2984. 
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Indeed, one function of the FNWC, and later of Suma, was to make small amounts available 
to new co-ops. 
It was noted in chapter 6 that of the three sectors, wholefood co-ops were the most reliant 
upon private sources of finance, and that nearly half (45%) were totally reliant upon internal 
(members) funds in their first year. Over a longer period, wholefood co-ops made least 
overall use of commerdal finance. 
SuTIJirJtU Rate 
In addition to being the largest co-op sector and established early on, wholefood co-ops 
have demonstrated a very high survival rate, of nearly 80% (see Table 10.1)19. This is 
significantly higher than the overall survival rate of 66%, better than that of printing and 
clothing co-ops, (12% and 52% respectively), and higher than the 68% survival rate of 
wholesale and retail co-ops overa1120• 
Table 10.1 FOl'D1ation and survival of wholefood co-ops to 1986; 
Sector Co-ops Co-ops Workers 
formed StmJiving (%) 
WP wholesale 10 12 83 
WPretai1 74 58 78 
WP wholesale &t retaU 86 68 19 532 
AU wholesale &t retail 252 112 68 928 
Services 361 249 69.0 1266 
Production 361 243 67.3 2250 
Total 1330 880 66.2 5455 
Sourc:I: London lCOM (1981), and own c:ala.aJationa 
We have seen in earlier chapters that there has been a close relationship between survival 
and commercial performance; where the latter is poor, then understandably, it is more 
likely that co-opt will fail. The contrast between the performance of printing and clothing 
19 'l7I. *fm to IIw ...m.z I'IdI tt/fIwIMaa ont¥ ,..,."" .. co-opmtiM; II acl"" ,., fDIIit:It apmaVIllOWy .. 
CDIl«t_ til' iflfar'tMl ,.mrm/dpt, wW mIlY Itaw W .'I1,Mr {ail"'" I'IdI; fMry mIlY alto 1M 1m .",.,., of _,-JIl«:tion, 
i,,1Itat IIw IlION SlICt:atful t:OI1«t_ '111m t1tDN fDIIit:It If1IIPI1uIIIly __ {rmrtally ,..tmtl .. co-ops. 
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co-ops is confirmed in their very different survival rates. However, this relationship is not 
replicated in the wholefood sector, where - amongst retail co-ops at least - a high survival 
rate is associated with very poor commercial performance. The reasons for this will be 
examined later, but firstly the performance of wholefood co-ops is discussed below. 
Commercial perfDrmIltlCe 
In chapter 7 the perfonnance of wholefood co-ops was examined as a whole, in comparison 
with printing and clothing. In this section, the results are disaggregated into the the retail 
and wholesale sub-sectors for more detailed analysis; results are presented below in Table 
10.2. 
Table 10.2 Performance of wholesale and retail co-ops (constant (1985) prices). 
Year No. Gross output Average output Average output Net VA per 
(sector) (£'000) per co-op (£'000) per worker (£) per worker (£) 
RW R W R W R W R W 
1978 13 1 1207.8 1032.6 92.9 1032.6 15484 11473 2549 6366 
1979 20 4 2028.8 2151.4 101.4 537.9 13947 53785 2266 5469 
1980 28 4 2877.6 2576.8 102.8 644.2 14699 58565 2812 5029 
1981 34 5 3495.6 3820.1 102.8 764.0 15300 70742 2507 6256 
1982 36 6 4132.6 5755.3 114.8 959.2 16732 82219 3247 6023 
1983 3 5 45985 6971.9 121.0 1394.4 17234 88252 3088 5845 
1984 2 6 2987.8 8253.6 129.9 1375.6 17760 84220 3372 6291 
Year Retained surplus Fixdassets Net VAl Average VA/output 
/net VA ('JI) per worker (£) ~dQSsets wage(£) ('JI) 
R W R W R W R W R W 
1978 6.301 42.16 574.3 886.0 4.439 7.18 2389 . 3682 16.46 5.55 
1979 -0..568 27.80 492.1 928.6 4.204 5.89 2312 3949 17.11 10.17 
1980 3.949 18.17 589.3 3547.3 4.393 1.41 2663 4115 19.32 8.59 
1981 -12.44 31.ns 10005 4774.3 2.453 1.31 2842 4313 17.05 8.84 
1982 10.419 28.81 lQn.9 4404.2 3.034 1.36 2929 4287 20.16 7.33 
1983 2.459 S.85 1285.7 6125.0 2.457 0.95 2951 SS03 18.24 6.62 
1984 6.388 8.92 1651.5 5438.1 2.158 1.15 3112 5729 19.92 7.47 
Not.: R-retd; W-wholelaJe 
Soun:.: own data 
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Two important results are apparent from an examination of these tables. Firstly, there is a 
major contrast between the performance of the two sub-sectors, and secondly, that although 
there have been some improvements in overall performance, this is not consistent, and in 
some respects there has been a deterioration. 
Firstly, the contrast between the sectors. Moving immediately to net value added per 
worker21, it is clear that wholesaling C(H)PS have been consistently more productive than 
those in retailing, with very roughly double the level of surplus generated. This enables the 
payment of significantly higher wages in wholesaling (on average two-thirds higher), and 
because the differential in wages is less than that in surplus generation, wholesale C(H)p5 
have been able to accumulate much more rapidly. Thus the level of fixed assets per worker 
in Wholesaling increased by over 500% over the period, while in retailing the increase was 
less than 200%. This in turn has contributed to differences in the rate of growth; the mean 
output of wholesale C(H)PS increased at an average of 16% per annum in real terms over the 
period 1979-1984, whilst the comparable figure for retail co-ops was only 5%. 
Secondly, we can see how performance has changed over time. It is apparent that in retail 
C(H)PS, there have been steady increases in output and net value added per worker, and in 
wage levels. Value added as a proportion of output has increased, and whilst the proportion 
of surplus which is retained and reinvested is small and fluctuating, it has not obviously 
diminished over time. Wholesale co-ops show a contrasting situation; output per worker 
has increased steadily (56% over 1979-84), but value added per worker has increased more 
slowly (15% over the same period), as the proportion of output realised as value added has 
steadily declined. Real wages have increased by 44%, substantially more than the increase 
in value added, and as a result retained surplus has steadily declined - although it remains 
consistently higher than in retail co-ops. 
Wagel, working condition. and working method •. 
Wag' levels 
Wholefood distribution is not a well defined industry, and as a result of this • and also 
because it is not part of production - it is not possible to make any comparisons between the 
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performance of wholefood co-ops and that of the rest of the industry. The only area where 
comparisons are possible is with wages. 
Table 10.3 shows wage levels in retail and wholesale distribution in comparison to those in 
wholefood co-ops. Several findings are clear. Firstly, wages in distribution are markedly 
lower that the averages for both all industries and all non-manufacturing industries. 
Secondly, and typically, wages for women are much lower than those for men across the 
board. Thirdly, taking wages in co-ops relative to capitalist firm averages, then wholefood 
wholesaling pays the highest wages; it is the only one of the sectors studied where co-op 
wages exceed the average wage level for women, and approach the figure for mens' wages. 
Fourthly, and confirming earlier results, wages in wholefood wholesaling co-ops are high 
by industry standards and are substantially above those in retailing; although wages in 
retailing generally are notoriously low, those in retail wholefood co-ops are particularly 
bad. 
Table 10.3 Wages and hours worked in food distribution, 1984. 
All All Wholesale Retail 
inds. non-mfg. food dist. food dist. 
(SIC 0-9) (SIC 0,1,5-9) (SIC 617) (SIC 641) 
(mean) M 152.3 148.1 138.8 129.3 
Average F 93.S 90.9 88.4 85.8 
weekly 
wage(£) M 143.3 138.5 131.4 121.2 
(medilm) F 88.6 85.1 84.6 79.7 
Weekly M 44.3 44.2 45.1 44.2 
hours F 39.4 38.9 39.8 38.9 
(mean, inc. overtime) 
Co-op wages 106.8 58.0 
Stnm:r. NftJ ElmliIIgs s"""Y; own calculation .. 
These findings concerning wholefood co-op wages are confirmed by cue atudy evidence. In 
his study of Suma Wholefoods22, Madarlane notes that wage levels are significantly above 
rates in the applicable Wages Council agreements. In 1982, workers at Suma received £100 
22~,1.9B7 
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per week net (equivalent to perhaps £150-160 gross), compared to the following Wages 
Council figures for 1983 (gross weekly): 
Drivers 
Warehousemen 
HGV drivers 
£82 
£73 
£89 
These figures suggest that Suma's rates were around double those of the Wages Council. 
However, it must be noted that other firms often pay wages above wages council 
agreements, and that Suma's workers probably work longer hours - overtime at Suma is 
unpaid, in contrast to other firms. 
This picture is corroborated by a further case study of two wholefood co-ops in Brighton23• 
In one, a retail co-op, the rate of pay was £40 per week in 1986, whilst in the other, which 
was predominantly a wholesaler, wages ranged from £100 to £140 per week. 
Working Conditions 
The achievement of objectives besides commercial success and high wages has always been 
central to the operation of wholefood and other alternative co-ops; as well as promoting 
wholefoods, these have included the encouragement of active worker participation and 
democratic control. Thus the pursuit of job rotation and direct democracy have been 
important in achieving collective ideals. In fostering equality within co-ops, wage 
differentials have been low or non-existent, and where they exist they tend to reward 
experience and needs rather than job content. Equality for women within co-ops has been 
pursued, although this can sometimes be on male terms - for instance in 'enabling' women 
to do heavy manual jobs which are normally held by men. 
Nevertheless, the willingness of workers in retail wholefood co-ops to work for low wage 
has been a crucial element in their high rate of survival, despite poor commercial 
performance. Despite many of them starting off, and remaining, small, low wages have 
enabled retail co-ops to meet other financial commitments and keep going where many 
other businesses would have folded. 
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This situation results partly from deliberate choice, in that prices have been kept low so as 
to promote wholefoods and make them widely available; low levels of performance and 
wages were explained away "as the 'price' that had to be paid to fulfil the 'service' 
orientation of the collective"24. Commercial objectives were perceived as subsidiary to the 
more important aim of promoting both wholefoods and collective working. The willingness 
to accept low wages was also related to the type of workers involved; a large number were 
graduates,25 with relatively affluent backgrounds, who had consciously rejected other, 
better paid and more materialistic career opportunities in favour of this kind of work. They 
contrast sharply with the women workers in clothing co-ops, forced into low-paying jobs 
with no altematives. 
The payment of low wages was widely accepted, at least initially, as necessary given the 
pursuit of other objectives. There was also a strong element of not wanting to grow, in the 
belief that growth "was incompatible with the desire to retain a small, relaxed and convivial 
working environment"26. In small co-ops it was relatively easy to sustain a collective 
approach, with effective rotation of workers between all jobs, and collective decision-
making. This was fadlitated by the low skill requirements in a small retail business which 
inhibited the emergence of a skill-based hierarchy; all of these achievements were 
considered vulnerable if growth was pursued. 
Wholesale co-ops shared many similar objectives - the promotion of wholefoods and of a 
collective way of working, but from the beginning had a different approach; theirs was 
much more oriented towards growth as a means of survival. As a result they showed more 
concern with operating effidently, and less willingness to accept indefinite self-exploitation, 
through the payment of low wages for long hours of work. Furthermore, because a 
wholesale operation was necessarily much larger than a retail one, the benefits of working 
with just a handful of people were not available. Rather than rely on the relative ease of 
working collectively in a small group, new methods had to be developed. 
The development of collective working in larger wholefood co-ops has been pursued over a 
long period, and to give credit to their commitment there· have been some successes. At 
Neala Yard Bakery - not a wholesaler, but a large co-op sharing a similar outlook - daily job 
24 iIdtI.., ,.1 
25 hi t1t13 ."..,., COoOJ1' ctmmIllIy IIw NIalIIMIatl ~ CIUI.IIulIa,."""'" of.".". .... "..... 
26 Wool,.."., 29N. 
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rotation was maintained between virtually all tasles over a long period, and all major 
decisions taken by a collective meeting of all members. Suma has also been committed, and 
has evolved a unique structure which involves dividing the workforce into divisions 
carrying out related areas of work, where each division has total collective control over its 
own area of responsibilities. All jobs are rotated, even the more complex tasles such as 
buying, marketing, warehouse co-ordination and transport co-ordination. Acknowledging 
the amount of skill involved in these posts, the incumbent would do the job full-time and 
remain in the post for a longer period (perhaps one or two years) before moving on; this 
contrasts with the daily or weekly rotation of less complex tasles. Most workers do a variety 
of jobs in any week; one beneficial result is that workers soon become familiar with all types 
of work within the co-operative, and the potential for alienation is reduced as the more 
tedious and menial tasks are shared. Until now this has been organised in such a way that 
the benefits of both job rotation and effident operation have been maintained. "It has been 
suggested that the arrangement has its ineffidendes; that many workers do not develop the 
level of skills or knowledge of the job that they would do if they worked continuously on 
one job •..•. Nevertheless, of great importance for the members is the reality that the 
varied work diet maIces the repetitive jobs more bearable for them, and the breadth of skills 
they obtain, and can hope to obtain, is rewarding. the reduction in the differences between 
the skill levels is an important contribution to equality in the co-operative"27. 
Suma has perhaps faced the most severe potential problems in sustaining collective 
working, being the largest wholefood co-op, with 36 members in 1988. However, it has also 
been in the forefront of aVOiding this fonn of degeneration through the development of new 
working methods, and has shown a high level of commitment to preventing hierarchies, 
whether formal or informal. This contrasts with many other co-ops, where inactivity has 
frequently led to the emergence of informal hierarchies28. 
E%tmll" rellltUml - the co-tip movement; trll. ""imu 
Despite the commitment to collective working, this has not generally extended to collective 
activity in clan terms; in fact collectivity has been viewed in a remarkably individualistic 
manner. The underlying prindple behind collective working "could be described as 
essentially a libertarian belief that the major purpose of the collective wu to maximise the 
27 ~,1987. ,.41. 
2.l.Mc4ry I1IL 1985; Omtforth I1IL 2988. 
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personal fulfilment of its members as individuals whilst at the same time fostering a sense 
of personal responsibility and mutual aid"29. Perhaps illustrating the anarchist basis to such 
beliefs, collective activity could largely be defined in terms of "freedom of the individual"; 
and the philosophy appears to differ from extreme-right libertarianism by its partial 
rejection of private property. 
However, such individualism is an underlying weakness, in that society is also analysed in 
individual terms. Alienation is viewed in personal rather than class terms, encouraging "an 
ostrich attitude to politics"30. Social change is viewed as emerging through the gradual 
extension of similar activity <e.g. co-operatives, collective living) throughout society, by 
example and persuasion. Although the characters are different, the approach differs little 
from that of nineteenth century supporters of a co-operative commonwealth. Co-ops are 
considered as a third sector of the economy (although it may not be called this), distinct 
from the hierarchy and exploitation of the large enterprises and organisation of the public 
and private sectors. 
ICOM became a natural focus of activity as a collectively controlled body representing 
worker co-ops. And although there were many cultural dashes, and differences over how 
co-ops should operate internally, the alternative and wholefood co-ops shared a belief in the 
'third sector' and persuasion by example with the capitalists who had converted their 
companies to co-ops. 
One result was that politicisation was directed towards their own lifestyle and work, rather 
than established political activity, and hence there was a reluctance to build linlcs with the 
labour movement. There has been a distinctly cool attitude towards trade unions, because of 
the latters' association with hierarchy and the bureauaatic establishment. There is also 
support for the view (again common with the 'conversion capitalists' that trade unions are 
unnecessary in co-ops. As a result, and despite their collective ideals, union membership in 
wholefood co-ops is very low: around one third of co-ops, and 13% of workers, were 
unionised in 1986, compared with 55% and 34% for co-ops overalPl. To be fair, however, 
this 'ostrich attitude' is not univenal in wholefood co-ops. Suma workers do share a basic 
sympathy with trade unionism, and remain un-unionised largely because of a consistent 
29 WGaiIIaI, 1'86, pJ7. 
30 T1IDmlq, 1981, ,.106. 
311Utul" frrtm ctHIpIl'IWfIqi _ alIo dtq,., 5. 
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lack of enthusiasm towards co-ops on the part of the TU movement, and from a position 
generally unsympathetic to co-ops, Gregory notes that "the sight of the entire staff of our 
local wholefood collective regularly turning up to picket in freezing winter weather at a 
union recognition dispute was convincing proof that the retail trade does not invariably 
produce petty bourgeois attitudes."32 
Market relatioIU & relation, with the indu,try 
The ability of many wholefood co-ops to survive, even with low wages and profits, was 
assisted by the almost total lack of competition faced by many of these co-ops, in the early 
period at least. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the wholefood industry was regarded as a 
fringe activity by the bulk of the food industry. In terms of the Schutt &£ Whittington 
classification of small firms, wholefood suppliers were in the independent but marginal 
category ~ that is, relatively independent of large scale capital but competing in a marginal 
niche of the economy that large firms did not find it worthwhile to enter. Co-operatives 
found access to the market relatively easy, and in a rapidly growing sector have found 
success. At this time, a co-op or collective was the only source of wholefoods in many 
towns. Co-ops were amongst the earliest enterprises in the 'wholefood revolution' and must 
take some of the credit for the successful promotion of wholefoods and healthy eating into 
the national consciousness. Wholesale co-ops were in a similar situation, competing with 
other independent wholesalers and the one large operator - Booker - which was largely tied 
to its own retail markets. 
The nature of market relations has been crudal for the success of wholefood co-ops, and of 
the wholesalers in particular. Although they faced competition from Booker and the 
independents, this was in the context of a market growing rapidly, at over 20% a year in real 
terms. Their more rapid growth than the co-op retailers, and higher margins, can also be 
traced to a different strategy - a deliberate attempt to reach as many people as possible and 
extend their influence through growth rather than through low prices. Suma has attempted 
strategies of both high and low prices, and found that the price level made relatively little 
impact on demand. furthermore, growth could take place without deliberate marketing 
strategies; as members of the co-op have said "we were in the right place at the right time"3.1. 
For many co-ops, increased business came largely as a result of unsatisfied demand that 
32 Cnrpry,2979. 
33~, 1987".20. 
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needed little stimulation. This has now changed, and inaeased competition both from 
within the wholefood/healthfood sector and from multiples caught the co-op sector 
unprepared. 
A second important reason for the wholesalers' success is the close links which they enjoyed 
with their customers, particularly the retail co-ops, which amounted to a partially protected 
market. This is analogous to the relationship between many of the old CPF producer co-ops 
and consumer co-ops, which the Webbs identified as being SO beneficial to the former. In the 
19708, the shops which formed the FNWC accounted for 80% of Suma's turnover, and 
whilst there were not enough retail wholefood co-ops to provide a closed market for the 
rapidly growing wholesalers, the provision of a base demand sheltered from competition 
was crucial, especially in the early years. 
The retail co-ops also enjoyed a partially protected market, receiving ideological backing 
from customers who share the same values. A survey of customers in 1987 found that over 
50% were graduates, more than 10 times the national average34. Much custom is based on 
contacts with sympathisers and contacts with libertarian and left supporters of the 
alternative movement. In this, they are in a similar situation to the alternative print co-ops. 
A third reason for success is that, unusually, the co-op form has proved to be a competitive 
advantage. This has particularly applied in the case of wholesalers. Madarlane notes that 
Job rotation and collective management in Suma made an important 
contribution to Suma's service. It meant that most delivery drivers knew a 
great deal about the products being sold, and about the commercial side of the 
business. Add to this their contact with a wide range of shops (on their 
delivery routes) and it can be seen that the drivers were in an ideal position to 
provide help and advice to individual retailers and respond to commercial 
problems they were experiencing. So Suma has provided a quality of service 
that is unlikely to be matched by non-co-op wholefood wholesalers.35 
RECENT CHANCES AND DEVILOPMENTS 
Wiggins and SneU36 identify five major trends currently taking place in the food industry in 
general. The first is increasing centralisation and concentration, both in manufacturing and 
retailing. Secondly, diversification is taking place. Faced by static food markets and pressure 
34 Surwy c.riIrllly ~ of WIrD16footl WIIolaIlm, 1987. 
35 ~,1917".21. 
38 Wiggbu & SrwIl, 79'6. 
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on profit margins, both manufacturers and retailers have to find new products to sell. The 
large food manufacturers are all now 'food and drink' companies rather than limited to a 
narrow range of products such as bread, beer or meat. Retailers are increasingly moving 
into the sale of non-food items. 
Thirdly, companies are developing integrated systems of production and distribution, from 
farm to table. Many large companies have invested heavily in technological integration, 
gearing farming to processing needs. With a huge capital outlay one result is inflexibility, as 
one part of the process cannot be changed without threat to its other parts. Fmns may have 
problems adapting to changing consumer demands - and hence devote much attention to 
making sure that those demands can be manipulated through advertising. 
Fourthly, the food chain is lengthening, with more processes being carried out on food 
before consumption. This takes the form of more processed foods, or the provision a service 
with food - catering. 
Fifthly, there is a fragmentation taking place in food consumption. There is a polarisation 
between low income'subsistence' consumers demanding cheaper basic foods, and high 
wage consumers requiring greater variety and higher quality. Further fragmentation occurs 
through the development of food markets for ethnic minorities. Communities whose needs 
are not met by the large processors and distributors have virtually developed their own 
systems for the importation, processing and retailing of food. 
Changing demand can produce 'gaps' in the market which major producers cannot 
profitably exploit due to the inflexibility of their capital-intensive manufacturing systems. In 
the past wholefoods have been one of these gaps which co-ops and small firms have been 
able to exploit successfully. Currently the mass food companies are attempting to move into 
this market - although they are here responding to consumer demand rather than creating it 
(consumer manipulation is aimed towards the expansion of the healthfood market). 
For the wholefood co-ops, the question is whether they can survive this kind of 
intervention, both in wholesaling and retailing. By their nature, wholefoods are not an area 
which is particularly suited to the modes of operation of the large companies. After all, 
wholefoods became popular partly in resistance to the trends initiated by these companies. 
By nature of their 'freshness' and the lack of preservatives and processing included in their 
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manufacture, the small scale and closeness to the consumer may be an important factor 
ensuring the long term survival of local wholefood co-ops. 
An illustration of this trend is in the increasing popularity of organic foods - grown without 
artificial fertilisers or pesticides. Organic foods are unsuited to the mechanised and 
standardised farming activities of the major food companies, and are an example of a 
growing new and specialised market which they are too inflexible to take advantage of. This 
offers a market niche which in some ways reproduces introduction of wholefoods a decade 
earlier, and it is one which some co-ops have taken advantage, although on the retail side 
supermarkets are already active in this area. 
The beneficial situation which aided the survival and growth of wholefood co-ops up to the 
early 19808 has not been sustained. This has been largely due to changes in external, market 
relations, and also to an unwillingness in some co-ops for workers to continue working 
indefinitely for low wages. 
The very circumstances which contributed to the success of wholefood wholesalers and 
some retailers are also the source of changes affecting the sector in recent years. Any rapidly 
growing market where high profits can be made will eventually attract capitalist firms, and 
as wholefoods has developed into a mass market this is indeed what has happened. Firstly, 
other independent non-co-op firms entered, and more recently the role of supermarkets has 
been increasing. This has had a major impact; although the market is still growing, 
wholefoods is much more competitive and the co-ops find much more pressure on margins. 
No longer are they in a marginal niche, but are actively competing against larger firms. 
Centralisation of capital is taking place very rapidly in both wholesale and retaU 
distribution, leaving co-ops highly vulnerable. They tend to be undercapitalised and lacking 
in technical and managerial skills, facing a market whose pattern of trade is shifting from 
small retail outlets towards larger supermarket chains which are part of national or 
multinational capital. Although co-ops have survived thus far because of their sophisticated 
product knowledge, the high quality of products and service, and an ethical commitment to 
food and related subjects, this may not be sustainable as competition from supermarkets 
intensifies. 
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The impact of supennarkets is particularly crucial. They are increasingly dOminating the 
food industry and determining its dynamic. Not only do they offer lower prices on the basis 
of bulk purchasing power and efficient operation, but they can offer a much broader range 
of products, including a wide range perishable commodities which many small retailers are 
not geared up for. 
In addition, the food industry is attempting to manipulate the demand for 'healthy diet' 
products away from basic, unprocessed items, including wholefoods, towards 
differentiated, processed products, including healthfoods, which are more suitable for 
monopolistic, profit-oriented companies. This causes problems for the wholefood co-ops. 
Many of them object on principle to 'healthfoods' and refuse to deal with them, considering 
that the companies promoting them are not interested in providing the best available food 
for healthy and cheap eating, but "concentrate on expensive supplements, pills and 
medicines (all with a higher profit margin than food) and made-up foods ..... they cash in on 
their status as health food shops to sell food of no especial quality ..... at excessive prices to 
an overtrusting public"37. 
As consumer demand is manipulated towards these items, the relative importance of 
wholefood trade is reduced; this would tend to reduce the level of turnover which can be 
secured by co-ops, and ensures that their turnover consists of items with lower margins. as 
a result, competition with less principled capitalist firms becomes more difficult, and in 
order to survive many retail wholefood co-ops have been forced into selling many of these 
less 'pure' items. Many retailers admit that they could not survive without the profits 
generated by such items. 
At the same time as competition has been increasing, internal changes have taken place, 
partic:ularly in retail co-ops. The initial willingness to work for low wages has gradually 
diminished, partly through growing needs of dependents, and partly from the need to 
reduce labour tumover and retain skUls and experience. There is growing realisation that 
wages and conditions can only be improved through growth and expansion, which in turn 
requiret confronting the constraints imposed by the market. There is a dearer appreciation 
that the market cannot be avoided, and that it does impose constraints on how co-ops 
operate. This in turn has contributed to a concern with more general political issues, a 
37 NIolItIIm, l'8f, ,.14. 
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diminution of the older isolationist view, and a linking of the 'politics of food' with socialist 
politics. The objective of selling at low prices has been gradually surpassed by a policy of 
charging enough to enable co-ops to accumulate and expand, and eventually offer better 
wages and conditions. The effect of this is shown in Table 10.2, where, in retail co-ops, 
margins have been increasing, enabling higher wages to be paid and some accumulation to 
take place. Nevertheless, after years of low prices and low accumulation, and lacking in 
business skills, many co-ops are in a weak position to resist new competitive pressures. 
For wholesale co-ops, the impact of more competitive market relations is evident in the 
gradually diminishing surplus which they have been able to achieve; the falling level of 
value added as a proportion of output is shown in Table 10.2; combined with a desire to 
steadily increase wages, this has contributed to declining accumulation. Their response has 
been centered on developing the collective ability of the co-op wholesalers to compete with 
large companies. 
Between them, the six wholefood wholesale co-ops had a turnover of £13m in 1987, 
representing perhaps 5% of the markets in which they operate. This in itself is a significant 
achievement, making wholefood wholesaling the only area of worker co-op activity in 
Britain where co-ops playa significant role nationally. Excluding direct purchases by 
supermarkets, Suma itself is the 4th biggest wholefood wholesaler in Britain, and the co-ops 
in wholefood wholesale network are collectively the 3rd largest wholesaler. Increasingly 
formal collective action by the wholesale network in order to compete as a large firm rather 
than margina1ised small firms is a controversial area; although there has been co-operation 
to date in the form of joint purchasing and agreements not to compete, there is resistance 
from the larger co-ops (who would gain least> to the loss of autonomy involved in a more 
formalised structure involving joint marketing38• 
The growth of the co-ops themselves also undermines some of their strengths. Suma has 
found that with increasing numbers of workers "the number of people driving has increased 
(so each driver visits anyone shop less often) and the knowledge of the drivers about 
products, about Suma, and about the organisation of the trade has necessarily fallen. 
Furthermore, increased trade has resulted in heavier delivery schedules, so drivers have less 
time to spend at each shop". Although the drivers have a higher level of knowledge than 
38 N", CdHzImIpr WiMr & Sprlrtg 1987I";~, 1987. 
drivers of other wholesalers, they are less able to provide the infonnation, advice and 
problem-sorting services which they have done in the past and which proved so effective. 
CONCLUDING REMAlUCS 
Although wholefood co-ops preceded the fonnation of many of today's worker co-ops, 
relationships between the two have sometimes been strained. In an article which appeared 
in Your Business in October 1983 entitled Taking tire Politics out of Co-operatives, George Jones 
of the National CDA claimed that the movement had 
shed its many bad images, the link with left wing politics, the thought that 
co-operatives are just last ditch attempts to save ailing industries and the idea 
that they tend to be wholefood firms and the like run by bearded eccentrics.39 
Jones' vision of apolitical co-operatives is a recipe for the replication of small business 
practices. In fact wholefood co-ops have made a great contribution to the wider co-op 
sector. They have provided a service for which there was an unmet social need, confronted 
the politics of food, and for a while at least, successfully opposed the interests of major food 
companies. Intema1ly, they have demonstrated a long-lasting commitment to collective 
working decision-making and a restructuring of the labour process which goes some way to 
meeting workers' needs rather than those of capital. In the process, they have made some 
innovative developments in these areas which have made a contribution to the major 
problem of democratising and restructuring work in larger co-ops. They have achieved an 
impressive survival rate, and in the wholesale co-ops at least, have a presence of national 
significance and offer wages and conditions as good as or better than those which apply in 
similar jobs in capitalist firms. Furthermore, these achievements have been made with less 
benefit from intervention and public sector support than has applied to some more recently-
formed co-ops. 
However, if lessons are to be learned from this success story which can be applied 
elsewhere, the achievements must be related to the specific conditions which made them 
possible. The most important factor is that co-ops identified a market which was not 
dominated by large firms, and yet was growing rapidly; a large part of co-ops' success is 
directly attributable to that growth. Secondly, co-op workers were highly committed to 
S, Howrtlt & H_fIIGDIl, 1'84.1""", .Ihq tIwrt ~ ID ""mt DIIt, it illuml to imlagiM from ",,, Irtnr1 1M ctH1p 
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what they were doing, an approach which contributed to their competitive strength and 
their determination to develop alternatives to capitalist forms of operation. It also meant 
that they were prepared to work long hours for low wages; whilst in some cases this 'sweat 
equity' was used as a means contributing to accumulation, this was not always the case. The 
possibility of working in this way is in no small part due to the relatively affluent and well-
educated backgrounds of these workers. This puts into perspective the conditions required 
for replicating wholefood co-ops success in other industries and with other workers. 
Furthermore, with the transformation of a rapidly growing marginal industry into one of 
mass consumption, the role of small-medium firms - and co-ops - is less secure. 
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11. Co-operatives and Market Relations 
INl'RODUcnON 
The theory and methodology chapters in Part I aimed to establish to causal processes which 
would be operating on co-ops in a capitalist economy. Co-ops' overall position is dominated 
by tendencies towards degeneration, although this conception of degeneration is not 
necessarily the same as that adopted elsewhere. Given this, it was suggested that the 
commercial performance, and hence survival, of co-ops would depend upon three main 
factors: 
• the nature of large firm/ small firm relations in an industry; 
• other aspects of co-ops' market relations; 
• the nature of production relations and the labour process in an industry. 
The empirical analysis in Part U had two objectives. Firstly, to present quantitative data 
showing the outcome of co-ops' performance; secondly, to present qualitative data 
concerning co-ops' market relations and the historical processes at work. 
In Part m, the intention is to evaluate what the empirical results have told us about the 
causal process identified in Part I, in particular how the processes have worked in the case 
of each individual co-op sector. This is then extended to draw out the policy implications of 
the results in chapter 12. 
Two particular features need to be pointed out at this stage, which distinguish this from 
conventional approaches. Firstly, I have intentionally concentrated upon relations between 
co-operatives and the rest of the economy, that is, the external factors operating on co-ops. 
Inevitably this has been at the expense of detailed analysis of the internal relations of co-ops, 
such as management, participation and dedsion-maldng structures. This is not because 
internal relations are unimportant; clearly they are of overwhelming importance to co-op 
workers and development workers involved with the day-to-day operation of individual 
co-ops. However, internal relations operate in an environment which is a product of 
external relations, and many apparently internal decisions - regarding problems and 
conflicts - are direct but internalised manifestations of external processes. In order to 
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understand what has happened to co-ops as a whole, and to individual co-ops, it is first of 
all necessary to understand the external processes at work regarding their relationships to 
the rest of the economy. The second feature is that the analysis has concentrated upon co-op 
sectors rather than individual co-operatives. That is, the area of interest has been the broad 
processes at work which affect all co-ops in a particular economic situation, rather than 
examining how individual co-ops respond to those processes. If this approach appears 
particularly extreme, it is a reflection of both the importance of studying economic 
processes, and the almost total lack of attention which has been devoted to them in 
conventional co-operatives research, whether from a behavioural or neoclassical 
perspective. Even when the economy is correctly conceived as capitalist, many aspects of 
the economy are viewed as unchangeable and not directly of importance to C(H)PS, The 
objective here, can be seen as analysing the factors which are generally taken as 'given' in 
conventional analysis, and as a result, are left uninvestigated. 
MAIN FINDINGS 
The main findings concerning the actual performance of co-operatives were presented in 
chapters 5,6 and 7. In terms of the realist approach of chapter 4, these outcomes are the 
result of both the underlying causal mechanisms, and whatever contingent conditions were 
operating over the relevant period. This chapter will concentrate largely upon the results of 
performance and survival; the financing of C(H)PS was dealt with in chapter 6, which was 
largely self-contained with both empirical results and analysis, and which will not repeated 
here. Later chapters in Part n analysed qualitatively the processes at work in each co-op 
sector leading to these outcomes; in this chapter the implications of this analysis for co-ops 
as a whole are drawn out. 
The main quantitative findings were: 
• conditions which govern the fonnation of co-ops and the growth of the sector through 
the establishment of new co-ops are very different to those governing their survival; 
• survival as enterprises is associated with varying degrees of degeneration from co-op 
ideals, and there is constant tension between survival in commercial and anti-capitalist 
terms. 
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• Survival as enterprises is dependent upon commercial performance. The record of 
co-ops in this area is characterised by the following: 
• co-ops have perfonned less well, on average, than comparable capitalist 
finns; 
• the commercial performance and survival of co-ops varies significantly from 
one industry to another; 
• there is evidence that the performance of co-ops has been improving over time. 
FORMATION AND StmVIV AL 
The formation of new co-ops was discussed in chapter S. The conventional approach is to 
present results concerning co-op sector growth and desaibe other changes which have been 
associated with this. I have attempted to go beyond this and draw out the underlying 
processes at work in the economy which have led to this growth. Therefore the emergence 
of these new co-ops was located as a response to crisis and restructuring taking place in the 
British economy. The aspects of restructuring of particular relevance to co-operatives are: 
• rising unemployment as firms close down or restructure their operations; 
• an increased role for small finns, partly as a response to restructured economic and 
trading links between large and small firms, and partly as a means of undermining the 
strength of organised labour; 
• the emergence of Labour<ontrolled local authorities as an altemative power base and 
centre of economic activity to central government; 
• confusion on the left as to the role and nature of social ownership of the means of 
production. 
• support for CCH>ps from all major political parties - part of a more general revival of 
support for workers' participation and industrial democracy aerol. a wide political and 
economic spectrum 
• the undermining of workers' collective organisation, and attempts to link wages more 
closely to the profitability of employers 
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Once fonned, co-ops operate with a variety of political and economic aims and orientations, 
but all are forced to deal with the conflict between surviving as both commercial enterprises 
and organisations representing the political economy of labour. I have concentrated in this 
thesis on the factors governing their survival as commercial enterprises. This is of course 
what the survival rates in chapter 5 represent, and would be different to survival rates in 
terms of other objectives. 
While they operate in the market, co-ops survive commercially in the same way as any 
other enterprise, that is, by successfully competing and accumulating capital. Aspects of 
restructuring which encourage the formation of co-ops are likely to have different 
implications for their commerdal performance and hence survival. For example, there 
might be a high formation rate of co-ops in an industry faced with economic decline and 
high unemployment, but adverse economic conditions would make survival for those 
co-ops more difficult. 
The contrast between formation and survival rates was illustrated by comparing clothing 
and printing co-ops; both have been prominent in the co-op sector and have demonstrated 
high formation rates, but the former has experienced a much higher failure rate. This result 
was reinforced in chapter 7, where commerdal performance of clothing co-ops was shown 
to be much worse than that of printing co-ops. 
The result that co-ops' performance overall is on average worse than that of capitalist firms 
is unsurprising, and has been dealt with in chapters 6 and 7. It was expected, for the 
following reasons: 
• co-ops will tend to suffer from a shortage of finance; 
• co-ops will tend to lack some essential skills; 
• attempts to pursue co-op objectives will generally conflict with the requirements of 
competition and accumulation; 
• any positive effect on productivity e.g. from extra commitment, motivation, will be 
insufficient to offset the negative effects of the above; 
Some of these can be alleviated through intervention and external support - such as the 
prOvision of training, of spedallst finandal sources, or a favourable legal environment, tax 
concessions etc. - and some of the contrasts between the situation in Britain and that of other 
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European countries have been brought out earlier. In the absence of such measures, 
pressures generated by the need for commercial survival tend to be at the expense of 
workers' interests. However, the British co-operative sector has benefitted little from 
planned development, and only in a few instances <e.g. the GLC, SCDC and Sheffield City 
Council) have grassroots initiatives been combined with an planned overall strategy. 
PllOBLEMS OF CO-OPERA 11VE ACctJMl.1LA TlON 
By comparing the three sectors where co-ops are active, it has been possible to analyse the 
conditions which facilitate co-op success. In certain instances co-ops have been able to 
combine commercial and co-operative success; this is most notable amongst the wholefood 
whQlesalers, where a high degree of commitment and efficiency were for a while combined 
with favourable market conditions, in an industry where a restructuring of production 
could be achieved with limited commercial cost, and in some cases a co-op structure was 
actually a commercial advantage. 
Identifying the conditions under which co-ops can thrive is beneficial, but there is a danger 
in concentrating on commercial success only. Where commercial success has been achieved, 
there is inevitably a tension between commercial and co-op objectives. Co-ops may become 
larger and longer-established, but the conflicts between commercial and co-operative 
objectives do not disappear, rather they take on a different form. This is illustrated in the 
conflicts faced by Uthosphere and Suma, discussed in earlier chapters. These partly arise 
from the problems of organising direct democratic control as the number of workers 
involved becomes larger, but experience has shown that the constraints of competing in a 
market economy effectively preclude many experimental options from being tried, forcing 
co-ops towards a representative democracy systeml . Although not necessarily the case, 
representative demoaacy tends to be more hierarchical and to exclude the majority of 
workers from effective participation in control, and one task fadng the co-op movement is 
to develop effective systems of representative democracy in larger organisations2. 
Evidence from larger British co-ops suggests that accumulation and growth cannot be 
achieved without gradually compromising on the specifically co-operative aspects of 
lllllltDugli S ..... W IOfIWIIICCaI 11I1I'IIOi4"" ,,", 
21COM Pilot Proj«I, 1986. 
378 Conclusion 
production, although this does not mean that all co-op ideals are totally subordinated. 
Pressures will be greater when growth is rapid. 
The experience of C<H:>ps in other capitalist countries, where co-ops are much larger, is 
mixed. The record of Italian co-ops suggests that even when there is a strong ideological 
commitment to co-ops, commercial pressures soon come to dominate. The Italian co-op 
movement has its roots among highly qualified, ideologically motivated, blue-collar 
workers, and has close links to the trade union movement, while the largest C<H:>p 
federation - the !.ega - has strong historical ties to the Communist and Socialist parties. The 
largest concentration of C<H:>ps is in the Emilia Romagna region, a situation at least in part 
due to the strength since the war at regional and provincial levels of left-wing parties 
sympathetic to the C<H:>perative movement. The last 20 years have seen the movement grow 
rapidly, with the Lega organising many new C<H:>ps as rescues of capitalist firms. This 
growth appears to have been accompanied by an increasing preoccupation with commercial 
matters: 
while the Italian co-op movement has succeeded over the last 20 years in 
establishing itself as a significant force in the national economy, it appears in 
the process to have forgotten what its significance is3. 
The strength of the C<H:>p movement certainly has had benefits for workers. Co-ops are 
distinguished from capitalist firms by a commitment to higher wages, lower differentials, 
greater employment security and fewer strikes and work accidents, and lower absenteeism. 
However there is very little commitment to participative management, to changing the 
nature of work or the division of labour, with evidence of "commercial cynicism, barbaric 
work practices, sexual discrimination, and rivalry between 'blue-collar' and 'white-collar' 
workers"4, although another researcher has been more positive: "wages and conditions are 
comparable to conventional companies, internal democracy is strong, and the experience of 
work is positive"S. Novertheless there is little consciousness of any role co-ops might have 
in transformi~g capitalist society; despite its historical links the !.ega has adopted a position 
of political neutrality, and is concentrating more on the commercial and competitive aspects 
of co-op production, less on developing any long-term social and political objectives. 
S BlIu:1rIq,19B6". 79. 
4i11J11.. 
5 HoImItrom, 2986. 
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Concentration and centralisation 
The problems of co-operative accumulation are related to the more general process of 
concentration and centralisation of capital outlined in chapter 2. The importance of these 
processes in advanced western capitalist economies tend to be overlooked by many 
supporters of a 'small is beautiful' line, and particularly those associated with co-operatives 
through the alternative movement. They are however of crucial importance for co-ops and 
have major implications for their development. 
We have seen that the ability of co-ops to generate a reinvestible surplus is limited, and 
appears to be less than that of small firms in general. This limits their investment in newer, 
larger scale, more productive technology, which in tum constrains their ability to compete. 
Nevertheless, they can slowly grow through concentration, as some surplus is generated 
and accumulated, although it is by no means certain that this will be achieved and they may 
constantly remain at a competitive disadvantage. 
Growth through centralisation is much more difficult. The nature of co-ops as enterprises 
controlled by labour rather than by capital (in formal terms at least) means that they are not 
open to takeover in the same way as capitalist finns; most co-ops do not have tradeable 
share capital, and any decision to merge two co-ops would depend on the decision being 
taken by the two sets of workers involved. In co-ops where workers actively partidpate in 
control, resistance to such growth is likely due to the increasing difficulties of maintaining 
partidpatory structures in larger organisation, and due to the dilution of any individual 
role. If anything, co-ops are as likely to split when they become large as combine when they 
are small; certainly in Britain there have been at least as many examples of co-ops splitting 
into smaller structures as there have been of co-op mergers or takeovers. In Italy there have 
been examples of mergers of weak co-ops promoted by support organisations, and at 
Mondragon the largest co-op, Ulgor, has spawned a number of new co-ops rather than 
grow itself. 
Although this reluctance to grow has a positive impact on the work experience of co-ops, it 
does constrain their ability to compete and survive. In her analysis of the older British 
co-ops, Bennett emphasises the issue of co-ops and centralisation. She concludes that one of 
the major reasons for the poor relative perfonnance of these co-ops is that, unlike capitalist 
firms, co-ops have been unable to take over their rivals and benefit from economies of scale 
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and securing market outlets, and identifies this and changing market circumstances as the 
main reasons for their demise6. 
A V AILABILlTY OF FINANCE 
The need for co-op funding has been recognised by co-op supporters of many different 
political and economic persuasions, in fact by most supporters of co-ops excepting those 
who wish them to mimic capitalist firms in every respect except for the presence of trade 
unions. Their initial shortage of finance leads to a lack of productive capital, particularly in 
their early days, and co-ops can only purchase more as they accumulate. This suggests that 
the pressures resulting from the accumulation process are if anything more intense in 
co-ops than in capitalist firms, forcing them into paying lower wages. As Thornley says: 
The basic need has been to increase productivity in line with other finns. With 
less money at their disposal, co-operatives must often buy inferior machinery 
and accept poor quality premises. To remain competitive they must then 
reduce the costs of labour to a greater extent than other firms and work more 
effectively.1 
The limited intervention which has taken place through the provision of co-op finance from 
public funds has eased this pressure, but co-ops still remain constrained for finance in their 
early years. Commerdal funds only become readily available once a track record has been 
established, and co-ops are still forced to rely largely upon members loans and accumulated 
surpluses. The gradual impact of accumulation is shown in the gradually improving 
performance of co-ops over time, in both absolute terms and relative to capitalist firms. In 
chapter 7 it was shown that this improvement in labour productivity was largely due to an 
increasing quantity of means of production at the disposal of co-op workers, rather than 
increasing productivity on existing machinery and equipment. The ability of co-ops to 
accumulate in this way is highly dependent upon the commitment of workers and their 
willingness to build up the co-op through 'sweat equity'. 
SECTORAL PEJUlORMANCE 
Whilst lack of finance intensifies initial problems, there is a danger in assuming that more 
finance is all that co-ops need. There are major variations in co-op performance between 
6 """", t''', t'"". 
7 7'1tt1m1q, 2m. 
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sectors, and the relatively poor perfonnance of clothing and wholefood retail co-ops cannot 
solely be explained by the finandng factor. It is necessary to examine the impact of 
charactetistics which distinguish the sectors. Following Part I, we can consider in particular: 
• relationships between large and small firms and co-ops in the sector; 
• co-ops' market relationships; 
• the nature of the production process; 
The co-op sectors studied here were specifically chosen to demonstrate contrasts in these 
areas; by examining their comparative perfonnance we can assess the impact of the various 
sectoral characteristics. Chapter 2 stressed the importance of co-ops' market relationships, 
as they are the means by which degenerative pressures are transmitted. The impact of these 
on performance will be considered first. 
CO-OPS' MAlUCET RELATIONSHIPS 
In dealing with market relationships, the first problem is to overcome the belief that the 
discipline of the market place can only beneficial for co-ops. This belief is widely held, and 
not just amongst those for whom reliance on market processes is an act of faith. The dangers 
have been stressed by Bennett in the context of the financing issue: 
although we would not dispute that co-operatives would benefit from 
additional funding, concentration on this issue alone can be misleading. It can 
lead to the conclusion that ready sources of cash is all that a co-operative needs 
to succeed, and that once a co-operative has funds it should be left to survive 
in the capitalist market8. 
In chapters 2 " 3, I argued that the nature of market relations have a major impact on the 
experience of all enterprises, co-ops and capitalist finns, and in particular that the role of 
small firms was dominated by the nature of their relationships with large firms through the 
market. This applies equally to co-ops. The poSition of co-ops in the capitalist economy is 
largely dependent upon their relations with capital, and it is through the market that the 
two interact. But far from the market being a positive infiuence (a la Thornley and many 
others even on the left) I would argue that market pressures - which tefJect the imperatives 
of accumulation and the interests of capital - are likely to be highly destructive to co-ops 
8 Smull, 2984".309. 
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and are one of the means by which their achievement of a restructuring of production under 
worker control is inhibited. 
The funding issue represents one aspect of co-operatives' market relations - relations with 
finance capital through the finance market. To obtain a fuller understanding of co-ops' 
experience it is necessary to examine their wider market relations. And just as intervention 
in the finance market is necessary if co-ops are to be supported, then intervention in product 
and labour markets is also likely to be necessary. 
Early writers on co-ops identified market conditions as having a crucial impact upon the 
operations of co-operatives. Although Marx did not deal explicitly with this topiC, he clearly 
believed that the requirements of competition would exert undesirable and degenerative 
pressures on co-ops. Later, The Webbs, Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg investigated and wrote 
how the potential for co-ops to achieve some form of restructuring of production under 
worker control would depend upon their ability to alleviate the pressures of capitalist 
competition. 
British co-operatives have operated in a variety of different market structures, as described 
in chapters 8-10, which have had a major impact on the operations of these co-ops. I will 
summarise these below. 
Printing 
In the printing industry in general many small firms fall into the the 'independent but 
competitive' category, where they compete with large firms on the basis of 'intense 
exploitation of labour and equipment'. This has become highlighted in recent years with the 
advent of instant print shops which intentionally operate outside of the established 
structure of the industry, so as to avoid and undermine trade union influence over wages 
and recruitment; these shops compete on the basis of very low wages and poor working 
conditions and can be considered the new 'sweated sector' of the printing industry9. 
The industry gains much of its character from the peculiar nature of its output - a bespoke 
product, produced to the highly specialised requirements of individual customers. As a 
result the potential benefits of economies of scale • from long production runs - are limited 
to a few specialised branches, such as magazine production, and so production in small 
9 Cough, 1986; Coa,1987. 
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finns is not a major competitive disadvantage. In practice, the main way to increase 
profitability is through reducing labour costs, and this is where recent pressures for change 
and conflict have been strongest in the industry. 
A second consequence is that the market is highly segmented, producing for many small, 
specialised and often local markets which can be best served by small finns. Large firms 
attempt to increase the potential scope of their operations by standardising these product 
markets - this has been one of the main characteristics of the instant print trade - but in 
many cases these peripheral markets remain. Although these markets may be small (thus 
not attracting the attention of large firms) they are not subject to such intense competition as 
general markets. Much of the early success of printing co-ops was due to their achievements 
in keeping out of general printing and operating in the specialised market of 'alternative 
print', which can be broadly defined to include the printing demands of the radical press, 
labour movement, co-operative and community groups and their campaigns. In this area 
co-ops have a competitive advantage over capitalist firms, because many customers 
specifically prefer having their business carried out by a co-op. Furthermore, alternative 
print expanded steadily from the late 19605, and received a boost in the early 19805 with the 
resurgence of 10cal democratic movements' and much wider economic and social activity 
by local authorities, which itself provided an additional semi-protected market. This 
provided a favourable environment for the emergence and growth of printing co-ops, with 
this degree of market protection alleviating the destructive effects of competitive pressures. 
Thus printing co-ops have not only been able to pay amongst the highest wages in the co-op 
movement (they are still below the industry average, but an increasing number of printing 
co-operatives can afford to pay union minimum rates), but at the same time have been able 
to retain a suffident proportion of earnings to reinvest and provide for growth. 
Since 1986 the larger local authorities have been abolished, restrictions have been imposed 
upon the finances of those remaining, and restrictions on the use of non-commerdal criteria 
in the fonnulation of purchasing policy has constrained the ability of authorities to give 
co-ops preference on the awarding of print contracts. As a result, the early 1980s • when 
many print co-ops were established· may have represented the ~ak of the alternative print 
market. The rapidly increasing size of the printing co-operative sector has in any case forced 
them to move into more competitive markets; some are by now suffidently well established 
to survive such changes. The intensification of competition as franchised instant print chains 
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continue to expand may prove a problem, but this is countered by the steady increase in the 
size of their total market. Overall, the industry continues to grow rapidly; output increased 
by 20% over the period 1983 to 1986, and this trend is likely to continue. 
Clothing 
In contrast to the experience of printing co-ops, the majority of co-ops in clothing face a 
highly competitive market structure. In the clothing industry small finns operate in a highly 
dependent relationship with large finns. The larger firms - or 'contractors' - handle the 
planning and co-ordination of both production and distribution; they provide material 
inputs to the manufacturing finns, who 'Cut, Make and Trim' to provide finished products, 
which are then distributed to wholesalers and/or retailers. Major elements of the 
production process - design, planning, purchasing of inputs, distribution and marketing are 
handled by these large firms, but the area providing most problems for capital - the 
management of the labour process - is contracted out to these 'labour only' subcontractors. 
Small clothing manufacturers have little autonomy in setting production levels or prices -
they effectively have to take whatever is offered - and this applies equally to co-ops as well 
as other smaIl clothing firms. Many are caught in the trap of low profit/low wage/low 
reinvestment/low productivity/low sldll production, from which escape is very difficult. 
The highly restrictive nature of this relationship was well illustrated by the experience of the 
Fakenham co-operative, and many co-ops since have had similar experiences. As a result 
the clothing co-op sector, despite having had a high rate of new co-op formation, is 
characterised by poor commercial performance and a high failure rate. In contrast to 
printing, the industry has been in long-term decline, with output volume over the period 
1979 to 1982 falling by 25%, and although output has risen since then, in 1985 it was still 
nearly 10% below the 1979 level. 
The individual clothing co-ops which have performed ·better than the norm are (almost) 
exclusively those which have avoided or escaped from such dependent relations. They do 
not operate in CMT but produce more specialist garments (although not specialist fashion 
garments where marketing is difficult and frequent changes of style are disruptive); they 
sometimes carry out their own marketing, and control a larger element of the overall 
production process. 
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Few clothing co-ops have been aided by any market intervention or amelioration of market 
forces on their behalf. Whereas printing co-ops' product has a high political profile (in tenns 
of the nature and content of the material), the same does not apply to the output of clothing 
co-ops. While printing co-ops have benefited from market protection because of a political 
sympathy between producers and consumers, this has been less so in clothing. In the case of 
Fakenham, the co-op did receive some orders specifically because of its origins as an 
attempt by women to preserve jobs under their own control when threatened with 
redundancy, but this was not extensive enough or in a form to benefit the co-op. 
The structure of clothing production is changing rapidly with the introduction of flexible 
manufacturing systems. For firms which can restructure in this way a further competitive 
advantage will result, but at the same time, the division between them and old-style CMT 
firms will intensify, and even more downward pressure on real wages will result. Unless a 
positive strategy for the financing and restructuring of clothing co-ops is adopted, their long 
term prospects are not promising. 
Whole/Dod cO-OP' 
Wholefood co-ops were established in the relatively early days of the co-ops boom, and 
were amongst the pioneers of the new movement. They also faced a specialist market, and 
in some areas enjoyed an almost monopolistic position. There were close links between 
wholesale and retail co-ops (Suma was itself established as a wholesaler by a group of retail 
co-ops), giving an element of market protection to them, with business not allocated 
exclusively on the basis of price competition. Because of their commitment to the product, 
many co-op workers on both the wholesale and retail sides were knowledgeable and could 
offer a sUperior service to customers. 
There was a broad difference between the way the wholesale and retail co-ops reacted to 
this situation. Whilst there was a general commitment to promoting wholefoods, the retail 
co-ops tended to do this by charging low prices and providing a personalised service to a 
specialised group of customers. Many were opposed to the idea of growth, and thus not 
interested in charging higher prices and margins in order to accumulate. Although they 
paid low wages, this was effectively done out of choice by well educated, middle class 
co-operaton who retained the option of finding another 'conventional' job if they SO wished. 
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Wholesale co-ops were much more commercial and growth oriented in their outlook, 
considering that their role in promoting wholefoods and co-ops lay in expanding and 
showing that co-ops could operate both as efficient businesses and with certain ideals. 
Concentrating on efficiency and competitiveness, they succeeded in both accumulating and 
providing high wages and good working conditions. Favourable market conditions -
resulting from a degree of protection through links with other co-ops, and a rapidly 
growing market, meant that at the same time they could maintain co-op characteristics, 
particularly in participative management and an element of job rotation. 
By the early 19805 wholefoods had been transformed from a specialist to a mass market, 
with the major food retailers moving in rapidly. This had implications for both wholesalers 
and retailers. Supermarkets had an overwhelming advantage in terms of efficiency, price 
and convenience, against which few of the co-op retailers - mostly very small - could hope 
to compete, although they would retain some loyal customers. As they were already in a 
weak commercial poSition - having chosen not to go for commercial success when the 
market was specialised - they are now in a vulnerable position. This is accentuated because 
many co-ops will not follow the response of other spedalist wholefood retailers -
particularly the Holland &: Barrett and Realfare chains linked to Booker - by transforming 
themselves increasingly into healthfood shops, where margins are much higher. 
Wholesalers are also under pressure but have adopted a different strategy. The supennarket 
chains are so large that they can by-pass conventional wholesalers and purchase straight 
from manufacturers or importers. Even Brewhurst, the Booker subsidiary, is attempting to 
move out of wholefood distribution as its profits are squeezed. in the face of competition 
from supermarkets. The major co-op wholesalers undertook a detailed market analysis and 
concluded that one way to survive was to reinforce the collective rather than competitive 
aspect of their joint behaviour - although this had always been strong - and establish a 
secondary co-op to deal with purchasing and mar1ceting, possibly trying to promote a joint 
co-op brand name. In the end this strategy has been undermined by the decision of Suma 
not to partidpate, and even for the other commerclally successful wholesalers the future 
must be uncertain. 
The result that co-ops fare better when competitive conditions are relatively less intense is 
in itself unsurprising. There is a clear parallel with the position of monopolistic or 
oligopolistic capitalist firms, where barriers to entry reduce competitive pressure and allow 
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relatively high profits. Co-ops which operate in areas where market forces are less intense 
can be considered to be making an element of monopoly profit, which can then be diverted 
to whatever uses the co-op sees fit. This does not mean that co-ops in such conditions 
actually realise high profits; they may operate in a way which uses this up the potential 
surplus before earning it. For instance, this could happen if a co-op practices job rotation 
which has a commercial cost, or if it charges low prices to particular groups of customers. 
Even in situations where competitive pressures are relatively weak, there is still some 
competition, and of course the threat of potential competition is real even for monopolists. 
Co-ops are under pressure to match the performance of those competitors; if they fall 
behind in accumulation their competitive position would eventually be eroded. 
Snuall firm/I"", firm rel"tiOfll 
The co-op performance described above can now be analysed in terms of the initial choice of 
co-op sectors according to Schutt &t Whittington'S classification of small businesses. The 
intention behind this was to analyse the impact of the different relationships between large 
and small firms on the ability of co-ops to survive. Firstly, it is necessary to consider how 
well the co-op sectors chosen correspond with the theoretical categories, before assessing 
whether the three types of relations do in fact influence the performance of co-ops. 
(1) dependent - complementary and servidng the activities of small firms. 
(2) independent (i) - competing with large firms often on the basis of intense exploitation 
of labour on antiquated equipment. 
(3) independent (ii) - operating in niches that consist of smalllocal/spedalised markets 
ignored by large firms. 
Oothing co-ops were chosen for the first category, and most of them do indeed meet this 
classification, particularly those in CMT. Their experience shows that this is an 
unfavourable position to be in. Certain of the more successful clothing co-ops - such as one 
making kilts - fall into category 3. 
Printing co-ops were selected for the second category, but the classification is less clear-cut 
than in the case of clothing co-ops. Some do fall into this category, whilst those operating in 
the political or alternative print market must be considered to be operating in category (3). 
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In practice print co-ops deal with more than one market and hence would fall into more 
than one category - some work may be obtained competitively against small print firms in 
general, other work may be in the more Specialised, partially protected market. 
Finally, wholefood co-ops were selected for category (3). This was accurate for wholefood 
co-ops when first established but more recently the situation for most has changed from 
being a specialist, niche market to a mass market, although this applies less to those who 
have maintained their Specialist position, for instance by dealing in organic products. 
The most successful co-ops have been those operating in the third category, in specialist 
markets where large firms do not operate widely, and where competitive pressures are 
relatively weak. The dangers lie in the fact that such markets are small - the very reason 
why large firms do not deal with them - and are likely to require a high degree of expertise 
to operate in them successfully and/or are commercially marginal. Where co-ops have 
performed well, they have not only been in specialised markets but have also had an 
additional link to their customers - a fonn of extra-commerdal commibnent between 
producer and consumer. Thus both wholefood co-ops and those printing co-ops involved in 
alternative print have enjoyed a fonn of market protection additional to that which would 
be enjoyed by any capitalist firm. The danger facing such co-ops is that any success on the 
basis of market growth is likely to be associated with a transformation of market structure 
and relationships; the success of wholefood co-ops has been associated with a 
transformation of wholefoods into a mass market, that large companies are now interested 
in. Once this happens the autonomy, of smaller enterprises begins to be suppressed. 
Certain co-ops in the 'independent and competitive' category (2) have nevertheless been 
successful. However, they need to be highly efficient in order·to survive, and even so the 
highly competitive nature of such markets means that co-op objectives will always be under 
threat. Oearly it is easier for established co-ops to succeed in such a situation, where the 
shortages of finance and skills typical of new co-ops would be less of a problem. 
Finally, it appears unadvisable that co-ops should be established in the 'dependent' 
category, given the lack of autonomy and poor commercial performance which results. The 
difficulties of successfully establishing a co-op in such conditions are appreciated in Italy, as 
the following example quoted by Thornley demonstrates: 
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The [co-op] federations had an offer from Louisa Spagnola, a clothing and 
knitting finn, to form a co-operative from the collar and button-making 
section. Louisa Spagnola wanted to keep their label in the market and to 
control prices, leaving the co-operative with little autonomy. The offer was 
turned downIO• 
IMPACT OF MAllKET RELATIONS ON CO-OP DEVELOPMENT IN EtJROPE 
The experience of co-ops in other European countries, particularly France, Spain, Italy and 
Yugoslavia has been well documented and researched, and British interest in this has 
increased substantially during the past decade. Much of this interest has been aimed at 
learning from the European experience in order to promote the growth of co-ops in Britain. 
Whilst this is an admirable objective, learning can take place only if the record of European 
co-ops is correctly analysed; otherwise, completely misleading lessons will be drawn. 
Unfortunately a correct analysis has rarely been the case. Neoclassical economists have, 
ironically, focused upon socialist Yugoslavia as the economy with the largest co-op sector, 
following their ahistorical belief that their analysis can deal with any social and economic 
system. Others have focused upon co-ops in France, Italy and Mondragon in Spain, but 
because the majority of researchers study co-ops in isolation from their social and economic 
links, from their markets and the historical development of class relations there has been a 
tendency to focus upon internal co-operative structures and problems, rather than the 
problems which they face outside. Consequently it is often assumed that if the internal 
structures which are associated with 'successful' co-op sectors in other countries are 
replicated, the experience of these co-ops can easily be transferred to Britain. 
Spill" - Mtnulragon 
We have seen earlier (chapter 6) how Oakeshott and others concentrate on Mondragon's use 
of individual capital shares as an incentive 
The workers' commitment to the long-term success of the enterprise will surely 
be immensely stronger if it is underpinned by the responsibility which a 
measure of actual ownership bringslt 
and CampbeU12 uses a similar argument based on the experience of Polish co-ops. These 
two writers have noticed the success of Mondragon, isolated an .upect of Mondragon not 
10 T1tDrrI1q 1982, ,.154. 
11 o.JraItott, 1980. 
12 o.m,."" 1980. 
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found in the UK, and assumed that this factor has caused Mondragon's success. This aspect 
is of course the individual rather than collective ownership of assets, and they suggest that 
the measure should be introduced for British co-ops. Their proposal does not deal with the 
underlying financial problem of British co-ops, and has been dealt with in chapter 6. The 
same chapter also details the particular financial arrangements which have benefited 
Mondragon co-ops, based upon the co-op bank and planning institution, the CLP. This is 
one element of co-ops' external relations, and although the operations of the CLP are 
recognised by observers its significance - particularly as a planning authority - is generally 
not appreciated. 
The CLP has had a dual role with respect to Mondragon co-ops. Firstly, it has shielded 
Mondragon co-ops from the negative influences of competing for funds in conventional 
finance markets. Secondly, it has acted as a central planning and management authority. 
These functions have reinforced very favourable general market conditions over the period 
of the group's expansion, from the mid-1950s to the late 19705. Fairclough points out that 
the rapid economic expansion achieved in Spain in the 19505 and 1960s· aimed at turning 
Spain from an agricultural economy to an advanced capitalist one - was dependent upon 
the sheltering of emerging capitalist industry by high tariff barriers, which, for a time, 
completely closed Spanish borders to international competition13• Furthermore the most 
heavily protected sectors included the ones in which Mondragon co-ops were concentrated • 
furniture, electrical consumer goods and electrical machinery. A small start was made in 
reducing this protection in the 1970&, but only with Spain's accession to the EEC in 1980 has 
the country's high level industrial protectionism been eroded. It is recognised that this will 
cause problems for Mondragon. At ULGOR, the largest co-op, making domestic appliances, 
which stimulated the growth of many new co-ops in the 19608, the general manager 
admitted in 1984 that, with the advent of international competition and the removal of the 
last remnants of protectionism, the co-op would need a 20% increase in productivity for it to 
survive14• 
Not only did Mondragon co-ops benefit from protection from foreign competition, but 
government economic policy also led to rapid economic growth in the 1960s and 19705, and 
this was coupled with booming world export markets. Thus during the twenty crucial years 
13 F,if'dDugll, 2981,,,. 7-8. 
24l1'1nqndql I'trrw. 22/5/",...,W in Fairdoug", 1981. 
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after the first co-op fonnations, Mondragon co-ops operated in a sellers' market and could 
co-exist with other Spanish finns. General economic conditions facing the co-ops could 
hardly have been more favourable. In addition, there has been emphasis on the 
development of inter-co-operative trading, which has taken the form of complementary 
product ranges and machinery being produced in one co-operative for use in another. Such 
co-op inter-trading was stimulated by tax laws which provided co-ops with exemptions and 
reductions on the taxes and levies applied to inter-enterprise trading, and as a result they 
benefited from a further degree of protection from competition. These exemptions have 
amounted to a considerable subsidy for co-ops vis a vis capitalist firms. 
The eLP's financial-provision role has been covered in chapter 6, but its planning and 
management capability has also been crucial. The infonnation gathered from individual 
co-ops provides the starting point for plans covering the group as a whole, and the 
elaboration of five year rolling plans has become one of the bank's most important 
functions. Within the context of this plan - which is geared to meeting the economic and 
social needs of people in the Basque country - the eLP co-ordinates the development of 
existing co-ops and the fonnation of new ones. Therefore associated co-ops are expected to 
deposit their funds with the eLP, so as to strengthen its financial resources; co-ops are 
expected not to compete with each other, given the eLP's role in developing product lines 
in the group as a whole. It carries out feasibility studies 'for the establishment of new co-ops 
and the expansion of existing ones, and co-ordinates the business plans of individual 
co-ops, using information from them and from its own research department to monitor the 
results. Finally, the employment guarantee given by individual co-ops is crucially 
dependent on the CLPs management of the employment levels of the whole group, given 
that workers in any contracting co-ops are offered jobs in others - or at least they have been 
until recently. 
Thus Mondragon co-ops have, for a long period, not been faced with the harsh competitive 
forces which, I have argued earlier, are the prime source of pressures for the degeneration of 
co-ops over time. This. supports earlier evidence from British co-ops, that those which 
performed best were in industrial sectors where market conditions were such that 
competitive pressures were, for whatever reason, ameliorated. 
State policy wu crudal in generating these favourable market conditions, and Mondragon 
co-ops benefited more generally from state policy and intervention over the period of their 
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most rapid development. Franco's Fascist government after the Civil War viewed both 
communism and laissez-faire capitalism as twin evils, and its economic ideology was both 
nationalist and corporatist. Not only was intervention widespread - in both product and 
labour markets - but co-ops were viewed favourably as a means of deflecting class 
conflict15. They benefited from generous fiscal and legislative provisions, which contributed 
to their economic success and the maintenance of a democratic character. 
Underlying this policy was a need to provide trade-offs for the denial of democratic political 
rights under a repressive regime, which continued to suppress independent trade unions 
and political organisations, and to imprison, execute and exile activists from the end of the 
Civil War in 1939 until the death of Franco in 1974. Although the Falangists claimed to have 
as a goal the 'unity of capital and labour', their corporatist approach 'made sense as the 
political strategy of capital'16. 
Mondragon's co-ops developed successfully within this strategy. It has been argued that 
they took advantage of legal provisions designed for agricultural co-ops, and secured 
unintended benefits for the workers involved17• However this development cannot be 
viewed in isolation from other aspects of Franco's co-op policy, which included the 
breaking of links between co-op workers and the rest of the labour movement, so as to 
undermine the latter and inhibit the development of a potentially revolutionary industrial 
proletariat. Thus trade unions are prevented by law from any formal representation in 
Spanish co-ops, and there is often active hostility within co-ops towards trade unions18• As 
in any capitalist economy, trade unions must be the primary means of passing the gains and 
experiences of co-ops to other workers. So, while the Mondragon co-ops have undoubtedly 
benefited the workers directly involved, whether they have benefited Spanish workers in 
class terms is less certain. 
At Mondragon there has until recently been undoubted success in maintaining co-op 
structures without falling victim to the sort of degeneration which afflicted the older British 
2$ Dcapi" 1M aIDCIMiIm D/ 0Hpf fDitII ,1M socWiI' tmIlllM'dlil. 1IIOWmIfI" ill tIM 1IiMtMrtlJJ CItIIMy, be tIM,."y 20tlt 
catury 1M ctJftIIrQI". c.dtolk dtlWdl W I¥anu IIImly bef1Ol_ be 1M JI10mDIitm of NCtIfIIIAry, ImU1mIIr tmIl mtlit 
COoOJI' ill ,..,.,.,... 7JIiI prt1fIiIW 1M l1ail ft1r '1M ,..,.."" D/ COoOJI' .".., PNMo. 
26 F.'n:lDuglt, 1981, ,.25. At lUI tlluItNtiIm of 1M IIIC&aI D/ tltil.trwUgy, IN QIII oInm1I UrI' wltiU 1M 
lOCitIlilt/com","nil'/IIIMdt'" PopulIIr Front ,.",...,.14tl. dar tltfwt to s,-w. arpiW in tIM 19301, it dMrly tIoa '"" 
tID till totIIIy, ".,. tIM ... rln, of .,.,. ,.,., by tIM Social", Party. 
110mt{twt1t 6' SpMr, 1981. 
18 SlIm",., by M. HDII,""" DfI CtHpI tmIl SAu (~ "',."..ymr lAborrd) be S".;n, It tIM 0,.,. Uniwrsity I8.U.81. 
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co-ops, and which so concerned the Webbs. The co-ops have not developed a class of wage 
labour intemally, nor have they fallen victim to takeover by capitalists. The explanation for 
this lies partly in favourable economic conditions - in which state economic management 
played a major role - and partly in the legal and fiscal structure erected by Franco's 
government. Both of these provided a favourable environment for the expression of 
workers' abilities and desires to run and develop their own workplaces. But as Fairclough 
points out "in no other country does it appear that co-operative law has been so facilitative 
of retaining co-operative integrity whilst encouraging growth and economies of scale to 
maintain competitiveness with their capitalist rivals"19. 
It must also be pointed out that Mondragon's successes are also viewed in male terms. 
Hacker notes that whilst Mondragon has partially transformed working conditions for men, 
the conditions of women workers is only marginally better, relative to men, than in 
capitalist firms. The economic success of Mondragon remains dependent upon womens' 
unpaid labour in the home, as it is in capitalist firms. The reproduction of gender 
stratification is compounded by replication of the conventional division of labour and use of 
technology in Mondragon co-ops, with all the negative implications for women which that 
involves20. 
Since 1980 there have been signs that the 'Mondragon miracle' has been coming to an end, 
with the international recession and intensification of market pressures. 'The formation of 
new co-ops and employment has declined, and the group has followed the practice of 
medium and large capitalist firms by dividing its intemallabour market. This has taken the 
form of temporary co-op workers, or semi-casual workers who move from one co-op to 
another with periods of unemployment in between, thus undermining the co-op prindple 
that all workers are equal. There is less employment security for all workers, and real wages 
have also declined21. Despite this, unemployment is lower at Mondragon than in Basque 
industry overall, and co-op workers do enjoy superior employment security22. Furthermore 
there are proposals to enable the CLP to lend to enterprises other than co-ops, which will 
then have to compete for funds. This is potentially the most far reaching change, as it will 
remove perhaps the most distinctive aspect of the Mondragon group· its access to capital, 
19 FIIlrdDu,Ia, 1987, ".17-18. 
20 "..,., 1988; CockIJurll 1983, 1985. 
21 S".,., 1987; .. IIID OMaIrDtt 81 W"',29I1. 
22 TIte ~of,.]"p l'llluetiDru IJJI4lowr ~t hi co-opt..""..,. WcitzNM', (1984)'" tlMt co-opI 
IIIttl/Dr 'fI'O/It·MIrit, TDili ~ • "..,., of """"=irtg ,.] ..". tlllrirtg ,..,iDIL 
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which removed the need to compete in conventional finance markets, hence avoiding the 
weakness which affects co-ops elsewhere. It is likely that pressures on Mondragon will 
increase this change occurs and as Spain becomes further integrated into the EEC and tariff 
barriers are completely removed 
France 
Mondragon owes a major part of its success to the interventionist role of the Spanish state in 
creating a particular economic and legal environment which worked in co-ops' favour and 
enabled workers to develop and run their enterprises. State intervention has also benefited 
co-ops in France, but in addition the labour movement has had an important role in 
supporting co-ops. 
Co-ops first emerged in large numbers in France during the revolutionary upheavals of the 
1860s. They were encouraged during the Paris Commune of 1871, and in 1876 were 
accepted by the first trade union congress as progressive enterprises which were 
complementary to trade unionism. At the same time state efforts were largely aimed at 
using co-ops as a means to defuse working class militancy. The Emperor Napoleon m 
established the first legal form for co-ops in 1867, agreeing to their demands as he attempted 
to secure working class support for his rule by introdudng social reforms. At the same time 
he hoped to contain militancy by encouraging co-operative sodeties, but, in case this did not 
work, the new law included a ban on the newly-legalised co-ops from holding meetings to 
propagate their views or recruit new members!23 
Economic support came with the awarding of the first public works contracts to co-ops in 
1888. Partial protection of co-ops' market has continued ever since, and is currently 
regulated by the Code des Marches Publics. This states that "if it is practicable, one quarter 
of the work involved in a project will be temporarily reserved for co-operatives at the 
average price of the other three lots [quarters)"24. As a result, 'building and public works' is 
by far the largest co-operative sector in France, and these co-ops have enjoyed a steady 
supply of work. 
As in Spain, state support is used to prevent degeneration of co-ops. The Webbs first noted 
that "privileges which the French Government accords to them, both in credit and in 
2.1 £tlwrtlt, 2m. 
2. TIumtlq, 1911".246. 
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custom, are dependent upon their retaining their character of enterprises in the control and 
management of which the workers play an effective part."25 Currently, for a co-operative to 
qualify for a lot reserve, at least three quarters of its members must be permanent workers, 
and it must be on a government-approved register of co-ops. French law also prevents the 
assets of a co-op in liquidation from being distributed to members, but must be passed on to 
another co-op. Thus there are effective safeguards against co-ops passing into capitalist 
control, which was one of the main dangers of degeneration identified by the Webbs, and 
these legal differences were identified as a major and beneficial contrast to the situation in 
Britain26. Although there is no requirement in law for all workers to become members - and 
hence co-ops may employ a substantial proportion of wage labour - it is not possible for 
workers to be deliberately excluded from membership. Furthermore, any distribution of 
bonuses must be to all workers, not just members, on the basis of earnings. As at 
Mondragon, members are obliged to pay a small entry fee, which can be paid out of 
subsequent earnings, and are entitled to partidpate in the assembly which is the co-op's 
ultimate sovereign body. The widespread practice of French co-ops having a large 
proportion of non-member workers could superfidally be seen as degeneration and the 
exploitation by members of a class of wage-labour; in fact it is more a reflection of the 
perceived impotence of this dedsion-making role. 
French co-ops have also been assisted by a spedalist bank for co-ops, established by the 
government in 193827. The legal framework is also more detailed than that in Britain, and is 
particularly aimed at preventing finandal instability. As in Spain, co-ops have had access to 
specialist finance and have not had to compete in capital markets; this had removed a prime 
source of commerdal weakness. 
Itldy 
The Italian worker co-op sector is the largest in western Europe, with over 11,000 co-ops in 
198128, and a steady growth since then. The sector is characterised by a high political profile 
and close links with trades unions, but has also enjoyed substantial state support which 
assisted the establishment of co-ops over a long period. 
25 W""" S. 111 B., 1914, ,.1. 
26 S1ncI1986 tit. .itrMJticm "., .",., l1li4 tIvN II ,."., II ,." .trict tUftmcI of f»oOJI ""wiJ'la. 
21_ cIuqItIr 6. 
2B £.trl1c, 1985. 
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From the earliest days of Italian co-ops in the 19th century, the state intervened in co-ops' 
market relations to provide contracts for work on favourable terms, or at least on terms 
which went some way towards overcoming co-ops' competitive disadvantages vis a vis 
capitalist firms. This has mostly been in contracts for public works and construction, and 
Italian co-ops remain concentrated in industries such as building, civil engineering and 
other fields where the public sector is the main market. In the Emilia Romagna region of 
northern Italy, which today remain a stronghold of the co-op movement, co-ops were first 
established in building and engineering, set up to compete for public contracts in land 
drainage and construction schemes29. Successive local government administrations in the 
region have promoted socialist polides and have been sympathetic to the co-operative 
movement, continuing to award them public sector contracts. 
The Webbs reported that the Italian government looked favourably on co-operatives, and 
passed laws in 1899 and 1904 which exempted co-ops from the need to make deposits and 
guarantees on public sector contracts, and pennitted them to undertake labour-only 
tendering, as well as other favourable conditions. Not only did this aid the commercial 
prospects of co-operatives, it inhibited degeneration. The Webbs reported that: 
the necessity of registration to secure these Government privileges has (as in 
France) the result of keeping the constitutions of co-operative sodeties from 
development in a capitalist direction, because the Government insists on all the 
workers sharing in the profits in proportion to wages, forbids all 
subcontracting, and only in exceptional cases allows non-members to be 
employed at a1130. 
When the legislation was originally introduced, local authorities could award contracts to 
co-ops without recourse to competitive tender31, and those controlled by Communist and 
Socialist parties used this to great effect to support co-ops. 
Although co-ops were repressed during the period of Fascist rule, they were given a special 
status under the 1947 constitution. They were recognised as a special form of enterprise and 
received support from the Ministry of Works and Social Security32. They were allowed 
exemption from tax on members' capital, in addition to the previously-won benefit of a ten 
year exemption from stamp duty. These legal provisiOns have been of substantial assistance 
29 'l'IIomIq, 1982, ",. 252-3. 
30 Wfbb, S. t; S., Ilt4, ".ll. 
S1 "IIfmII" "''' JIP'f1fIIIiDrt ,., .M ,.". """iIIwd. 
32 'l'IIomIq, 1983,,,,. 3ZU. 
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to the development of the co-op sector, with many co-ops deriving a regular market for a 
proportion of their production. In certain industries co-ops are now a significant force in the 
national economy. 
However, state support has not provided the basis of the extension of co-op production in 
recent years; this owes much more to the activities of the Lega and other co-op federations. 
As in other capitalist economies, co-ops are vulnerable to increasingly strong competition 
from large capitalist firms. In response, the federations have promoted the formation of 
consortia (consorzi). These are secondary co-operatives fonned by a number of workers 
co-ops, and carry out functions on their behalf. These have a specific status under Italian 
law and are used extensively by capitalist firms as well as by co-ops, with 79,000 in 
existence in 1979, and are eligible for grants and loans from central, regional and local 
governments, and from banks33. They centralise certain functions such as the acquisition of 
raw materials and semi-finished inputs, negotiating for finance and contracts, selling 
finished products, and the accumulation of expertise. The consorzi have overcome expansion 
problems by enabling two or more co-ops to tender for work on contracts too big for 
individual co-ops, and have also facilitated inter-trading between the co-operative sectors. 
Within sectors, direct competition between co-ops is discouraged. With concentration and 
centralisation of capital increasing the size of capitalist firms, the consorzi have increased the 
competitive power of co-operatives - and indeed of smaIl firms in general - and lessened 
their vulnerability to highJy-organised multinationals. 
The consorzi have certainly aided the commercial poSition of those co-ops involved, but 
demonstrate a subordination of ideological objectives to commercial expediency. Although 
they are secondary co-ops, their workers are employed as wage labour. One member of the 
IPP party visiting Italian co-ops recounts the telling story of Celcoop, a secondary co-op set 
up by one of the consorzi to provide computing and administrative services to co-ops and 
extema1 customers. The vice-president and director said that "Ce1coop would work for 
anyone, and in response to a direct question smugly assured us that they would be 
delighted to receive work from the defence industry"34. 
Experience shows quite clearly that the nature of specific industries has a crudal bearing on 
the fortunes of co-ops. There appears to be little appreciation of this in Britain, where co-ops 
13 "',1916; £AG, 1983. 
31 B*IcIq, 1986". II. 
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have been established across a wide range of industries, with little regard to the causes of 
poor performance and low chances of survival and hence the factors which need to be 
addressed if co-ops are to survive. Much attention has been devoted to the internal 
organisation of co-ops - which is of course important - but little to the economic 
environment, to co-ops external economic relations, and the likely impact of these. Whilst 
there may well be a need to establish co-ops in the clothing industry - given its decline, 
unemployment and poor working conditions - there is only any hope of co-ops in the 
industry improving on this over the long term if serious attention is paid to the causes of 
high failure rates, poor wages and working conditions in small firms generally in the 
industry; otherwise co-ops will simply reproduce these and fail to improve workers' 
conditions. Identifying the conditions which favour co-ops does not mean that they should 
be established only where the market provides these conditions; it also identifies the 
constraints on co-op operation which need to be addressed if co-ops are to be established 
successfully where these conditions do not exist. 
All of this assumes a particular perspective on the role of co-ops: that they should contribute 
to an improvement in working conditions and ultimately contribute to a socialist 
transformation of the capitalist economy. This is not shared by all of those supporting 
co-ops, and the strategies adopted to aid co-op development depend upon the underlying 
objectives. The next chapter reviews different perspectives on the role which co-ops are, or 
can be, playing, and the measures taken to support them. 
FmtTHEIl CONTllASTS: LABOtJIl PIlOCESS " TECHNOLOCY 
There are other factors which contribute towards the vast differences between printing and 
clothing co-ops, and in order to appreciate these it is necessary to consider the historical 
development of the indUStry - in particular of capital-labour relations - and the present state 
of both social and technical relations within each industry. 
The position of workers in the printing industry as a whole has had a major impact on 
printing co-ops; in particular four factors-
• workers in the printing industry have a long tradition of collective organisation and 
politidsationi 
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• they have retained a high degree of control over the production process, including 
wages, recruibnent and the organisation of work; 
• printing work remains highly skilled and predominantly male, with high wages and 
secure conditions; 
• current economic restructuring has been used by capital to mount an intensive attack 
on the above. 
Co-ops have previously appeared as part of printing workers' fight to resist capital, and in 
the current co-op boom many printing co-ops have attempted to re-organise work along less 
hierarchical lines. Thus job rotation and skill-sharing is widespread, even though this has a 
high commercial cost given the relatively highly skilled nature of much printing work. 
There is also a strong commitment - in some co-ops at least - to undermining the male near-
monopoly of skilled work by introducing women into traditionally male jobs and changing 
the attitudes of print unions from within. In tenns of their economic position, printing 
workers have used that same strength to secure high wages and favourable conditions, 
although of course there has always been a non-union or 'rat trade' sector where these are 
undermined. Because wages in printing firms competing with co-ops have been high, 
co-ops have not been forced to pay low wages (in absolute terms) even if they have been 
commerdally weaker. In addition this has given co-ops some Qimited) economic flexibility 
to pursue restructuring in production, despite costs in terms of commercial perfonnance. 
The position of workers in clothing manufacture offers a contrast: 
• production work is predoQUnantly carried out by women; 
• production is generally widely dispersed in small manufacturing units, and includes 
homeworking; 
• workers have never been extensively organised, and despite much work being skilled, 
wages remain low, conditions poor, and employment insecure. 
The use of women workers by capitalists has generally been highly effective in preventing 
collective organisation, as workers could always be easily sacked and replaced. This does 
not mean of course that women workers in the clothing industry are docile in the face of 
oppression - far from it, as the examples of the Fakenham workers and those at Lee Jeans in 
Greenock make clear. However it does mean that working conditions and wages have 
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remained poor. Thus co-ops have been constrained in the extent to which they could pursue 
alternative strategies which had a cost in terms of commercial performance, simply because 
to do so would reduce wages in an industry where they are anyway notoriously low. 
The poSition in wholefood distribution is different again. The industry is relatively labour 
intensive with an undifferentiated slcill structure. Therefore it has been relatively easy for 
wholefood co-ops to introduce and experiment with more egalitarian forms of the division 
of labour; rotating workers between different skills and jobs has less of a commercial cost 
when the majority of work is relatively unskilled manual work. The large wholefood 
wholesalers have had to modify this policy as some administrative tasks have become more 
specialised (such as accounting and purchasing), but a commitment remains. This policy 
has been facilitated by relatively favourable market conditions. 
The relationship between co-ops, technology and the labour process is an important but 
complex one. It affects the industries in which co-ops operate, their development, and the 
ease with which a specifically co-operative structure can be maintained. Co-ops do tend to 
be concentrated in labour-intensive indusbies, reflecting both attempts by workers to 
preserve skilled, craft based production in the face of implementation of deslcilling 
technology, and the severe problems faced by co-ops in obtaining finance. Given the 
financing constraint, co-ops would tend to survive longer in industries characterised by 
labour-intensive, small scale production, where co-ops would not be at too much of a 
competitive disadvantage. In this context it is instructive to note that at Mondragon, where 
co-ops probably face less of a financing constraint than anywhere else in western Europe, 
co-ops do operate in relatively capital intensive, manufacturing industry. 
Whilst a shortage of finance is important, it is not something engraved in tablets of stone, 
but reflects the economic and political environment which face co-ops, and it also important 
to consider other issues involved in the nature of production and their impact on co-ops. 
Co-operative production is not simply about obtaining suffident finance to mimic capitalist 
production, it is also about changing the nature of work, the organisation of production and 
relationships between workers, and this is closely related to the predominant form of the 
labour process in various indusbies. The way in which the capitalist labour process clashes 
with the ideals of co-operative production will vary enormously, and various writers have 
attempted to identify the conditions under which co-ops would prosper. And the findings 
of this research suggest that it is not just a question of how labour-intensive an industry is: 
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printing is more capital-intensive than clothing manufacture, and yet co-ops in printing 
have been relatively more successful. 
The relationship between co-ops and technology has been explored by Robinson35, who -
abstracting from financing problems - concludes that co-ops are suited to skill-intensive, as 
distinct from labour-intensive, production. Following Cooley36, he distinguishes skill-
intensive activities, where technology amplifies human skills, abilities and judgements, and 
machine-intensive ones where human skills and judgements are replaced and the overall 
effect is one of deskilling. The former encourages active partidpation by workers in their 
tasks, and is based around decentralised decision-making which is in the capability of 
individual workers. Nor is there likely to be a detailed division of labour in skill intensive 
production, all features which complement co-operative organisation. By contrast, jobs that 
are deskilled and robotised do not prepare people for participation, and furthermore, 
machine-centered production requires centralised control. 
From this perspective co-ops are doubly disadvantaged in capital-intensive, mass 
production industries, restricted by lack of finance and an inappropriate labour process. 
However, they may be more appropriate to emerging areas of economic activity. It has been 
noted that companies operating in advanced technology areas demonstrate some 
characteristics similar to co-operatives, often starting as small-scale partnerships, and an 
increasing number of co-ops are active in computer-based research and consultancy 
activities. In such areas the co-operative form may not be a major commercial disadvantage 
nor prove difficult to sustain. The relationship between technology, the labour process and 
the development of co-operatives is an area which requires more detailed research, but this 
is clearly an important issue regarding the fortunes of co-operatives in various industries. 
71re role of value added measura in as.eI.ing performana 
Analysis of the commercial performance of worker co-operatives has been based upon the 
use of value added measures, developed in chapter 7. These measures have served a useful 
purpose, but many problems remain associated with their use, which in turn reflect the 
contradictory position of co-operatives themselves. 
35 RDI1 .... , 1986. 
36 CDoIq, 1980. 
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The main difficulty is concentrating on the commercial performance of enterprises which 
clearly have prominent social objectives. These social objectives will tend to have 
commercial costs, but the positive impact of their achievement will not be taken account of, 
and as we have seen, co-op performance in commercial terms does tend to be worse than 
that of capitalist firms. Examples of these other objectives are a particular pricing policy, 
adopting a division of labour or technology which is not value-added maximising, and are 
illustrated in the following example desaibing the work of a printing co-operative, Calverts 
North Star Press: 
At present we are earning £?O for a 35 hour week or £85 for 42 hours, but are 
aiming for the average industrial wage in the short term. All workers earn 
equal wages. Some of our potential earnings (maybe £15 a week each) goes 
towards subsidies on jobs whose publishers have no printing budgets 
e.g.community groups, campaigning organisations, etc. We operate three price 
scales depending on the size and financial poSition of the customer.37 
Such achievements will escape value added measures and these objectives will be relegated 
in importance. Although adequate financial performance is a constraint, can it be elevated 
to the sole criteria of success? 
This question is indicative of a wider problem - that of assessing achievements which are 
not quantifiable in monetary terms, many of which are felt outside of the co-operative itself. 
How do we take account of the benefits to consumers of socially useful products (more 
exercise and less pollution from bicycles, better health from wholefoods), which would not 
necessarily be provided on the basis of profit rather than need. Indeed,.one could argue that 
as the existing economic system acts to exploit and oppress the vast majority of people, then 
any co-operative activity which rejects existing reactionary practices is advantageous and 
socially desirable. 
There may be no way out of this contradiction whilst co-ops are essentially left to compete 
in the market; it is ultimately on the basis of their commercial performance that survival 
depends, and so concentration on this is vaUd. But if co-ops were to be supported for other 
reasons, and in some way sheltered from competition, then some assessment of whether 
those other objectives were being met would be required. To what extent are co-ops 
achieving other objectives, and how can this be assessed? If the state Oocal or national) 
37 CDc.".". " 11%980, ". 74. 
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wishes to support co-ops and reinforce their progressive potential, on what basis could the 
success or otherwise of such strategies be evaluated? 
One conventional response is the cost-benefit approach of the social audit. This attempts to 
put a monetary valuation on 'externalities', including wider costs and benefits in a 
calculation. This approach has been adopted in different circumstances38 in attempts to 
quantify the wider impact of decisions taken by nationalised industries, and fonned the 
basis of part of the opposition to the 'uneconomic pits' argument during the 1984/85 
miners' strikel9. A similar exercise could be undertaken by a government interested in the 
macroeconomic impact of co-operative development as an employment creation strategy. 
The shadow cost of investment in co-operatives would then be much less than the monetary 
cost, reflecting the relatively low net cost to the state of pubUcly funded employment 
creation. 
For many, however, co-operatives are part of a wider strategy of restructuring the economy 
in favour of labour, rather than simply employment creation. Generally the 'social benefits' 
involved cannot be valued in a monetary way; elsewhere we have made efforts to develop 
the concept of'social returns' to social investments, as an analogy to finandal returns to 
finandal investments40, in a way which could perhaps be used by organisations 
undertaking investments in co-ops (or elsewhere> on the basis of social rather than 
commerdal criteria. Ideally this would strengthen the investing authority in the same way 
that finandal returns are accumulated by commerdal investon. However, the concept 
remains underdeveloped, and "there is a worrying tendency for this new policy mechanism 
to assume the status of a 'radical administrative fix' for a very large problem indeed"41. 
CONCLUDING IlEMAllJ(S 
Throughout Europe there are many facton contributing to the experience of co-ops, which 
can be identified as being due to the different contingent conditions in which co-ops 
operate. These include relations between the labour movement and and co-ops • 
particularly important in Italy; cultural factors, which have frequently been dted as 
important in the development of Mondragon; but most important has been the nature of 
J8 RtIrDIIItmc II1fII Wn 1979, NDfII197S; HIII1. & 0Iwft, 1917 
39 •• g. GIyft, 7984, hi .. O'D",uwll, 79IM /fir. cril". 
40 .. ,.,.,. & RDImuarIl986. 
41 GIdila,1911. 
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state (both central and local) policies towards co-ops, through the provision of a legal 
framework, tax regulations, and intervention in product and finance markets. Various 
different policy implications can be drawn from this. Firstly, if the objective is to promote 
co-ops in the small firms mould, an intensification of competitive pressures would inhibit 
their pursuit of objectives which conflict with commercial survival. SecOndly, for co-ops to 
develop as alternatives to capitalist enterprises, rather than replicating them, there are two 
options. One is to adapt the character of the co-op sector so as to match it more closely to the 
requirements of the economy; one aspect of this would be to promote the establishment of 
co-ops only in industries and markets where conditions for co-op survival are favourable -
in the context of the sectors studied here, that would mean not promoting co-ops in the 
clothing industry. Alternatively, aspects of the system which constrain co-ops can be 
confronted and attempts made to change them; at the very least this includes policies of 
intervention on behalf of co-ops in markets for finance capital, but also includes 
intervention in product markets. In the next chapter I examine the nature of policies from 
competing economic and political perspectives towards the role of co-operatives. 
12. Worker co-ops: policies and prospects 
CO-OPS AND CAPITALISM 
The final issue to be addressed concerns the extent to which co-ops have contributed, and 
can potentially contribute, to a transformation of capitalism, in the light of the experience of 
co-ops in Britain. From their earliest days co-ops have been supported because they were 
perceived as having the potential to improve the position of workers; this support has come 
from both liberals and socialists, although there are major differences in their respective 
conceptions of capitalism and of workers' position within it. In this chapter I move from the 
commercial performance of co-ops to a consideration of their wider impact and role in the 
economy, and examine the extent to which they may advance the political economy of 
labour. 
Co-operatives appear to strike at the basis of capitalism, the division between those who 
own the means of production and those who have only their labour power to sell to these 
owners. This division is removed in co-ops and the basis of ownership changed; as worker-
owned enterprises they can be seen as potentially system-transformatory. Certainly the very 
structure of co-ops confronts the established capitalist fonn of ownership and control, but 
the outcome of this confrontation is uncertain. Capitalism contains the seeds of its own 
destruction; the question is whether co-ops are, or can be, part of this process, or whether in 
practice they strengthen capitaliSm. 
Much support for co-ops as a means of confronting capitalism has been on the basis of their 
potential contribution to a gradual process of transformation of society, as an alternative to 
a sudden revolutionary seizure of power by the working class. This approach was taken by 
19th century utopian socialists such as Owen and Neale, idealists who thought that the 
world could be changed simply through the power of logic, argument and example1. They 
lacked both a developed conception of capitalism as an economic system and a political 
strategy, and outside of a few isolated experiments their ideas never took hold. In recent 
years their approach has been taken up by Oakeshott and Campbe1l2• Although they have 
campaigned vigorously for co-operatives, their models do not stem from the articulated 
1 MDrltnJ.1976. 
2 o.JraItDlt, 1978; CiJrrqIHll, 1987. 
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needs of the working class, and tend to attract support mostly from capitalists. However, 
there are similarities with current elements of Labour Party strategy, including that of some 
local authorities. For these advocates, the outcome of an extension of worker co-op activity 
(or perhaps other forms of social or worker ownership) is seen as the gradual emergence of 
a 'post-capitalist' society, by refonn, which avoids the problems of centraIised state 
sodalism as experienced in eastern europe. While there is widespread support for the 
objective of democratic worker control in the economy, the proposed strategies or process 
by which the objective is to be achieved is generally based upon dubious analytical 
foundations. 
Frequently this refonnist approach is derived from a concentration on ownership relations, 
which are equated with production relations; if the former are changed then so are the 
relations of production, and other desired changes can follow gradually. Essentially this 
identifies socialism with making workers the 'owners' of capital, and is embodied in the 
frequently-used slogan that in co-ops "labour hires capital rather than capital hiring labour". 
This views 'capital' as a physical object, and in this sense of course workers would own (or 
hire) capital under socialism. 
However it is impossible to gain an understanding of capitalism (or sodalism) by viewing 
capital in physical terms. In Marx's analysis of capitalism: 
Capital is itself a social relation: specifically it is the social relation involved in 
the self-expansion of value, the production, appropriation and accumulation of 
surplus value. Capital, being self-expanding value, is essentially a process, the 
process of reprodudng value and producing new value. In other words, capital 
is value in the process of reproducing itself as capital and, being a process, it is 
in a state of motion. The circuit of capital describes this motion and it 
highlights the fact that capital takes different forms in its circuit or 
reproduction process. The social relation which is capital successively assumes 
and relinquishes as clothing the forms of money, productive capital and 
commodities.3 
To view capital in physical terms is therefore to mistake its appearance for its underlying 
form'. Once capital is viewed as a process or a social relation then our conception of 
capitalism, socialism, and co-ops' role in the transformation between them, is changed. 
3 Pfrw 81 &rriI, 2'1',,,,. 3-4 
4 -Ectmom"" lIN D/tItt .trvd IPitIt ,..iw IIIltmillmtMl ' ..... ., tJtq ".. Jutl IllDugltt to "..,. .". willi "., 
tliffil:vlty III. tJtl", IIUIMnIy .",." III. _fill rrlMiDrt .,." tIwrt "."..,. to ,.., tIwrrt ., ... III • Ill;"" "."", tJwy ".. 
",",y"""''''' to."". II 1II.1DCitIl "''''''. -lJ. Rubi", EtMyI 011 Mmt'. T1IM1ry of VIII.,., 8l11dc _ W, Dftroit, 
1'12".2', tplDti1I, from MIr.r'. A COIItn'bul"" to 1M Crilu,w of Political Eanumry, aum .. M.Xm' 81 Co., adCII"" 
1901, ,. 31. 'l'7I4mb to Pfrw agIO). 
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Firstly, capital as a social relation is historically specific to capitalism, and thus would not 
exist in sodalism. Some of its physical forms will exist; production will take place and hence 
means of production will be required, but capital as a social relation is incompatible with 
socialism. Secondly, the class relations of production extend beyond ownership relations, 
and are integrated with the processes and relations of distribution and exchange. Thus 
changed ownership relations in production must confront markets and the continued 
existence of commodity relations, and cannot be considered in isolation from these. Thirdly, 
although co-ops do confront and transform capitalist ownership relations, their role 
depends on more than these changed ownership relations; it is not just the relationship of 
co-op workers to the physical means of production which is important but their relationship 
to the process of capital accumulation. 
Because the relationship between workers and capital is a social relation and not simply an 
ownership relation, it extends beyond the enterprise itself. Focusing solely on the changed 
ownership relation in co-ops omits consideration of the wider scope of social relations, that 
is, the double nature of labour's subordination to capital, both 'within the enterprise and 
through the nature of value production and expropriation in the economy as a whole'S. 
Analysis of the impact of co-ops must focus on both changed relations within the enterprise 
and within the economy. 
To what extent can co-ops contribute to advandng the interests of workers? It is necessary 
to point out that this question does not relate to the conception of workers as a group 
involved in the production process, but to workers as a class. Advancing the interests of 
workers means, then, not just improving the position of workers within any co-op or co-ops, 
but improving the position of workers or labour as a class in society as a whole. It is 
certainly possible for co-ops to improve the position of workers in the enterprise (although 
even this is not assured) but much less clear-cut at the level of the economy. Oearly co-ops 
start by transforming ownership relations, but the task is to analyse what their real 
significance and potential can be in the context of their wider relationship with capital. 
What contribution do Uley make to transforming the social division of labour or the political 
economy of class struggle embedded within the system of relations? In concrete terms, what 
role are co-ops playing in the current process of restructuring and how do they contribute to 
the conflicting clasa interests of capital and workers? 
5 HaIortIt 8J .""." 1984, p. 313. 
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There is a parallel here with the experience of nationalisation, which has shown that 'social 
ownership' does not necessarily transform a capitalist economy, and can in fact serve 
capital's interests. In this case, social ownership was not supported by the necessary 
political and economic changes. Certainly co-ops face the same danger as any reformist 
strategy: if they should come to constitute a real threat to capital then repressive forces 
would be mobilised to eradicate them or neutralise any threat through incorporating them. 
This is not the same as saying that capital's strategy would inevitably succeed, but the 
pressures upon co-ops would become intense. In fact there have been continuous attempts 
to incorporate co-ops and blunt their transformatory (i.e. revolutionary) potential, and 
particularly during the current process of capital-oriented restructuring. In the rest of this 
chapter I examine how capital has attempted to achieve this, the nature and adequacy of the 
left's response. 
1"",= of PDlitical and EctnUmJic Emrirtnmf6JJt 
The experience of co-ops in Britain and elsewhere shows that the extent of their 
development and the form which they take is fundamentally influenced by the nature of the 
economic, social and political environment in which they operate. Chapter 5 detailed the 
emergence and massive growth of Britain's co-op sector over the last decade in relationship 
to material changes in the economy, in particular the economic crisis since the early 19708 
and subsequent extensive restructuring. The growth of co-ops was specifically related to the 
changed role of small firms in the economy, renewed attempts to undermine the labour 
movement, disillusionment on the left with the experience of nationalisation, and the 
emergence of local authorities as the main power base of the Labour Party in the face of 
Tory control of central government. Similarly, studies of individual co-op sectors have 
traced the influence of economic changes on the development of co-ops within each 
industry. 
This is not widely appreciated within the co-op movement, or by those associated with it, 
where the autonomy of co-ops and the movement is considered paramount. Co-ops can 
represent an attempt by workers to gain control of their labour to fulfill their own needs and 
interests. Hence the widespread preference for "bottom-up" development, where co-ops 
emerge as grassroots initiatives, rather than being imposed on people in a "top-down" 
fashion from outside. This has been a crucial element in the resurgence of new co-ops, 
which have mainly been 'new starts' by groups of unemployed workers. However, this 
Worker co-ops: policies and prospects 409 
view can lead to an over-emphasis on the autonomy of co-op workers' decisions, neglecting 
the impact which economic events have on them. Their formation is a response to Specific 
economic circumstances - it is only due to the economic aisis that the workers are 
unemployed in the first place - but more important is the impact of the economy on co-ops 
once they have started trading. They are crucially affected by the nature and strength of 
competition from other firms, by their own attempts to pursue objectives counter to 
profitability, and by the availability of financial support, market protection and training, to 
counter their economic weakness. 
The experience of workers at Lucas Aerospace provides a parallel with the more recent 
co-op growth and illustrates these limitations6. The development of the Lucas Alternative 
Plan was an attempt by workers to gain more control over their jobs, over both the nature of 
their work and the products made. Threatened with closures and redundandes in factories 
manufacturing defence eqUipment, the workers drew up detailed plans for the manufacture 
of socially useful products for which a need had been identified - including kidney 
machines and other medical equipment, transport equipment and alternative technologies. 
In the end the plan failed in this immediate objective, although it did act as a great 
inspiration to many workers in Britain and elsewhere. But the failure was not due to 
shortcomings on the part of the workers; on the contrary, they demonstrated skills and 
abilities which were not usually called upon in their work. The Plan failed because of the 
way the economy was (is) organised: the economy requires firms to make profits, and this 
determines what is produced. Unless the state would agree to create a market for socially 
useful products, then Lucas could not sell them at a profit. And it is not as if requiring the 
state to provide a market was a radical departure from existing practice: the majority of 
Lucas Aerospace's products were defence related, purchased by the British or foreign 
governments (and hardly socially useful). 
Similarly, the ability of co-op workers to take autonomous decisions cannot be divorced 
from the social relations of capitalism which surround them. Decisions about products, 
pricing, growth, wages, employment levels, investment and the nature of work cannot be 
isolated from the competitive process of which they are a part. Although co-ops do reflect 
initiatives by workers and have the potential for extending worlcer control - by their very 
nature - their character and prospects largely result from the impact of extema1 influences. 
6 W.inwrlgllt 81 Elliott, 19B2; Open Urtiomily, 1982 (Unh 6). 
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The nature and effect of these can vary; competition tends to accentuate economic weaknesS 
and inhibit attempts to transform the labour process, but other social and economic forces 
can support attempts to extend worker control. Throughout their existence C<H>PS have 
been subject to the contradictory forces of workers attempts to strengthen their role both in 
C<H>PS and as a class, and capital's attempts to either to destroy C<H>PS or manipulate them 
so as to weaken, rather than strengthen, workers. The following section will examine recent 
attempts to incorporate co-ops to serve capital's interests and blunt workers' power in them. 
UNDEJl THE INJILt1ENCE OF CAPITAL 
One apparently contradictory aspect of C<H>P growth is the extent to which these 
enterprises, with the means of production owned by their workers, have been welcomed by 
those on the economic and political right. This support indicates the confidence of capital 
that co-ops can be subordinated to the capitalist economy and incorporated within it, rather 
than offering a challenge, but this support is itself part of the process of incorporation. There 
have been attempts to draw co-ops into capital's wider strategy of undermining the labour 
movement, as the following article illustrates: 
The Government has emerged as a champion of workers' c<H>peratives, 
espedally those that would be formed round the privatised parts of the public 
sector. Local authorities and local and regional health authorities are 
examining the possible attractions of workers' ownership of hived-off services 
such as laundry, cleaning and maintenance. It is thought that such 
arrangements could defuse some political problems frequently attending such 
moves. 
Mr Norman Tebbitt, the Trade and Industry Secretary, often thought of as a 
hard-line Right winger, has given such initiatives his blessing ..... Mr Tebbitt 
said the government wished to encourage more workers' involvement and 
wider share ownership. He pointed to the National Freight Corporation and 
the Tyne and Grangemouth ship repair yards as instances where workers 
bought out publicly-owned concerns. Mr Tebbitt said he would take a 
"continuing and close interest" in efforts to promote wider share ownership 
and employee participation7• 
The same artide went on to quote Mr George Jones, head of the national Co-operative 
Development Agency, as saying that "trade union hostility to privatisation could be 
deflected by using workers' C<H>peratives". 
7 FInqndql'J'fmg15.2.84. 
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Worker co-ops offer all sorts of advantages to the right. Firstly, they are part of a more 
general trend towards wider share ownership, profit sharing, and employee partidpation in 
capitalist companies. All of these measures are designed to conceal underlying class 
relations in the economy, to promote 'worker capitalism' or a 'job-owning democracy', and 
undermine the role of trade unions in representing workers' interests. Co-ops are 
particularly suitable; because the workers are also owners, they can be promoted as 
enterprises where there are no divergent interests and trade unions are unnecessary (shades 
of Franco's Spain?). Secondly, they fit more generally into plans to restructure the economy 
in according to the needs of capital, as 
they provide a source of cheap, non-unionised 'peripheral' labour which is an 
important supplement to the 'central' workers located in the larger factories 
and offices.s 
Co-ops taking over privatised functions are doing exactly this; substituting poorer 
employment conditions for secure, well-paid and unionised jobs in municipal workforces. 
Support by capital for worker participation in ownership cannot be divorced from its 
broader aims of undermining the class power of workers. At a theoretical level, the right has 
made use of neoclassical economic theory in justifying the need for competition and free 
markets to promote effidency and equity. This is extended from product to labour markets, 
where unemployment can be presented as a market failure; if workers are unemployed - i.e. 
there is an of excess supply over demand - it is simply because the price of labour (wages) is 
too high, and is somehow prevented from falling to the rate at which the market could clear 
and involuntary unemployment would be zero. Trade unions are perceived as major 
obstacles to the free and efftdent operation of the labour market - essentially they are 
viewed as monopoUes of workers ranged against employers, and as monopolies they keep 
wages at an artifidally high level. Trade union strength prevents employers from hiring 
workers at lower wageS and as a result workers are priced out of jobs - hence they identified 
as one of the main causes of unemployment9. 
The key to solving the problem of unemployment is therefore seen as a reform of the labour 
market. One aspect is to strengthen the determination of wages by market forces - wage 
B ptlly, 29n,,,..," irt W-iCIftM, 2m. 
9 MbtfoN, 1984. 
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rises or falls should be in response to the forces of supply and demandlO. A major plank of 
this policy is an assault on the position of trade unions, including changing the perception 
of unions by workers and the public - instead of being organisations to protect workers' 
interests, they now actually hann not just workers interests - by increasing unemployment -
but also society's interests by enforcing higher than necessary wages, and by retarding 
economic growth. 
Hence one of the main strands of political and economic policy since 1979 has been an 
assault on the legal rights of workers and trade unions. At the same time, there has been 
concern that incentives are not suffident to induce different behaviour by workers. At 
present workers do not identify suffidently with their employers, and appear largely 
indifferent to the success or prosperity of the finn. If workers had an incentive to contribute 
to and identify with this success, they might behave differently, and industrial relations 
would improve. The goal is to transfonn the oppositional relationship between labour and 
capital so that workers do and feel they do share the role of a capitalist. One way of achieving 
this is to make part of employees' wages profit related. 
Some economists and politidans have proposed that part of employees' wages should be 
related to the profits of their employerll. This would produce 
the advantages traditionally associated with profit-sharing, such as a closer 
identification of an individual with the future of his [sic} company and make a 
contribution to industrial relations12• 
But the primary aim is to achieve wage flexibility, so that wages would rise or fall 
depending on the level of profits. This flexibility would, it is argued, encourage the hiring of 
workers, would lead to wage reduction rather than redundancies when profits are low, and 
make a positive contribution to bringing down unemployment. Profit-sharing can therefore 
be presented as a way of overcoming rigidities in the labour market, and relating wage 
levels more closely to the supply of and demand for labour, and to profitability. 
20 Far "",.,., ..,. CDIIJCiIt ,.. bt 1M ,.., ,., ""'"""'''' ... ". bt UNbt bulrulria, bt 1ft effort", fI'Ot«IlOfffI of tIw 
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Behind this argument, relying on the logic and neutrality of the market, is clearly the 
intention to reduce wages by a backdoor method and make them less secure. 
At the level of the individual finn, the employment effects are obtained 
through .... reducing pay per head .... [and] management must retain and even 
strengthen its right to hire and fire.13 
As long ago as 1858 Marx condemned profit-sharing as 
a special way of cheating the workers and of deducting a part of their wages in 
the more precarious form of a profit depending on the state of the business14. 
This argument has also been used by the rue, who claimed that profit-sharing schemes 
were discredited as they increased insecurity for workers15. They might have added that 
relating wages to profits undermines or eliminates the role of trade unions in collective 
bargaining. 
There is mixed evidence as to whether, in practice, profit-sharing schemes transform 
employee attitudes16. Many employees come to see them as no more or less than a bonus, 
and the whole-company basis of such schemes reduces further their impact on motivation, 
since the individual employee's efforts bear little relationship to her or his bonus. On the 
other hand though it has been reported that 
.... the Industrial Participation Association has found that profit-sharers (i.e. 
those firms with profit-sharing schemes) did significantly better during the 
eight years up to 1984; for example, their earnings per share were 12 per cent 
better and their return on capital was 33 percent better17 ..•• 
although of course the Introduction of such schemes could result from better performance, 
rather than the other way round. 
There is another side to these schemes, however, in that they may provoke worker curiosity 
about the company's financial affairs. The CBI have warned that 
as employees' stake grows, so do their expectations that they will share in 
decisions that affect them.18 
13 s.m.I BrlIfIm bt 1M Fitwtrid Tima 2$.2.85. 
14 MInx, 1858, p. 218. 
15 ruc, 1914. 
16 HIn«wUt 1I1fIl1WmMy, 1984. 
11 EiMncitJl Tima "'""1 011 E"",. OrtmmIJip, 6.4.86. 
18 CBI, 1918. 
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The arguments in favour of profit-sharing have been extended to employee share 
ownership, where workers take an ownership stake in their firm. It has many similar 
attributes to profit-sharing, in terms of incentives and rewards, but ties workers even more 
clearly into 'worker capitalism'. In fact worker share ownership is more acceptable to capital 
than profit-sharing because it maintains the sanctity of property rights. Under profit 
sharing, workers take a share of profits because of their status as workers, but this has the 
danger that "to preach that labour has the right to share in profits is to corrupt our national 
understanding of this process"19. With worker share ownership this problem does not arise, 
as the link between ownership and rewards is maintained and strengthened. In 1984, 
Treasury Secretary John Moore told a distinguished audience that 
workers who are also shareholders will correctly perceive an absolute identity 
of interest between themselves and the success of the companies for which 
they work.20 
In the case of worker share ownership, there is a distinction between schemes where shares 
are owned individually and those where ownership is collective. The former has the 
ideological function of reinforcing individualism and blurring the labour-capital 
relationship. Economically the purpose is to motivate workers to higher productivity by 
giving them an apparent stake in the capitalist system, which can remain essentially 
unchanged. There remains a purely cash nexus between workers and their company, as 
illustrated by the experience of the National Freight Corporation. The NFC was the only 
nationalised industry in the 1980s to be privatised predominantly by way of an employee 
buyout, which was followed by substantial increases in profitability and the in value of 
workers' shares. At their 1988 AGM, an overwhelming majority of the worker-shareholders 
voted to float the company on the stock exchange so that they could cash in on this value, 
despite the fact that this would almost certainly lead to eventual loss of control; for them, 
the prospect of substantial financial gain far outweighed the benefits of worker 
ownership21. 
Collective ownership of shares has been promoted as a contrast to both individual share 
ownership and social ownership through nationalisation, most notably by the Labour Party 
in Britain22. This supposedly guards against individualism and does not present individual 
2' {rom.1dIIIr 10 IIw EIrMndII TImg,..". ill HftIrWfIIllI RMrttay, 2184".306. 
20 EIrwm:ftI TflIw MWy 011 E"",.. 0rtmmIJi, 8.4.86. 
22 Eirwncfal rima 22.2.8'. 
221M {or"""" 8tycft CoulII' • .,.a 10 1Iw29'7l.J1baur Pm, Omfmttu II1fIlIlImllPOlll sub..,.,.,., SJ*CIta ill 2987/88. 
Worker co-ops: policies and prospects 415 
workers with the temptation to trade in their shares for cash. The idea has also been 
pursued in the USA where ESOPs <Employee Stock Ownership Plans) have proliferated 
rapidly since 1974. By 1986 more than 5,000 US companies had set up ESOPs23, but 85% of 
the 10m workers covered by ESOPs were in companies which were less than 15% employee-
owned, while 5% were in companies with more than 50% employee ownership24. In cases 
where the ESOP owns only a small proportion of the company's total stock, potential 
worker control is limited, and even where there is majority worker ownership any 
democratic control can be diluted by the particular relationship between workers and the 
trust which actually owns the shares. Schemes where an ESOP owns most or all of the stock 
are generally established in 'rescue' situations, where they have frequently been promoted 
as a means of undermining union resistance to redundancies and closures, and are usually 
part of a restructuring package. Many such ESOPs have subsequently led to lower 
employment, increased productivity, and reduced union influence in the restructured finn, 
and their role is clearly to secure workers' acquiescence in capital-oriented restructuring; 
their main attraction is the flexibility they allow to employers. In several well-publidsed 
ESOP rescues, the firm eventually collapsed anyway amongst heightened bitterness and 
very poor industrial relations. Even when they have stayed solvent ESOPs have also failed 
to bring much democracy to their firm; typically the banks which provide financing for 
ESOPs insist that worker representatives receive no more than a minority of a company's 
board sets until their loans have been paid off2S. However this is not always the case, and 
there are examples where unions have won significant influence over company policy as a 
quid pro quo for the restructuring involved in an ESOP deal26. Although ESOPs represent a 
capitalist initiative, US trade uniON - faced with low and declining membership - are now 
less opposed than they once were, and have accommodated them out of necessity whilst 
attempting to gain maximum advantage from them; nevertheless, workers' involvement in 
ESOPs is generally to save jobs rather than through any ideological commitment. In Britain, 
an ESOP structure is now being promoted by the trades union-sponsored bank, Unity Trust, 
although without any of the favourable tax concessions which have made them so popular 
in the USA. 
23 R....u, 1988. 
24 Sttm_ by NlallIl1nMItlIIIl, 0",. U,dvmity,20.10.86. 
25 R....u, 1988, ,.2$. 
26 ,.g. WUrllll, Pit""" SIa'. 
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In theory ESOPs and other capital sharing schemes do have the potential to advance worker 
control, and cannot automatically be dismissed as a means of transforming cIass relations 
and socialising the means of production. But in practice there are severe limits to what can 
be achieved. ESOPs in the USA have certainly managed to preserve some jobs, but at the 
cost of lower wages and an overall weakening of the power of the labour movement. As an 
employer-led initiative, ESOPs contrast with the capital-sharing schemes proposed by the 
Swedish trade union movement (LO); these have been virulently opposed by capital and 
increasingly watered down. Haworth and Ramsay conclude that 
Capital sharing does seek to advance the political economy of labour against 
that of capital .... but on balance it does not seem to us likely to challenge 
fundamentally capitalist relations and more probably it will promote the status 
quo through that juridicial deception, the collective 'worker capitalist'27 
As with co-ops, worker shareholding does start to transfonn labour's subordinated 
relationship to capital in the enterprise, albeit in varying degrees. But the challenge to 
labours' subordination to capital in the economy as a whole is much less clear cut. 
There is of course a contrast between worker co-ops and worker share ownership - the basis 
of ownership and control. In co-ops, the right to participate derives from status as workers; 
those who contribute labour have formal control, on an equal basis. In the case of employee 
shareholdings - either in combination with external capitalists2B, or in an employee 
buyout29, the basis of control remains financial. It is not employees' status as workers per se 
which entitles them to control, but their status as shareholders, and moreover control is 
unequally distributed, depending on the number of shares owned. Whilst all of these 
initiatives reinforce the link between ownership and control, between property rights, 
incentives and rewards - in itself a part of capital's ideology - at least in co-operatives 
ownership is on the basis of labour rather than capital. As a result, co-ops do present more 
of a challenge to very basis of capitalism, although this may be more fonnal than real. 
Nevertheless, it is real to Mrs Thatcher, whose support for co-ops is distinctly lukewarm 
because apparently "she thinks its a step down the road to workers' Soviets"30 
The extreme case of labour in worker-owned enterprises being subordinated to capital on a 
soda! scale has been raised by Cowling: 
271984, ". SU,317.s. 
2B a .,.,..,.,.., ill ,.,., ~ lie" rDiIII fa QJftCfllirml. 
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.. by converting from indusbial to finance capital, capitalists could avoid the 
increasing conflict in the process of production and retire into a position of 
supplying capital at anns length to worker controlled enterprises. Workers 
would be left to resolve the problems of production and would compete 
amongst themselves, that is, among wor1cer-controlled enterprises, for 
capitalist funds31. 
This is essentially the structure advocated by Peter Jay as a remedy for the contradictions 
inherent in an advanced capitalist economy32. The mechanism by which co-ops are kept in 
check - and would remain so in the above scenario - is the need to compete and survive in 
the market. The importance of this is illustrated in the following speech from Conservative 
spokesman Kenneth Oarke: 
No one on this side of the house had anything at all in principle against the 
idea of workers' co-operatives. Properly managed they seem to me and many 
of my Right Honorable friends to be an attractive idea. We are principally in 
favour of them so long as the workers who own the industry raise capital on 
the market and aim to produce a proper return on the capital, and so long as 
they are subject to the same disciplines as anyone else running an industry. Most 
important of all we are certainly in favour of workers co-operatives as long as 
they can be viable without continued support from public funds. (House of 
Commons 22.3.77) (italics added). 
and the same point was made again the following year: 
The Conservative Party is favourably disposed towards worker co~peratives 
or wor1cer-owned enterprises so long as they operate in the market on the same 
terms as their competitors (6.4.88). 
Thus capital would rely upon market forces to keep co-operatives in check, although there 
remains the possibility that co-ops may deviously attempt to avoid replicating capitalist 
practices; therefore Kenneth Oark continued, in his 1977 speech above, to urge the Triumph 
Meriden co-operative to end their flat rate pay system in the name of 'realism'. 
There has been very little direct intervention by the right in support of co-ops, as would be 
expected from a government proclaiming faith in market forces. One exception has been 
continued funding for the national COA. This runs counter to the general policy of reducing 
expenditure on 'quangos', but the national CDA does promote co-ops with a 'small 
business' outlook. This is despite the COA's close linb with the Co-operative Union and the 
consumer co-operative movement, which itself has close historical and present day links 
with the trade union movement. 
31 CoIIIliftg, 1982, p. 214. 
32111Y,l1BO. 
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Market Force, and Inten1ention 
Although there has been little central state intervention since 1979 around co-ops, it does 
not follow that co-ops have been unaffected by state activity. The period since 1979 has seen 
both a strengthening of the operation of market forces, and extensive state intervention in 
the economy, which has had an impact on co-ops. 
An essential element of government policy since 1979 has been the reassertion of market 
relations in the economy and an apparent return to laissez faire capitalism. The market is 
usually interpreted as the process by which decisions concerning what and how much is 
produced and consumed, and by whom, are reconciled by the price mechanis:rn33. This is 
contrasted by direct government involvement in these decisions. 
However, this is a particular interpretation of the market process, and reflects the primacy 
afforded to exchange in bourgeois economic theory. The process of exchange, and the 
conditions under which it takes place, is part of the wider process of capital accumulation. If 
we start with production, then within a capitalist economy the form of exchange emerges as 
a consequence of the requirements of accumulation. Therefore, an extension of market 
relations in exchange can be associated with extensive state intervention in the economy as a 
whole. This may seem paradoxical, but the key to understanding is not to focus upon the 
market itself but on the restructuring process of which the extension of market relations are 
a part. Once the crucial process is seen not as an extension of market relations per se but a 
process of a restructuring of the conditions under which capital accumulation takes place, 
then the role of government intervention becomes clearer. 
Polanyi notes that even in the heyday of laissez-faire capitalism in Victorian Britain, the 
extension of the market was very much an act of the state itself. 
Then, as now, state intervention is necessary to restrain the impact of 
unfettered market relations, for instance, through legislation to ensure public 
health, institute social insurance and regulate trade. Not only to provide social 
cohesion but also to promote the smooth working of the market itself, the state 
had to protect, regulate, subsidise, standardise and intervene.34• 
Restructuring has had two main objectives around the ultimate aim of creating conditions 
where profitable accumulation can take place: firstly, the removal of unprofitable capitals, 
ll ..• .g • ." I!JI, 1981". U . 
.u PolIInyI,1951. 
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through their exposure to competition, so as to improve the rate of profit for those 
remaining; secondly, the weakening of labour to give capital more power in determining 
the conditions under which production and accumulation take place. These objectives have 
required substantial state intervention since 1979, of which the main measures have been3S: 
• monetarist economic policy 
• Public sector cuts and privatisation 
• Internationalisation of the economy 
• Removal of workers legal rights 
These contrast with the predominant form of state intervention over the post-war period, 
which was largely oriented towards Keynesian demand management. Although a 
strengthening of market relations taken on its own indicates less state intervention, a 
significant degree of intervention is required to bring about the changes on which this 
strengthening is dependent. These may not be overtly economic, but frequently involve 
legal changes which have major economic implications - such as those relating to the legal 
(and hence economic and political) power of trades unions. Furthermore, changes must in 
any case be viewed as part of a whole set of economic polides, in which state intervention 
plays a major part. The large number of major (and usually controversial) pieces of 
legislation which parliament has dealt with since 1979 is evidence of this. 
According to neoclassical economic theory, the market mechanism is the most effident 
means of allocating society's resources. Effidency is defined relative to consumption - the 
tastes, preferences and endowments of individual economic agents - and is biased towards 
the maintenance of the stlltus quo through the use of the Pareto-optimum criteria. This 
provides a useful basis for propaganda around the need to strengthen the market and 
competition. Focusing attention on the market has a useful ideological function; it 
concentrates on the position of people as consumers, as individual agents forming the basis 
of sodety, rather than on their role as producers having collective, class interests. 
The economic function of market forces within capitalism has varied, and the lIIisstz /rdre 
principle has been readily saaificed if accumulation would not be served by it. Thus when 
British Telecom was privatised, the need for a strong monopolistic telecommunications 
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company which could hold its own in international markets was considered more 
important than opening up the domestic market to more competition36• The market 
mechanism provides one means of weeding out unprofitable capitals, a process generally in 
the interests of capital as a whole, but which is particularly necessary during economic 
crisis. At certain times the opposite policy may serve capital's interests. One example is the 
extensive nationalisations of the post-war period; if the logic of the market had been 
allowed to work through to its conclusion, large parts of these industries would have closed 
down when profitable accumulation could no longer be supported. Although ideological 
motives facilitated the carrying out of such nationalisations, their primary function has been 
the prevention of bankruptcies in essential industries which would have harmed capital as a 
whole; once the industries had been nationalised they operated largely as if subject to 
market criteria, and are now being returned to the private sector. The degree to which the 
market has been allowed to operate has essentially depended upon the requirements of 
accumulation. 
The controversial issues surrounding state intervention, market forces and the prospects for 
co-ops are well illustrated in the case of local authority service provision. Recent 
government policy has included legislation to limit the power of local authorities to provide 
certain services without having first engaged in 'competitive tendering'. Under the 1988 
Local Government Act, local authorities are obliged to put out to tender a wide range of 
services including refuse collection, catering and vehicle maintenance; any 'in house' 
prOvision of these services will be subject to competing bids from private contractors. This is 
a move to ensure the private sector provision of such services, rather than the cheapest 
provision~ It has to take place regardless of the previous level of service provision, and the 
government retains the power to force local authorities to engage private contractors, even 
if an 'in house' bid is the most competitive. 
This offer. the potential for workers' co-ops to take over some of these functions. After all, 
in several European countries co-ops have flourished through securing local authority 
work. Could the same happen here - is this an opportunity for workers to put control over 
services in their hands by forming co-ops to bid for contracts? Some CDAs have already 
started encouraging co-ops do exactly this, attracted by the argument that democratic 
control is preferable to exploitation by a capitalist contractor, that this is an opportunity to 
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demonstrate that worker~ntroUed businesses can deliver the goods with a social 
conscience. 
The reality would be very different. For gains to be made on the scale of those achieved by 
co-ops Italy and France, councils would need to provide preferential treatment for co-ops, 
but this will clearly be disallowed by the banning of conditions placed in contracts based 
upon 'non~mmerdal' criteria. In the absence of this, the prospects for workers in such 
co-ops are grim. The Treasury concluded that "Most of the savings from contracting out 
arise because of poorer conditions of employment .... they eliminate bonus schemes and 
overtime working, provide little if any sick pay, and avoid national insurance payments by 
means of more part-time working"37. The main contractors in the area are two 
multinationals - Hawley and BET - who have scant regard for wages and conditions in the 
pursuit of profit. Given the outlawing of non~mmerdal criteria, co-ops would have no 
choice but to compete with these companies on the same terms, with co-ops' lack of finance 
exacerbating the problem of poor wages and working conditions. Co-ops - or indeed any 
small enterprise - would be able to compete only on the basis of intense exploitation of 
labour38. Any aspirations that co-ops could provide more satisfying and democratically-
controlled work would be rapidly crushed; "co-op jobs gained through competitive 
tendering would be firmly controlled by the market which is not open to negotiation"39. 
Co-ops workers would also be highly vulnerable, as it is anticipated that "some workers 
might choose redundancy and use the money coming to them to set up in business"40, 
money which would of course be lost if the venture proved unable to compete. A perfect 
solution for capital: not only is the cost employing these workers, and hence of providing 
essential services, reduced, but capital is also rid of the problems of managing the labour 
process and dealing with worker resistance. To cap it all, potential costs to capital through 
the provision of finance are offset by the use of workers' own savings; capital then receives 
all of the benefits (through lower costs and higher profits) and bears none of the risks -
clearly a case of having one's cake and eating it. For workers on the other hand, wages 
would be both lower and less secure. 
37 HM. Trwaury 2916, .. " D. 
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The promotion of co-ops in this area not only fails to provide well-paid jobs in a favourable 
working environment, but undermines other workers' struggles; CDAs involved in this 
must be quite clear about whose interests they are serving. On both a propaganda level and 
an economic level, the readiness of workers' co-ops to take over privatised functions 
undermines workers' campaigns to maintain in-house provision. If competitive tendering 
cannot be avoided, then workers' struggles are much more effectively served by using 
traditional trade union organisation and collective action to defend pay and conditions in 
large private sector employers, than by dividing workers amongst small co-operatives 
where their preoccupation is competing with other workers and coping with the harsh 
truths of commercial survival. 
I shall return to the issue of the market relations and their significance for co-ops later. At 
this point, the important point is that an extension of market relations does not mean that 
state intervention is absent, but that its form has changed. 
OPPOSING CAPITAL? LOCAL AtTTHORITY St1PPORT FOR CO-OPS 
Intervention by the state to strengthen market forces will have a negative impact on co-ops; 
those which are subject to the most intense competitive pressures are commercially weak, 
and highly constrained in pursuing worker-oriented perspectives. In these circumstances 
~ 
co-ops would closely replicate small firms, including their instability and poor working 
conditions, and will find the pursuit of non~apitalist objectives more difficult4l. 
The relationship between the co-op sector and the state is therefore a crucial issue. Although 
there is a tendency to reject the idea of state intervention whilst valuing co-ops' autonomy, 
this ultimately leaves the sector vulnerable to adverse state policies. Rather than rejecting 
the notion of intervention altogether, the need is to influence the form of intervention in 
favour of co-ops. 
What then are the conditions which would strengthen the co-op sector in its confrontation 
with capitalism, rather than anowing co-ops to be subsumed within it? There are three 
aspects to this task: firstly, to reduce their economic weakness and ensure they can pay 
going wage rates etc.; secondly, to support the transformation of the labour process within 
42 171m " , "..",.nIl willi IItt ~ of indUing sor:Wtia, wltidJ ..,. ,.,.,UWtI 1111fI1IltIM IDCwtia, amttolW by tMi, 
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CO-OpS; and thirdly, to strengthen co-ops as part of the collective advance of the working 
class. As a contrast to the capital-oriented policies implemented by central government 
since 1979, we can tum to the policies adopted by various local authorities and examine 
whether they provide a contrast in terms of the development of co-operatives. 
Intervention to promote capital-orientated restructuring has not taken place unopposed in 
Britain, and at local level there have been economic policies introduced to counter the worst 
effects of central government policies. Many Labour-controlled local authorities adopted 
economic policies over this period in which co-operatives have a specific role, and which 
contrasted with the approach of the right towards co-ops42. Although a range of different 
policies were adopted, they centered on the (contradictory) policy of 'restructuring for 
labour by investment in capital', although in the more straightened circumstances since 
1986 the more radical objectives of certain authorities have given way to a 'new realist' 
consensus of a more conventionally social-democratic nature on the role of the local state in • 
relation to the market43. 
Nevertheless, the various authorities have adopted a variety of policies concerning both 
co-ops and economic issues generally. The approach taken here is to contrast typical policies 
taken by a wide range of authorities with those of the Gte. The GtC was the largest local 
authority, and its policies were not generally representative of those carried out elsewhere; 
they were the most thoroughly developed and the most explicit in the objective of 
advancing the political economy of labour. 
In general local authority intervention in support of co-ops has had three main stated 
objectives44: 
• creating jobs at a time of high and rising unemployment, and in particular jobs which 
would be under local control and produce for local needs; 
• complementing equal opportunities policies by encouraging co-ops which provide 
work for black and women workers, and others marginalised in the labour market. 
• providing alternative ways of organising work and the economy. 
42 ."". AI,,,,," aMldII ("",.",., ""1).."". lim. JIOlicia. 
43 c.ua,I988. 
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In practice the first objective, employment creation, has been paramount, and most councils 
have supported co-ops as an adjunct to wider policies of small business and industrial 
development. For Labour-controlled authorities in particular, support for co-ops had the 
added advantage of potentially offering improved working conditions and could be seen as 
a form of community development; these were bonuses on top of any jobs that might be 
created. 
There are two elements to the policy of supporting co-ops on the basis of their employment-
creation potential. The first is that small firms or enterprises are more effective job-creators 
than large enterprises. The second is that, given this, co-ops themselves are more effective 
employment creators than capitalist firms. In view of the widespread support for both these 
propositions, I address them both below. 
Smldl firm. lind employment C1'ellnon 
The most influential research in support of small firms as a generator of jobs has been that 
of Birch. In a paper entitled "The Job Generation Process"4S, he analysed 5.6 million 
establishments in the USA over the period 1969-1976. Birch claimed that firms with less than 
20 workers contributed 66% of jobs generated in the US between 1960 and 1976. Firms with 
less than 100 workers generated 82% of jobs, and those with over 500 generated only 13%. 
As a result he argued against indiscriminate incentive policies aimed at large firms, and in 
favour of 'rifle shots' aimed at specific small firms. 
Birch's conclusions have subsequently been subjected to much criticism. Armington It 
0dle46 undertook a similar analysis for 1978-1980. They found that while over this period 
private sector employment increased by 8.7%, and 78% of this occurred in establishments 
withless than 100 employees, these establishments employed only 49% of the private sector 
labour force - therefore on an establishment basis small businesses employ around half of 
the workforce but provide eight out of every ten new jobs. However, once they examined 
firm size rather than tstRblishment4'1 size, they found that firms with less than 100 workers 
provided 36% of the labour force and generated around 39% of the new jobs - i.e. "the new 
45 BhdI,l979. 
46 A",.blgtDrI 61 01&, 1982. 
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employment growth contributions of both large and small businesses appear to be roughly 
proportional to their respective shares of the labour force"48. 
Birch's analysis also concerned net jobs generated. According to the GLC 
all the evidence we have suggests that larger establishments account for a 
much greater proportion of both job loss and new jobs gained than do small 
firms, even though their net 'balance' may be less ..... [hence] ... there appears 
to be greater scope to influence employment levels by reducing job loss and 
expanding job creation by large firms than by confining policy to job creation 
by small firms. "49 
This is echoed by evidence quoted in the Financial Times, concluding that 
it will be years before Britain's new high technology firms replace the jobs lost 
Crom older, larger companies. The jobs created by Britain's fastest growing 
computer manufacturers, Sinclair Research, Systime, ACf, Acorn, Panorama 
and Torch are dwarfed by about 10,000 redundancies at ICL (Britain's biggest 
computer company) in the past three yearsSO. 
Fothergill and Gudgin51 relate Birch's conclusions to his ideological stance. His suggestion 
that small firms should be encouraged still further was eagerly seized upon by the small 
firm lobby and the right in both Britain and the USA; whereas on the basis of his evidence it 
would have been quite reasonable to conclude that larger firms were in difficulty and more 
should be done to help them, as they clearly dominate overall employment. The GLC 
concluded that small firms tended to predominate in technologically backward and low-
productivity sectors, with a limited capacity to generate a re-investible surplus. In 
formulating the London Industrial Strategy, they decided to concentrate intervention 
towards rebuilding the London economy on medium and larger-scale firms. 
Storey et al52 have analysed the small finn sector as a target category (or employment 
policy. On the basis of a substantial database of enterprises in north-east England, they have 
found that aid to small firms is of limited value as currently applied. Small firms have a 
high mortality rate, and the vast majority create only one or two jobs beyond those of the 
proprietors; about half of the jobs created came from 3-4% of total small firms. Much aid 
48 Armi",. & 06,2'82, ,. 17. 
49 CLe 2'83, p. 7. 
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directed indiscriminately at small finns tends to be wastedj their conclusion is that if aid is 
to be directed towards those specific small firms which are likely to grow, it requires a 
detailed and highly interventionist 'hands on' approach by public authorities. This gives lie 
to the belief that small firms in general left to compete freely in the market will flourish and 
achieve the objectives set out for them. Relating this to Birch's work, the crucial question is 
how are the firms selected to which the 'rifle shot' assistance is to be aimed? 
The general category of 'small finns' is itself one of dubious usefulness for analysis. It does 
not necessarily describe a homogeneous group; small finns differ widely in their type of 
business, market and competitive pressures, their relationship to large finns, wages and 
employment conditions, profitability and prospects for growth. To the extent that small 
firms are active in employment creation, this results from, in part, a shift of economic 
activity <e.g. from broadly defined 'manufacturing' to 'services'); the role of small firms 
reflects a changing industrial structure rather than any intrinsic merit of small firms 
themselves. These economy-level changes must be included in any analysis of the role of 
and prospects for small finns. 
CO-OP' lind employment aelltion 
The second supposition is that co-ops are themselves more effective in employment creation 
than comparable capitalist firms. This is a relatively under-researched area and many 
contrasting - and sometimes contradictory • claims have been made. For instance, it is 
sometimes held that co-ops are more productive than capitalist firms, and therefore will 
demonstrate superior economic growth; on this basis, a sector comprised of co-operatives 
rather than capitalist firms should show greater long-term employment growth. However, 
this does not take account of jobs in capitalist firms that may be displaced as a result of such 
co-operative growth; nor does it address the issue that with given demand conditions, 
gi-eater productivity in an enterprise may be expected to lead to lower employment. In 
Britain evidence suggests that co-ops are in any case less productive than comparable 
capitalist firms, and are more labour intensive. In these drcumstances co-op production 
would lead to greater employment, but at the expense of lower wages. This identifies the 
central issue in the debate, which thus turns out to be no different to ,the Tory solution to 
unemployment· reduce real wages and employment will increase. In concluding the most 
extensive survey of the employment-creating potential of co-ops, Estrin notes that 
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Co-ops may be particularly attractive to policy makers because they can create 
jobs more cheaply than capitalist firms by mobilising workers' effort, wage 
flexibility and perhaps even their savings5.'4. 
The evidence of this present research is that wages in co-ops are indeed lower than in 
comparable capitalist firms, and there is widespread evidence that rescue co-ops in 
particular are associated with wage cuts54. If co-ops' main potential for increasing 
employment is on the basis of lower wages, then support for co~ps would be a divisive 
issue within the labour movement. 
The policy of co-op development on the basis of employment creation was flawed from the 
outset. In Britain, co-ops have failed to have anything more than a marginal impact on 
unemployment. With only 5,000 or so co-op jobs created throughout the country, the impact 
in anyone area has been tiny. Even when other EEC countries are Included, with more 
supportive environments and much larger co-op sectors, new jobs created in co-ops over 
1976-1981 represented perhaps 3-4% of the increase in unemployment over the same 
periodSS. Some of these jobs are effectively transferred from capitalist firms to co-ops, rather 
than additional jobs, and so the net impact of co-ops on unemployment will of course be 
even smaller. 
In most cases there was little real idea of the resources which would be required to support 
an effective co-ops policy, and generally the amount· of material support for co-ops (i.e. 
other than rhetoric> was very smaIl. The small impact of co-ops on unemployment in Britain 
is in part a reflection of this. The most widespread support has come in the form of funding 
for local COAs and other support organisations, which are generally involved in aiding the 
establishment of new co-ops, rather than with continuing supportS6• Most COA workers are 
faced with demanding jobs and work extremely hard, but COA's are small and the 
resources at their disposal are IimitedS1. Some authorities have in addition established sman 
loan funds specifically for co-opsS8. It may be that the resources devoted by councils to 
co-op support were the most that could be afforded, but there seems little realistic 
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appreciation of the likely impact of such limited funding. Certainly the sums devoted to the 
development of co-operatives pale into insignificance when compared with that spent on 
subsidising small businesses. Munro estimates that over the period 1976-1986, public sector 
expenditure on co-op support organisations (including ICOM and the national CDA) 
totalled £17.9m, with a further £10.8m on the direct loan and grant funding of co-ops 
through ICOF, GLEB, local authorities and loan funds, making a total of £28.7m. According 
to to one estimate, between 1980 and 1985 government spent at least £1 billion subsidising 
small businesses59, apart from presumably greater sums spent on larger enterprises - a 
situation which should give any self-respecting socialist party pause for thought. 
Local authority co-op policies have often been accompanied by glowing references to the 
experience of Mondragon, with its 17,000 co-op jobs and economic prosperity. At the same 
time there has been little appreciation of the factors behind Mondragon's record and the 
sheer magnitude of resources mobilised behind co-op development there. Even in Wales, 
where the Wales ruc dreamed of establishing a similar regional co-op enclave, the crucial 
role of the CLP in supporting co-ops through the provision of finance, planning and 
management and in co-ordinating the sector's overall economic development, was missed. 
The failure to create many jobs in co-ops is particularly serious given that local authorities 
continually pressurised COAs to give priority to the number of jobs created rather than 
encouraging fewer, better quality jobs60• This must be seen in the context of widespread 
support for small firms and of local authorities' readiness to jump on the small firms 
bandwagon, without considering the type of jobs that would result. 
DrttW&lICb of LOCAl Authority Co-op' Polky 
Although support for co-ops on employment grounds has been largely ineffective, this does 
not mean that co-ops should not be supported by local authorities. Attention should be 
devoted to the quality of co-op jobs rather than their quantity, and support forthcoming on 
the basis of improvements to the nature of work in co-ops rather than simply 'playing the 
numbers game'. If polley simply concentrates upon new jobs created by co-ops, then jobs 
which are created in co-ops rather than in capitalist finns make no net addition to 
employment. If, on the other hand, attention is paid to the potential for co-ops to improve 
59 Btl".".., 19B6, ,. 25. 
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the position of workers, then the 'transfer' of jobs from capitalist firms to co-ops becomes 
worthwhile. 
Unfortunately the quality of co-op jobs has not been widely considered as an objective, at 
least outside of London. However, it is particularly important given both the record of small 
firms, and the concern of trade unions in ensuring that co-ops do not lead to a worsening of 
working conditions. 
One characteristic of small firms is their instability, low wages and poor working 
conditions, and a widespread anti-trade unionism amongst employers. It is questionable 
whether this has been appreciated even by most Labour local authorities, and little, if any, 
attention given to the reasons for it and small firms' marginal economic position61. 
Certainly the economic forces acting on small firms have been neglected, and the same 
applies to co-ops. As a result the positive aspects of co-ops are seen as flowing automatically 
from the changed nature of ownership. The special attention which co-ops received was 
largely devoted to overcoming specifically co-op problems, such as special training needs, 
and the development of co-op management and administrative structures, rather than 
changing their economic position. Whilst there is clearly a need for such developments, they 
are inadequate without addressing co-ops' economic position. 
The findings in Part n confirm that co-ops are in an even wea1cer economic poSition than 
typical small firms, and although trade union membership is higher, co-ops do appear to 
pay lower wages. There are compensatory aspects of co-operative working, but the dangers 
of creating worse working conditions in co-ops than in small firms remains real. 
One further perceived advantage of co-ops - creating jobs under local control - does not 
apply any more to co-ops than to small firms generally; both are vulnerable to economic 
decisions made elsewhere by large firms who may be their customers, suppliers or 
creditors. A further advantage of co-operative working - greater job satisfaction - is also a 
laudable objective, but is often assumed to flow simply from the changed nature of 
ownership in a co-op, and evidence cited earlier suggests that this is not assured. Economic 
marginality inhibits any real decision-making power on the part of co-op workers, and 
wider policies of economic intervention are required to overcome this. Some attention has 
been devoted by COAs to developing alternative management structures to stimulate 
61 RAhmil, 1984, p. 159. 
430 Conclusion 
participation, but as was made clear in chapter 2, this has generally been from an 
organisational perspective with little attention devoted to the role of production technology 
and the division of labour. This is not necessarily the fault of CDA's - it is not realistic for a 
CDA with two hard-pressed workers to start developing the technology for socially useful 
prodUction, but it is necessary for local authority policy-makers to be aware of the impact of 
this. 
Although well-intentioned, the economic polides of many Labour local authorities 
appeared to be devoid of any coherent underlying strategy. This is not particularly 
surprising; the need to respond to the problems of unemployment, inner dty decay and 
economic collapse came suddenly in the 19708 after a long period of economic stability and 
local authority activity limited to the provision of municipal services. Shaken by the severity 
of the problems which they faced, their responses were based around attempts to create 
jobs, but without an understanding of what had caused their problems in the first place. 
Rainnie notes that 
Labour local councUs in the 'depressed areas' have been clutching on to any 
straw in a desperate attempt to cope with what is variously described as the 
'regional problem' and more particularly 'inner dty crisis'62. In other words, 
they have been searching for immediate palliatives to what is a long term 
problem, namely the restructuring of capital on a national and international 
scale, one symptom of this being the flight of capital from inner cities. Labour 
coundls are once again blindly trying to deal with the problems created by 
capital, rather than dealing with capital itself63. The inner city problem then 
becomes isolated from the problems which cause it.M 
Although in many cases local authorities had little theoretical reasoning behind the support 
for co-ops - beyond a need to create employment and a belief that co-ops were somehow 
'good' - their initiatives tied in with polides developed by the Labour Party at a national 
level, in particular the party's support for "new forms of social ownership", decentralisation, 
and the market mechanism. The new policy marked a sharp break with the past and the 
traditional reliance on nationalisation as the primary means of securing public ownership of 
the means of production, and state intervention to guide the economy. In view of the 
prominence given to co-ops65 within Labour's new policy (the 'Jobs and Industry 
Campaign'), it is worth examining the thinking which lay behind it. 
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IS 8""",1984. 
64 Rat ... , 1984, ,.159. 
IS lMIaIw PIII'ty, ... 4. 
Worm co-ops: policies and prospects 431 
LABOUR PARTY POUCY 
The move llWay from nati01udi,aticm 
The first aspect of the new policy was a rejection of the traditional policies of nationalisation 
and central planning, stemming from the belief that they were inherently limited as an 
organisational mode. Nationalised industries were perceived as inefficient, bureaucratic, 
inflexible and undemocratic, and there was concern at the unpopularity of further 
nationalisations as an electoral strategy66. 'We must develop new models of sodalist 
enterprise that build on the initiative and creativity of working people and combine 
productive efficiency with responsiveness to consumer and community needs, if we are to 
inspire popular support for soclalism'61. Associated with this was a concern to maintain a 
distance from the experience of socialist countries in general and the Soviet blOC in 
particuIar68. 
The new version of sodalism therefore came to be defined in a somewhat negative fashion: 
not what had come before in Britain, and not what had been done elsewhere. Such an 
approach was based upon a complete dismissal of nationalisation rather than a considered 
appraisal of that experience in the historical context of the post-war British economy. 
Although the nationalisations of that period represented a triumph for the labour 
movement, the balance of class forces was such that subsequent policy regarding the 
nationalised industries - and indeed the state's activities generally. were largely pursued in 
capitalist interests. Part of the problem of nationalisation was the failure of the labour 
movement to consolidate those initial gains by securing the operation of nationalised 
industries in accordance with soclalist principles; this reflected both the continuing power 
of capital in determining economic priorities, and the strong influence of Fabian 
bureaucratic paternalism on the labour movement and its dismissal of workers control 
within public ownership as either desirable or achievable. Given the extent of 
nationalisation in Britain it is remarkable how little attention it has received, and in the 
absence of considered analysis the views of the right have largely prevaUed. One of the few 
exceptions to this is work by O'Donnell, who concludes that 
" Wldtbrwul, 1985, 'P' 126. 
6'1",a fly RDy H.,,..,, tfllDlMl irt n.rriMm.,." MorpI, 191$,,,,.38-39. 
6B Fbw, Htmil fLJIl, 2984, 'P' 6. 
432 Conclusion 
"the record of the nationalised industries reveals not the inherent limitations of 
this organisational mode, but rather the latter's vulnerability to the particular 
policies and stance of successive governments."69 
As for the rejection of central planning, this is to dismiss a policy which has never properly 
been tried in Britain, whether in the interests of capital or labour. Indeed this failure to 
undertake any sort of strategic planning has been a primary cause of the Britain's economic 
problems70• 
TIre ",",Jlit of democracy 
The second strand to Labour's economic policy has been a new emphasis on democracy, 
freedom and the rights of the individual, and the need to achieve this through 
decentralisation. This at the expense of both an economic analysis and political strategy 
based upon class, and is partly a concession to the renewed emphasis by the right on 
individualism and the role of capitalism and the market in guaranteeing economic 
'freedom'7l. It is also a further justification of the move away from centralised decision-
making. 
Co-ops have been promoted as a central part of Labour's 'new forms of social ownership', 
and integrate with the new adherence to market principles, the rejection of nationalisation, 
and the pursuit of decentralised democracy. Although much of this represents perceived 
electoral opportunism, a theoretical basis is provided by Hodgson's work12. This has had a 
strong influence on Hattersley and Labour party economic policy generally. Hodgson's 
economics derives from a Sraffian critique of marxism, and results from his dissatisfaction 
with two of its central elements - the labour theory of value and the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall73• Having rejected these elements, he then moves away from the concept of a 
mode of production and. the marxist analysis of historical change. We are thus left with a 
fundamentallyahistorical analysis, which rejects 'the idea that classes are the prime object 
of social and economic analysis'74 in favour of 'structures and systems'. This leads to a very 
different conception of capitalism, sodalism, the transition between them, and consequently 
the process of political and economic change. 
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Hodgson considers that 
Capitalism has to accommodate within itself other forms of organisation and 
regulation; typically the family, planning within the firm, and the state. We 
shall call these forms impurities. The idea that they are necessary to the 
capitalist system we shall call the impurity principle (as applied to 
capitalism).7S 
He then extends this to the principle of dominance - that socio-economic systems generally 
exhibit a dominant structure, and 'every socio-economic system includes at least one non-
dominant structure .... every dominant structure requires at least one other structure for the 
system as a whole to function'. This is then given a backing in systems theory and 
cybernetics76, and Hodgson then uses these ideas to support his argument that socialism 
must be economically and politically pluralist. He then argues that the task for the labour 
movement is 'a difficult but progressive process of democratisation under capitalism, 
leading to its transformation into a socialist system'. Although a socialist economy would be 
predominantly based upon planning, markets would have an important subsidiary role. 
The growth of co-ops is considered to be an important part of the transition process, and 
they would of course have an important role in the 'market' aspects of the future socialist 
economy. 
The impurity principle supposedly applies to all socio-economic systems, and is 
incompatible with marxist historical analysis and the historical specifidty of capitalism. 
Cearly not all relations within capitalism are commodity relations, and there may be 
reasons why socialism will include some elements of market activity, but to rely upon an 
ahistorical explanation gets us nowhere in terms of understanding why or how this takes 
place. After all, 
..• the strength of historical materialism is that it allows us to get behind the 
peculiarities and the seductive ideological ways in which societies explain and 
express themselves, and look at any concrete society in terms of 'who is doing 
what to whom'. It is not at all clear that, for socialists, it would be better to start 
by asking 'what are the structures and systems'7'1. 
With emphasis on structures and systems, and in the interaction of groups rather than 
classes in society, the process of social change becomes one of reforming those structures 
and systems. Whilst Hodgson makes clear his own personal view that society and the 
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economy needs a radical and thoroughgoing transformation, this is not a necessary outcome 
of his analytical approachi this contrasts with a class analysis where meaningful change in 
society - which includes removal of the current ruling class - must involve a fundamental 
transformation of social, economic and political relations. Hence, Hodgson's analysis can 
form the basis of both a moderate or far-reaching transformation, and in practice it tends to 
be used as the former. 
Although Hodgson raises some interesting issues regarding the nature of a socialist 
economy, his conception of the transition process is highly contentious, and this essentially 
stems from the failure to appreciate the nature of modem capitalism. The main flaw is the 
failure to consider how progressive elements within capitalism will be treated by capitali 
this follows from his conception of society as constituted by groups and structures rather 
than classes and class interests. 
Hodgson's support for co-ops, and for worker participation more generally, has several 
constituent elements. Firstly, as extensions to democracy, they are of necessity a step 
forward towards socialism. Secondly, participation increases labour productivity, and is 
therefore economically superior and preferable. Thirdly, and following Tomlinson, 
Hodgson proposes that the pressures of competition and market relations do not determine 
the way in which enterprises operate, and that there is flexibility within market relations to 
accommodate co-ops' different objectives. 
Concerning the first point, participation can lead to greater democracy and job satisfaction, 
but it is not necessarily so, as examples from clothing co-ops and Triumph Meriden make 
clear; securing those gains is conditional upon a range of other factors. Again with 
productivity: he uses a series of examples to iIlustrate how co-ops or other participatory 
structures can be more productive than conventional capitalist ones, but is is equally easy to 
produce examples where this is not the case - as much of the evidence from co-ops studied 
in this thesis suggest. Increasing productivity is certainly possible but it is not assuredi 
Hodgson is unconvincing because of his implicit belief that increases in productivity 
necessarily result from worker participation, rather than examining the conditions under 
which this will happen. The pursuit of participation has costs involved (at the very least, 
meetings take time), and this has implications for co-ops' ability to compete. 
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As with Tomlinson's work, constraints on co-ops freedom are unexamined. There is a 
tendency to dismiss the issue of co-ops' degeneration in capitalist economies as in any way 
a real problem, rather than examining the conditions under which degeneration is more or 
less serious. We would at least expect a response to the question of how co-ops are to avoid 
replicating capitalist conditions and working practices. 
Ultimately the problem with Hodgson's analysis, and the areas of Labour Party policy 
associated with it, is the failure to appreciate the nature of modem capitalism. This extends 
to an uncritical examination of co-ops' relationships with the capitalist economy, and the 
sort of polides which would be needed to ensure an effective role for co-ops in the 
transition to sodalism. 
THE ExPERIENCE 0' THE Gte 
GLC & Economic Policy 
The polides of the GLC introduced by the Labour administration in 1981 represented a 
contrasting strand in Labour Party economic thinking, and did include an attempt to come 
to terms with the nature of British capitalism. For the first time the GLC and some other 
local authorities "abandoned their traditionally passive approach to local enterprise in 
favour of a more dirigiste stance"78. In some cases economic initiatives were part of a wider 
programme of social change, instigated under the direction of left-wing Labour coundls. 
For the GLC, economic polides were aimed at regenerating and democratising London's 
economy, and were termed 'restructuring for labour'. This involved 
• a focus on production relations and industry rather than exchange relations and 
markets as the arena for economic policy initiatives, 
• bringing production increasingly under the control of labour and ensuring that the 
necessary restructuring took place in the interests of workers rather than capital. 
Such progressive restructuring aimed to enhance the 'livelihood, health and human 
capadties of labour', and more specifically to introduce enterprise democracy, a narrowing 
of workforce differentials, and socially useful production. The GLC's economic polides 
78 Nola 61 O'DortrrGl, 1917,,,.251. 
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contrasted with those of the majority of Labour local authorities and the Party nationally not 
just in terms of size but also in taking a strategic and interventionist approach. 
A central aspect of the policy was the promotion of flexible specialisation (FS) and up-
market restructuring in selected firms. The starting point for this approach was the view 
that accumulation in advanced capitalist countries was no longer taking place under a 
regime dominated by 'Fordism', that is large scale, assembly-line production of 
standardised commodities, based upon de-sldlling technologies and Taylorist work 
organisation. Instead, it is considered that a new regime of accumulation - neo-Fordism - is 
in the making. This is based upon micro-electronic technologies, and is characterised by the 
production of specialised commodities for smaller, segmented markets. These are produced 
using advanced flexible manufacturing systems, or 'Flexible Specialisation' (FS), enabling 
flow production techniques to be applied to differentiated products, which would no longer 
have to be produced in relatively costly small batch production79• 
Although the introduction of FS was part of capital's restructuring process, some GLC 
economists held that that the workforce could potentially gain from flexible specialisation, 
as new technological systems could be implemented without deskilling workers and 
exacerbating divisions between them. Furthermore, the adoption of this new, competitive 
technology would enable firms to move up-market into profitable market niches. 
The aim was that in providing finance to promote and assist restructuring in selected 
private sector firms, the GLC/GLEB could force these firms to introduce greater industrial 
democracy through trade union representation, enterprise planning agreements, and 
perhaps eventual conversion to a co-operative fonnBO. Implementing this policy in selected 
firms only was partly a response to limited resources but also reflected a belief that 
exemplary projects would be copied by other firms. Successful restructuring would give 
these firms a competitive advantage, and if successful, this policy would assist in both 
reviving the competitiveness of London's industry, and at the same time securing gains for 
workers. 
Underlying this policy was a general belief that this progressive form of restructuring could 
by and large be achieved within the current operation of market forces, and that their 
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reconfiguration was compatible with a range of possible outcomes at the level of the 
. workplace. Thus up-market restructuring amounted to finding niches in new, segmented 
markets demanding high-quality, high-value added products. 
There have been several critical assessments of the GLC's economic policy81 which -
although mostly starting from a basic sympathy with the GLC's aims and values - have 
generally concluded that there were major flaws. Perhaps the most serious criticism is that 
the outcome would be to benefit only a small group of workers - those employed in skilled 
jobs in FS-firms - and fail to advance the material needs of the poorest and weakest groups. 
Although there is a case to be made that FS can involve a technical improvement in work 
quality, this is countered by new social dynamics of discipline and control; 'mounting 
evidence from Britain and America suggests that increased flexibility at the level of 
particular jobs has been accompanied by greater centralisation of control, work 
intensification and greater job insecurity'82. Workers in FS-firms may benefit from 
privileged conditions, but the system develops on the basis of 'a whole satellite economy of 
suppliers, retailers, business services and innovators'83. Workers in these support services 
are frequently part-time, temporary and low-paid, often working from their own homes. A 
policy promoting FS-restructuring is likely to exacerbate divisions between these 'core' and 
'peripheral' workers and thus end up self-defeating. 
A second criticism identifies the contradiction between up-market restructuring, and the 
objective of production for social need. The former essentially responds to opportunities 
created in the market, while the latter aims to give priority to needs which are neglected by 
the market. 
The example of the 'Third Italy' region from Bologna to Venice is frequently dted to support 
the potential of such a strategy in regenerating a regional economy84. While there has 
indeed been an economic revival and the region grew as fast as any other in Europe during 
the 1970s, there is clear evidence that the major workforce divisions have arisen; there is 'an 
enormous unevenness of conditions of work between workers and lack of security of 
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continuous employment which makes organisation for common, class objectives extremely 
difficult'8S. F.Murray also makes the point that 
the retreat into self-employment, co-operatives, and the poor conditions of the 
artisan sector was a defensive reaction which followed the dismantling of 
Emilia's large, and well-organised, industrial bases. It has taken the region's 
small firms 35 years (over half of which were years of the post-war boom) to 
develop to the stage where some of them have been able to enter market niches 
on an independent basis86 
Although LEI's were to some extent developed in the anticipation that a sympathetic central 
government would be in place within a few years, the supportive role which the central 
state was hoped to play in such initiatives was minimal- such as passing legislation relating 
to minimum wages, equal opportunities and health and safety legislation, and also ensuring 
that local authorities had sufficient resources to carry out their policies. This could perhaps 
be extended to stronger state intervention in order channel restructuring in favour of 
labour, but even so this would primarily be through the local state. It was not considered 
that a powerful central state, carrying out extensive planning and economic intervention, 
would be necessary or desirable, regardless of whether or not state power could actually be 
secured and directed in this way. The role of the state is reflected in the way market forces 
are dealt with in the fonnulation of LEI's, and is evident in GLEB's approach to co-ops. 
GLC & Co-op. Policy 
The GLC's co-ops policy was framed as part of its wider economic policies, particularly in 
the promotion of democratised production which was responsive to the needs of local 
communities. Co-ops were specifically included as one way of transferring ownership of the 
means of production to the workers in an enterprise. However the promotion of co-ops lay 
uneasily with other aspects of GLe policy, particularly its rejection of small finns and 
reliance on medium and large ftnns in job creation and economic development - although it 
could be argued that in any case this turned out to be a largely rhetorical position anyway. 
Thus a crudal aspect of the co-ops policy was to ensure that they did not replicate the 
negative aspects of small firms - poor wages and working conditions, low trade union 
membership, low growth and poor survival capability. Thus co-ops were encouraged to 
link actively with the wider labour and union movement87, while in the longer tenn the 
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objective was to create a co-operative economy and co-operative movement rather than 
numerous isolated competitive co-ops88. Perhaps more in London than elsewhere, co-ops 
were seen as a vehicle for promoting equal employment opportunities. In addition to 
supporting new, small co-ops the GLC also aimed to undertake more pro-active 
developments with larger co-ops through 'phoenix' or rescue situations, and through 
encouraging some existing businesses to convert to co-operative ownership. 
Co-ops could also be seen as complementing the FS-restructuring pollcy promoted by the 
GLc. Firstly, co-ops are unsuited to operation in mass-production industries, but potentially 
able to operate successfully in industries where smaller, FS firms may predominate. 
Although the capital equipment reqUired for FS production is generally expensive, co-ops 
can overcome handicaps in this area if sufficient finance is provided through the public 
sector. Secondly, competitive success would now appear to depend upon flexibility and 
adaptability in production, upon a compliant workforce willlng and able to develop new 
competences as and when circumstances require. This should of course be easier to achieve 
in co-operatives than in capitalist firms. Thirdly, co-ops would not suffer from the direct 
obstruction of capital in the adoption of a progressive labour strategy within enterprises. 
Fourthly, co-ops often have close links to consumers and the community, which should 
enable them to be more responsive to changing patterns of demand. 
Implementation of Co-op. Policy 
The GLe's co-op policy was refined and implemented through GLEB, the Greater London 
Enterprise Board, which was established in 1982 to carry out industrial and commercial 
development in London within the broad strategic aims laid down through the coundl's 
Industry and Employment Committee. A co-op unit was established within GLEB's 
structural investment division in 1983. In 1984 the London Co-operative Enterprise Board 
(LCEB) was set up as a subsidiary of GLEB to deal exclusively with co-ops, and in particular 
to handle the relatively standardised applications for small amounts of funding. 
Once the political decision had been made to support co-ops, the GLC's approach was 
inspired by the experience of Mondragon. The co-ops unit has a parallel in the CLP's 
management services division (the Empresarial), taking an interventionist approach to the 
proviSion of management expertise and planning. As at Mondragon, the main element of 
BB CAG & '1'IttmIlq, 19B6, p. 2. 
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the policy was the provision of loans to new and existing co-ops, and this certainly had an 
impact on a large number of Co-ops89. 
GLC policies certainly contributed to the massive growth in the number of London co-ops 
over the period 1983-6. In tenns of increasing the size of the co-op sector in London, the 
policy can be considered a success. The number of London co-ops rose by over 100% during 
1983-1986, by which time some 31% of all British co-ops were located within Greater 
London90• 62% of new co-ops during this period were created with direct financial 
assistance from GLEB or its delegated schemes. But despite the large number of co-ops 
assisted financially by GLEB or its delegated programmes - 215 over the period - the 
number of jobs created remains small- just over SOO remained in April 1986. 
The equal opportunities policy could be considered a success, with 32% of all GLEB loans 
going to co-ops fonned by black or women workers, and 58% of LCEB loans going to 
similar priority groups. The provision of finance was backed up by other programmes, with 
training or other development programmes reaching over 100 co-ops (out of 365) over the 
period 1983-6. 
However, the success in stimulating new co-ops, particularly amongst priority groups91, has 
not been accompanied by corresponding success with promoting larger co-ops through 
rescues or conversions. The early failures of the rescue co-ops Third Sector and Custom 
Shoes, coupled with a lack of expertise, meant that subsequent attempts were more 
cautious. 
The accumulation of experience necessary to deal with rescues was effectively cut short by 
the abolition of the GLC in 1986, and subsequently the reduced funding and changed 
political role for GLEB in 1986/7. One of the more promising rescue co-ops - The Lettering 
Centre - was reconverted to a capitalist firm in 1987. 
Prom the beginning there had been tension within GLEB between those who viewed it 
essentially as a conventional venture capital institution, and those who supported the 
objective of 'progressive' restructuring of London's industry. This reflected similar conflicts 
within the GLC itself, where reactionary members of the roundl's full-time bureaucracy 
81 ... ,,.,6. 90 .. .,,.,5. 
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attempted - together with some right-wing members of the ruling Labour group - to jettison 
the more radical elements of the manifesto on which Labour had been elected92. GLEB's 
activities were always constrained by these conflicting aims. By 1987 most of the more 
radical members and workers at GLEB had been purged, and the objectives of promoting 
enterprise planning and workers rights in industry had largely been abandoned; one victim 
of this change was the previous commitment to co-ops. 
Some elements of the GLC's co-ops policy have survived its abolition. There remains an 
active network of COAs in London, although, like COAs elsewhere, their long-term future 
must be in doubt as local authority funding comes under greater pressure. The LeEB 
survives and is still financing London co-ops, but again its prospects depend on the 
availability of finance. Another initiative was the Marketing Resource Centre (MRC), 
established to provide marketing. services for use by London co-ops. Although the MRC 
survived the demise of the GLC and has managed to attract some non-GLEB funding, the 
London co-op sector has not expanded as fast as anticipated. As a result there are 
insufficient co-ops in London to keep the MRC going and its original brief has recently been 
diluted, and it is now attempting to attract co-ops from outside London, the voluntary 
sector and non-co-op small businesses93. 
The GLC's commitment to co-ops certainly had a positive impact, and London co-ops 
probably had as favourable an environment as any others in the country - despite the 
sometimes strained relations between GLEB and the co-op sector. The long tenn impact is 
more difficult to assess. The fonnation rate of new co-ops in London has fallen dramatically 
during 1987-894, while the ability of existing co-ops to survive remains an unknown 
quantity. Unionisation is higher in London co-ops than elsewhere, but there are doubts as to 
whether this state of affairs will continue. 
There have of course been problems and failures, but this is to be expected in any radical 
new policy initiative. Many of the early GLEB projects were with rescues and other high-
risk co-ops, but once the co-op unit had been established within GLEB, the ability to 
undertake effective monitoring of co-ops improved. 
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Relations with central government 
The GLC attempted to draw parallels with Mondragon in its co-ops policy, but these cease 
as soon as the role of central government is considered. Mondragon co-ops benefited from 
central government measures, both in terms of general economic policies and intervention, 
and specific co-op policies through legal and taxation measures. In Britain all of these 
factors are missing. The early 19805 were a period of recession, with low economic growth 
and sluggish demand. Co-ops have no legal or tax concessions in Britain - in several aspects 
they are worse off than capitalist companies - or indeed any form of favourable treatment 
from central government. Tory policy has been specifically to ensure that co-ops do not 
have any 'unfair' competitive advantages over capitalist firms. 
It was beyond the power of the GLC to grant legal or tax concessions to co-ops, and the 
overall resources which the GLC could be devoted to economic intervention were very 
limited. However there was a failure to appreciate the limitations on what could be 
achieved in the context of central government policies, and in particular within the structure 
of market relations. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, the original manifesto and 
policies were developed on the assumption that a sympathetic government would be in 
power by 1983 or 1984, or as things became more desperate, by 1987/88. Secondly, there 
was a belief that local state initiatives were somehow superior to those of the central 
government, being more democratic and free from bureaucratic rigidities. In many ways the 
local state is potentially able to develop democratic planning in response to needs, it is 
crucial to face up to the limitations of local state power vis a vis the forces of capital, which, 
throughout the period of the GLe's existence, were supported by the central state. 
However, local economic initiatives must be seen as a complement to, rather than a 
substitute for, intervention at the national level. 
Despite the GLe's attempts to promote a general policy of restructuring which promoted 
dynamic and technologically advanced 'exemplary' firms, there has been minimal success 
in applying this to co-ops. As has been pointed out, this form of restructuring tends to 
widen the division between 'core' and 'peripheral' workers, and one major danger is that 
co-ops win tend to emerge in peripheraI support services rather than in the core firms. 
Although this is an area which requires further investigation, a cursory examination of the 
activities of London co-ops suggests that they remain concentrated in peripheral activities. 
In clothing manufacture, for example, where extensive restructuring along these lines is 
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taking place, there are as yet no co-ops utilising FS manufacturing systems, and as a result 
they are likely to become more concentrated into sweated subsectors. However, it can be 
argued that if an increasing division amongst workers is to develop, then co-ops are 
perhaps an effective way of protecting the conditions of the most vulnerable workers, 
particularly if C(H)PS can demonstrate higher levels of union membership and hence act as a 
counter to the promotion of divisions within the working class. 
London's C(H)P growth only managed to mirror existing patterns of C(H)P formation; the 
only transformation was in terms of the increased opportunities for women and black 
workers. This reflects a failure to appreciate the nature of interaction between co-ops and 
market relations, and the need to intervene in the operation of the market if co-ops are to be 
promoted so as to change the nature of work 
As with the wider economic policy, the co-op policy was based largely upon an acceptance 
of market conditions and aimed to assist co-ops to move into favourable market areas: 
Co-ops are as subject to market forces as any other enterprise, though some 
appear to ignore economic realities and have shown themselves to be as much 
at risk as the many badly planned or managed small businesses which litter 
the capital. Because C(H)PS have in the main stayed on the fringes of the 
commercial marketplace they are especially vulnerable. Their chances of 
expansion and growth are consequently limited, and one aspect of the Board's 
approach is to help provide the support and expertise which co-ops need if 
they are to gain a more appropriate share of the market95. 
The emphasis seems to be that if C(H)PS had not stayed on "the fringes of the commercial 
marketplace" they would have been less vulnerable; however, as we have seen in earlier 
chapters, these "fringes" could just as well be described as market niches, and co-ops in such 
activities are in fact stronger than those in highly competitive markets. And as we have seen 
above, other aspects of GUB strategy aim to encourage firms into up-market niches, where 
'restructuring for labour' would be facilitated. 
Confusion over the relationship between enterprises - co-ops or capitalist firms - and the 
market permeates the GLC's industrial strategy. On the one hand, individual firms were to 
be assisted by restructuring into market niches, where they could both compete effectively 
and provide improved working conditions, reflecting a policy which aimed to identify 
favourable market areas and to give selected firms a competitive advantage. It specifically 
95 GLEB,1I.4.(4). 
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did not aim to intervene to restructure those market forces; perhaps this was at its most 
extreme in the sector strategy for cultural and media industries, where finding market 
opportunities was seen as the way forward and state intervention - particularly subsidies -
was strongly dismissed as having only negative consequences96• The co-ops policy did 
differ slightly, however, in that there was an intention to use public sector purchasing 
power to support co-operatives97. The sheer bulk of potential purchasing power could 
enable co-ops to expand rapidly, and avoid the destructive effects of competition with 
capitalist enterprises. This reflects the approach taken in support of co-op sectors in France, 
Spain and Italy. Secondly, the GLC encouraged inter-co-op trading and marketing consortia, 
such as the London Co-op Printers Association, and the avoidance of inter-co-op 
competition; this would reflect elements of both the Italian consorzi and Mondragon's 
planned co-op economy. But as with general policies, no attempt was made to enable co-ops 
to meet local or social needs which could not be articulated through the market. 
Although welcome, these initiatives were relatively underdeveloped by the time of the 
GLC's abolition and the restructuring of GLEB, and London co-ops have largely been left to 
respond to market opportunities in the same way as any other enterprises. 
Ultimately, the thinking behind this and many other local economic initiatives has failed to 
confront the problem of the dominance of market forces on the operation of co-ops or 
indeed any other enterprise which attempt to provide an alternative to conventional 
employment. Although without such intervention niches can always be found where 
market forces are less strong and co-ops have some flexibility to pursue some of their own 
objectives, these wiD not offer a stable opportunity for co-ops. Either they wiD disappear as 
consumer tastes change, or, if developed successfully by co-ops, they will be subject to 
eventual competition from larger capitalist firms - as the experience of wholefood co-ops 
has shown. Co-ops in such niches can only offer co-operative production and employment 
to a (fortunate and privileged?) minority of workers. Elsewhere the need to compete and 
match other firms' effldency in order to survive pushes them towards capitalist methods of 
operation. Therefore 
the success on a large scale of co-operatives and other types of enterprises 
observing socialist principles requires a strong central state, able to interrupt or 
replac.'e market forces in some areas or, in other words, to create a space by 
91 GUS, ,..,I.(f) 
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using taxes and subsidies, the allocation of finance, and controls over markets 
to protect a sector from such competitive forces98• 
The success of Mondragon has been based upon exactly this kind of intervention by central 
government; without it, we see a co-op sector in Britain which has grown rapidly but 
remains fragmented and unco-ordinated, and can appropriately be desaibed as a co-op 
sector rather than a co-op movement. Most unfortunately, the co-op successes which have 
been seen cannot even be potentially replicated for all workers, given the crucial importance 
of production and demand conditions in specific industries, and therefore are potentially 
divisive to collective organisation. With current central government policies, even with 
some continued support from the remaining local authorities and COAs, the fragmentation 
of the movement is likely to continue. 
CONCLUDINC REMAlU(S 
The economic changes of the past decade signify a period of capital-oriented restructuring, 
in which class conflict has risen to a level unseen for a long period in Britain. It is likely that 
these processes will continue into the future, although they may take a different fonn. This 
period was favourable for co-ops, in that the rapid growth of the sector was stimulated, 
although the growth of the sector has yet to be translated into good commercial 
performance. Already changes have taken place which will affect the future development of 
co-operatives. In particular, the abolition of the Gte and the metropolitan counties has 
removed the main proponents of 'municipal sodallsm', and consequently removed a major 
source of funding and support. This is exacerbated by continuing attacks on the powers of 
remaining local authorities through ratecapping and the introduction of the poll tax, and 
announcements in 1988 of restrictions on the use of Section 137 funds under which the vast 
majority of COAs and other economic development initiatives have been funded. These 
moves will eventually constrain the funding of co-op support organisations, of training 
programmes, and specialist sources of finance for co-ops, particularly in view of co-ops' 
predictable failure to provide a panacea for local unemployment. This could perhaps be 
partially countered if strong links had been developed with trade unions, but these are still 
in a state of flux, and without stimulation from active local authorities are highly 
vulnerable. 
98 FiM & Ham., 1984,,,.33%-2. 
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However, a major part of the growth of the co-op sector has resulted from changes in the 
nature of production and accumulation in Britain. This includes the shift of production from 
large to small firms, and continuing attempts to undermine workers collective strength and 
class organisation. There is every reason to believe that these trends will continue, thereby 
providing further (if marginal) economic opportunities for small enterprises. Furthermore, 
it is to be expected that worker co-operatives may receive support as part of the wider 
promotion of employee share ownership. 
Contrary to the need for intervention to assist co-ops, the strengthening of market forces 
will have an adverse effect. It is difficult to predict the impact on co-ops' survival rate - it 
may be that if fewer co-ops are fonned, those ones are more likely to survive than if, for 
instance, CDAs promote co-ops heavily but do not have the resources to support the greater 
number of co-ops which do emerge, and which are then more likely to fail. However, there 
will be a reduction in the ability of co-ops to act in workers' interests - working conditions 
will become more like those in small firms, with poor wages and insecure employment; 
linlcs with trade unions will be more difficult to maintain as co-ops undennine unionised 
workers; and co-ops will generally become more 'commercial' in their outlook and mode of 
operation99. 
Although co-operatives constitute a formal mechanism of workers' control, their inability to 
escape from wider economic and soda-political forces means that any gains cannot be 
assured. Their size and economic vulnerability leaves them open to abuse by those with less 
progressive objectives than the majority of co-op workers. As Fairclough aptly notes: 
Cynical though it may be as a policy, the promotion of co-operatives can be a 
low cost, if temporary, means of deflecting opposition to big job losses, 
privatisation and attempts to undennine union orgarusation, which make little 
claim on state resources whilst at the same time appearing to meet some of the 
community's social needslOO. 
In present conditions there will be a tendency for co-ops to increasingly replicate small 
firms. As early as 1984 Bennett noted that market protection is necessary "if any British 
government was serious in its promotion of co-operatives", but considers this unlikely in the 
forseeable future; as a result the continued promotion of co-ops "would seem ill-advised, if 
99 WIdell" .tmillar to au """ .... '" {rIr COoOJII ill 1M SaN' Un"": "AI they (CD-OpmItivaJ gtrnD, ~ tllf[m1l'w. 
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not irresponsible, given the risks that co-operative members face .... if these organisations 
insist on promoting co-operatives, then they must be very selective of the industrries in 
which they operate"lOl. To have some hope of avoiding this, a minimum requirement 
would be the replication of some or all of the conditions which have proved beneficial to 
European co-ops. These include: 
• Sources of finance to which co-ops have exclusive or preferential access. 
• favourable market conditions created or reinforced by state intervention. 
• a tradition of support for workers' co-ops on the left and in the labour movement. 
• recognition of a workers' co-operative as a distinct legal form. 
• a favourable taxation regime. 
• a co-op federation or network of support organisations with powers to plan the 
development of the sector. 
In Britain at present, the first is met minimally, conditions [2]-[5] hardly at all. Much 
depends upon the survival and resources of existing organisations such as ICOM and 
various local support organisations. Even so, they remain small and limited compared to 
the Italian co-op federations and Mondragon's CLP, and are mostly concerned with 
stimulating new co-ops rather than their continuing survival. At the present time, the 
prospects are unfortunately for their absorption into conventional small business advice and 
development agencies, rather than their survival as well-resourced and politicised 
alternatives. 
Further lessons can be learned from Europe, where conditions more favourable to co-ops 
are in place. There, it appears that co-ops can improve can improve their productivity over 
time, eventually paying higher than average wages,and gaining some independence. 
However, experience suggests that even with favourable conditions - and the stable 
economic environment of the long post-war boom - the establishment of such a co-op sector 
takes a long time, even without the instability of a period of severe economic restructuring. 
However, even in these conditions European co-ops lack the radical edge which 
characterises many of those in Britain, even if they have not degenerated in fonnal terms. In 
both Britain and the rest of Europe there have been gains for most of those working in 
101 Ben,.,t, 1984, TIP. 314-5. 
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co-ops, which must not be underestimated, but there appears to have been little overall 
impact in class tenns. British co-ops have yet to prove that they can form the basis of a 
stable and progressive sector of the economy, and even as economic growth proceeds in 
1988, co-ops remain - with some individual exceptions - "cuttings from the recession, 
battling to survive with obsolete plant and equipment, dependent upon commitment to 
accept low wages and long hours"l02; a sad reflection indeed on such an innovative form of 
productive organisation. Co-operatives face a political task as much as an economic one in 
eliciting sufficient support from the state and labour movement to protect them from the 
irrationality and instability of their capitalist environment, and yet the situation now is 
much less favourable than it was in the early 19808. Marx's sentiments that "Co-operation 
could never defeat monopoly unless developed to national dimensions . . . only political 
power could enable it to escape from the 'narrow circles of the casual efforts of private 
workmen'" remain as true today as they were over one hundred years ago. The workers 
co-operative movement is a long way from developing on workers' tenns. 
102 &alcnl, 29B5. 
Appendices and References 
Appendices - Contents 
Appendix 1 Co-operative principles and legal structures 451 
AI.I ICA Principles 451 
AI.2 Legal status 451 
Appendix 2 Sources of data 454 
A2.I Co-op statistics 454 
A2.2 Financial data 457 
A2.3 Data Collection 461 
Appendix 4 Finandalstructure of co-ops 465 
Appendix 5 Sources of data for capitalist firms 467 
AS.I Printing sedor data 468 
Appendix 6 Comparison of co-op and capitalist firm data. 469 
Appendix 7 Definition of variables 471 
Appendix 8 Deflator used In nominal to real conversion 472 
Appendix' CPF co-ops 473 
Appendix 10 Standard Regions 474 
Appendices 
APPENDIX 1 CO-OPEKA TIVE PRINCIPLES AND LEGAL STRUCl'UKES 
Al.l lCA Principles 
The general principles underlying workers' co--operatives have been set out as follows by 
the International Co--operative Association (lCA) . 
• membership is voluntary and open; 
• there is democratic control, usually on the basis of one member, one vote; 
• interest on share capital is limited; 
• there is equitable distribution of any surplus or savings among the members; 
• provision should be made for education of their members, officers and 
employees and of the general public in the prindples and techniques of c0-
operation; 
• co-operatives co--operate in every practical way with other co-operatives at local, 
national and international levels. 
The lCA prindples are silent on whether co-ops should' be organised on an individualistic 
or collectivist basis. The additional prindples required for a common ownership are: 
• only people employed in the co-operative can become members. 
• all those working in the co--operative have the right to become members 
• capital employed is in the form of loan stock or reinvested profits and carries no 
element of control (it is collectively owned) 
• in the event of dissolution, the members cannot benefit from the distribution of 
residual assets. 
Al.2 Legal status 
Co-operatives were first registered under the Industrial and Provident Societies Q&:PS) 
legislation, dating from the 18605, and revised in 1965. This was established to provide for 
any kind of mutual or friendly society, controlled by and operating in the interests of its 
members, and has subsequently been used by workers co-ops, consumer (retail) co-ops, 
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building societies, social clubs etc., although there was no legislation specifically for anyone 
of these fonns. A society requires a minimum of seven members, and registrations are 
overseen by the Registrar of Friendly Societies. 
Until recently virtually all co-operatives were registered under this legislation. In the 1970s 
ICOM developed a set of model rules based upon the I&PS Acts, specifically for common 
ownership worker co-ops. The specific features of ICOM model rules related to collectively 
owned assets, with no individual workers shareholdings, and also by the prindple of 
'disinterested dissolution', with restrictions on the ability of members to distribute a co-op's 
assets for personal gain. 
With the advent of smaller co-ops, there was a need for a different form of registration, and 
ICOM subsequently developed model rules for common ownership workers co-ops under 
the Companies Acts, registered as companies limited by guarantee, which require a 
minimum of two members. 
In recent years, registrations of co-ops under the companies Acts have gradually 
superseded those under I&PS Acts, and in 1987 constituted over 90% of total worker co-op 
registrations. 
ICOM model rules are designed to prevent degeneration through the employment of wage 
labour (all workers must be eligible for membership), or through control passing into the 
hands of capitalists (only the minimum share issue is permitted, a nominal £1 per member). 
However, these conditions are not enshrined in law, and co-op members at any time can 
vote to change a co-op's Rules or Memorandum and Articles so as to remove these 
restrictions if it wishes (although it is believed that this rarely happens). The only law 
relating specifically to worker co-operatives is the Industrial Common Ownership Act 
(1976) which lays down criteria for hoM fide common ownership enterprises. These criteria 
are based on the internationally accepted (lCA) co-operative principles and the two 
additional principles of collectively owned assets and disinterested dissolution. 
The national CDA has also developed model rules. They are less egalitarian than ICOM 
rules and do not relate to common ownership co-ops. 
-' 
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A few co-ops are structured differently. Examples are: 
[1] Incorporation with own rules - customised rules, which fall in between the 
basic requirements of the legislation and the common ownership structure of 
ICOM co-ops. These are often used by co-ops converted from capitalist 
companies. 
[2] JOL (Job Ownership Ltd). Model rules concocted by Robert Oakeshott's trojan 
horse in the co-op movement. JOL co-ops require members to make an initial 
financial contribution as a condition of joining a co-op - i.e. workers have to 
buy their jobs (hence Job Ownership). Because of this, JOL co-ops are often not 
recognised as legitimate workers' co-ops, for instance by the GLC/GLEB. 
There are very few JOL co-ops. 
[3] Co-op Partnerships - not incorporated with limited liability, formally 
partnerships with agreements which ensure some co-op characteristics. 
However, partnerships cannot have common ownership of assets. 
[4] Unincorporated collectives - no formal constitution and technically a 
partnership. They operate 'as if co-ops on an egalitarian and collective basis, 
but do not have legally enshrined common ownership 
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APPENDIX2 SOURCESOFDATA 
A2.1 Co-op statistics 
A2.1.1 Worker co-op database 
The worker co-op database was originally established by London ICOM in 1983, with 
funding from the GLC, to provide a computerised recordl of aU co-ops in London. This was 
later extended to include aU co-ops in Britain. Information on the database for each co-op 
included: 
• Name, address, telephone 
• No. of members, full- and part-time worken 
• Industry sector (SO categories); SIC 
• Location: region (11 in Britain); town (boroughs in London, about 100 divisions 
elsewhere in Britain) 
• Year registered, year folded (if applicable) 
• Trading status (alive or dead) 
• Type of constitution or rules 
• Activity - up to SO word description of co-op 
Although the setting up of this database had been funded, a substantial commitment was 
required to keep it up-to-date. Over the period 1984-1987 I devoted approximately 6 months 
in total to the collection of data for the database, its maintenance, and the writing of 
software to analyse the data. 
The initial sources of information for the database were the co-op directories compiled 
manually by the national CDA in 1980 and 1982. The expansion of the database to cover the 
whole of Britain was largely undertaken by the CDA for its 1984 directory, using a 
telephone and postal survey of aU known co-ops. 
. ~l 
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Subsequently the main data sources were: 
• infonnation submitted by individual co-ops 
• infonnation submitted by local COAs concerning co-ops in their area 
• information on 'dead' co-ops gleaned from mail returned to organisations using 
the database as a source of mailing lists 
• postal survey of all known co-ops in February 1986 
• postal and telephone survey of all known co-ops in July 1986, carried out by the 
national COA for their 1986 directory 
The database was used as the source of all co-op sector data in this research, particularly for 
the statistics presented in chapter 5. It was also used to select co-ops in each industry for 
financial analysis. The more detailed criteria for selection of co-ops are presented below. 
Although a useful research tool, the database was originally intended as a source of 
infonnation for marketing by and to co-ops (this was the basis of the original GLC funding). 
It gained some income from the sale of mailing lists, primarily to organisations such as the 
GLC, GLEB, LeEB, many local COAs, the CRS, and to co-ops themselves. The structure of 
the database allowed mailing lists and other infonnation to be extracted according to quite 
complex requirements. 
A2.1.2 Selection of cCH1pS for inclusion 
The statistics on co-operatives presented in chapter 5 and used throughout this thesis are 
significantly lower than those frequently quoted. For instance the 1986 National COA 
directory suggests a figure of nearly 1500 co-operatives (see Table 5.1). The COA works on 
the principle that a co-operative known to have registered is assumed to be still trading if no 
evidence is received to the contrary. This includes co~peratives where no evidence other 
than the registration data is available, even if it is not known whether the co-operative 
actually started trading. It also includes co-operatives with only part-time workers, and 
hence can include some very small businesses, and because of their criteria they include 
co-operatives which have registered but never traded ('idle' co-ops). The CDA also includes 
community co-operatives, where ownership and control rest with community members and 
the workers are employees. Both worker and community co-operatives are likely to have 
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economic, social and political objectives, but the internal dynamic by which these are 
pursued is different2. 
My approach has been stricter on recognising a trading co-operative. Essentially this 
requires positive evidence, rather than a lack of negative evidence. Therefore I include only 
co-operatives which are known to be operating and which have given a positive response to 
some form of contact. This can be contact with a local CDA, or a response to a telephone or 
postal contact. Use has been made of local CDA information, and the results of the 
telephone and postal survey which the National CDA made in compiling its 1986 directory, 
all the results of which are maintained on London ICOM's Worker Co-operative Database 
(WCDB). All co-operatives which are positively known to be trading are entered on the 
WCDB as having at least one full-time worker, or more if known. Therefore the criteria of 
having one or more full-time worker is used to select real co-operatives. 
This approach may seem unnecessarily harsh but is supported by other researchers. The 
same criteria was used by MadarIane3. Perhaps the strongest confirmation that these 
figures are about right came from a survey of co-operatives in London carried out by Chloe 
Munro of GUB. She attempted to contact 180 of the co-operatives thought to be trading in 
London (of an assumed total of around 400), and made three attempts to contact each 
co-operative by phone before classing them as unavailable. From the 180 co-operatives she 
found 92 to be actively trading, and concludes that there were then only 200 active 
co-operatives in London. She notes "it may be concluded that the frequently recorded 
statistics on numbers of co-operatives in London are considerably exaggerated"4. The 
London Co-op Enterprise Board (LCEB) estimated the stock of co-ops in London to be 262 at 
the end of 1987; this suggest that my figures for 1986 (273 co-ops in London, 883 in Britain) 
may still be an over-estimate. 
A2.1.3 Politically informed classification 
The above relates primarily to a formal, legal classification of a co-operative, and does not 
necessarily correspond to a politically-informed conception of what a co-op is. The formal 
classification merely provides a reference point against which to judge what is/is not a 
wor1cers co-op, a reference point which contains its own set of values. In particular it pays 
2 ~ 1986".10 
3 iIlfIl. 
4 Mlmru, 1911, ,.1. 
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more attention to a co-op's fonnal structure rather than how it operates in practice. 
Therefore, a 'co-op' whose workforce consisted of 20% members and 80% wage labour 
could be legally a worker co-op, but would not, I suggest, justify being considered as such. 
There is also controversy over whether the charging of membership 'entrance fees' (as is the 
case throughout Europe, and in Britain in JOL co-ops) is compatible with being a worker 
co-op. In practice, the majority of British co-ops neither employ wage labour to any 
significant extent nor are subject to any external control. There is also room for debate over 
whether enterprises which are formally co-ops, but which in practice demonstrate little 
worker participation in control and decision-making, or those which entirely replicate 
capitalist management and working practices, should be classed as co-ops. I do not pretend 
to have an answer to this issue, but raise it to demonstrate the weakness of a formal 
definition, even though this is the one that I have used. 
The source for the financial data used in the project was the annual returns which co-ops are 
obliged to submit either to the Registrar of Friendly Societies or Registrar of Companies. 
Although these returns are broadly similar, covering trading and balance sheet infonnation, 
there are important differences. 
Returns to Registry of Friendly Societies: Trading infonnation, including sales, cost of sales, 
staff costs, overheads, financial charges, and allocation of surplus to bonuses and/or 
reserves. Balance sheet infonnation is of the usual fonn, and covers assets and liabilities 
structure, and financing of net assets from internal and external sources, with details of 
sources and terms of external loans. Also provides numbers of workers (full- and part-time) 
and members. 
Returns to Registrar 01 Companies: Similar to the above, but there is no obligation to provide 
infonnation concerning number of workers, although Oess usefully) the number of 
members is shown. There is also less detail concerning the source of loans. 
Recent changes in legislation have reduced further the reporting requirements for small 
companies (but not Friendly Societies), and co-ops will now have the option of providing 
very limited financial details which if followed will make this kind of analysis virtually 
impossible, particularly in view of the rapidly increasing proportion of co-ops registered 
under the Companies Acts. 
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Where the number of employees was not given, this information was taken from CDA 
directories (bi-annual from 1980 to 1986), or directly from the Worker Co-op Database. 
The following two pages show the details of information collected from co-ops' annual 
returns. 
A Name of Co-op ................................. . 
e. Registered No. . ................. . 
C Date of Registration .................. . 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
'P 
.. ' 
K 
L 
M 
N 
P 
o 
s 
u 
Date of Financial Year End ... , ................. .. 
(::'ompleted by .............................. Date ..... , ................... . 
Moambers ............................. 
Workers - Full Time 
- Part Time 
TRADING ACCOUNT 
Turnover 
Cost of Sales 
(Gross surpus H-J] . , . '.' .............. . 
General Overheads 
Bad Debt.s I' .... , •••••••••• , , .... 
Wages 81 Salaries 
Rent 
Depreciation t •• l' •• , •••••••••••• 
Lease 
(Trading surplus H-J-KJ 
Grants · ................. . 
Other Income 
Interest Paid • ••••••••••• t ...... . 
Other Debits · .............. , .. . 
v 
w 
x 
AA 
AB 
AC 
AD 
AE 
AF 
AG 
AH 
AJ 
AI\: 
AL 
AM 
AN 
Other Credits 
Employee Benefits 
Tax Paid 
[Net surplus after tax] 
Transfer to General Reserve 
Fixed Assets 
Investments 
Current Assets 
Current Liabilities 
BALANCE SHEET 
[Net current assets AC-ADJ 
[Net total assets AA+AB+AC-ADJ 
External Loan 1 
External Loan 2 
External Loan 3 
External Loan 4 
Member Loans 
Shares 
General Reserve 
Tax Reserve 
CAPEX 
NOTES 
· ................. . 
· ................. . 
· ................. . 
· ... , ............. . 
• ••••••••••• t •••••• 
· ... , .............. . 
• ••• , •••••••••• t ••• 
· ................. . 
· ..... , ........... . 
· ........ , ........ . 
Source 
Source 
Source 
Source 
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A2.3 Data Collection 
Data Collection. Information was firstly taken from the WCDB and old directories so as 
compile complete lists of all co-ops which had operated in the three chosen sectors at any 
point over the period 1975-1986. This included both co-ops still trading in 1986, and those 
which had previously failed. The collection of finandal data took place mostly during 1986, 
with some follow up in 1987; this determined the time period over which financial data was 
available. 
In general there is at least a two year delay between the period to which data is applicable, 
and that data being compiled by accountants, audited, submitted to the Registrar, checked 
and placed on public file. Therefore, the last year for which a nearly complete set of data 
was available was 1984, although some were available for 1985. Frequently the first return 
submitted by a co-op covered less than 12 months, or a period before trading was properly 
under way. Therefore co-ops with only the first return available were excluded, i.e. at least 
two returns were required for inclusion. Therefore, only co-ops which had been trading 
since 1983 could be included. Inevitably, data coverage was better for co-ops which 
remained active throughout the periods than for those which failed at some point. In 
general, co-ops which failed did not submit returns for the final one or two years of their 
life. In view of the need for two years of returns, co-ops which failed with three years or less 
of trading were not generally included. 
The sample of co-ops for which financial data was collected therefore covered 
• All known co-ops in the three sectors which had traded for two years and were still 
trading in 1984/5. 
• Co-ops which failed before 1984/5 but had submitted two years of returns (effectively 
which had been trading for 3-4 years before trading). 
Therefore, whilst the aim was to obtain data on all co-ops which operated until 1984/5, the 
actual data obtained is biased towards the exclusion of successful, established co-ops and 
against younger co-ops and those which failed. A total of of 88 co-ops were included in the 
dataset. made up as follows: 
Wholefood 47; Printing 21; Oothing20 
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CG-OPDA'l"IVES QU!S'rIOllRAIU: 
Thp following questionnaire is being circulated to all co-operatives 
in order to lilsist with research currently tliking place at the Open 
Uni v('si ty"s Co-operatives. Research Uni t. The aim of the questionnaire is 
to collect information on the performance of co-operatives in the UK and 
the f~ctors which influence this. 
The answers will be confidential, except for question 1 which will be 
pnteored on to the Worker Co-operatives Database. If you do not wish to 
AnSWPT any particular question, please move on to the next one. If there is 
not enoullh space to answer a question please write your answer on a 
separate sheet stating the question number. 
Thank you for your assistance. 
1) Pleo8seo indicateo how the co-op was formed (tick one only): 
* As a completely new enterprise started from an idea 
by members or previous members. 
* As a completely new enterprise started from an idea 
by an outside body or agency. 
"~* "A~ a conversion from an established traditional 
company. 
* As II result of closure, redundancy or threatened 
Teodundancy and continuinl{ in the same line of 
business. 
• As a re8ult of closure, redundancy or threatened 
redundancy but in a new line of business. 
* Other (please describe): _________________ _ 
2) At th. time of formation did the co-op receive substantial 
advire or support from an outside body (e.g. co-op 
dpvelopmf'nt agency, trade union? 
If ye8, please name the body or agency. 
HAR ~he co-op received such assistance 
Rinceo starting up? 
3) Plpa.e stllte the approximate number of workers in the 
co-op in the firlt full year of tradin~ 
4) Please give the total sales figure (turnover) for the co-
operative in the last financial year. 
YES/1m 
DS/lfO 
Please do not 
write in thiS 
margin 
1 
2 
3 
".5 
6 
7 
8 
9 , 
o 
o 
[J 
o 
Cl 
o 
o 
J 
5) Pl l " ase €Inter below the average number of hours currently worked per 
\oIf'l'k hy ('<lC"h cRtep,ory of workE'rs: 
M~~MBERS NON-MEMBERS 
Ful ]-timp 
Part-time 
6) Arp different people in the co-op paid different wages? YES/., 
Please state which of the following are in line with the co-op"'s 
pottcy? 
- equal take-home pay for all workers YES/., 
- different wa~e rates for more experienced/senior workers lIS/., 
- differpnt wa~e rates for different jobs lIS I., 
- different wage rates for different needs Yls/., 
- workers can only earn more if they work longer hours YES/JfO 
... other (please describe) ___________________ _ 
7) PLE'8Se enter below thp. number of co-op workers currently receiving an 
AvrrA~p weekly gross WA~P in the following cate~ories: 
FULL-TIME PART-TIME 
100... 
l(,Rs than .£ 10 
100... 
4: 10 -.£ 24 
--
.t25 - £49 
""'" 
£50 - £74 
.... 
.t 75 - ~9 
""'-
.tIOO -£124 
.... 
.£ 125 -~149 
.t 150 -£174 
""'-
... £ 175 & over 
Please do not 
write in this 
margin 
11 12 
CJCJ 
13 14 
I:JCJ 
15 0 
21 0 
22 23 
CJ CJ 
24 25 
DO 
CJD 
60 
30 31 
CJ CJ 
32 33 
y~ 
CJCJ 
36 37 
c.:J CJ 
~Q 
fi) To which unions, if any, do people in the co-op belong? 
NAME OF UNION NO. OF PEOPLE 
T f some .or all workers are union members, is this for reasons which are to 
do with 
- protectin~ workers' interests within the co-operative . YESI'm 
- general solidarity with the trade union movement YEs/., 
- other (please describe): ___________________ _ 
9) Co-operatives usually have a range of different objectives. Please tick 
up to 5 of the following which are close to the objectives of the co-o~ 
* maximising the· level of wages and bonuses 
* increasin~ employment in the co-op 
* maximisng job security for existing workers 
* providing a product or service which you feel is 
particularly important 
* participating in the wider labour movement 
* providing a·service to a particular special group 
within the community 
* rotAting workers between a variety of jobs 
* sharing And developing a broad range of skills 
* re-organis1ng work along lines which are 
different to that which might be expected in a 
typical company 
* increasing involvement with the wider co-
operative movement 
* Riving members a greater opportunity to have a 
say in managing the enterprise 
* maximising profitability and efficiency 
* other (please describe): __________________ _ 
'l'IIdI lOU fOR YOUR CO-OPDATIOR 
Please do not 
write in this 
margin 
40 
41 
42 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
CJ 
o 
CJ 
[J 
o 
o 
C1 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
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APPENDIX 4 FINANCIAL STRUC1'URE OF CO-OPS 
A conventional company balance sheet is constructed as follows: 
CAPITAL EMPLOYED 
Fixed assets (plant and machinery, buildings etc.) 
plus Current assets (stocks, trade debtors) 
less Current liabilities (trade creditors, overdraft, other short term creditors (e.g. tax» 
equals Net total assets 
FINANCED BY: 
Shareholders funds (equity; shareholders loans; profit'" loss reserves) 
Extemal funds (long term loans (banks, finance houses etc) 
The balance sheet is an accounting identity, that is, both sides must balance by definition as 
all of the capital employed in a business must be financed in one way or another. There are 
certain conventions employed which result from the purposes to which a balance sheet is 
put, e.g. short term and long term loans are separated out, with the former (those due 
within 12 months) treated as current liabilities rather than finandng of net assets. This 
reflects the concern of banks and other financing institutions with the perceived stability of 
a business - is it likely to meet all of its financial commitments due in the next 12 months 
(through the 'liquidity ratio' of current assets to current liabilities) - although this may have 
more to do with the banks' traditional assessment of security if the businesses closes, rather 
than its viability as a going concern. 
My purpose here is somewhat different: to investigate the financial structure of co-ops 
rather than their short term liquidity; this requires some alterations to the traditional 
arrangement of the balance sheet. For instance, overdrafts must be included with other 
sources of finance rather than as a short term liability; although legally they are the latter, in 
practice renewed over~ts are used by banks u longer term finance. Therefore I have 
removed overdrafts from current liabilities to external finance (the balance sheet is an 
identity and items can be added or subtracted from both sides, while the totals will still 
balance). I have treated trade debtors and creditors as an item to be financed (rather than a 
source of finance) in the conventional manner. This gives a structure u follows: 
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CAPITAL EMPLOYED 
Fixed assets 
Stocks, cash, trade debtors less creditors 
FINANCED BY 
Intemal (members') funds 
loans 
shares (nominal only) 
reserves (retained earnings) 
Extemal funds 
loans - public sector (local authorities; COAs; loan funds; ICOF) 
loans - commercial sector (HP /finance company; bank tenn loans; bank overdraft> 
loans - private sources (sympathisers, other co-ops) 
Members funds are analogous to shareholders funds in a capitalist company, consisting of 
loans from members plus earnings which have been retained within the business rather 
than distributed to members. 
This is not particularly controversial as the balance sheet still consists of 'stock' items. 
However there is a complication as far as the financing of co-ops goes, and this stems from 
the frequent giving of grants to co-ops. These may be start-up grants (towards initial capital 
costs) or revenue grants (towards operating costs) and if they are applicable to one financial 
year only (as is usual) they are treated as a revenue item rather than as a 'stock' item, and 
they appear in the profit &t loss (trading) account rather than the capital account. On the 
balance sheet the impact of grants is therefore felt through reserves - these are increased by 
the amount of the grant as profit is increased (or loss reduced) by the appropriate amount. 
The totals are not altered but grants are effectively treated as internal (members) funds, 
whereas the source of grants (certainly major ones) is the public sector. This is deceptive 
when the task is to ascertain the sources of finance, particularly as some grants are 
substantial. Therefore, I have treated grants as public sector financing, by reducing reserves 
by the amount of grant in any year and increasing public sector provision by the same 
amount. 
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APPENDIX 5 SOURCES OF DATA FOR CAPITALIST FIRMS 
The most extensive set of data available for capitalist firms is the Business Monitor (Census 
of Production) series, published by the government's Business Statistics Office (BSQ). The 
PA series covers 3-digit SIC (1980) categories in production, and is published annually. It 
contains data on the following: 
• Number of enterprises and establishments 
• Number of workers (administrative and operative) 
• Total wages 
• Total gross output 
• Total net output 
• Total gross value added 
• Total capital expenditure 
Obseroations 
• From these data, operating rations and per capita figures can be calculated. 
• Data are collected from a sample of firms and totals are estimated for the whole 
industry. 
• These data are available from 1979; earlier data is only available for the old SIC (1968) 
categories. 
• The data are also presented for different size categories of enterprises, e.g. those with 
less than 100 workers. Since 1984, more extensive data has been made available, including 
disaggregation to 4-digit SIC categories. 
The PA series covers only production industries; PA475 (Printing &: Publishing), and PA453 
(Oothing) were used extensively here. Unfortunately there is no equivalent for distribution 
industries. The quarterly (PQ) series was also used, notably PQ 4754, general printing &: 
publishing. 
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M.l Printing sector data 
Data on the capitalist sector is derived from Business Monitor P A475, which includes all 
firms under SIC 475 (1980). This heading makes almost no distinction between publishers 
and printers, as the following sub-heading (activity) list shows: 
4751 - Printing and publishing of newspapers 
4752 - Printing and publishing of periodicals 
4753 - Printing and publishing of books 
4754 - Other (general) printing and publishing 
From 1979-1984 most data was available only for the whole printing and publishing sector 
(SIC 475). The PQ series gives detailed output figures for SIC 4754, but no other data. 
Analysis of these figures suggests that output from the publishing element of this activity 
accounts for around (20%) of sales, printing for (80%). Overall the difficulties in obtaining 
entirely comparable data on capitalist firms is likely to have led to an underestimate of the 
relative performance of co-ops, although again the trend is likely to be accurate. 
Prom 1984 Business Monitor PA475 provided data by activity heading, which enables a 
more direct comparison of co-operative performance with that of the general printing and 
publishing sub-sector, rather than printing and publishing as a whole. For the sake of 
consistency the 1984 figures quoted are on the same basis as earlier ones (SIC475), with 
subsector figures shown in brackets where applicable. 
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APPENDIX 6 COMPAlUSON OF CO-OP AND CAPITAUST FIRM DATA. 
It is clear from the data in chapter 3 that co-ops are predominantly small enterprises. Table 
3.3 shows that the median size of C(H)P is 4 workers, that 96% of co-ops have less than 20 
workers, and over 99% have less than 100 workers. Given that the comparison of data for 
capitalist firms and co-ops plays an important role in this research, it is important to identify 
any problems in making this comparison. To what extent is like being compared with like? 
This is particularly so when the data for capitalist firms and co-ops is derived from totally 
different sources; the former from industry level data, from which averages can be 
calculated, the latter from enterprise level data which is then aggregated. The best available 
Census of Production data for comparison with co-ops is for firms in the 1-99 workers size 
category. 
The major problem of comparability arises from the fact that for the Census of Production, 
establishments employing less than 20 persons are not required to complete returns; 
information from such establishments is therefore not included in the overall data. This is 
potentially important because, as noted above, the vast majority of co-ops are below this 
size. Interestingly, Alan Leyshon's Paisley study found that 90% of capitalist finns had less 
than 20 workersS• It is only potentially a problem however, because if the performance of 
firms does not vary a great deal with size, then the omission of small firms will not make 
the sample biased and cause results differ greatly from the true values. Furthermore, even if 
the sample is biased, the relative bias should not vary; although direct comparisons might 
be misleading, any trends over time should be accurately represented. 
Because data is not available for the smallest firms, it is difficult to make an assessment of 
whether very small firms do perform differently. It is possible to see how much results vary 
with size in the figures which are reported. This is done below for the printing industry. It 
does show that performance is better for larger firms, although the difference is most 
noticeable for the very largest firms (1000 or more workers). 
5 ClWtl"" 26.22.17 
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Printing sector - index of variation of key variables by size of firm 
(1000+ = 100) 
Size Gross output Gross VA Average Wagesl Gross VAl 
category per worker per worker 'Wtlge gross V A gross output 
1-99 87 76 64 84 88 
400-499 93 84 67 1'9 91 
1000+ 100 100 100 100 100 
SmwcI: Cautu of Protlllctitm P A415 
These figures do suggest that using data for printing finns with 1 - 99 workers probably 
over-estimates the appropriate capitalist figures, making co-operatives appear less 
favourably than they should. 
In practice, the differences between co-op and capitalist figures presented in chapter 5 and 
elsewhere show very large differences between the two, which means that the importance 
of any comparability errors is reduced. And as noted above, the error is likely to remain 
constant over time and so trends should be accurate. 
APPENDIX 1 DEFINITION OF VAlUABLES 
GIlOSS OtJTPtJT - sales plus net additions to stock 
less direct production costs (materials) 
=NETOtJTPtJT 
less indirect production costs (rent, advertising, other overheads 
= GIlOSS VALUE ADDED 
less financial charges and depredation 
= NET VALUE ADDED 
less wages 
• NET TIlADINC StJIlPLUS 
plus grants and any other net non-trading credits 
= NET SUllPLl1S 
less bonuses and distributions 
= TIlANSFER TO GENERAL RESDVE 
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APPENDIX 8 DEFLATOR USED IN NOMINAL TO REAL CONVERSION 
Year Index 
1975 39.6 
1976 47.6 
1977 56.6 
1978 60.6 
1979 67.9 
1980 76.1 
1981 82.5 
1982 89.0 
1983 91.8 
1984 96.9 
1985 100.0 
~ AII,,1UIl AbstNct of St4tistics 
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APPENDIX 9 CPF CO-OPS 
Those The few producer co-operatives associated with the Co-operative Productive 
Federation (CPF), and a few others, have been excluded from this study, but do deserve 
some separate attention of their own. These were the subject of the Webbs' research, and in 
fact it is these co-ops which have been the subject of all previous empirical neoclassical 
economic research on co-operatives in Britain6. 
These co-operatives are the survivors of the producer co-operative movements of the 19th 
and early 20th centuries. In todays terms they are strictly spealdng not workers' 
co-operatives at all, but 'Co-partnerships'; that is partnerships of workers, ex-workers, 
family members, retail co-op societies, other producer co-ops and trade unions. 
Membership of the co-op is open to some or all of these groups, depending on the 
individual society's constitution; at Blackfriars Press, for example, it was until recently a 
condition that people could could only join the co-operative if also members of the 
Independent Labour Party. As a result, workers were and are often in a minority of the 
membership in CPF co-ops; more importantly perhaps, it has often been the case that only a 
minority of workers are members. This was the characteristic of British co-ops which the 
Webbs found so offensive, and which if enforced by the members is in my opinion 
incompatible with the nature of a co-operative. 
All CPF co-ops are incorporated under the 1&:1'5 legislation, which actually permits the 
limited issue of shares, and the sale of shares as a condition of membership was used by 
many societies to raise capital. 
Despite this lack of 'purity' in today's common ownership terms, the CPF co-ops had 
genuinely working class origins, contrasting with the trend for many of today's co-ops to be 
set up by the offspring of the bourgeoisie. For instance, the workers who established Equity 
Shoes insisted in the co-op's constitution that the Committee of Management should include 
none but 'practical men"? Although in the narrow sense they were not under worker 
control - i.e. they were not controlled by their workers - they certainly were 'worker 
controlled' in class terms, possibly more so than many of today's co-operatives. Several 
(including Equity Shoes and Walsall Locks) were formed after strikes or lockouts. Their 
6 Jtma III BIduI, 1977. 
7 0rIIraIID1t, 1978: lClrlrIuIm, 1971. 
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objectives - of linking different working class movements - were certainly aimed at building 
class solidarity, even if in practice many co-ops did come to accept capitalist values and the 
protestant work ethic, and soon became divorced from any revolutionary approach to 
transforming capitalism by the imperatives of surviving in a competitive market. Over time 
they moved away from the labour movement and kept few links. One CPF co-op - Bristol 
Printers - was wound up by its members so that they could cash in on the capital value of 
the co-op's assets; a far cry from today's common ownership principles. 
These co-operatives have been excluded from the scope of this thesis not because of any 
condemnation of their status but because they are subject to a historically different dynamiC 
to that of the new wave of co-ops; not only that, but their relatively large size would tend to 
swamp the newer co-operatives. However, for interest I include below details of the CPF 
co-ops on which information is readily available. 
1. Surviving Co-partnerships - 1988 
Queen Eleanor 
Equity Shoes 
NPSShoes 
Watford Printers 
Avalon Footwear 
(formed 1898, 54 workers) 
(1886, 2~) 
(1881,65) 
(1921,30) 
(1892,100) 
2. Co-partnerships suruiving unh11960. 
Printers 
Blackfriars Press 
Ripley Printers 
Leicester Printers 
Bristol Printers 
Clothing and Footwear 
Avalon Footwear 
St. Crispin Footwear 
Manufacturers 
Sunray Textiles 
Ideal Oothiers 
Kaycee Oothing 
Glenfield Progress 
Excellon Shoes 
Sperope Boot 
Other 
Walsall Locks 
Leicester Carriage Builders 
Hull Printers 
Nottingham Printers 
Derby Printers 
Alcester Productive 
Kirkby in Ashfield 
Wigston Hosiers 
Chesham Boot 
Crompton Boot 
Holyoake Footwear 
Midland Boot 
Toy Town Shoes 
Data FUm Productions 
Co-operative Planning 
Souru: Co-operative Union, 1960; Oalceshott, 1978; Jones, 1976; Registrar of Friendly 
Societies 
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It has been estimated by Derek Jones that numbers of CPF co-ops surviving in certain years 
this century were: 
Ytar Index 
1905 112 
1913 71 
1924 64 
1936 50 
1950 44 
1960 37 
1970 26 
Smm:r. Jones, 1976 
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APPENDIX 10 STANDARD REGIONS 
South East: Greater London, Bedfordshire, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, East Sussex, Essex, 
Hampshire, Isle of Wight, Kent, Oxfordshire, Surrey, West Sussex, 
East AngUa: Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambridgeshire. 
South West: Avon, Cornwall, Devon, Gloucestershire, Somerset, Wiltshire. 
West Midlands: West Midlands, Hereford &: Worcester, Shropshire, Staffordshire, 
Warwickshire. 
East Midlands: Derbyshire, Leicesteshire, Uncolnshire, Northamptonshire, 
Nottinghamshire. 
Yorkshire & Humberside: South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, Humberside, North Yorkshire. 
North West: Greater Manchester, Merseyside, Cheshire, Lancashire. 
North: Tyne &: Wear, Cleveland, Cumbria, Durham, Northumberland. 
Wales: Owyd, Dyfed, Gwent, Gwynedd, Mid-Glamorgan, Powys, South Glamorgan, West 
Glamorgan. 
Scotland: Borders, Central, Dumfries and Galloway, Fife, Grampian, Highland, Lothian, 
Strathclyde, Tayside and the Orkney Islands, Shetland Islands and the Western Isles. 
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